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Preface 
“How interesting!” 
An often heard remark the past years when I told people I was studying restructuring of 
industrial sites. A remark they usually made just a second before the topic of the conversation 
elegantly, and very diplomatically, was manipulated towards something closer to ‘what really 
matters’ in society. 
Value for society
However, time changes and so do political priorities. The past years there has been an ever 
increasing attention towards restructuring. Politicians have acknowledged the value of well-
functioning industrial sites for society. Restructuring has become an issue on the Dutch 
national political agenda: not only important, but even with some urgency. This urgency is 
even increasing, because in practice restructuring often lasts very long: too long according to 
national policy. A worst case scenario is actually still not completely unrealistic: it has been 
claimed that the restructuring challenge has been growing the past decade, and without 
substantial extra efforts it may grow even more. 
Does this mean that nothing has been done? The opposite is actually the case. Practitioners 
have tried to initiate new processes of restructuring and a large number of reports have been 
written about the problems encountered. A diversity of obstacles that prevent successful 
processes has been reported, and, in particular, there is a perceived lack of effective regional 
cooperation, private involvement, ‘professionalism’, and, of course, (financial) resources. The 
essence seems to be that restructuring is perceived as complex, and therefore difficult to 
design and manage successfully. 
The academic challenge
And this is exactly what has been fascinating me about restructuring since I started this study 
(and actually long before that). I wanted to discover what was inside this black box called 
‘complex and difficult’, and to search not only for scientific understanding but also for how 
this understanding could help practitioners in their real life management of restructuring. 
Discover something that not only would support such processes towards satisfactory 
outcomes, but preferably within a shorter time than now seems to be needed. 
I knew that such an adventure was a very ambitious one, so it would be a highly explorative 
journey. On the other hand, as they say, you never reach your goal if you never start, and 
I had the advantage of a flying start based on more than fifteen years of experience in 
consultancy and applied research. 
My beliefs
This background has also strongly influenced my ideas about what to study and especially how 
I believe that reality can be understood. One of these essential beliefs is that “things” do not 
take any decisions: human beings do. Nothing will ever happen in a restructuring unless people 
decide so. Accordingly, discussions about ‘lack of money’ become somewhat meaningless to 
me, because I see money as an expression of human priorities and commitment. 
This human perspective is the basis of the whole study. It means that actors and their 
interactions fascinate me, because I see the understanding of reasons for behaving in a 
certain way as the key to improving processes. However, at the same time I acknowledge 
the limitations of this approach, because there are just too many factors and too many 
relationships that determine how decisions are made. Although my journey was aimed at 
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understanding as much as possible, common sense at the same time told me that I would 
need to limit my scope, to simplify, and to focus. 
Who should read this book?
If you are one of those persons who share my beliefs, who is fascinated by actors and their 
interactions, and who would like to see how a ‘boring’ topic like restructuring of industrial 
sites can be understood and modelled, then this is a book for you. You may find the ideas 
about arena-thinking fascinating; enjoy the line that starts with the simplicity of human 
rational behaviour and adds the affective ingredients that make life so rich, and perhaps 
most of all enjoy the views on how interdependency and informal rules work as invisible glue 
that binds us all together. 
How can it be viewed and used?
There seems to be a strong need in society nowadays for making ‘useful’ things, and this 
book is no exception. This book intends to be useful in two ways. First, it intends to contribute 
to the development of an academic understanding of complex (restructuring) processes. 
Second, it intends to support practitioners in their daily struggle within exactly the same 
processes, in order to assist their decision making and to show how a human perspective on 
actors and interaction can improve and enrich their strategies. 
Finally, this book is, and this may sound somewhat strange, certainly incomplete. It is 
not something that I would call “finished”, but I believe it can be seen as a milestone: a 
provisional outcome of an explorative and qualitative search for understanding. It is 
therefore, in particular, intended to be used as a building block, as an argument in the on-
going academic (and policy) discussion, and as a small contribution to a creative process of 
growth and improvement. 
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11.1. Introduction
Decay of industrial sites is a major challenge in the Netherlands
Industrial sites are important concentrations of economic activities, because approximately 
a third of all workplaces are there. Their development is a high priority for local authorities 
who are concerned with ensuring sufficient employment opportunities and other socio-
economic benefits for local communities. Until a few years ago, attention was focused almost 
exclusively on the development of new sites. In The Netherlands the local authorities have 
a dominant position in this process, as planning agency as well as supplying the land. The 
emphasis on development of new sites was to make it possible to accommodate new as well 
as expanding (and therefore possibly relocating) firms. 
Although new sites will still be needed in the future, there is a growing understanding of the 
importance of maintaining, and preferably improving, the quality of existing sites as well. 
Otherwise, ageing and decay usually lead to a variety of undesired effects, such as firms 
leaving older sites for new ones, and related problems, such as unused lots and unnecessary 
transformation of rural areas into new industrial sites. And this is exactly what is encountered, 
because decay on industrial sites is a significant problem in the Netherlands, and possibly, 
despite the considerable efforts in the past years, an increasing one. 
A specific need for restructuring industrial sites more quickly
This indicates that current approaches to restructuring are not working well enough. These 
approaches may be effective in the sense that they (eventually) lead to a desired final situation, 
but they are lasting too long. Unless better restructuring approaches are found, the situation 
will worsen. This serious problem has been acknowledged and has resulted in increasing policy 
attention in the past years for improving industrial sites, and in particular for accelerating 
improvements (EZ, 2004b; THBa, 2008; EZ and VROM, 2008). This important challenge is the 
focus of this study (see section 2.2 for a more detailed elaboration on this issue). 
Current understanding of problems and solutions
It is clear that an effective approach to this challenge – how can the problems on already 
decayed sites best be addressed - should build on an understanding of the processes of 
decay, the effects they cause, and how future decay can be prevented. 
All those topics have been addressed in previous research. Insight into mechanisms of ageing 
1. Rise and fall of industrial sites
“[…] Although the positions of players can be quite conflicting, 
for instance ecology versus economy, it can be assumed that everybody 
strives towards better industrial sites with the best intentions […]” 
(authors translation of: Dinteren, van, 2008, p. 18)
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This leads to the purpose of this study, which is to understand such processes better, and 
based on this understanding, to develop a decision support model that should reduce the 
total duration of restructuring in specific situations without endangering the quality of the 
outcome (see chapter two for more details). The study intends to contribute to the body 
of knowledge within the social sciences, and in particular spatial planning, regarding how 
process design and management can be used in complex multi-actor decision-making. 
Scope, focus and some methodological issues
The aim of this study is to understand better the relationships between applied process 
approaches and their effect on progress. Improving this understanding starts with descriptions 
of how industrial sites currently are developed, and how restructuring is designed and 
managed, including the kind of obstacles that are encountered. This description then 
enables an informed and focused search for, and development of, a theoretical perspective 
for understanding how such processes can be modelled and improved. This model is then 
developed, and subsequently tested and operationalised by practitioners.
The limited systematic knowledge available puts severe constraints on the nature of the 
study and its conclusions. It is mainly explorative, and in that respect it is intended as a 
basis for future research. Finally, we do not want to argue that its conclusions are applicable 
outside the Dutch context.
Structure and contents of the book
This first chapter describes and positions the restructuring of industrial sites within the Dutch 
context. After a short introduction to the concept of industrial sites (1.2), the focus is on 
positioning the restructuring within a site life-cycle (1.3) and on describing the development 
of new sites (1.4), on ageing and decay (1.5) and on the large scale interventions that can be 
applied (1.6). Finally, the changing role of the public authorities (1.7) and the main challenges 
for industrial site development are introduced (1.8).  
Chapter two operationalises the study. The choice is made for studying how the total duration 
of restructuring can be influenced, and key terms are introduced and defined. Then the 
chapter elaborates on the role of the local authorities as planning agencies, and concludes 
by merging all aspects into a research design that includes the specific research questions 
that are addressed in the following chapters. 
Chapter three provides insights into restructuring processes in practice. It tells what we can 
learn from practice, for improving that practice. The range of approaches to restructuring 
currently applied are described. This includes the main tasks and activities encountered in 
restructuring, and how the local authorities, as planning agencies, tackle them during the 
whole process related to different ‘phases’. Finally, it includes an analysis of the practical 
obstacles that are encountered in restructuring. 
Chapter four presents a theoretical framework for understanding complex multi-actor 
processes, such as restructuring. First the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework is chosen, and then rational choice is chosen a leading theory that is compatible 
with this framework. The limitations of rational choice are acknowledged, and micro-
assumptions are made that enable useful complementary theory to be identified. This 
complementary theory focuses on how actors and action situations in complex processes 
can be understood. 
Chapter five focuses on how the theoretical framework (developed in chapter four) can be 
applied to making policy for restructuring of industrial sites. The “Contextual Interaction 
theory” is presented as a useful theory for understanding and influencing individual actors 
and the interaction between them, and for making choices regarding specific measures for 
influencing the situation. Process management is then introduced as an integral approach 
and decay has been developed (CPB, 2001), and this includes how ageing is identified in 
practice (PBL, 2009). However, most attention has been given to improvement processes 
(THBa, 2008; BWU, 2009; VROM et al., 2010a and b), and the problems encountered in practice 
during these processes (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; PBL, 2009; Nicis, 2009). In particular, 
emphasis has been on restructuring, which within this study refers to integral improvement of 
sites without changing their main economic function. The studies have provided a rich body 
of knowledge about improvement options (THB, 2008a; BWU, 2009), about consequences 
related to lack of regional cooperation (VROM-raad, 2006; THBa, 2008), about higher political 
emphasis given to developing new sites (Nicis, 2009), and about competition between 
different policy fields for financial resources (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008).   
Who sees decay as a problem?
The increased attention to research and policy for addressing decay is an acknowledgement 
of the need to act. This need is acknowledged by the national, provincial, and local authorities 
(VROM et al., 2009). All levels of government have together agreed to address decay through 
large scale restructuring (VROM et al., 2009). In addition, environmental interest groups also 
see the importance of addressing decay. They view restructuring as an important part of a 
strategy for better land use, where opportunities on existing sites can reduce land claims for 
development of new sites. Finally, some firms experience problems on existing sites. However, 
their views on the need to act and on what needs to be done are much more diverse, and they 
usually focus on specific problems that directly affect business opportunities.  
Why do local authorities accept problem ownership?
Within this group of concerned actors, the local authorities fulfil an important role. They 
have a general responsibility for addressing community development in an integral way, 
and industrial sites are part of this responsibility, especially regarding how the presence of 
firms affects local employment opportunities. In particular, local authorities are responsible 
for the maintenance of their own land (i.e. streets and surrounding ‘green’) on the sites. It 
is therefore not surprising that local authorities often feel responsible for at least initiating 
and managing restructuring. They see the effects of decay, and they know that doing no 
more than developing more new sites cannot be a solution for all problems on existing sites. 
Local authorities face the ‘real life’ challenges of reaching a desired final quality of the site 
and of finding the necessary commitment and funding for doing this. These are no simple 
challenges, because the past decades have shown that such processes are complex, long 
lasting, and expensive, and the recent objective to accelerate restructuring in the whole 
country has made the challenge even greater (VROM et al., 2009). In practice, however, local 
authorities often act on an incomplete understanding of the situation so it “[…] is not possible 
to establish with certainty whether the approach they choose for restructuring will offer a real 
solution for the problems” (PBL, 2009, p. 97).
The purpose of this study
This uncertainty regarding the link between restructuring approaches and outcomes was 
the reason for undertaking this study. There are three important issues that have received 
insufficient systematic attention. First, although several studies identify problems and 
suggest solutions, the underlying understanding of how restructuring is performed in practice 
is predominantly implicit (i.e. current practices are not described). Second, most available 
studies have focussed on general problems and general solutions, which mean that they do 
not address how solutions can be selected, and used, depending on the specific local settings. 
Third, although these studies focus on influencing the process, they usually pay insufficient 
attention to the impact on progress and to the effects on commitment and final quality. 
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1.2. Industrial sites and their importance
What does the term ‘industrial site’ mean? This study uses the definition that an industrial 
site is an area “of a size of minimum 1 ha that because of its use has been designated 
and made suitable for trade, (manufacturing) industry, commercial and non-commercial 
service industry, including (parts of) sites partly designated and suitable for offices” (author’s 
translation of definition given in IBIS: the Dutch “Integral Industrial Site Information System”; 
note: the IBIS system explicitly excludes some specific production areas from the category 
industrial site). 
This definition implies that an area has been designated in a ‘Zoning Plan’ (in Dutch: 
Bestemmingsplan) according to the ‘Spatial Planning Act’ (in Dutch: Wet op de Ruimtelijke 
Ordening) for use by specified economic functions only. The  choices made in the zoning plan 
regarding the range of allowed functions, and the related spatially relevant regulations, will 
affect the possibilities for future site developments. However, the evolution of the site will 
be influenced also by the way the authorities act to ensure compliance to, or to adjust, the 
Zoning Plan. 
Such designated industrial sites do not have a very long tradition in the Netherlands (Louw et 
al., 2004). Most of the older current sites started as mixed function areas close to city centres. 
Earlier, housing was quite usual on the sites or in the direct proximity, because people 
preferred to live close to their work and this was not restricted by regulations. During several 
decades, the characteristics of those older sites have gradually changed. New economic 
activities have replaced older ones, and living on the sites has generally been discouraged 
or even prohibited. The result has become what in the Netherlands is called ‘mixed industrial 
sites’: areas of a high diversity regarding type and size of activities. 
However, active planning of industrial sites has been increasing, and currently new sites 
are  usually both designated and designed solely for specific industrial activities. Besides 
the functional restriction to industrial activities, sites nowadays often have specific profiles 
(or themes) such as high-tech or logistics. This historical development reflects a shifting 
emphasis from predominantly autonomous growth processes towards deliberate (restrictive 
and directive) planning. 
Although approximately two thirds (PBL, 2009, p.41; CPB, 2005, p.12) of all employment is 
still located outside industrial sites, there can be no doubt about the importance of these sites 
for the national, regional and certainly local socio-economic development. Current industrial 
sites are high-density concentrations of economic activities. A well-functioning area affects 
prosperity through employment possibilities and through indirect effects such as use of local 
suppliers and housing. Maintaining the attractiveness and vitality of existing sites, as well as 
offering sufficient locations for new, or expanding, firms are accordingly high priority issues 
for industrial site planning in the Netherlands (e.g. EZ, 2004a; EZ, 2004b; BZK, 2004; VROM-
raad, 2006; THB, 2008a; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; PBL, 2009). 
1.3. The lifecycle of industrial sites 
This requires understanding, designing, and managing, long-lasting processes that reflect 
the changing needs not only of firms, but also of a wide range of other actors in the local 
community. The first step in the life-cycle is the development of a new industrial site. 
The average time needed for preparing a site with building plots that are ready for sale 
and construction (i.e. the necessary basic infrastructure and utilities are available) in the 
Netherlands is about 8 years (EZ, 2004b). Although industrial sites in principle are developed 
to how the interaction process can be designed and managed, and finally choices are 
made about the kind of model to be developed.  
 Chapter six presents the decision support model itself. The main components of the model, 
the decisions for which support is desirable, and the way these decisions are operationalised 
are first presented. Together they provide a set of design principles. These are combined 
in the question-based decision support process model that enables follow-up actions to be 
selected for specific situations during restructuring. A brief description of possible follow-
up measures is given, and finally strategic options are presented for addressing a limited 
number of ideal-type situations that can be encountered in restructuring. 
Chapter seven includes the testing and operationalisation of the model by practitioners in a 
series of “Focus group” sessions. A “Thematic analysis” of the results leads to (provisional) 
conclusions about the model. 
Finally, chapter eight sets out the contributions of this study to knowledge and practice. 
Context of restructuring
Objective; scope, key terms and actor; 
questions and design
Approaches to restructuring in the 
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Choice of framework; leading theory; 
complementary theory
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Ch.5. Applying the theoretical framework to 
restructuring
Ch.7. Testing the model and operationa-
lising it
Ch.4. A theoretical framework for 
understanding complex multi-actor processes
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practice
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way to the overall quality of the area. On the other hand they can neglect maintenance, or 
they perform activities in such a way that they affect performance of neighbouring firms 
(such as nuisance caused by transport and parking). Together the effects of both groups will 
determine how the life-cycle evolves. 
 
A problem is that, because the life-cycle of industrial sites extends over decades, it is difficult 
to plan and implement the ‘right’ set of actions at the ‘right’ moment. Any action should 
preferably take into account not only the needs of all currently involved actors, but also 
precaution and flexibility to accommodate future needs. 
1.4. Development of new sites  
The first step towards a better understanding of the context of restructuring is to focus on 
why, and how, new sites are developed. 
The ‘why-question’ serves as the starting point. Industrial sites are specifically developed 
for accommodating new and, in practice especially, relocating firms (Louw et al., 2004). The 
needs of these firms should accordingly be the basis for determining where new sites should 
come, and the size and characteristics of the sites. This should influence choices about the 
actors that preferably should, and often will, be involved in the development process. 
Although other parties may be involved, currently the local authorities are the dominant 
actors in the development of new industrial sites in the Netherlands (Louw et al., 2004, 
p.77, PBL, 2009). This is so for smaller sites designated for local industry, and for larger 
sites aimed at serving the regional market. The latter case implies at least some kind of 
agreement between the local authorities in the region regarding location of the site and its 
main function. 
Effective long-term planning is vital, because the development takes several years. In 
Dutch planning practice, industrial site development passes through a number of more or 
less distinct phases, which can be characterised by sets of dominant activities. Although 
there is no widely accepted definition of these phases, steps such as initiative, planning, 
implementation, and management (in Dutch often referred to as “beheer”), in a variety of 
forms and sub-divisions, are encountered in most descriptions (DHV, 2000; Novem, 2001; 
to last ‘forever’, the attractiveness of the site will, for a number of reasons described below, 
change over time. Louw et al. (2004, p.131) present a hypothetical lifecycle, drawn in analogy 
with product lifecycles used in economics, showing the changes in demand for locations on 
the site (figure 1.2). 
The figure shows that, after the initial phases of introduction and growth, the demand will 
stabilise, and sooner or later, start declining. This decline indicates a growing gap between 
what the site offers and what firms need. Some firms therefore migrate to newer sites and 
are often either replaced by lower added-value activities, or the areas will be left unused. The 
authors link these changes in demand to indicators such as employment and property value, 
which reflect perspectives on how quality of site performance can be assessed. Decline in 
demand will ultimately be viewed as decay. 
However, any assessment of quality always represents the view of one, or more, actors 
about what is desired at a certain location. Decay in that respect can mean more than just 
decreasing demand, employment and property value. In general, decay will be seen as a 
decreasing satisfaction about site performance, which may also include a variety of other 
quality issues such as infrastructure and environmental performance (see section 1.5 for a 
more detailed description of processes of ageing and decay, and the relationship between 
both terms). Decreasing demand, employment and property value are not always signs 
of decay. For example, if the development of a site is according to the planning, and if 
the firms remain satisfied with their location, a transition such as towards a site for lower 
added-value firms can better be viewed as an economic reprofiling than as a process of 
decay. 
This example illustrates that in practice, quality and the related actor satisfaction can, and 
often will be, influenced by a wide range of interventions during all phases of the life-cycle. 
These can be divided into two groups. The first group contains efforts to actively (in a planned 
way) influence the performance of the industrial site. Currently, substantial efforts to extend 
the lifecycle of sites with a sufficient quality are initiated by authorities (see figure 1.3.; for a 
more specific view on effects of Park Management and restructuring, see Schapendonk and 
Van Enck, 2005). These planned efforts at integral improvements of the sites are the focus of 
this study (see chapter two). The second group contains a large variety of actions taken by 
individual firms that somehow affect the site performance either positively or negatively. Firms 
can for example invest in buildings and parking facilities, which can contribute in a positive 
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Figure 1.2  Industrial site lifecycle as a function of demand (Louw et al., 2004, slightly adapted).
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this process is high, and only a few illustrative examples are presented here. 
A first example is the question of ‘demonstrated need’ (in Dutch usually referred to as “nut 
en noodzaak”). As mentioned above, local authorities traditionally prefer to have reserves of 
land for industrial site development. Representatives of firms, such as Chamber of Commerce 
and employers, consider a generous availability of land to be an important factor for enabling 
entrepreneurship, and accordingly they in general stimulate (i.e. lobby for) development of 
new sites. Environmental interest groups on the other hand find that the current approaches 
by local authorities have led to a situation where too much land is claimed for new sites. They 
view the development of new sites as a ‘last solution’, which should be applied only if there 
is a real need and no opportunities can be found for accommodating this need on existing 
sites (Wagter et al., 2002, Blauw, 2007; Verhaak, 2007). The local authorities have, besides a 
general responsibility for local prosperity and quality of life, also a specific financial interest 
in the development of new sites. For the planning agency usually buys land, makes the area 
ready for construction, and finally, sells lots to firms. The end result is  that any ‘demonstrated 
need’ will be the outcome of a process where not only the uncertainty of prognoses, but also 
the influence of local authorities, firms and interest groups matter. 
Another example of this complex mutual dependency is the need to identify, and acquire, 
a ‘best-choice’ location. Such a location should satisfy the needs of firms, and at the same 
time be the best choice regarding environmental impact and social consequences. It should 
accordingly be a sustainable choice, viewing sustainability as the optimum regarding the 
“Triple-P” of People, Profit and Planet (Elkington 1997). The process of identifying such a 
sustainable optimum is not straight-forward. Not only is it very difficult, or maybe even 
impossible, to assess all effects reliably, but the choice may also be influenced by decisions 
made in the past. The municipality may for instance already own land at a location that 
earlier has been identified as a likely candidate for development. Also, the choice of location 
has effects on property prices. Widely communicated information about search locations can 
therefore attract private parties interested in speculating in land. The financial involvement 
of the planning agency means that it will have an interest in preventing this. Dutch 
municipalities do not need to buy all land immediately. Speculation can be prevented if the 
area is claimed for future development as an industrial site according to the “Pre-emptive 
Right of Municipalities Act” (author’s translation; in Dutch: “Wet Voorkeursrecht Gemeenten”). 
This intervention ensures that current landowners, if they want to sell, first have to offer their 
land for sale to the local authorities. 
Besides estimating quantitative needs and searching for a suitable location, the initiative 
phase usually includes a variety of activities aimed at getting a clearer picture of the specific 
needs of potential buyers and of the objectives of other actors. It includes also the organisation 
of the local authorities themselves. In particular, this phase must identify the policy ambitions 
of the local authorities as well as the broader commitment of different actors to common 
objectives. These common objectives are sometimes presented in a Vision Document, which 
can be accompanied by a Letter of Intent that, to some degree, formalises the roles, and 
resource input, of the involved actors. The specific constraints and/or ambitions formulated 
by the planning agency are documented in a Planning Brief. 
The Planning
These documents together serve as a signal of a certain commitment and a change to 
producing more detailed planning documents. There is a gradual change into something 
that may be called a Planning phase. During this phase several activities, started in the 
Initiative phase, will continue. In particular, initial decisions may have to be reconsidered, 
changed or even discarded. This will be influenced by interaction between the various actors, 
and will be reflected in a number of documents such as a Spatial Design plan (in Dutch: 
Novem and DÉCOR, 2003; Louw et al., 2004). Often a link is made between the separate 
phases and the spatial planning documents (DHV, 2000) such as a “Planning Brief” (in Dutch: 
Programma van Eisen) and the Zoning Plan. The following brief description of main activities 
within the general steps - initiative, planning, and implementation, - introduces a number of 
variables all of which can influence future needs for restructuring. 
The Initiative
The process usually starts by a growing understanding of, and support for, the need to 
develop a new site. No initiatives have yet been undertaken and there is still a considerable 
degree of uncertainty about the exact need for land over time. A diversity of factors creates 
this uncertainty. First, macro-economic trends, such as economic recessions, may change 
business growth opportunities drastically. On the level of individual firms, more specific 
market mechanisms also influence the development. Firms may decide to expand on their 
current location instead of relocating and, if they choose to relocate, the preferred location 
might be found in another municipality, region or even country. Even well-performing firms 
may be closed down or relocated for strategic reasons. 
The challenge for a planning agency is to address this dynamic by reducing the degree 
of uncertainty. This means collecting information about market developments and needs. 
The normal approach combines elements of monitoring and statistical prognoses (for 
more details see: Louw et al., 2004, pp. 44-47 and references cited therein). Monitoring, in 
particular, focuses on knowing the needs of firms located within the municipality. Regular 
written surveys or personal consultation make it possible to develop an overview of emerging 
needs, and more or less elaborated plans, for relocation. Statistical approaches can focus 
on demographic as well as property market trends in order to support a prognosis for future 
needs. Traditionally, planning agencies have pro-actively provided, and maintained, strategic 
supplies of land for industrial site development. Considering the long time needed for the 
necessary legal procedures, as well as for making the sites ready for construction, such an 
approach is understandable (Louw et al., 2004, p. 73). Planning agencies often base their 
prognoses for new sites on high economic growth scenarios (PBL, 2009, p.16), and this can 
influence the need for restructuring quite significantly. For the availability of lots on new sites 
can stimulate firms to relocate instead of investing on existing sites, and that can influence 
ageing and decay of the existing sites (Gordijn et al., 2007; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008). 
The accuracy of prognoses and the related strategic choices made by planning agencies will 
influence the estimates of the quantitative need for a new site. 
Besides this focus on quantitative needs, the local authorities (often involving private actors 
as well) also start activities such as formulating site related objectives, searching for a 
suitable location, acquiring land, and initiating legal procedures such as making a spatial 
Zoning Plan and, if necessary, an Environmental Impact Assessment. This description may 
suggest a rather simple chronological process. However, in practice, the different activities 
will be performed partly in parallel, and conflicting actor interests will influence objectives, 
constraints and outcomes. An understanding of how different actors can influence the 
development of new sites is needed, because these choices also will affect the setting of 
restructuring. 
Although a wide range of actors may be involved, it is especially the planning agency, 
(representatives of) firms, owners of land that may be developed for new sites, and interest 
groups that are involved in early phases. Again viewed from the perspective of the local 
authorities, the starting point is that they know that any choice regarding location and design 
of new sites will be perceived by some actors as a loss and by other actors as a gain. The local 
authorities therefore have to be cautious about how they interact with different actors and, 
in particular, about communication related to plans. The number of mutual dependencies in 
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an opportunity for firms on existing sites to relocate. The combination of the land price and 
the specific quality on the new site, compared to that on the existing site, can be influenced 
by the planning agency. In practice, there are “[…] continual pressures to provide new 
industrial […] spaces and to transform and decommission old ones [which] affect patterns of 
property value […]” (Healey, 1994, p. 192). Second, the choices regarding location, design, 
and management on existing sites can all influence how the quality of the site develops and 
accordingly the (perceived) need for relocation and restructuring.  
1.5. Ageing and decay
It is therefore important to get a better understanding of this relationship between time and 
quality. A starting point was already given in the description of the site life-cycle (in section 
1.3), which showed that, after a time, decreasing demand, and possibly decreasing quality, 
follows. The first question is then, how the ageing of sites is related to decay.  
Ageing, viewed in a traditional (restricted) sense, can be viewed as a normal process that 
affects all structural elements such as buildings and infrastructure (Gordijn et al., 2007). In 
this restricted sense, the term “ageing” does not necessarily have a negative connotation. 
Property value can for instance increase over time, which is quite often encountered with 
“ageing” in the housing market. Also on industrial sites, increase of the value of property can 
be found for instance on inner city locations. However, if ageing turns into perceived decay 
the situation may change drastically. The term “decay” has a clear negative connotation. 
It refers to a more or less continuous process of decreasing quality and, possibly, financial 
value. Medhurst, Lewis and Gittus (focusing more in general on decay in towns) describe the 
variety of meanings that writers have given to this term: there is a multitude of unpleasant 
images of declining attractiveness of the environment, decay of buildings, decline of 
activity, growth of ‘undesirable’ activity, or even the quality of administration (Medhurst 
et al., 1969).    
In Dutch restructuring practice, the term “ageing” (in Dutch: “veroudering”) is usually 
applied CPB, 2001) in a restricted sense, referring to a process that leads to decreasing 
quality of an industrial site. In other words ageing is here viewed as decay. Various attempts 
have been made to identify and categorise general mechanisms of ageing (CPB, 2001; 
Louw et al., 2004), but there is still a lack of clear, uniform, criteria (THBa, 2008). 
Nevertheless, a general picture of how ageing is perceived can be given. A starting point is 
provided by a report that identified four different ageing mechanisms (CPB, 2001), which 
are still used in the annual survey of industrial site developments (IBIS 2010; PBL, 2009). 
These are “technical ageing”, “economic ageing”, “ageing caused by changing norms of 
the society” and “spatial ageing” (IBIS, 2010; CPB, 2001; all terms translated by author). 
Technical ageing
Technical ageing is rather uncomplicated. Normal use and natural causes (weather etc.) will 
always affect the quality of buildings and infrastructure. Insufficient maintenance of buildings 
and infrastructure is the primary cause of technical ageing (by Korteweg, 2002, referred to as 
structural ageing). In the Netherlands, ownership of land on industrial sites is divided between 
the local authorities and the firms. This makes it possible that insufficient maintenance may 
be caused by just one actor, such as an individual firm or the local authority, or by more 
actors. In practice the term “decay” is normally used for situations where larger parts of the 
site, and accordingly several actors, are involved. 
A second cause, or mechanism, of “technical ageing” is the establishment of new activities 
“Stedenbouwkundig plan”), an Environmental Impact Assessment, Financial calculations of 
feasibility (in Dutch: “Grondexploitatie”) and, finally, the Zoning Plan.  
The process in this phase reflects the underlying challenge of developing a site that will at least 
be acceptable to all involved actors. The various individual actors will assess how individual 
measures and complete planning scenarios affect their interests, and any choice will be more 
satisfactory to some actors than other ones. The local authorities therefore need to search for 
commitment to solutions, taking into account all effects and the satisfaction with those effects. 
The main elements of the planning have been institutionalised in the procedures for, for 
example, the Environmental Impact Assessments and the Zoning Plan, where each step is 
coupled to criteria and to legal opportunities for influencing the development. These legally 
prescribed steps are the most important ones, but local authorities also, in parallel, apply 
less formal strategies to involve citizens and interest groups. These strategies range from 
one-way communication to voluntary participation in working or advisory groups.  These 
approaches can deliver useful feed-back on commitment to different development options, 
which makes it possible to adjust plans in order to (hopefully) reduce local opposition and, 
in particular to make it less likely that citizens take disagreements to Court (In the Dutch 
context: “Raad van State”).
The planning process slowly moves towards ‘final’ decisions. Most of these decisions are 
‘final’ only in the sense that there is a growing (felt, if not legal) commitment, and that the 
number of opportunities to influence the process outcomes declines. In practice, the answers 
to most of the questions regarding site location and site design come together in the Zoning 
Plan. Making this plan is a key activity, because it represents a continuous ‘translation’of 
a large diversity of choices into a spatial design. The Zoning plan regulates issues such as 
the economic functions that will be allowed on the site, the specifications for constructing 
buildings and related land use, and the use of the area. In that sense it integrates economic, 
environmental and spatial issues into a coherent framework, which, depending on the 
definition used, may be viewed as reflecting choices regarding sustainability, or total quality, 
of the development. The only limitation of the Zoning Plan is that it regulates issues only 
as far as they are spatially relevant. The Zoning Plan is usually accompanied by a Visual 
Quality Plan (in Dutch: “Beeldkwaliteitsplan”) that specifies additional design requirements, 
or at least guidelines, for the quality of architecture and landscape. Finally, the planning also 
(increasingly) addresses the need to develop site management in order to maintain, and 
preferably improve, the quality of the site.   
The Implementation
The combination of a Zoning plan, a Visual Quality Plan, organisation of site management, and 
a financial translation of the consequences of these documents, starts the Implementation 
phase. The first activity in this phase is the acquisition of land (if not completed in an 
earlier phase) and then making the area ready for construction by putting in the necessary 
infrastructure and services. Finally, lots will be marketed and sold. Because the local 
authorities are usually unable to sell all lots on a new site quickly, they often prefer, for 
financial reasons, to phase the development, servicing smaller parts of the area for use 
according to need. This approach can damage the perception of quality of the area if the 
infrastructure remains incomplete or if construction continues for several years. It also 
means that the Implementation-phase might overlap with the phases of stabilisation, and 
management, of completed parts of the site. 
The potential impact on restructuring
All choices made during planning and development of new sites can, and usually will, 
influence the restructuring context in two main ways. First, the availability of new sites offers 
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developing new industrial sites (Wagter et al., 2002; Blauw, 2007; Olden, 2007). This leads 
to an increasing pressure for a more sustainable use of land (Valk, van der, 2002), which 
requires that local authorities apply integral management of new and existing sites. Such an 
approach can have significant effects on ageing, although it is difficult to assess in advance 
what these effects will be. 
Spatial ageing
The attractiveness of business locations can also be influenced by spatial changes in the 
vicinity. For example, sites previously situated at the periphery of the cities have in many 
cases gradually become completely surrounded by other activities such as housing. The 
close proximity of such ‘vulnerable’ functions may lead to conflicts and subsequent ageing 
as a result of changing societal norms (see above). However, this is not the only effect. 
The fact that the industrial site gets completely surrounded by other built-up areas restricts 
the expansion opportunities of existing sites. It can also reduce the access to regional 
main roads and motorways. Because firms consider good access a high priority, this may 
influence business performance and even stimulate firm relocation (Steen, van, 1998; Pen, 
2002). Finally, the quality of surrounding areas can have an effect on the industrial site. For 
example, decayed neighbourhoods may negatively influence the attractiveness of the area 
(B&A-groep, 1998; Pen, 2002).  
The combined impact of ageing mechanisms
Each of these ageing mechanisms separately may influence the development of an industrial 
site. However, the ‘classical’ problem situation encountered on most of the older industrial 
sites is normally a mix of the effects of all four ageing mechanisms (PBL, 2009). A complex 
pattern of interactions between spatial, legal and economic developments determines the 
rate, and gravity, of the ageing and decay. The situation will therefore continuously change. 
As actors attempt to find optimum ways to intervene, new problems may emerge and 
existing problems may worsen (THBa, 2008). Although no reliable quantitative information 
on ageing currently is available (Traa and Knoben, 2009), there are clear indications that 
the total restructuring challenge has increased considerably the past 20 years (Reesink and 
Van Aalst, 2003; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008). It should be said that  there are indications 
that current estimates are too high (THBa, 2008), possibly caused by local authorities who 
have an interest in getting industrial sites registered as in need of restructuring, because 
they hope this will increase the possibility of achieving funding from national or provincial 
authorities (PBL, 2009). 
1.6.  The variety of large scale interventions to influence 
       quality on industrial sites
However, even if the numbers are corrected for possible effects of such ‘strategic behaviour’, 
it is clear that the challenge remains large. The first step in addressing this challenge is to 
understand the specific problems on a site. This enables an appropriate intervention strategy 
to be selected. The question is then: which kind of interventions can best be used, depending 
on the ageing characteristics.   
Definitions related to impact on economic functions
Despite attempts to develop a clear classification system for such interventions, there is 
still no widely accepted set of definitions in Dutch planning practice (CPB, 2001; Louw et al., 
that do not fit into the (desired) profile of the site, where this affects the perceived quality 
of the site. An example is the location of a car demolition firm in the middle of an area 
dominated by service-oriented or high-tech firms. The way these activities influence each 
other, and the surroundings, can damage the total image (reputation) of the site. 
Economic ageing
Such developments can also influence the opportunities for firms to respond effectively to 
market demands. The core of the economic ageing process, accordingly, is that the site 
characteristics are no longer in accordance with the changing needs of firms. 
Those needs can change for several reasons. First, there is increasing globalisation. 
International firms more or less continuously assess alternative locations worldwide to identify 
the best sites regarding factors such as required product quality, labour costs, availability of 
skilled personnel, and distance to markets. The outcome of such assessments is sometimes 
that manufacturing firms relocate their production activities to low-cost countries, possibly 
maintaining business centres and R&D in the Netherlands. This is a clear, still ongoing, 
trend in the Netherlands, with a gradual decrease of traditional manufacturing industry and 
parallel growth of the service sector. Secondly, firms in general change through increasing 
mechanisation and use of ICT,  both of which influence the possibilities for adapting quickly to 
market demands and shorter product life-cycles. The result of such changes can be that firms 
need more office space (Louw et al., 2004), opportunities for flexible adaptation of buildings, 
and attractive surroundings often preferably situated close to motorways.  
If these requirements are not fulfilled, firms will consider relocation as an interesting, or even the 
only acceptable, option for solving their problems. Relocations of ‘strong’ firms may accelerate 
the ageing process. There can be a relationship with the development of new industrial sites, 
which provide ready solutions to problems on the existing sites. This market effect, also referred 
to as relative ageing (Korteweg, 2002), may have a significant impact if there is much new land 
offered in a variety of attractive price – quality segments (Louw et al., 2004).  
Ageing caused by changing societal norms
Ageing is also influenced by changing norms in society. For instance a growing concern 
for safety, health and environmental issues in the last decades has gradually changed 
perceptions of what is considered acceptable performance of firms on an industrial site. 
Citizens living close to the sites sometimes experience, or fear, negative effects such as 
noise or odour, and lower acceptance of these can lead to complaints. Even more important 
for ageing is how this change in social norms and values has been incorporated in laws 
and regulations. A clear trend the past decades has been the development of higher (i.e. 
stricter) standards for safety and environmental performance. Accordingly, specially firms 
situated on sites close to neighbourhoods or city centres have faced increasingly severe 
constraints on their operations. This can have a variety of consequences. Individual firms 
have voluntarily, or through enforcement of environmental permits, improved their safety 
and environmental performance through a combination of management and technological 
solutions. However, in some cases such improvement measures are insufficient. Some firms 
are then on locations viewed as less favourable by authorities and/or firms. Some of these 
high-risk firms are therefore stimulated, or even facilitated, to relocate to new sites. This 
process, again, can damage the performance of the existing site (as described above related 
to economic ageing). 
Relocations also have an effect on land use more widely. If the land on the existing site 
remains unused and unusable after relocation, there will be a net loss of area available for 
industry. There is a growing concern, especially voiced by environmental interest groups, 
in the Netherlands regarding the scarcity of land and, in particular, regarding the need for 
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Finally, with transformation the original (designated) function of the area is completely 
changed, which means that the site is no longer available as an industrial site (BCI, 2008; 
PBL, 2009). Transformations are not always viewed as belonging to the group of restructuring 
interventions (PBL, 2009), and they are sometimes split into sub-groups such as transformation 
into housing and transformation into other urban functions (PBL, 2009).   
Choice of intervention
There seems to be a growing consensus about how the range of possible interventions can 
be related to the consequences for economic functions and the financial investments needed. 
The choice for a specific strategy is strongly influenced by this combination of consequences 
and investments. To put it simply, high costs need to be matched by high incomes. Property 
developers may for instance be able to make a profit out of reprofiling or transformation (PBL, 
2009). If, on the other hand, costs cannot be fully met in this way, national or provincial co-
funding is required.  
Currently there is equal emphasis on plans for revitalisation (1/3), transformation into housing 
(1/3) and, transformation into mixed urban functions (1/3) (PBL, 2009).
In practice, and certainly influenced by financial criteria as well, the choice of intervention 
is linked to location. For sites next to, or even completely surrounded by, areas having other 
economic functions such as housing or railway stations, transformation tends to be the 
preferred planned intervention, whereas sites close to motorways, and sites where large 
firms are situated are more likely to be revitalised  (PBL, 2009).  
The combination of the nature of ageing, the necessary investments, and the location 
characteristics (influencing potential return on investments) is important. The choice for a 
specific intervention should therefore be guided by a thorough understanding of the ageing 
mechanisms, individually and in combination, on the specific sites (see section 1.5). 
1.7. The changing role of authorities
The problem is that nobody can know in advance how successful a chosen approach will 
be, because there are too many uncertainties. This is no excuse for not trying, and local, 
provincial and national authorities have certainly become increasingly active in industrial site 
restructuring the past decade. The ideas about what they should do are numerous, and most 
attention has been given to the role of the local authorities.
What are local authorities recommended to do?
The essence seems to be that local authorities should become more professional, and there 
is a wide range of more or less strong recommendations about how this should be achieved 
(e.g. VROM-raad, 2006; THB, 2008a; Dinteren, van and Krabben van der, 2008; Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2008; Nicis, 2009; PBL, 2009; BWU, 2009; Olden, 2010). Local authorities 
should improve cooperation with firms on the site, with investors and with other local 
authorities within a region, and they should reduce internal bureaucracy, get industrial site 
development onto the political agenda, and assess the need for new sites more realistically. 
They should also make better use of legal tools, link the development of new and old sites 
financially, and facilitate the development of site management organisations that maintain 
quality and prevent future decay. Furthermore, they should find sustainable solutions (VROM, 
1997; EZ, 1998), improve spatial quality, and stimulate cooperation between firms by 
applying for example principles of industrial ecology (Frosch and Gallopoulos, 1989; VROM, 
1997; RMNO, 1997; Konz and Van den Thillart, 2002). Actually, the situation is even more 
2004). Terms such as modernising (Pen and Hiethaar, 1998), renewal and restructuring, have 
been used to describe the improvement of areas in general. However, within the context of 
industrial sites, restructuring is now well-established (e.g. IBIS, 2010). It has been defined 
as an approach that encompasses “[…] a coherent total of activities, consisting of all non-
recurring interventions on the site not being part of regular maintenance, aimed at improving 
the quality of location factors [in Dutch the term “vestigingsklimaat” is used] on an existing 
industrial site […]” (author’s translation of definition given in: EZ, 2004b, p. 69). 
This definition is quite broad, because it includes everything except recurring interventions. 
The next step is to explore which kind of non-recurring interventions have been reported. 
Again there is a lack of a general agreement on the meaning of the terms used for different 
strategic options, although it is clear that the options are positioned within a range depending 
on their impact on the economic functions on the site. Figure 1.4 illustrates such a range, 
including four often-used terms for strategic improvements falling within the general category 
of restructuring. 
The following brief description of these four options therefore focuses on the differences regarding 
their impact on economic functions (ETIN, 2002; Louw et al., 2004; BCI, 2008; PBL, 2009). 
A face-lift primarily addresses technical ageing and has no significant effects on the economic 
structure of the site. It focuses on buildings and infrastructure (BCI, 2008), and accordingly 
it addresses image (appearance) and functionality of public (EZ, 1996) and private property 
(Pen and Hiethaar, 1998; THBa, 2008). It has been argued that face-lifts do not belong to 
the “[…] core of the restructuring challenge […]” (THB, 2008a, p. 4), because they should 
be addressed through continuous site-management as part of regular maintenance: they do 
not fall under ‘non-recurrent’. This task should be the responsibility of the private and public 
actors directly involved (THBa, 2008). 
Revitalisation, on the other hand, is currently widely accepted as belonging to the group of 
restructuring interventions. It addresses ageing that cannot be counteracted through regular 
maintenance (Louw et al., 2004).  Revitalisation implies a thorough integral improvement 
of the industrial site, whereby the existing economic functions are maintained (ETIN, 2002; 
Louw et al, 2004; BCI, 2008; PBL, 2009). It includes a variety of possible actions such as 
stimulating the use of vacant buildings and unused land, and improving infrastructure and 
access to the site. Revitalisation can be further divided into regular and ‘heavy’, based 
on how serious the problems are (BCI, 2008). This assessment is coupled to the level of 
necessary investments, and, in particular, the need for high investments for buying property, 
soil remediation, demolition of buildings, and constructing completely new infrastructure 
(BCI, 2008; IBIS, 2010).  
Reprofiling has even more consequences for site design and performance. It specifically 
addresses economic ageing (Louw et al., 2004). Accordingly, maintaining the existing 
economic functions is not a necessary condition, although the area remains an industrial site 
(BCI, 2008; IBIS, 2010). Major structural changes to the area, and relocation of firms, are used 
to facilitate the establishment of new economic functions, such as new mixes of offices, firms 
and other activities.  
Face-lift ReprofilingRevitalisation Transformation
Figure 1.4  Impact on economic functions of different intervention options
             Low                       Impact on existing economic functions            High
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1.8. Towards an improved understanding 
This chapter has briefly introduced the main issues regarding the complexity and 
interdependencies of development processes on new and existing industrial sites. It has 
shown that, in restructuring, there is a wide range of factors that influence, and may constrain, 
the search for feasible improvement strategies. 
It is accordingly important to know the possibilities for influencing restructuring, and to predict 
the probable consequences of (planned) interventions. This is the core of the ‘how-question’ 
regarding successful design and management of restructuring. The available diversity of 
improvement options and recommendations does not give enough guidance, because there 
still remains a significant uncertainty about how the ‘right’ mix of options can be chosen 
and subsequently implemented, and how this should depend on the specific local situation. 
Reducing this uncertainty is the aim of this study.
complex, because the recommendations vary widely regarding their relative importance 
and expected success in improving industrial site development, and both recommendations 
and relative importance can change over time. 
What are local authorities doing?
Regardless of how many well-intended recommendations local authorities receive, there are 
at least two important considerations. The first is that local authorities have to prioritize. 
They have limited resources, and accordingly they cannot implement all recommendations 
at once. The second consideration is that most options influence each other. This means that 
the local authorities, above all, are facing highly complex decision-making challenges, where 
they are supposed to manage processes in such a way that ‘everybody’ (meaning: all actors 
affected by, or able to affect, local decision making) stays, or becomes, satisfied.   
It is not surprising that change has been gradual and cautious. The local authorities are 
increasingly experimenting with, and actually implementing, several of the recommendations 
mentioned above. They attempt to engage in open dialogue and active cooperation 
with external actors to achieve satisfactory results, and they try to professionalize their 
organisations. However, the results are seldom as good as desired, and there is need 
for a process that allows making mistakes, learning and improving. Moreover, most 
recommendations are not situation specific, and application should accordingly be much 
more than any simple ‘copy-paste’. 
There is a growing sense of urgency. The past decade has seen a surge of attention for 
industrial site development, and, in particular, for restructuring and its link with the 
development of new sites. This has led to more directive approaches and covenants, to a 
wealth of recommendations (VROM et al., 2009; BWU, 2009). In particular, local authorities 
are supposed to cooperate in regional programming regarding industrial site development, 
to develop better prognoses for forecasting the need for new sites, and to apply the “SER-
ladder” (EZ and VROM, 2008; Gordijn et al., 2007; SER, 1999). The SER-ladder means that 
local authorities, in their assessment, first have to underpin the need for land, and specifically 
to take account of the impact of restructuring and more intensive land use on existing sites. 
Then they have to make use of the possibilities found on existing sites, and, finally, only if 
land is still needed, are they allowed to start the development of new sites. However, the 
effect of the use of the SER-ladder on total land claims for development of industrial sites is 
expected to be limited (Gordijn et al., 2007). 
Which challenge are local authorities facing? 
The local authorities are accordingly facing a complex decision-making challenge, and a 
considerable financial challenge as well. They are responsible for developing an (estimated) 
11,000 ha new sites and at the same time for restructuring about 16,000 ha within ten 
years (VROM et al., 2009; BWU, 2009). Agreements regarding tasks and responsibilities 
for addressing the restructuring challenge were formalised in a covenant between local, 
provincial, and national authorities (VROM et al., 2009). An essential issue in this covenant 
was that “[…] the covenant gives room for own choices on a decentralised level [which in 
The Netherlands means local authorities / municipalities] regarding the industrial site policy. 
Also regarding the ‘how-question’ […]” (BWU, 2009, p. 34)1. This ‘how-question’ is the key to 
success, because the real challenge is actually not a quantitative one. The real challenge for 
local authorities is to develop and maintain sites that continue to fulfil as well as possible the 
needs of a variety of actors. It is about design and management for quality and satisfaction. 
 
1  Recently new national policy has been formulated. The consequences are that national goals for restructuring has been withdrawn, which means that 
no	national	financing	will	be	available	after	2013	(financing	until	end	2013	has	already	been	made	available	to	provinces)	(Kabinet	et	al.,	2011,	p.43).	
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2.1. Introduction
Restructuring is complex, so choices will have to be made regarding which questions to be 
addressed and from which perspective that will be done. There is a need for a clear scope and 
focus. The objective of this chapter is to develop a study framework for the inquiry (Schlager, 
1999) into restructuring. 
To reach this objective, a stepwise approach is applied. First, a focus for the study is chosen 
(2.2). This is followed by an exploration of key terms (2.3), actors (2.4), and how restructuring 
can be influenced through decision support (2.5), leading to a set of ‘building blocks’. These 
are combined and applied for constructing the main research question and for developing a 
research design (2.6). 
2.2. Focus on total duration of restructuring 
The challenge of restructuring is to ensure that industrial sites offer an appropriate quality. 
The term “appropriate” means fulfilling the requirements of those actors with an interest 
in the performance of the area. In practice the needs of the firms, and constraints set by 
laws and regulations, provide the main criteria for assessing quality. The general objective 
of any restructuring is to improve the total quality until a level is reached that is considered 
satisfactory by the involved actors. 
Such processes take a long time (EZ, 2004b). An important objective is therefore to accelerate 
them (EZ, 2004b; THBa, 2008; VROM et al., 2009). It is assumed, by these authors and also 
for this study, that accelerating these processes can be achieved without loss of quality. 
Based on this assumption, the general objective for this study is formulated as: 
“Improve the understanding necessary for reducing the total duration of restructuring of 
industrial sites, without endangering the quality of the outcome”.
Only limited attention in academic literature has been given to processes of industrial site 
development in The Netherlands. Studies have for example addressed the development of 
2. Operationalising the research
“For the social scientist or researcher in applied fields, 
research is a process of trying to gain a better understanding of the 
complexities of human experience and, in some genres of research,
to take action based on that understanding” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p. 23)
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initiating efforts towards restructuring. There is no restructuring policy without a perceived 
need to act: the current quality of an industrial site is viewed to be inappropriate and in need 
of attention. However, it is not clear how the national policy on this (e.g. EZ, 2004b; EZ and 
VROM, 2008; VROM et al., 2009) is related to the views of different stakeholders. Firms are 
certainly concerned with their opportunities for entrepreneurship, and they need sufficient 
supply of industrial sites offering appropriate quality. However, although there are several 
examples of restructuring where firms have been active, most initiatives in the Netherlands 
are started and managed by the local authorities. Their assessments of quality will be 
partly based on the opinions of firms, but also on additional objectives, in accordance with 
their integral responsibility for the local community. Finally, environmental interest groups 
(organisations) are quite active proponents of restructuring. We can conclude that policy 
on, and perception of, restructuring, is based on an aggregation of different views about the 
quality of existing sites. Included in this “aggregation” process are opinions regarding the 
impact of restructuring on a large variety of other more or less interdependent topics, such 
as land use for new sites, and quality of inner city areas. 
Views on the relative importance of different quality aspects change over time. For example, 
change in the perception of environmental and safety aspects has actually ‘created’ problems 
on existing sites. First, laws and regulations have become increasingly strict. This has, through 
a mechanism that has been described (in chapter one) as ageing caused by changing societal 
norms, led to undesired situations. Second and related to the change in laws, nuisance 
aspects, such as noise, dust, and odour, have received increasing attention. There seems 
to be a decreasing tolerance of the experienced effects of such emissions by people living 
near to industrial sites. The perception of spatial quality also receives more attention.  The 
result is that what is considered to be appropriate quality of existing sites cannot be taken to 
be constant during a long-lasting restructuring. Initial objectives may (have to) be adjusted 
during the process and the ‘picture’ of the desired final situation adapted. 
Summing up, desired quality is the aggregated result of a complex, often implicit, continuous 
weighting process. As a consequence, the condition that processes be speeded up “without 
any reduction of quality of the final outcome”, needs to be addressed with caution. Applying 
a rigid pre-defined detailed ‘picture’ of a desired final quality based on a set of measurable 
indicators might be inappropriate for taking changing ideas and needs into consideration. 
Furthermore, the emphasis in this study is on improving the understanding of the processes 
and not on assessing the quality of the outcome itself. This study therefore views quality as 
exogenous, a normative framework mainly developed, used, and adapted, by the involved 
actors themselves. 
Process duration
The next question is how process duration is to be viewed within this study. The first part of 
the answer is that a restructuring normally lasts until the involved actors are satisfied with 
the quality of the industrial site. This means that process duration will depend on the site 
specific problems to be solved, and on the commitment of actors to invest in improvements. 
In practice, statements of the time needed for a restructuring (for example: EZ, 2004b) refer 
to an estimated ‘average’ time for something that is assumed to be a representative ‘average’ 
of all individual processes. The same applies to objectives for reducing total duration without 
endangering quality. Any quantitative objective referring to all industrial sites (for example 
an objective of reducing process duration by 20% was formulated in EZ, 2004b) will refer to 
some kind of ‘average’ process.    
The importance of these assumptions for this study is that process duration is not addressed 
quantitatively. It is not measured in number of years, and no quantitative objective (percentage) 
is applied for reducing the duration. Process duration is simply viewed as something that 
new sites as being a process of interaction in strategic urban planning (Graaf, de, 2005), 
game-theoretic modelling of interactions and decision-making in restructuring (Blokhuis, 
2010), and restructuring viewed from an industrial ecology perspective (Konz and Van den 
Thillart, 2002). More attention has been given to issues more indirectly related to integral 
site development processes, such as the relationship with supply of land (Olden, 2010), the 
impact of location factors on firm migrations and site planning (e.g. Pen, 2002; Steen van, 
1998; Pellenbarg, 2006), or sustainability (Pellenbarg, 2002). 
The available literature on relationships between process approaches, progress, and the quality 
of outcomes of restructuring is mainly limited to policy documents, consultancy reports and 
management guides for practitioners. These documents seldom include any explicit description 
of the theoretical framework applied. However, they do provide a valuable source of information 
on how practitioners experience problems and how they suggest addressing these. 
The formulated objective of this study introduces a number of key terms and related questions. 
First, the term “restructuring” in Dutch planning practice of industrial sites includes a wide 
range of different kinds of interventions in site performance (see section 1.6). It is therefore 
necessary to state what is meant by “restructuring” in this study, whereby we limit the scope 
of restructuring options that will be studied. Second, the objective explicitly links quality 
of the outcome to process duration. The question is then: how both terms are viewed in 
practice, and how they are related. 
2.3. Exploring key terms
What we mean by restructuring 
The range of restructuring is quite considerable (see chapter 1). The three forms called face-
lift, revitalisation, and reprofiling are (increasingly) comprehensive interventions to change 
the area, but all imply that the area keeps its main economic function. In that respect only 
transformation is significantly different, because the area gets another function and space is 
no longer available for industry. 
This study has to make choices regarding scope and focus. The ‘face-lifts’ seem to be 
very different concerning process and financing. They were not included in recent national 
restructuring co-funding schemes. Furthermore, there is a growing agreement that a face-lift 
actually should be viewed as regular maintenance (THBa, 2008; PBL, 2009). Transformation, 
changing the main economic function of the area, also has quite different characteristics 
(Louw et al., 2004; THBa, 2008). It is therefore not surprising that the national government 
chose to focus on revitalisation and reprofiling (EZ and VROM, 2008). This study makes the 
same choice and therefore face-lifts and transformations are not addressed. 
Although both revitalisation and reprofiling fall within the scope of this study, it is important 
to know that they can differ in their financial effects. In a revitalisation, the total costs 
usually exceed the profits (THBa, 2008). This means that additional financing is necessary 
to cover the ‘unprofitable part’ (in Dutch: “onrendabele top”, Algemene rekenkamer, 2008). 
Reprofiling, on the other hand, has a higher probability of becoming financially feasible, 
because it usually includes redevelopment with higher property value: it is easier to attract, 
and involve, private investors. 
Quality of the outcome
What is an ‘ideal’ quality level, and who finds it good enough and why? If there is no widely 
accepted agreement about the desired quality, why is that? This question is answered by 
looking into the involvement of actors and the evolution of the concept of quality. 
The first issue is who assesses quality, and the reasons they have for stimulating and 
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2.4.  Market, hierarchy, or interdependent actors and their 
interactions  
The complexity of restructuring makes it necessary to make choices regarding how to view 
and study it. Such a process can be studied from different perspectives, each of which reflects 
a certain view on how such processes (may) function in practice and therefore suggests 
certain fields of theory. Here we introduce and explore the pros and cons of three possible 
perspectives: restructuring as something that can be understood and influenced as being 
driven by market mechanisms, as a process where results can be ‘enforced’ through position 
in a hierarchy, and as a process characterised by actions by, and interaction between, 
interdependent actors. 
Applying the three suggested perspectives to the main characteristics of restructuring 
provides the following picture:
Figure 2.1  Characteristics of three different perspectives on restructuring 
Up to now, integral site restructuring has not functioned without active interventions by 
the local authorities. There does not seem to be any market mechanism (yet) that ensures 
sufficient progress as well as results that are satisfactory to all involved actors (THBa, 2008, 
pp.25–26; Adviescommissie Plabeka, 2011; see also Krabben, van der and van Dinteren, 
2010, for an analysis of market failures and suggestions for new interventions). This 
phenomenon is usually referred to as market failure. There is seen to be a fragile real 
estate market, with private sectors cautious to invest, and a decline in level of economic 
activity (Amin et al., 2000). The lack of investments is caused by a perceived high risk 
and uncertainty for investing (McNamara, 1993). The importance of costs and the related 
problems of ensuring the necessary financing have repeatedly been stressed in literature 
on restructuring (see appendix I for a description and discussion of several reports referring 
to this issue). Usually, in practice, the costs associated with restructuring significantly 
exceed the resources of the local authorities and even the combined financing capacity of 
all local actors. 
In practice, financing is only one aspect of a feasible development scenario for a site. 
Feasibility includes organisational, political, technical and, legal aspects as well. Achieving 
successful regeneration is accordingly a complex challenge that involves much more than 
property-led renewal (Hopkins et al., 1997). This indicates that a market perspective is not 
suitable for studying restructuring. 
Because the involved actors have partly different objectives and interests, there is a growing 
understanding of the importance of involving both (local) authorities and firms in this process 
(THBa, 2008). This suggests focusing on actor involvement and influence. The key question is 
then whether one (group of) actor(s) can use a hierarchical position to significantly accelerate 
varies according to the specific situation, and this study searches for approaches that can 
reduce the time between a ‘start’ and a ‘finish’. Measuring this duration may sound simple, 
but in practice efforts to improve an industrial site often have been going on for a long time 
prior to any restructuring initiative, and should continue after its completion. Defining any 
‘start’ and ‘finish’ is not as easy as it may sound.    
Initial situation: local authorities formally starting restructuring initiative
First, defining the initial situation, a ‘t0’, means that some kind of change compared to the 
‘autonomous’ developments prior to that moment needs to be identified. This is where the 
term “restructuring” is helpful. Restructuring has been defined (in chapter one) as “[…] 
a coherent total of activities, consisting of all non-recurring interventions on the site not 
being part of regular maintenance, aimed at improving the quality of (location factors on) 
an existing industrial site […]”. The definition tells us that such a restructuring implies more 
than addressing problems related to regular maintenance. It also specifically points to “[…] a 
coherent total of activities […] aimed at improving the quality […]”. This suggests that some 
kind of coordinated approach is applied. 
The initial situation – t0 – is then the moment when certain actors acknowledge a need to act 
and start such a coordinated initiative. But who are these actors? The answer to this question 
influences the definition of the initial situation. 
In practice there are usually two main (groups of) actors involved in a restructuring initiative: 
the local authorities and the firms situated on the site. An initiative could be taken by one 
of these actors individually or there could be a joint initiative, whereby a joint initiative will 
usually be the result of activities started earlier by one (or both) single actor(s). In this study, 
t0 is taken to be the moment where the local authorities start an initiative. The main reason 
for this choice is that in The Netherlands the local authorities start most initiatives. Although 
prior to such a moment, significant efforts to improve the site may have been taken by local 
authority departments or officials, the ‘t0’ will be defined as the moment when a formal 
(political) decision is made to start a restructuring.   
Final situation: site revitalised or reprofiled
The final situation is reached when the site has been restructured. This implies that the 
quality of the site, and possibly its surroundings as well, has improved sufficiently to satisfy 
(at least a number of) the involved actors. Problems have been solved and objectives have 
been reached. In practice it is rather difficult to identify such a moment in time. A process 
may even last for decades, and during this period a large diversity of planned as well as more 
or less autonomous (defined as not planned within the context of an on-going  restructuring) 
activities will influence the total quality of the site. To enable a final situation to be identified, 
a restructured site will therefore be defined as a site where two conditions have been fulfilled: 
a restructuring plan (or set of plans) has been implemented, and the local authorities consider 
the restructuring as complete. 
The term “plan” may suggest something that is developed in an early stage of a development 
and subsequently implemented without any alterations. This would indicate clear ambitions 
that have been transformed into specific objectives, actions and related time-scales and 
allocated means. Although this study certainly acknowledges the value of plans in such a 
‘traditional’ sense, it will focus on, and explore, planning rather than plans. 
In line with the argumentation for defining the initial situation, a formal decision made by the 
local authorities that the process of revitalising or reprofiling is completed will be viewed as 
the tf: the endpoint.  
Market mechanisms Hierarchy Actors & Interactions
Restructuring assumed to be 
market driven. Low degree 
of actor interdependency 
as well as low degree of 
influence (power to enforce) 
of individual actors.
Restructuring assumed to be 
(at least partly) enforceable 
by dominant actor(s).
Restructuring assumed to take 
place in interactive processes 
based on high degree of 
interdependency and complex 
patterns of influence. 
No dominant actor able to 
enforce desired changes. 
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2.6.  Decision support model, and theory for spatial 
investments
The planning agency needs to select an approach to choosing and performing certain main 
tasks, inherent in the way in which any restructuring is performed. This study aims to develop a 
decision support model that can help planning agencies to choose an appropriate and effective 
approach, taking account of the specific situation. A decision support model is here viewed 
as a tool that can help identifying key characteristics of a specific restructuring situation, 
and that then suggests appropriate follow-up actions to influence these characteristics in a 
desired direction. It does not prescribe these actions, but leaves the choice to the planning 
agency (and other actors possibly involved in the decision-making). Such actions enable 
planning agencies to get more insight into the process and, in particular, help in finding 
solutions that satisfy the needs of the involved actors more quickly. 
Such a decision support model needs to build upon theory. The appropriate theory must 
fit the specific conditions surrounding spatial investments: in this case those surrounding 
industrial sites. The possible theories are investigated in chapter four, where we will also 
make a choice for the most appropriate theory. 
 
2.7. Research design 
The previous sections have delivered a number of ‘building-blocks’ for narrowing down the 
research scope and focus. Summarising and combining these elements, the main research 
question of this study is: 
“How can a decision support model be developed that enables planning agencies to identify 
appropriate	situation-specific	approaches	that	reduce	the	total	restructuring	duration	
without	endangering	the	quality	of	the	final	outcome?”
The assumption is that the current approaches can be improved, and that such improvements 
can be reached by applying process approaches that are adapted to the specific situation. 
The following figure visualises the main relationships, and the way in which a decision 
support model can assist planning agencies in this. It shows how the decision support model 
and situation-specific process approaches are applied in a continuous process of alternating 
steps of analysis and follow-up actions. At the beginning of a process, the decision support 
model is used for choosing an approach appropriate to the initial situation, an approach which 
takes into account characteristics encountered. This approach again affects the process, and 
accordingly leads to an altered situation and a new round of analysis and follow-up.  
the process. The local authorities do have some opportunities to enforce some actions 
through laws and regulations. However, for a significant part of the desired developments, 
successful voluntary cooperation between at least firms and local authorities is a necessity. 
This makes the ‘command and control’ approach to management unlikely to work (Battram, 
1996). Complex actor interdependency is accordingly a key aspect of restructuring. 
All these characteristics and arguments indicate that a perspective focusing on actors, 
interaction, and cooperation is suitable for developing an improved understanding of 
restructuring, and better than a perspective from markets or hierarchy. 
Summing up, the choice for this actor-and-interaction perspective is based on the following 
characteristics of restructuring (which are described in more detail in the next chapter):
•  It cannot be expected that market mechanisms alone will ensure sufficient progress and/
or satisfactory outcomes of restructuring;
•  Neither local authorities nor firms on the site are able single-handedly to implement, 
and in particular to finance and/or enforce, any integral restructuring of the whole 
industrial site;
•  Development of feasible solutions requires an integral process approach to the interests 
and goals of, and to the interdependency between, different stakeholders regarding 
organisational, financial, political, technical and, legal aspects;
2.5. Local authorities acting as planning agencies
The next issue is: on which actors this study should focus. The previous description has pointed 
to firms and local authorities as being actors having significant interest in, and influence 
on, performance of most of the industrial sites in the Netherlands. However, initiating and 
managing the process is usually performed by municipalities (Louw & al., 2004, ch. 6: pp. 
125-154, THB, 2008a, Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; EZ and VROM, 2008; PBL, 2009). In 
that sense, the latter act as a planning agency, taking a certain responsibility for the spatial 
planning within a specified geographical area (Alexander and Faludi, 1996; Needham, 2000). 
The way planning agencies act, and in particular the way they interact with other actors, 
will accordingly influence progress and results (see e.g. Healey, 2007, for some reflections 
on the development of views on the ‘planning agency’). Moreover, interaction (cooperation 
and coordination) between local authorities on a regional level is important (VROM-raad, 
2006; THBa, 2008; BWU, 2009; Adviescommissie Plabeka, 2011). So, regardless of whether 
a local or regional perspective is applied, all situations will include the local authorities. Their 
way of cooperating, formalised or not, will direct and influence the restructuring progress 
and results. This study will include the interactions on a regional level, but will do so viewed 
from the perspective of a local authority in its role as planning agency. The term planning 
agency will therefore in this study be used to mean a local authority which takes a certain 
responsibility for the planning of the restructuring.   
The role of such a planning agency has already been briefly introduced in chapter one as well 
as in the previous sections of this chapter. The planning agency takes a certain approach to 
starting a restructuring initiative, and subsequently to managing a process aimed at achieving 
results which are satisfactory enough to actors having an interest in the site performance. 
This requires at least performing a number of main tasks. 
Decision support model
Situation-specific process 
approach applied by 
planning agency
Initial situation 
Site in need of 
restructuring
Final situation
Site revitalised or 
reprofiled
Figure 2.2  Relationships influence planning agency and process duration. 
          t0                                                                                                                tf
Restructuring process
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In order to answer this research question we must build upon existing knowledge and at the 
same time incorporate the assumptions about how restructuring can best be understood and 
studied. 
Because restructuring industrial sites is not well understood, and, in particular, it is unclear 
which theory, or theories, is / are most suitable for studying such processes, an explorative 
step-wise approach is applied. This approach is mainly qualitative and is a gradual, iterative, 
process towards getting a clearer idea of the main aspects that can guide the selection, and 
development, of theory and of the decision support model. It supports the view of Flick when 
he says that “[…] designing methods open to the complexity of the study’s subject is also a 
way to study complex issues with qualitative research. Here, the object under study is the 
determining factor for choosing a factor and not the other way round […]” (Flick, 2009, p. 
15). On the other hand the explorative search within this study is informed, and to a certain 
degree focused, by previous experience (e.g. Lambooy, Spit and Bugge, 2002; Bugge, 2003; 
2006; 2007; 2008; Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 2004; Bugge et al., 2007; 2010).  
The search therefore starts with a brief description of restructuring, focusing on the range of 
approaches currently applied by planning agencies to the main tasks. This phase is mainly 
descriptive and explorative. It has the characteristics of preliminary research and is used to 
develop a clearer idea about the full complexity of restructuring in practice. The next step is 
to apply this information in the search for frameworks and theory that fit the phenomenon 
being researched (i.e. restructuring) and which can be applied in practice (Dey, 1999). 
Next, the situation-specific approach for handling restructuring, which is called a ‘decision 
support model’, can be developed. This model, again acknowledging the explorative nature 
of this study and the importance of applicability, can then be tested and operationalised by 
practitioners. Finally, the significance of the outcomes for knowledge and practice can be 
discussed.  
It is now possible to formulate the detailed research questions:
1.  What are the main activities and tasks in restructuring, and how are they currently being 
handled	by	planning	agencies	(addressed	in	chapter	three)?
2.  How can performance of complex multi-actor processes (such as restructuring) be 
understood	(addressed	in	chapter	four)?
3.  How can the theoretical framework be applied to restructuring of industrial sites (addressed 
in	chapter	five)?
4.	 	How	 can	 a	 model	 be	 developed	 for	 situation-specific	 process	 approaches	 chosen	 by	
planning	agencies	to	influence	progress	(addressed	in	chapter	six)?
5.  How can practitioners test and operationalise the model, and what do the outcomes tell us 
about	the	model	and	restructuring	(addressed	in	chapter	seven)?
6.  What do the outcomes contribute to knowledge and practice, and what do they tell us 
about	the	need	for	further	research	(addressed	in	chapter	eight)?
3.1. Introduction
Although each restructuring is different from all others, there is sufficient in common to 
make it possible to study how restructuring processes in the Netherlands are being tackled 
in practice. 
The question is then whether these (commonly applied) restructuring approaches are effective 
in practice? However, planning agencies have limited, or no, previous experience with large 
scale industrial site restructuring. They are largely unaware of what they can expect, and 
they tend to view everything that occurs as new and special: they may even assume that 
what happens is incomparable to anything encountered elsewhere. They may even be unable 
to ask the ‘right’ questions, because they have no, or too limited, experience with causal 
relationships, for example between process interventions and effects on commitment.  
The objective of this chapter is to describe how such complex processes are designed and 
managed in practice This chapter accordingly seeks an answer to the first detailed research 
question formulated in chapter two:
 What are the main activities and tasks in restructuring, and how are they currently being 
handled	by	the	planning	agencies?
The first step is to choose how the description can be structured (3.2). The chosen structure is 
then filled in. First, restructuring processes are presented as possessing a limited number of 
common main tasks and activities (3.3). The approaches to both tasks and activities depend 
on the phase of the restructuring. Some tasks are repeated during the process, or they 
address the whole restructuring (3.4), whereas other approaches are applied for short-term 
objectives and activities (3.5). 
3.2. How the process description is addressed
Based on literature and personal experience
An exploration of the literature on industrial site development reveals that although processes 
of ageing, decay and restructuring (CPB, 2001; Konz and van den Thillart, 2002; Louw et al, 
3. Current approaches to restructuring
 in practice 
“We consider the success of revitalization to be a function of the 
combined quality of stakeholder involvement, management and 
organization of the process and, finally, specific measures.”
(Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 2004, “Preface” p. 5)
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This means that the scope of the description is limited to the role of planning agencies, 
and the focus is on how they address specific tasks and activities. Nevertheless, the high 
complexity of the processes implies that there are numerous possibilities for making such 
a description, varying from what loosely might be called ‘telling a story’ towards applying a 
predefined format. A structure represents a simplification and can accordingly never capture 
the full complexity of any real life process. On the other hand, the use of a structure means 
that selected relationships, differences, and importance of issues are made explicit. This 
ordering of issues makes it possible to discuss, refine and redesign restructuring processes 
on all levels, which is exactly how the following description of the processes is to be viewed. 
3.3. Main activities, tasks and their relationships
The basis for the chosen structure and description of restructuring activities is taken from a 
three year research project on sustainable revitalisation of urban industrial sites funded by 
the European Commission within the Fifth Framework program (Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 
2004; for a short summary of the project see appendix II). Within this project, a decision 
support approach was developed that incorporates experiences from six real life cases and 
from the body-of-knowledge on restructuring available at that time. These experiences 
showed that there is always a certain degree of interaction between the involved actors 
aimed at identifying, and subsequently implementing, feasible opportunities. Furthermore, 
restructuring seldom, or maybe in practice never, is performed as a single concerted set of 
actions according to a blueprint master plan. Instead a partly consecutive, partly parallel, 
approach is applied, where each improvement measure has its own more or less independent 
planning and financial exploitation. At the same time, this approach is used for building 
commitment for a follow-up, and it is also increasingly intended to enable some of the 
investments to be recovered through a partial revolving fund construction.  
This short description implies that all processes have two other distinct characteristics in 
common. First, there must be a moment in time (see chapter two for a definition) where 
an organised intervention is started, which from that point in time is called a restructuring. 
Prior to this moment, improvements of the site may, and usually will, have occurred, but for 
some reason the process was not considered to be a restructuring. Second, any restructuring 
includes the activities of preparation, determination (or decision), and implementation 
(Voogd, 1995). 
The total restructuring can accordingly be viewed as a set of activities which vary according 
to the phase of the restructuring (Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 2004). First, awareness and 
acknowledgement of a need to act gradually develops. Then this awareness leads to one 
or more actors taking a step towards starting a restructuring, which usually gradually 
develops into joint efforts to take an organised initiative. Such an initiative builds on a first 
understanding of the problems, and usually it results in ambitions and a set of objectives 
being formulated. Next, solutions are sought and assessed, and then decisions to implement 
are made. Attempts are made to develop a continuous improvement process, and in 
successful cases such attempts lead to a situation where management has been organised, 
and monitoring of site performance has been implemented and/or improved.  
This leads to a ‘simplified’ structure for describing how restructuring proceeds in practice, 
a structure which captures the fact that some activities partly overlap and are encountered 
several times during a process. First, there is an initiative ‘phase’, which leads to more or less 
specific goals for the restructuring, and subsequently there is a ‘phase’ aimed at ensuring 
that feasible and desired solutions are found and implemented. 
2004; Olden, 2007; PBL, 2009; Blokhuis, 2010) have received considerable attention the past 
years, most efforts have been directed towards developing, influencing, or evaluating the 
impact of the policy of public authorities (e.g. EZ, 2004b; RPB, 2005; 2007; VROM-raad, 2006; 
THBa, 2008; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; PBL, 2009; Nicis, 2009; Adviescommissie Plabeka, 
2011). These efforts were aimed at identifying problems and obstacles (see appendix I); at 
developing (mainly) plans for a large number of individual restructuring cases (e.g. Novem 
and EZ 1999; 2000; VROM et al., 2010a): and at a variety of more or less comprehensive 
guidelines (e.g. EZ, 1998; DHV, 2000; Provincie Flevoland, 2000; Novem, 2001; Novem and 
Décor, 2003; Brand et al., 2004; BOM, 2006; REVIT, 2007) and ‘good practices’ for specific 
themes such as land use, architecture, private involvement, and industrial site management 
(e.g. BCI, 2003; VROM, 2001; EZ, 1999; 2002). Although these documents are based on 
practitioners’ experience, they rarely include any explicit descriptions of current approaches 
to restructuring, nor, in particular, how they are designed and managed by a planning agency. 
Instead they are usually normative, either telling what is perceived to be ‘wrong’, or providing 
a ‘better’ alternative. In short, although the literature includes a rich body of knowledge on 
how restructuring in the Netherlands is performed by planning agencies, this information is 
mainly implicit and can only be ‘extracted’ from literature cautiously.
The information used for this chapter is of the same sort as that used by Barrie Needham 
who says, for his description of Dutch land-use planning “[…] as the final piece of supporting 
evidence I give the general knowledge that I have of planning practice in the Netherlands 
[…]. This is no more – but also no less, being built upon many years studying practice […]” 
(Needham, 2000, p. 451). In this chapter, the information from literature is complemented, and 
enriched, by more than fifteen years personal experience with industrial site development, 
process management, and decision support. This experience includes a wide range of 
activities such as applied research into decision support for regional innovation processes 
(Bugge et al., 2007; Welter et al., 2008; Bugge et al. 2010); into opportunities and obstacles 
for industrial ecology on industrial sites (Bugge, 1994); into the influence of planning 
agencies on  revitalisation of urban industrial sites and the dilemmas they face (Bugge; 2003; 
Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 2004; Bugge, 2006); into multifunctional land use (Lambooy et al., 
2002); into development of management guides (Novem, 2001; Brand, Bugge and Roelofs, 
2004) and visions for sites and cities (Bugge, 2000; 2004); into process interventions and 
evaluations (e.g. Bugge, 2007; 2008); and into a wide range of other contributions to Dutch 
industrial site practice and policy development. 
Elements of a structure
Both literature and own experience indicate that in practice a large number of activities and 
tasks can be identified that, to a varying degree, are relevant to, and important for, the effect 
of restructuring. It is possible to distinguish between such tasks and activities according 
to their nature and importance. Some, which will be called main tasks and activities, are 
encountered during any restructuring. These can be used to order the description of the 
processes, and, in particular, to provide a framework for a description of more detailed tasks. 
To describe all possible process variations would, within the scope of this study, be infeasible. 
The limited description suffices to present the ranges which are encountered in practice. 
The variety suggests that planning agencies have reasons for choosing what to do and how 
to act, and that somehow this ‘causal background’ influences, and limits, their choices. 
However, this is only briefly addressed in this chapter (see chapter four for a theoretical 
perspective on how the actions of planning agencies can be understood). 
Any description represents a simplification and perception of reality 
Our aim is to make a description which is useful, taking the objective of this study into account. 
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However, because restructuring lasts so long, changes might stimulate, or even often 
necessitate, adjustment of both plans and organisation. The situation on the industrial sites 
continuously changes through, for example, migration of firms and changes in business 
activities. Different ageing mechanisms operate, and generate new problems or make 
existing problems worse. At the same time, new insights provide more options and sometimes 
better solutions. Also trends and planned changes in policy, organisation and socio-economic 
situation influence the local situation. 
Planning agencies therefore have to manage processes of change. Their strategies can 
be positioned on a range between two extremes. The first extreme would be a ‘blueprint’ 
approach where a plan is developed and subsequently implemented without any alterations. 
The opposite extreme would be continuously to adapt objectives, plans, and organisation 
to external and internal developments. In practice, planning agencies seem to prefer an 
intermediate approach: a continuous change strategy within a long-term framework of 
ambitions and general objectives, sometimes called a Master Plan. 
Such a framework allows a considerable degree of flexibility. The planning agency can, and 
does, develop and execute separate projects according to need and opportunities. The start 
of any new project is the outcome of a process aimed at finding, or building, a solution that 
has sufficient support from the involved actors. This support is based on different things. First, 
a project design mirrors the needs, and ambitions, of planning agency, firms and possibly also 
other involved actors. Second, it is based on the availability of resources. This availability 
limits the opportunities. It is therefore not surprising that projects that get sufficient support 
are quite diverse, or that times of (seemingly) no activities alternate with times where major 
changes occur within a relatively short time. To plan, organise and manage this diversity 
and the changing availability of resources and commitment, the planning agency applies 
different reductionist approaches. These lead to a ‘simplification’ of a problem situation, 
which means that at least implicitly the planning agency accepts the related advantages 
and disadvantages. ‘Simplifying’ a problem can for example mean that its relationships with 
other problems on the site are excluded from assessment; and that can be viewed as an 
advantage. On the other hand, simplifying can mean that effects not assessed can negatively 
affect the restructuring in the future: a disadvantage. 
The planning agency simplifies based on three partly interdependent criteria: spatial scale, 
content related themes, and actors. First it divides an industrial site into smaller parts that 
can be addressed either in parallel or consecutively. This makes it possible to separate areas 
based on importance, urgency and homogeneity of the problems, and this enables selecting 
improvement strategies that fit the problem in that particular area. Second it develops 
projects that address specific themes such as security, quality of infrastructure or land use. 
Finally, projects are sometimes limited to specific actors. There can be projects aimed at 
specific sectors, such as individual firms that are responsible for a significant part of the 
undesired environmental or safety effects, or at the property of the planning agency itself 
(i.e. public space). In practice, these three types of approaches are used together, such as 
addressing specific actors and themes related to smaller defined areas of an industrial site. 
On the other hand, the planning agency sometimes makes the problem situation less simple 
by linking restructuring of industrial sites to comprehensive integral improvement strategies 
for the local, and sometimes even regional, community. Especially industrial sites located 
in urban areas often possess specific weaknesses and strengths that present threats and 
opportunities to the surroundings. The planning agency tries to address this complexity 
through an approach, which includes changing functional mixes and enabling spatial dynamics. 
In practice, this means working towards accommodating the ‘right activity at the right place’. 
If a firm is situated on the wrong place, for example for safety reasons, it is stimulated to 
relocate. This often includes offering alternative locations on new sites. Such relocations then 
The main tasks of the planning agency can be related to the activities in these two ‘phases’. 
Planning agencies usually fulfil an important role in a restructuring. Besides often being 
the process initiator, they normally plan, organise and manage most of the activities. This 
implies that the planning agency more or less continuously needs to search for alternative 
approaches and solutions, assess their impact on the process, and decide how to proceed. 
This complex search is always aimed at finding feasible solutions, to which actors will commit 
themselves and to implement which the required means are available. Building commitment 
is accordingly another main task for the planning agency. To be able to develop and manage 
an appropriate process, and to identify and implement appropriate solutions, planning 
agencies therefore need to collect information about the motives which actors have, and 
about how commitment to allocating resources can be reached. The links between these 
main tasks and the restructuring activities are visualised in figure 3.1.
 
Figure 3.1  Main tasks planning agency and relationship to main restructuring activities 
These tasks are encountered both related to the complete restructuring, and to the two 
separate activities of initiative and implementation. This implies that planning agencies 
continuously need to manage at the same time both the individual activities and the complete 
process. The way they address the main tasks are described in accordance with this division, 
starting with approaches applied to the complete process.   
3.4. Approaches to main tasks for the complete restructuring 
Plan, Organise & Manage
The first issue is how planning agencies plan, organise and manage a restructuring. Planning 
agencies link this to long term ambitions for developments of the local community. There is 
always at least general policy, regarding matters such as employment and environmental 
performance, which will have consequences for industrial sites. This policy, possibly also 
influenced by local complaints or by policy of higher authorities, leads to the development 
of a plan for the restructuring, which is translated into an organisational design and which to 
some extent governs the subsequent management of the process.  
Main Tasks 
Planning agency
•  Plan, Organise & Manage
• Search, Assess & Decide
• Build Commitment
Implementation phase
Choosing solutions and strategies 
Assessing feasibility of options
Searching for improvement options 
that fit objectives
Initiative phase
Defining problems and objectives
Awareness and acknowledgement 
of need to act
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other extreme approach is to keep (especially) external involvement to a minimum. Such a 
minimum is dictated by considerations such as legal requirements, impact on financing, and 
land ownership. The choice for an approach depends on factors such as kind of decision, 
influence of actors, and the relationship between local industry and planning agency. Because 
all these factors can change over time, the approach during a restructuring often changes 
too. Also, different approaches to building commitment are sometimes applied at the same 
time for different kind of decisions. 
Because quality of solution is related to the commitment of actors, this task is complicated. 
The planning agencies accordingly try to develop feasible solutions which balance, in a 
way acceptable to all actors, satisfaction, effects and available resources. In particular, this 
means acknowledging, and addressing, the fact that the degree of commitment will always 
be related to specific measures. 
In practice this means that although planning agencies will attempt to find good solutions, 
the need for commitment (expressed through ability and willingness to invest) may lead to 
solutions that are feasible, but still far from being any ‘best choice’ regarding total effects. 
For example, the planning agencies sometimes choose, and implement, ‘quick-win’ solutions. 
These measures may have a very positive effect on short term satisfaction, but may on the 
other hand financially, or even physically, restrict future possibilities for site improvement. 
Therefore the planning agencies also try to combine, and to adjust according to need, long 
term and short term activities aimed at building commitment. This flexibility is also an 
important aspect of ensuring continuity and progress. The long duration of the restructuring 
can otherwise lead to a decrease in commitment. 
Relationships between main tasks
We have identified three main tasks which planning agencies perform regarding the complete 
restructuring. These three tasks all interact, and the approaches to these tasks taken by 
planning agencies accordingly (at least partly) overlap (see table 3.1). For example, the 
tasks of building commitment and performing searches can also be viewed as belonging 
to management and organisation activities. However, they have been described separately 
because they illustrate different aspects of how planning agencies address actors and 
interactions in their attempts to restructure industrial sites. 
create opportunities for new activities, and possibly different functions, on the now available 
vacant space. The planning agency usually tries to manage this interdependent relocation 
strategy in such a way that functional changes cover, at least partly, financial deficits from 
restructuring efforts. This objective is sometimes achieved through transformation of (parts 
of) industrial sites into housing or office areas: as long as such re-profiling and transformation 
concerns only a small part of the site, the restructuring still falls within the scope of this study. 
Search, Assess & Decide
The diversity of problems, opportunities, projects and time-related efforts is reflected in 
the way decision making is performed. The decision making process is composed of three 
activities: searching, assessing, and taking the actual decision. The planning agencies 
normally have a role in all of those activities.  
In practice, it is often necessary to perform these activities several times before a satisfactory 
result has been achieved. This means that any decision, based on searching and assessing 
options, usually leads to some change, but not necessarily to the implementation of any real 
‘solution’. What often happens is that a new ‘round’ (Teisman, 1992) is started, which can 
include changes to the actors involved and to the topics that are discussed. These ‘rounds’ 
(see figure 3.2) continue until a satisfactory solution has been found, where “satisfactory” 
means that there is sufficient commitment to proceed towards implementation. 
 
Figure 3.2  Complex decision-making in ‘rounds’
In practice, the activities of searching, assessing and deciding are not always as separate as 
the visualization above may suggest. Sometimes complex decision making is performed in 
a ‘garbage can’ (Simon, 1957; 1960) where all three activities are addressed in parallel and 
intertwined during one short session. 
The planning agencies can be involved in these activities in different ways, ranging from 
complete responsibility to no involvement at all. Their involvement may be compulsory, 
related to specific legal responsibilities. However, in most cases the chosen involvement 
is based on an assessment of the expected impact of different actions in the light of own 
resources and ambitions (more details on approaches to such ‘search – assess – decide’ 
rounds are given in the next section). 
Build commitment 
Finally, a specific, and highly important, main task of the planning agencies is building 
commitment. This requires more or less continuous efforts directed towards both external 
and internal actors. Again different process strategies are applied. Sometimes a wide range 
of actors are involved in planning and, depending on the issues, even decision making. The 
Assess Decide
Implementation of 
solution
Search
Main tasks Applied process approaches
Planning, Organisation, and Management
Combination of global long-term ambitions 
and use of specific time-dependent 
opportunities
Search, Assess, and Decide
Choice of role in complex decision-making 
‘rounds’ based on expected impact and 
available resources.
Build Commitment
Working towards solutions which are 
accepted by all / most actors regarding 
satisfaction, available resources and effects 
on site performance.
Table 3.1  Main tasks and applied process approaches for complete process
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Recognizing and underpinning the need for restructuring
In practice, planning agencies apply approaches somewhere between pro-active and 
reactive. The most pro-active planning agencies typically monitor and evaluate information 
that is considered to be relevant for internal decision making and policy development. The 
planning agencies regularly collect information about satisfaction of the firms and about 
the technical – physical situation on the site. Satisfaction used to be monitored by written 
surveys, interviews, or regular meetings with representatives of firms. However, industrial 
site management organisations, in the Netherlands usually called “Park Management”, are 
slowly becoming more important in a continuous interactive process between firms and 
local authorities. This interaction facilitates the development of a common understanding of 
problems and possible solutions, and as such creates the basis for initiatives for restructuring. 
Monitoring of (physical) site performance is partly based on the same approaches, but also 
often includes regular quick-scans.  
Access to relevant information depends also on the internal communication within the planning 
agency itself. The results of the monitoring (i.e. data) will usually enter the organisation at 
different points. Detailed information, such as on environmental performance, quality of the 
infrastructure, and plans for firm relocation, may be known only to specific departments or 
even only to groups of civil servants. Pro-active planning agencies ensure that the internal 
communication is coordinated, to ensure that all parts of the organisation receive necessary 
information on time. This means that they are ‘translating’ data into management information 
in accordance with the diverse needs of internal target groups.
However, in practice, monitoring and subsequent assessment is often much less continuous 
and structured. Surveys are carried out, but irregularly as a reaction to such things as 
complaints about site performance, and they are not part of any continuous integral 
improvement approach. This situation is usually encountered in planning agencies applying 
a more reactive approach. The most extreme reactive strategy is that planning agencies wait 
until external developments (experienced as pressure) more or less force them to act. 
A parallel and intertwined process of building commitment
Regardless of the approach to monitoring and assessment which the planning agency takes, 
there will be a moment where the need to act has been recognised by a limited number of 
civil servants and possibly individual politicians. The next task is to get the topic onto the 
local political agenda. This may be done in a number of ways. In practice a gradual approach 
to building commitment seems to be the favoured strategy. 
Assuming that this process starts within the planning agency itself, the initiators first try to 
collect any necessary additional information about the necessity to act. This may include a 
whole range of activities including workshops, brain-storm sessions, surveys, measurements 
and visualizations of effects of problems, and site visits. Parallel to this, initial, often informal, 
assessments of feasibility of different improvement strategies are made. The possible effects 
of a restructuring initiative on existing plans and objectives in other policy fields, the opinions 
of local politicians, and funding options are explored. 
This process is not limited to collecting information, and can be viewed as a continuous search 
and assessment of feasible developments aimed at discovering opportunities for starting an 
initiative. The tasks of collecting information and building commitment accordingly often run 
parallel and intertwined rather than consecutive.
At a certain moment, the results are presented to the responsible politicians as a coherent new 
policy initiative, or alternatively as an activity which may be considered as a continuation of 
current policy. This initiative will not come as a surprise, because it will have been thoroughly 
prepared as described above. Nevertheless, such proposals in practice provoke different 
reactions. In some cases, responsible politicians acknowledge the need for restructuring, 
3.5.  Activities specific to the initiative phase and to the 
implementation phase
The complete restructuring process just described can be divided into two ‘phases’, initiative 
and implementation (see figure 3.1). We now consider each of those separately, describing 
the activities specific to each phase. 
3.5.1. Initiative 
Even before the restructuring has been formally started, there will have been more or less 
organised attempts to influence commitment to, searches for, and implementation of, site 
improvement measures. However, these actions might not have led to acknowledgement of 
urgency and importance sufficient for starting an integral and comprehensive restructuring. 
Movement towards an organised initiative is accordingly characterised by a growing concern 
about the situation on the site. This concern is expressed in different ways by a variety 
of internal (i.e. originating from ‘inside’ the planning agency) and external actors, and it 
influences the perceived need for change. Developments in laws and regulations and policy, 
experienced negative socio-economic or environmental effects related to the site, and, of 
course, complaints can contribute to this growing concern. 
Impact of policy development of higher authorities
The importance, and related urgency, of restructuring decayed industrial sites is stressed in 
national policy. This national policy serves as a framework for Dutch provinces in development 
of their own policy. Planning agencies functioning on a local (and usually in different ways 
also regional) level are confronted with policy of higher authorities through objectives and 
specific related instruments such as the (previously mentioned) use of the “SER-ladder”, 
regional programming, and funding schemes. 
This description might suggest a simple top-down approach. However, measures taken by 
higher authorities are often influenced by information from the local level, because both 
national and provincial authorities use, in their own policy development, input from local 
authorities and other relevant organisations, such as a wide range of interest groups. 
Satisfaction of firms and neighbourhoods 
Complaints, in particular, are symptoms of specific problems or of more comprehensive 
processes of decay. Firms leaving a decayed site or contacting the local authorities in search 
for new locations might indicate inappropriate quality on the existing site. Complaints can 
also come from a variety of groups and individuals involved in the local society, in particular 
those living near to the site. 
Internal developments of the planning agency
Different departments, groups within the municipal council, or individual politicians or civil 
servants, may be aware of part of the problems and try to get these on the political agenda. 
This can happen without those actors having an overview of the problem situation or any 
common agreement about what needs to be done, and certainly no broad formal commitment. 
Nevertheless, a planning agency, viewed as a single entity, has to recognize, and subsequently 
underpin, any need for starting a restructuring initiative, and its subsequent, intertwined 
objective is to ensure that this need is acknowledged by sufficient actors to enable starting 
the initiative. 
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Figure 3.3  The Initiative: actor involvement and possible outcomes
Such an initiative evolves along various lines and leads to various activities and outcomes, 
depending on actor involvement and the agenda (see figure 3.3). In practice, a joint vision 
for the site development is often encountered. This usually includes a more or less ambitious 
picture of the future accompanied by a set of (global) objectives. Often this vision is coupled 
with a Letter of Intent that confirms, and strengthens, the willingness of the involved parties to 
cooperate and invest in the site improvement. However, in some cases no vision is developed 
in this early stage: the involved parties first collect more information on problems and 
improvement options, and then develop a (Master) plan for (parts of) the area. Sometimes 
even the integral planning phase is accompanied by the parallel implementation of a limited 
number of feasible measures. 
Collecting additional information about the situation on the industrial site
However, in both cases (vision or no vision) the planning agency needs to collect information 
to facilitate decision making on what the restructuring objectives should be. Although 
some information has already been gathered during the process, which has led to the 
acknowledgement of the necessity to act, in practice at this stage there is often still no 
overview available. A quick-scan might then be performed, which can address a wide range 
of topics. It may be limited to generating an overview of problems, but it will usually also, 
at least implicitly, include options for improvement. The quick-scan therefore normally 
addresses all aspects of ageing and decay (see 1.5), without all aspects necessarily receiving 
the same level of attention. Scope, focus and method are influenced by perceptions of 
but for different reasons (e.g. other priorities or lack of resources) they choose to postpone 
starting any restructuring. The political consequences of launching an initiative at what 
might be the ‘wrong’ moment also influence such a decision. Another outcome may be 
that politicians still doubt the necessity to act. This may completely stop an initiative, or it 
may lead to new efforts to underpin the need and feasibility. There is accordingly a search 
for a well-balanced proposal about the importance and urgency of starting a restructuring 
initiative, about (potentially) available resources, and about commitment. 
Acknowledgement of a need to act
Finally, this emerging awareness leads to an acknowledgement by at least the planning 
agency of a need to act. This acknowledgement means that some global objectives for a 
restructuring are formulated and ideally integrated into more comprehensive development 
programs for the local community. These then serve as the starting point for developing a 
joint restructuring initiative. 
There is then some commitment, a general idea about the problems and related possible 
objectives and solutions, and a first global check of feasibility. However, usually there is still at 
this point much uncertainty regarding what needs to be done, by whom and when. 
Strategy, actor involvement and possible outcomes
There are three possible initial situations regarding actor commitment and involvement: the 
first steps are taken by the planning agency, by firms, or by both. However, the first two 
approaches tend to develop into a joint initiative in time, because in such comprehensive and 
integral improvement, there is interdependency between planning agencies and firms that 
necessitates a certain degree of cooperation. 
Planning agencies are always, and necessarily, involved, because they have specific and 
exclusive legal responsibilities for spatial planning (The Spatial Planning Act, and in particular, 
the Zoning Plan) and environmental performance (The Environmental Management Act). Any 
spatial developments either have to be in accordance with current regulations or will have to 
be incorporated in a modified (or new) Zoning plan. On the other hand, integral improvements 
of sites include both the property of the local authorities and that of the firms: this usually 
means that both sorts of actor need to invest.  
Moreover, the investment needed for the total restructuring usually significantly exceeds 
the capacities of all local actors together. Often this leads to the involvement of higher 
authorities, and in particular, provinces. Besides this financial reason, provinces are often 
involved because they often actively stimulate restructuring initiatives as part of their policy 
on industrial site development. 
A variety of other actors, such as representatives of residents of nearby neighbourhoods, 
interest groups and investors, may become involved as well. Some of these actors, such as a 
specific restructuring agency or a regional development agency, may (partly) be involved in 
performing the tasks of the planning agency as well. 
Planning agency
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Planning 
agency + firms
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Firms
(Master plan)
Vision / goals,
and possibly 
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(Implementation of 
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if desired, to develop first a plan only for the improvement of public space, for which the 
decision-making process is simpler. The leading idea behind this strategy is the hope that 
such an initiative may stimulate firms as well to invest in the area, at a later stage. On the 
other extreme of the range of approaches, the planning agencies do not develop any specific 
internal vision, but prefer to react to external developments or to co-develop a joint vision 
in co-operation with a selection of actors who have an interest in the area. In both cases, an 
internal vision evolves, more or less explicitly, during the process. 
 
Choosing a strategy for involving actors in the choice of objectives
An internal vision – what the planning agency wants – is a starting point for a dialogue with 
external stakeholders, but it may also set more or less hard constraints on any joint search 
for objectives. In any case, the initial ambitions for site improvement influence how actors will 
be involved. Planning agencies identify the actors which, they believe, should be involved, 
and what their role should be. Previously mentioned factors such as interests, influence, and 
expressed willingness to participate in the restructuring are then, more or less explicitly and 
consciously, taken into account. 
Planning agencies know that integral restructuring requires at least the support, preferably 
active contribution, of firms on the site. How should an appropriate representation of 
these firms be organised? It is not only infeasible, but also unnecessary and even probably 
counterproductive, to get full involvement of all firms in all activities. If there is an employers’ 
organisation, or Park Management organisation, this will normally be invited to represent 
the firms. Other ways used are representatives of employers’ organisations at the level of 
the municipality or the Chamber of Commerce, but also active individual firms. The planning 
agency usually tries to identify specific individuals that are trusted by both ‘sides’ (i.e. planning 
agency and firms), who can ‘build bridges’ between the different actors. Such individuals (in 
Dutch sometimes referred to as ‘oliemannen’) are sometimes representatives of larger firms, 
but they may also be former (i.e. retired) entrepreneurs who have both sufficient time and 
the desired influence. 
Depending on the outcomes of initial assessments, the planning agency might choose 
to involve other actors also in the restructuring initiative. The aim is to ensure that an 
appropriate mix of actors is developed, which means both problem owners and (potential) 
problem solvers. In both cases, the planning agency focuses on how the actors can contribute 
to the desired change through allocation of resources, and on their (potential) willingness to 
invest in the restructuring and its outcomes. Therefore the province is an often encountered 
actor in this early phase. 
Organising the decision making process on restructuring objectives
The next task of the planning agencies is to design, organise and manage a process that 
leads to the desired agreement on restructuring objectives. In revitalisation and reprofiling 
processes this task is complex, because of the variety of different actors having quite different 
and sometimes conflicting goals, and because the necessary investments are high.    
Depending on the way the planning agencies have addressed the previously described 
activities, they might already have a certain basis for organising the decision-making process. 
This consists of information on problems, possible solutions, actors and their preferences, 
and their own objectives and constraints regarding resources and solutions. The planning 
agencies then often invite the selected actors to participate in brainstorm activities aimed 
at developing a complete vision, or at least a set of objectives. This is usually organised as 
a mix of group and bi-lateral sessions. Depending on the situation, the creative activities 
start either from current problems, or they use a picture of the desired future situation as 
the starting point. Parallel, and more or less continuous, attention is paid to exploring the 
problem urgency and importance, as well as by resource constraints of the actors involved 
in the quick-scan. Consultancy firms usually perform these quick-scans, applying their own 
pre-developed research methods. 
In practice a predominantly qualitative, or semi-quantitative, assessment is made, based on a 
mix of visual inspection of the area, data already available from measurements, and possibly 
feedback on satisfaction from firms or other actors. The visual inspection is aimed at getting a 
general idea of the quality of buildings and their surrounding areas, infrastructure, and image 
of the area. This makes it possible to create more detailed pictures of sub-areas of the site, 
and accordingly to locate problems and related problem owners. Buildings may be assessed 
regarding level of maintenance and the degree to which they fit into their surroundings. Use 
of space and tidiness are aspects that are checked in the unbuilt spaces. Special attention is 
often given to spatial symptoms of business efficiency, such as non-used buildings or firms 
having insufficient space for storage, parking or loading freight. Quality of infrastructure on 
the site and of access routes to the site is another important aspect. A quick-scan tries to 
assess whether the available infrastructure fits the needs of the firms. Phenomena such 
as regular traffic congestion can indicate serious problems. The increasing importance of 
“image” means that presence and maintenance of ‘green’ areas are included in the scan as 
well. Another issue is the environmental performance: certain activities of firms cause safety 
risks or nuisance for other firms or neighbourhoods. The quick-scan can provide information 
on risks related to laws and regulations, but also on complaints and potential conflicts related 
to nuisance aspects such as dust, odour or noise.  
Collecting additional information about actors
Information on the physical – technical situation on the site is not sufficient as input for 
decision making. It is important for the planning agency to have information also about the 
actors that are, or could become, involved in the restructuring of the industrial site. This 
information is gathered in quite different ways. In some cases, the planning agencies include 
a brief analysis of actor involvement in a general site performance quick-scan: the scan is 
then limited to a survey of general satisfaction and experienced problems of all firms on the 
site. In other cases, more elaborate approaches are applied, including in-depth interviews 
with representatives of firms, but also with actors such as higher authorities, intermediary 
organisations, interest groups and citizens living close to the site. These approaches can 
include attempts to get a better view of the ownership situation on the site, of relocation 
or expansion plans of firms, of interests, influence, ideas, and willingness to invest in a 
restructuring. On the other hand, planning agencies for strategic reasons (such as lack of trust 
between firms and planning agency) sometimes choose not to contact external actors and, in 
this early phase, mainly rely on information already available within their own organisation.   
It is necessary to collect more information about the situation within the planning agency 
also. Different departments and policy fields will have partly conflicting interests, and it 
is accordingly valuable to know their willingness to participate in the restructuring, and 
constraints on that.    
Developing an internal vision on restructuring objectives 
Based on this information about the situation on the site and about the (potentially) 
relevant actors, the next task of the planning agency is to develop its own objectives for the 
restructuring. This is done in a variety of ways. Sometimes general visions are developed. 
These describe the desired situation on the site, linked to general objectives. The general 
nature of such visions allows considerable flexibility and adjustment to changing conditions. 
Planning agencies sometimes choose to combine specific objectives for areas owned by the 
municipality with general objectives for areas owned by the firms. This makes it possible, 
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detail later, as part of the description of how such searches and assessments are performed. 
Restructuring should be viewed as a process of continuous efforts to achieve and maintain a 
desired quality. This is increasingly acknowledged by practitioners and reflected in approaches 
to restructuring based on program management instead of ‘traditional’ project management. 
Good program management should enable projects to be handled in such a way that all 
individual projects positively contribute to the desired final outcomes.  
Managing actor involvement 
This should be based on good knowledge of the actors who will be affected by the 
restructuring. Planning agencies know that each kind of involvement has its own effects. 
Excluding actors from the process sometimes leads to active opposition. On the other hand, 
although involvement can give positive results such as more and better ideas and more 
resources, it can also slow down the process, or even be ‘abused’ by some actors as a way 
of undermining it. In practice planning agencies always make choices based on limited 
information, and participants are also often primarily involved based on existing mechanisms 
for cooperation and coordination. There is not always a best fit between the challenge and 
the involved actors. 
More specifically, the planning agency takes account of the fact that the actors who should 
be involved will change over time. Ideally there should be actor involvement that ensures 
continuity and progress, and at the same time there should be specific, focussed involvement 
related to well-defined problems. The absence of crucial actors can block, or at least postpone, 
specific projects. This is often encountered regarding the involvement of representatives 
of firms, because decisions on investments (unless there are joint funds available for site 
improvements) always have to be made by the individual firms. However, processes can also 
be delayed if representatives of local authorities do not have clear mandates.  
Planning agencies focus on continuity in interaction and in communication. They try to 
organise structural communication with all actors who are affected by the restructuring, in 
order to maintain commitment. The aim is to demonstrate progress and to monitor how the 
developments are appreciated by different actors. 
Managing the interactions between the tasks of searching, assessing and deciding
During these long-lasting processes, planning agencies have to plan, organise and manage 
a large number of ‘search – assess – decide rounds’, where the involved actors, problems 
and possible solutions vary. What may be regarded as feasible by one set of participants in 
one specific situation, does not necessarily have to be even acceptable by another group 
in another setting. Another complicating issue is that in practice there is not always a clear 
separation between the tasks of searching, assessing and deciding. Accordingly, although 
each individual task may look rather straightforward, a number of alternative approaches are 
possible, and also used, in practice. 
Searching for options 
Options can be physical, but also organisational and financial. Often both types are linked to 
each other. A physical change to an area will for example usually be linked to a set of ‘best 
fit’ financial and organisational options. Search activities are used to ‘diverge’ as well as to 
enrich. ‘Diverging’ is defined as activities aimed at finding new options outside the current 
process or content scope; whereas enriching is defined as activities aimed at collecting more 
information about already identified options. The chosen, more or less specific, objectives 
serve as a starting point. The search is for options that contribute to reaching the objectives. 
The objectives accordingly represent initial guidelines, or sometimes even hard constraints. 
Depending on the stage in the process, more or less detailed information on effects and 
feasibility of different emerging scenarios. The planning agencies are sometimes satisfied 
if they can achieve an acceptable compromise, but they try to reach a consensus which 
goes further than that. The degree of commitment, again, will influence the process and its 
outcomes. In practice a variety of results is encountered. There might be clear visions and 
objectives coupled to very concrete Letters of Intent even including specifications of financial 
investments for each individual actor. At the other end of the range, only general intentions 
to improve the area, mainly referring to follow-up actions to identify the best solutions, 
are formulated. Both situations, although different, introduce their own opportunities and 
constraints into a search for feasible improvement measures. Specific objectives narrow 
down the range of potentially feasible solutions, whereas global objectives make it difficult 
for planning agencies to choose where and how to search.  
3.5.2. Implementation
Now the planning agency has to search for feasible solutions. To do this, it builds on the 
commitment to joint objectives achieved during the Initiative phase. In Dutch restructuring 
practice, the planning agencies traditionally play a dominant role in this highly complex 
and long-lasting phase. They usually initiate and manage a multitude of studies aimed at 
identifying possible solutions and their feasibility, and they use the results as input and 
arguments in their interaction with actors when developing plans and building commitment 
for decisions. 
Choice of organisation related to availability of resources 
The support, internal (political) and possibly external, has made it possible to allocate 
resources for planning and organising this process. The amount of available resources varies 
considerably, and this affects the choices about how to organise the process. Usually, a small 
steering group and a project team are formed that are responsible for coordinating the search 
for a feasible restructuring scenario and for specific improvement options. Planning agencies 
sometimes integrate (almost) all activities into the regular line organisation. However, if 
sufficient financial resources are available and the planning agencies lack either know-how 
or human capacity, they sometimes outsource part of the activities, or even engage specific 
organisations that handle (almost) the complete process. 
Continuous managing of process and project(s) 
A tendency to use such specific restructuring organisations indicates an acknowledgement 
of how difficult it is to manage a process that is very far from following a ‘simple’ step-wise 
sequence. In practice (as briefly introduced in 3.4), the process slowly evolves through a 
large number of ‘rounds’, consecutive and parallel, of searching, assessing and deciding, that 
often results in implementation of improvements, but also experiences temporary setbacks 
and non-activity. So although the process may be directed by initial integral visions or plans 
for site restructuring, the need for flexibility and the limited resources make the planning 
agencies split the process into smaller parts. There is a continuous long term process, and 
also several more or less independent projects. This enables a restructuring that is easier to 
organise, finance and manage. 
The combination of high complexity and limited resources necessitates simplifying the 
challenge. It is infeasible to address all objectives and related possible options at the same 
time through in-depth searches and assessments. The planning agency can choose to divide 
its efforts equally between all objectives, or to select only one, or a few, and postpone the 
rest. In practice, a mix of both strategies seems to be preferred. The quality of the outcomes 
is also affected by this simplification. These issues of simplification are addressed in more 
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implementation of specific measures, more or less detailed quantitative assessments of 
feasibility are performed.  The assessments can include any, or all, of the following aspects: 
• Financial feasibility
• Organisational feasibility
• Political feasibility
• Technical feasibility
• Legal feasibility
• Effects
First, the assessment of financial	 feasibility is crucial. The planning agency usually has a 
leading role in developing feasible financial solutions. It explores and assesses the willingness 
of individual actors to invest in specific developments, which includes taking into account 
constraints linked to specific funding opportunities. Often a number of “search – assess – 
decide” rounds are necessary before an acceptable solution is found. An important aspect 
of financial feasibility is the link between investments in restructuring, and investments in 
developing new industrial sites. The planning agencies can influence the availability, and 
price, of land on new sites. So their task includes assessing the effects of land prices on the 
new sites on the feasibility of improvement options on existing sites. Increasing the price 
of land on new sites can result in firms choosing to improve their current location instead 
of relocating to a new site. The assessment must also take into account the fact that some 
investors may benefit only partly, or indirectly, from their investments. For example, the 
planning agency invests in restructuring a site, but the benefits are received by the firms. 
Finally, the assessment should take into account that financial feasibility usually changes over 
time. New co-funding schemes and increasing willingness of firms to invest are opportunities, 
whereas economic decline and firms leaving the industrial site may undermine the feasibility. 
The planning agency tries to monitor these changes and assess their consequences for 
financial feasibility. 
In practice, organisational feasibility is strongly linked to the financial feasibility. The planning 
agencies assess what they can achieve, taking into account the available internal and 
external resources for the restructuring. This assessment is both quantitative and qualitative. 
Smaller organisations, in particular, may lack sufficient know-how to manage such complex 
processes. They therefore need to investigate the knowledge contribution from other actors 
such as firms and providers of services. Another consideration is whether the organisational 
structure and systems of the planning agency suffice. Finally, the assessment of organisational 
feasibility addresses the degree of organisation among the firms on the industrial site, and its 
impact on the improvement process or specific projects.  
Although some political support for the restructuring has been reached in an earlier phase, 
the assessment of political feasibility is a more or less continuous task. During the several 
years which those processes can last, the political situation can change considerably. A new 
situation can provide new opportunities, but also new constraints and threats for specific 
developments. For example, shifts in emphasis from developing new industrial sites towards 
restructuring efforts may have a considerable impact. Assessing political feasibility is further 
complicated by the political structure of the local (and regional) authorities. The restructuring 
option will be assessed regarding how it fits the objectives of the political party of the 
responsible politician or political coalition.  
Assessment of technical feasibility is quite a straightforward task. The planning agency can 
do this by carrying out certain technical studies with the desired scope and degree of detail. 
In the Netherlands the task of checking legal feasibility has environmental and spatial 
aspects. One of the reasons for restructuring industrial sites is the need to improve 
feasibility of each option is collected. Several complicating factors are encountered. 
First, planning agencies have limited resources. Those resources are not only financial 
and personnel, but also internal know-how. In practice, planning agencies address these 
constraints by narrowing down the scope of the search, or by out-sourcing (part of) the search 
activities to consultancy firms. A typical approach in an early stage of a process is to perform 
studies and/or organise creative sessions aimed at getting a more or less complete overview 
of different options. The collected information is often qualitative and limited to lists of pro’s 
and con’s of each option. This leads to quite different reliability, accuracy, and completeness. 
Later in the restructuring, more detailed information will be needed, especially on feasibility. 
Normally these searches are limited to the selection of a few promising options. 
How do planning agencies actually search, and what kind of solutions do these approaches 
deliver? Four different main approaches can be distinguished (Nutt, 2000), and they are all 
encountered in Dutch restructuring practice. First, is the existing solution approach, which 
means that planning agencies make use of available fully developed options. This is a rather 
practical approach, because it reduces the costs and enables rapid implementation (March, 
1994). A somewhat more time (and accordingly resource) consuming approach is to search 
for available ideas. This quite common approach means that the planning agency asks for 
proposals from external organisations, and the received ideas are then assessed regarding 
feasibility and effect. This approach is also applied in ‘rounds’ that gradually lead towards 
an improved understanding of what is needed. A third option applied is bench-marking. In its 
simplest form, the planning agency tries to identify ‘best practices’ by comparing approaches 
used (for example) in other restructuring cases. In a more complex form, the results from 
different bench-marking efforts are integrated into a new approach. The final option is 
innovation aimed at developing new solutions. Probably, the use of existing solutions and 
simple searches, or searches in ‘rounds’, are most common. Bench-marking does not seem 
to be widely applied, and innovation, although it does occur, is rarely done by the planning 
agency itself. 
The complexity of the situation regarding number of problems, objectives and improvement 
options stimulates planning agencies to develop ‘scenarios’. This means that they develop 
‘packages’ of options. Such a ‘package’ is an attempt to provide a phased, integral 
restructuring solution for the area, addressing both current site characteristics and more or 
less uncertain factors such as trends and developments. Although the local authorities may 
not explicitly use the term scenario, one or more such ‘packages’ of options usually emerge 
during the process.
Assessing options and scenarios
The next task is assessment. As mentioned above, the usual search-approach is to start from 
a broad orientation and then perform more in-depth searches for more information about 
a limited number of selected options. This requires assessments, implicit or explicit, which 
deliver input for decision making at each step in this process. 
Planning agencies apply a variety of assessment approaches ranging between predominantly 
qualitative and predominantly quantitative. Each is based on a more or less explicit use 
of criteria. Especially during early stages of a restructuring, planning agencies often use 
qualitative approaches such as the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) 
analysis. This provides a basic understanding of a need to act and gives some direction 
regarding possible strategies. Furthermore planning agencies sometimes apply qualitative 
risk analyses and stakeholder analyses, which enable the possible effects of actions to be 
identified. Comparison of options, or even sometimes scenarios, is done through more or less 
elaborate and explicit multi-criteria analyses. 
On the other end of the range, and to support the final decision making just ahead of 
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In the meantime, we analyse what is known about the obstacles to restructuring industrial 
sites, for it is possible that that helps us in our search.
3.7.  An analysis of the practical obstacles to restructuring 
industrial sites
For many years there has been general dissatisfaction with the slow progress in restructuring 
industrial sites (see section 2.2), The planning agencies have a complex task in addressing 
obstacles that they can actively influence, while taking account of ‘external’ factors that 
during a long-lasting restructuring can change. Most reports do not give explicit information 
on definitions, nor on relative importance of obstacles. Some people have tried to 
understand this better by analysing the obstacles to progress. These analyses have been 
studied, and the results are reported in appendix I. It shows that many different obstacles 
are reported but no systematic categorization has been made so far. From the analysis of 
reported obstacles, it can be concluded that the following can influence the performance of 
restructuring industrial sites:
• the way that the restructuring is organised;
•  the way that the processes proceed, and are managed, within the chosen organisation 
form. This includes how actors try to influence each other, the process itself, and (possibly) 
the initial organisation in order to develop solutions that are as satisfactory as possible to 
themselves and at the same time ‘bridge’ diverging views (i.e. are acceptable to all other 
stakeholders);
•  the availability of material  resources (time, manpower, money) for both the processes and 
the investments, also how those resources are distributed between the various actors, the 
financial risks, and the agreements made about the distribution of costs and benefits and 
the distribution of the financial risks;
•  the know-how available to the actors, which refers to the access to, as well as the ability 
to appropriately use, relevant information
•  The way a planning agency makes use of its legal instruments, which refers to the use of 
opportunities provided by (i.e. within) the existing framework of laws and regulations
All those factors can be influenced by the planning agency, to some extent.
Other factors that can affect the performance of the restructuring, but which cannot be 
influenced by the planning agency, are:
• the existing laws and regulations themselves;
• the specific situation on the site to be restructured.
Summing up, planning agencies have to collect information, and design and manage the 
restructuring, in such a way that actors are willing to invest in the process and in specific 
industrial site improvements. In particular, they have to find ways to operate within constraints 
given by available resources (such as time, money, know-how) and  information, and at the 
same time they need to develop interaction mechanisms that can influence access to (more) 
resources and information. 
environmental performance. This may imply very expensive remediation of polluted soil, but 
also solving environmental (including external safety) problems coupled to individual firms. 
Legal feasibility requires assessing whether, and to which degree, improvement options solve 
problems of non-compliance to laws and regulations. A comparable, but somewhat more 
complicated, situation is encountered regarding spatial developments. Improvement options 
may reduce non-compliance with the existing zoning plan or building regulations, but these 
are normally of minor importance for the restructuring. More important is to assess which 
consequences the possible changes have for the existing spatial Zoning Plan for the area. In 
the most extreme cases a new Zoning Plan will have to be developed. 
Finally, planning agencies assess the effects of improvement options. The effects include 
physical or organisational changes, but also there is the expected impact on the satisfaction 
of different actors. An important part of this task is to take possible synergetic or antagonistic 
effects of different options into account. This includes not only how these options interact in 
a short term, but also the quite uncertain long-term effects.   
Decision making: Continuous, fragmented and a few formal moments 
The previous description shows that a decision-making phase, and certainly moment, is 
difficult to distinguish in Dutch restructuring practice, because a series of consecutive and 
partly parallel decisions are made during a period of several years. Although several of these 
decisions are viewed as preliminary, they do influence the subsequent development of ideas 
and commitment. The result is a slowly emerging scope and focus for the general process. 
However, some of these decisions result in immediate implementation of specific measures, 
and so the final outcomes, and related quality, are influenced already in very early stages of 
the process. 
Although this description may suggest that practice is rather fragmented, pragmatic and 
uncoordinated, this is to some extent counteracted by the influence of higher authorities. 
Planning efforts of national and provincial authorities aim to coordinate the restructuring 
challenge and to improve the results. The development of a Master plan for a site is a 
requirement for access to specific funding programs (e.g. the Dutch “Topper” co-funding 
scheme for industrial sites of national importance). The completion of such planning documents 
is often linked to more formal decision-making moments. Accordingly, local initiatives have 
been strongly stimulated to follow a more integral step-wise planning approach. 
However, if the decision thus made is limited to the plan itself and there are no time-constraints 
regarding implementation and financial commitments, then the effect of the decision can be 
quite limited. In such cases, the plan only serves as a mile-stone. This means that one or 
more new decision-making rounds may be needed for identifying and choosing solutions, and 
for achieving agreements about the distribution of costs (investments) among actors. 
3.6. An assessment of current practice
The description just given is structured and rather abstract, but not more than a description. 
Crucially, it does not include any evaluation of the effects of that practice, such as the 
effectiveness or efficiency of a particular measure or packages of measures. This means 
that it does not lend itself to attempts to derive from it proposals for improving practice. 
In particular, we cannot use it directly in the search for ways to speed up the process of 
restructuring. This does not mean that we cannot use it indirectly, for in that search we look 
for approaches which are suitable for the process of restructuring industrial sites: so we must 
know the characteristics of that process. This will become clear in chapters 4 and 5.
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3.8. Conclusions
What can be learned from this description and analysis of current practice, that can be used 
by a planning agency for speeding up that practice?
First, some characteristics of the practice itself. It necessarily requires the involvement of 
many different actors, who have differing motives and interests, but who are dependent on 
each other for realising those. Also, there is great complexity, with the related uncertainty 
about the effects of applying measures.
Second, there is no reason to think that the activities currently carried out by the planning 
agencies are ineffective or counterproductive. This applies in particular to the division of 
those activities into two phases. What is clear, however, is that planning agencies often do 
not know how best to carry out those activities, so as to speed up the restructuring.
Third, that planning agencies should pay particular attention to the organisation of the 
restructuring, to the process of steering the parties through the restructuring, to the material 
constraints and arrangements, and to the use of the available laws and regulation, within the 
given context of those laws and regulations and of the situation on the site to be restructured.
What cannot be learned from current practice alone is how the conclusions just mentioned 
can be used to improve that practice. For that, we need more insight into how the various 
actors in interaction behave and how that behaviour can be influenced. For the complexity 
and related uncertainty regarding causes, effects, and relationships between factors leads 
to the conclusion that we need to better understand actors: their willingness to participate 
in the interactive restructuring process and to invest in specific solutions. This requires an 
improved understanding of how that willingness is influenced by actor interdependency, 
by the available resources, and by situation-specific constraints related to information and 
interaction mechanisms. In particular, a better understanding is needed of how the individual 
factors influence each other, and how this depends on the specific situations. The ‘building 
blocks’ for developing this improved understanding are sought (in the next chapter) in 
frameworks and theories about complex multi-actor interactive processes. 
4.1. Introduction
The planning agencies have to design and manage interaction processes between 
interdependent actors in order to influence both progress and final outcomes. The 
relationships between the role of planning agencies and restructuring, and how a decision 
support model can help, are illustrated in figure 4.1. This is the same as figure 2.2, but filled 
in using chapter three. 
               t0                                                                                                               tf
Figure 4.1  Relationships role Planning Agency and restructuring  
The large number, and variety, of factors, dependencies, and uncertainties means that 
‘everything depends on everything’, which might suggest that it is impossible for a 
planning agency to know how progress can be influenced. We do not agree. We argue 
that it is possible to understand  a complex specific situation sufficiently to be able to 
address it appropriately. This is precisely what we need to do for restructuring. For we 
need to understand how performance and outcomes of processes can be understood 
related to how individual actors, and in particular the planning agency, act and interact. 
4. A theoretical framework for under- 
 standing complex, multi-actor 
 processes 
“Actors are in the end, of course, always people”
(De Boer and Bressers, 2011, p. 66)
Decision support model
Planning Agency
•  Plan, Organise, Manage
•  Search, Assess, Decide
•  Build Commitment for 
Restructuring Initiative 
and Implementation
Initial situation 
Site in need of 
restructuring
Final situation
Site revitalised or 
reprofiledRestructuring process
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behaviour” (Gibson, 2005, p. 229). However, such a framework “[…] is [even] more than 
a checklist: it situates variables into a causal schema while allowing great flexibility in the 
determination of exactly what factors should be included […]” (Gibson, 2005, p. 229). This 
implies that the chosen ‘best fit’ framework makes it possible to select, and apply, factors 
in accordance with the characteristics of restructuring. This limited set of parameters and 
variables can then be linked to precise assumptions, which makes it possible to build the 
model (Ostrom, 2007). 
Theory and micro-assumptions
Frameworks combine the elements that any theory relevant to certain phenomena needs 
to include, and accordingly several theories will normally be compatible with a specific 
framework (Ostrom, 2005). After choosing a framework, we have to choose theory that can 
explain the performance from the perspective of actors and their interactions. The selection 
is based on a three-step approach (Lichbach, 1996). First, a ‘thin’ theory will be chosen as a 
baseline model. Then the extent to which the performance of restructuring can be explained 
by this theory is explored. Finally, micro-assumptions are made about issues that have not 
been well enough explained, and these assumptions enable choosing specific complementary 
theories.  
4.3. Searching for a suitable framework
The previous chapters have high-lighted a number of characteristics of restructuring which 
should be taken into account when choosing a suitable framework. First, the framework should 
be applicable to a complex and dynamic decision-making process that can be influenced by 
a planning agency through appropriate planning, organisation and management. Second, 
a framework is needed that focuses on actors, and how actors act and interact aimed at 
solving problems and at reaching more or less well-defined, sometimes conflicting, goals. It 
therefore needs to address the reasons which individual actors have for acting the way they 
do in specific situations, including how they balance their own ‘action potential’ (Kooiman, 
1993) with the motives of, and perceived dependency on, other actors for solving problems 
and reaching goals. Finally, the preferred framework should relate these (inter) actions to 
process performance (including progress), outcomes, and the external factors that belong to 
the ‘environment’ of the process. 
Within the scope of this study any description, and certainly analysis, of the full range of 
available frameworks is not attempted (see e.g. Sabatier, 2007 for an overview and Schlager, 
1999 for a comparison). Instead we begin the selection by choosing between two sorts of 
frameworks.
Progress linked to “phases” or “rounds”
The previous description of restructuring shows elements of a ‘linear’, ordered, process in time, 
where certain sets of activities occur within something that may be called ‘steps’, ‘phases’, or 
‘stages heuristic’ (Lasswell, 1951; 1956; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Several attempts 
to divide a policy process into phases have been reported for activities such as environmental 
scanning, the structuring of a policy problem, agenda setting, search and assessment of 
policy alternatives, assembling feasible options, developing policy recommendations, formal 
decision making, implementation, accountability, and evaluation (Lasswell, 1956; Brewer 
and deLeon, 1983; Anderson, 1975; May and Wildawsky, 1978; Jenkins, 1978; Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1983; Rist, 1994; Lomas, 1997). The input-output approach introduced feedback as 
The importance of this issue is that... 
  “[…] because municipalities [as planning agencies] will act based on an incomplete 
understanding of the ageing and its consequences [….] it is not possible to establish with 
certainty	whether	the	approach	they	choose	for	restructuring	will	offer	a	real	solution	to	
the	problems	[…]”	(PBL,	2009,	p.	97,	author’s	translation).
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework on how to understand 
the complexity and dynamics of specific situations encountered during restructuring. This 
chapter is intended, as Astley so nicely expresses it, to be helpful as an interpretive tool that 
enables understanding and making sense of an otherwise confusing world (Astley, 1985). 
The key to improvement is accordingly to address that uncertainty. It is about ‘demystifying’ 
complexity and dynamics, terms that in practice often are used to express that something is 
too difficult to understand. 
This chapter accordingly seeks an answer to the second detailed research question formulated 
in chapter two: 
How	can	performance	of	complex	multi-actor	processes	(such	as	restructuring)	be	understood?
That application of the theoretical framework is the topic of chapter 5. And in chapter 6, the 
application is worked out further in the form of a decision support model.
4.2.  Approach to the development of the theoretical
  framework
A policy process 
Because this study focuses on the involvement of a planning agency, which is a public body, 
policy sciences provide particularly useful perspectives. Policy sciences are multidisciplinary, 
contextual and problem-oriented in nature, explicitly normative (Lasswell, 1951), and, in 
particular, “[…] concerned with knowledge of and in the decision process of the public and 
civic order […]” (Lasswell, 1951, p.5; 1971). 
Making choices: complexity versus completeness  
The complexity of restructuring, and the related uncertainty, produce a difficult choice. 
Ideally, an explanation of restructuring should address all relevant factors and all relationships 
in a coherent way. However, that is infeasible, probably impossible, due to constraints of 
bounded-rationality (Simon, 1982). There are just too many factors and too many possible 
relationships involved, and therefore selections have to be made (Luhmann, 1995). A choice 
has to be made about the basis for a theoretical framework that is as complete as possible (i.e. 
not over-simplified) and that integrates, and addresses, the most important characteristics 
(Haimes, 2004) of restructuring. 
Choosing a framework
What is a suitable framework that fits the most important characteristics of these processes? 
The framework chosen can then be used to organise diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry 
(Ostrom, 2005), and in that sense it serves as “[…] an orientation device and not a theory, 
[… and] as a checklist of those independent variables that […] explain individual and group 
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4.4. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework
A framework that fits well the above description of key characteristics of restructuring is the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (see figure 4.2). This framework is to 
a large extent credited to the work of Elinor Ostrom (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom et al., 
1994; Ostrom, 1986a and b, 1990; 1999; 2005; 2007). 
The key characteristics of the framework
The core (for a list of alternative core units of analysis, see: Ostrom, 2005, p. 14) of the IAD 
framework is the ‘action arena’, which consists of ‘actors’ and ‘action situations’. 
Figure 4.2  The IAD framework (slightly adapted from Ostrom, 2005, p.15).  
Actors are the individuals, or groups functioning as corporate actors, who are involved in 
the action arena (Ostrom, 2007). Their involvement is characterised by “(1) preference 
evaluations that actors assign to potential actions and outcomes; (2) the way actors acquire, 
process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information; (3) the selection criteria 
actors use for deciding upon a particular course of action; and (4) the resources that an 
a possible phase that ‘closes’ the policy cycle (Easton, 1957; 1965a; 1965b). The central 
question is to what extent different phases are identifiable within a specific (more or less 
cyclic) process, and in case they are, whether they can be used to explain, and subsequently, 
improve the process. 
These questions are central to the use of the policy stages framework (Lasswell, 1951; 1956; 
Brewer and DeLeon, 1983; Hoogerwerf, 1998; DeLeon, 2007). As pointed out by Sabatier, 
the stages framework has its limitations. According to him it does not portray the policy 
process accurately. In particular, it oversimplifies the way processes usually include multiple, 
interacting cycles (Sabatier, 1999), which alternatively may be referred to as rounds in 
pluralistic decision-making systems, (Teisman, 1992), characterised by continual adjustment 
to problems, ideas, and actor involvement. 
We agree with Sabatier’s view on the limitations of the stages framework, in particular 
when it is applied to understanding restructuring of industrial sites. As described (in chapter 
three), such processes are usually interactive processes taking place in ‘rounds’. This means 
that a suitable framework should focus on these interactions, and, in particular, on how 
certain conditions that structure actor behaviour, interaction, and choices influence process 
performance and outcomes2. Nevertheless, we retain the distinction between the two phases 
of initiative and implementation.     
2		Those	conditions	are	the	institutions,	defined	as	shared	concepts	used	by	humans	in	situations	organised	by	rules,	norms,	and	strategies	(Crawford	
and	Ostrom,	1995;	the	term	institution	has	been	interpreted,	and	applied,	in	several	alternative	ways:	see	e.g.	Guy	Peters,	1999).	An	interesting	
aspect is then “[…] how institutions themselves may transform the individuals who operate within them, and then changed in turn by these 
individuals	[…]”	(Gibson,	2005,	p.	229).
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how power and interests influence the development of institutions (Ribot, 2006). He stresses 
how institutions are created or supported by powerful interests.   
The consequences for this study 
These comments neither question the choice of factors, nor the main structure and the 
existence of relationships between factors within the framework. However, they do question 
the way each individual factor within the IAD framework interacts with other factors, their 
relative importance, and in what detail each factor should be addressed. The main point is 
that in real life action arenas, all factors and actors may change. For example, as mentioned 
by Fenger (see above), actors try to influence rules in the arena, and sometimes they are able 
to do so. This means that rules are not only exogenous to the arena. In this study we choose 
to view rules as partly endogenous, and accordingly these rules can be influenced by the 
actors, and in particular by a planning agency. 
The interactions and the outcomes of any arena also affect future opportunities. This has 
been included in the more recent version of Ostrom’s IAD framework, with the ‘feed-back’ 
cycles from outcomes to arena and to exogenous variables (Ostrom, 2005, see figure 4.2). 
This change is not random, but the result of (re) actions of, and interaction between, actors 
in a situation characterised by complex interdependencies. 
In order to be able to understand how action arenas function in restructuring, we need to 
know why, and how, actors choose to interact. For this, we need a theory. According to Ostrom 
“[…] several theories are usually compatible with any framework […]” (Ostrom, 2005, p.4). 
This applies, in particular, to the IAD framework. Ostrom has shown that there is a variety of 
compatible theories (Ostrom, 2005). First, we choose a leading theory. The characteristics of 
restructuring (see chapter 3) then inform the selection, and use, of complementary theory.  
4.5. Choice of a leading theory
Rational choice as leading theory 
The first step is to select a leading (‘thin’) theory that will be used as a baseline model 
(Lichbach, 1996). A key characteristic of a complex restructuring is that actor behaviour 
is crucial both for process performance and outcomes. The IAD framework assumes that 
actor involvement is the result of the preferences and selection criteria of the actors, 
which become manifest through communication and allocation of resources. How are these 
preferences ‘formed’, do they change, and how can this be modelled? This question can be 
explored from the perspective of the interaction itself, and from that of the individual actor. 
The first perspective focuses on the characteristics of the interaction process, the second on 
the characteristics of the actors. Kooiman says that because “[…] much emphasis on problem 
solving has been aimed at improving the interaction mechanisms between actors [….] the 
reasons for these problems are not sought within the actors themselves […] (Kooiman, 
1996, pp.41-42). We agree in the sense that a focus on interaction should not mean that 
actor characteristics are forgotten. Actor characteristics are here used as a starting point 
for the choice of theory. However, at the same time it is acknowledged that the interaction 
perspective can provide valuable complementary information: interaction, structured by 
exogenous variables, influences the behaviour of actors: this is worked out in more detail 
below. 
A first assumption is that individual actors would describe their actions, and decisions, as 
‘rational’, and also that they attempt to act as close as possible to this ‘ideal’. This ‘rationality’ 
is mainly implicit, but it is recognisable in practice. For example, the actors apply different 
actor brings to a situation” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p.33). An action situation, where actors 
meet each other, is then the “[…] social space where individuals interact, exchange goods 
and services, engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, or fight […]” 
(Ostrom, 1994, p. 28). Such a situation involves “[…] participants in positions who must decide 
among diverse actions in light of the information they possess about how actions are linked 
to the potential outcomes and the costs and benefit assigned to actions and outcomes […]” 
(Ostrom, 1994, p.29). This means that the structure of a situation can “[…] be characterised 
using seven clusters of variables: (1) participants (who may be either single individuals or 
corporate actors), (2) positions, (3) potential outcomes, (4) action-outcome linkages, (5) the 
control that participants exercise, (6) types of information generated, and (7) the costs and 
benefits assigned to actions and outcomes […]” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 14). 
These characteristics show that such an action arena will always be part of a larger situation 
(or in simple words: it is part of ‘real life’). The action arena influences interactions and 
the resulting outcomes. On the other hand, it is itself influenced by three categories of 
exogenous variables. The first category - biophysical and material conditions - includes the 
‘hard’ factors. In restructuring, for example, the industrial site characteristics are particularly 
important, but this category also includes all other local and regional characteristics as 
far as relevant for the performance of the site. The second category, the attributes of 
community, “[…] includes generally accepted norms of behaviour, the level of common 
understanding about action arenas, the extent to which preferences are homogeneous, 
and the distribution of resources among members. The […] term culture is frequently 
applied to this bundle of attributes […]” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 45). Finally, the rules 
receive considerable attention in the IAD framework. Rules determine “[…] what actions 
(or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted and the sanctions authorised if the 
rules are not followed […]” (Ostrom, et al., 1994, p.38), and include shared understanding 
by participants about their use as enforced prescriptions (Ostrom, 2005). There can 
accordingly be rules about everything for everybody at any moment. Such rules may apply 
not only to day-to-day operational interaction and decisions, but can also cover higher-level 
decisions about eligibility, changing of operational rules, and design of collective choice 
rules. The rules can provide more or less complete sets of guidelines coupled to specific 
action arenas for addressing all the questions posed above regarding who becomes involved 
as participants and why, the distribution of influence and information among participants, 
choice of assessment, and decisions about long term versus short term goals. The rules vary 
according to physical factors and culture (Ostrom et al., 1994). This means that rules are 
linked to a sense of necessity and feasibility. They are considered relevant and applicable, 
taking into account the problems, desired outcomes, and previous experiences within more 
or less comparable local settings. 
Critics 
The IAD framework fits restructuring characteristics, but how useful is it? What are its weak 
points and limitations? Can it be applied in this study? Some critical remarks of others are 
helpful. Fenger addresses three issues (Fenger, 2001, pp.30-31). First, he points to a possible 
underlying assumption that actor characteristics remain stable within the framework. 
Second, he questions whether too much emphasis is given to structure. Third, he questions 
the comprehensiveness of the set of rules presented by Ostrom. He then adds his own 
interpretation and suggestions, which introduce other (i.e. at that time not explicitly described 
by Ostrom) influencing relationships. He suggests that actor characteristics may be subject 
to change within an arena, that rules may apply also to actor characteristics, and that actor 
strategies may also be aimed at changing rules or characteristics of an action situation. 
More recently Ribot criticised the IAD framework for the way in which it takes into account 
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will change in time depending on the situation, and actors face considerable uncertainty 
regarding knowledge of options and consequences. 
The limitations of rational choice
It is therefore assumed that rational choice can provide only part of the explanation for actor 
behaviour. The limitations of modern rational choice theory are that “[…] it invites both a 
simple model of the individual actor and a simple model of his or her interactions […]” (Abell, 
2000, p. 229). To reach socially robust outcomes (Pielke, 2003), which is what is needed 
in restructuring, a richer view on interaction processes is needed, and accordingly a richer 
model that takes account of the complexity of the process (Abell, 2000). 
 
4.6. Complementary theory on actors and action situations
How rich should such a model be, and, in particular, how can choices be made for 
complementary theory? The complementary theory needs to be capable of covering the 
richness of the practice of restructuring, and at the same time suggest which variables are 
the most important to include in the decision support model. 
Pluralistic approach is needed
A first observation is that knowledge of restructuring practice shows that a multitude of 
aspects needs to be addressed. This makes it possible to apply a multitude of perspectives 
and theories. The problem faced, as expressed by Möller and Wilson, is that…
 
	 	“[…]	the	economic	perspective	cannot	penetrate	the	social	aspects	of	exchange;	resource	
dependency	theory	does	not	explain	the	cognitive	aspects	of	organizational	learning;	social	
exchange	theory	does	not	cover	the	market	and	transaction	specific	factors	addressed	by	
transaction	cost	economics	[…]”	(Möller	and	Wilson,	1995,	p.	46).	
Any single perspective or theory has its limitations, and Möller and Wilson take a pluralistic 
approach: in their case for developing a comprehensive understanding of relational exchange 
between businesses. We argue that in restructuring as well, a pluralistic approach is exactly 
what is needed for understanding actors and their interactions. In their decision making, 
these actors are taking into account transaction costs, resource (and accordingly actor inter-) 
dependency, and the social aspects of interaction in local settings. 
The complementary theory needs to provide an explanation of how processes occur within 
(mainly) local settings where actors are dependent on each other for reaching goals, know 
each other, and have previous experiences with interactions and (possibly) cooperation, and 
expect to need each other also in the future. For this study, such theory specifically needs to 
focus on actors and their reasons for acting, and interacting, in certain ways. 
Motives, information, and resources as actor characteristics
The Contextual Interaction Theory (Bressers, 2004; 2009; Boer de and Bressers, 2011) is 
suitable for explaining the influence of the individual actor characteristics. According to 
Bressers “[…] the course and outcomes of the policy process depend not only on inputs (in this 
case the characteristics of the policy instruments), but more crucially on the characteristics 
of the actors involved, particularly their motivation, information, and power […]” (Bressers, 
2004, p. 290). In more recent papers, Bressers refers to an arena where the actors possess 
the characteristics “motives”, “cognitions” (interpretations of reality, information held to be 
kinds of assessments such as SWOT-analyses, Multi Criteria Analyses, and cost-benefit 
analyses, and they document both intentions (plans) and results, thereby paying attention to 
their own accountability. 
However, each individual actor, and even a group within one actor, can interpret rationality in 
its own way (e.g. Simon, 1982, Bouyssou et al., 2006). “[…] The present condition of the term 
rationality is that it has multiple personalities […] ” (Lupia et al., 2000, p.5; for an informative 
description and exploration of the term rationality and the diversity of proposed definitions, 
see e.g.: Lupia et al., 2000, ch.1). Nevertheless, it is argued that “[…] a rational choice is [at 
least] one that is based on reasons, irrespective of what these reasons may be […]” (Lupia 
et al., 2000, p.7). 
The reasons for actions are linked to the interests of the actors. This is the core assumption of 
rational choice (or action) theory (Parsons, 1977; 1978; see figure 4.3 for a view on its basic 
assumptions according to Monroe). 
1. Actors pursue goals
2. These goals reflect actors’ perceived self-interest
3. Behaviour results from a process that involves conscious choice
4. Individual is basic actor in society
5. Actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable
6. Actors choose the options that are consistent with the highest expected utility
7.  Actors possess information on both the available alternatives and the likely consequences 
of their choices
Figure 4.3  Basic assumptions of (instrumental) rational action  
Rational choice theory is therefore applied as the leading (‘thin’) theory (but no more than 
that) for explaining actor behaviour in restructuring action arenas. It is assumed that all 
actors expect, and accept, that all other actors at least to a certain extent will try to maximise 
their own benefits and minimise costs (Heath, 1976; Elster, 1989; Guy Peters, 1999; Scott, 
2000; Allingham, 2002), and that “[…] no exchange continues unless both parties are making 
a profit […]” (Homans, 1961, p. 61). Or, as practitioners nowadays prefer to express this 
requirement: there is a need for “win-win solutions”. 
How do actors ‘calculate’?
The question is then how actors search for such acceptable ‘win-win’ solutions, and, in 
particular, whether this behaviour deviates from the basic assumptions of rational choice 
(see figure 4.3). According to Arthur Stein: 
	 	“[…]	 Behaviour	 is	 a	 function	 of	 purposive	 calculated	 human	 choice.	 Actors’	 perceived	
interests matter. The alternatives actors think important and the calculations they make 
also matter. Thus, knowledge of aims and the nature of calculation become critical to 
explaining chosen behaviours. Explanation necessarily depends on the goals actors have 
and	the	nature	of	the	calculations	that	they	make	[…].”	(Stein,	2006,	p.	196,	emphasis	
added by author)
What Stein says is that, although actors act purposefully to reach goals, their behaviour is 
influenced by perceptions, and by what they think is important. They pursue goals rationally, 
but their understanding of the situation influences how they do that. In other words, especially 
Monroe’s assumptions five and seven (see figure 4.3) in practice rarely apply. Preferences 
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We view information as something that changes, or reinforces, the understanding of a 
situation. Information, again, serves as input for building knowledge. More information can 
give a better understanding of a specific topic, but also of the relationships between different 
topics. 
Actors can have information about a large variety of topics. This includes information about 
a specific action situation, and about other actors. Actors face uncertainty related to lack 
of information: there is a difference between the available information and the required 
information. The involved actors face such uncertainty, for example, regarding searches 
for information on improvement options (Nutt, 2000). An incomplete understanding can 
be caused by ‘simple’ (quantitative) lack of information, but also by ambiguity (March and 
Simon, 1958). 
Any actor enters an arena ‘bringing’ its own information. During the interaction in the arena, 
information will to some extent be exchanged, and shared. However, actors usually choose 
to share only part of their information, and they also choose the specific moments when they 
believe using, or sharing, information will be beneficial to themselves. They use information 
strategically for reaching their goals.
Who are the relevant actors?
Who are the actors in these processes, and which of them are most important for explaining 
process performance? 
Ostrom describes actors as single individuals, or as groups functioning as corporate actors 
(Ostrom, 2007): but this is only one of several possible views on, and definitions of, actors 
(see e.g. Coleman, 1974; Jordan, 1981; Mayntz, 1986; Schneider and Werle, 1990; Scott, 
2003). The term actor is here applied in a broad sense encompassing all entities, such as 
‘formal’ organisations, networks of actors, or ad hoc interest groups that are, or attempt to 
become, actively involved in decision-making activities in action arenas. 
The diversity of actors that can become involved in a restructuring is large. Different sorts 
of interest groups, higher authorities (in particular the provinces), organisations having a 
responsibility in policy implementation, providers of services or products, and investors and 
project developers, may all be involved in specific arenas, or during long periods. The only 
certainty is that a comprehensive restructuring always necessitates the involvement of at 
least the planning agency and firms situated on the industrial site. 
The choice of other actors to be included in the explanatory model is not trivial, because it 
will affect the explanatory power (Lake and Powell, 1999). The selection here is based on 
an estimate of the importance that actors perceive, and express, about becoming involved, 
but also of their possibilities for influencing a process. These two criteria together identify 
actors that can affect or are affected by the restructuring: in other words these actors are, in 
Freeman’s definition, stakeholders (Freeman, 1994). Applying this definition should prevent 
excluding any stakeholders too early. 
The importance of agents
The formal actors are sometime represented by agents, who continuously have to act related 
to a “frame of reference” (Kaufman, 1986) provided by the organisation they represent. They 
need to find ways to bridge the gap between institutionalised initial expectations and strategic 
actions (Clemens and Cook, 1999). This means that they need a certain strategic flexibility 
in how they are allowed to act (their mandate), and at the same time they need to convince 
their principal that they are doing their best to ensure that its objectives are reached: they 
may even need to earn the support of the organisations they represent (Bruijn de et al., 
2002). In restructuring, for example, this situation in particular applies to representatives of 
public authorities, firms, and semi-governmental organisations, and can explain why they try 
true), and “resources”. “Resources” refer to how the available and accessible resources can 
function as both capacity to act and a source of power in an interaction process (Bressers, 
2009; Boer de and Bressers, 2011). The Contextual Interaction Theory explains how these 
characteristics, working together, influence the choices which actors make for entering, and 
staying involved in, an action arena, and their willingness to invest in specific actions or 
outcomes.
These three actor characteristics (which encompass the four characteristics in the IAD 
framework – see figure 4.2) have, according to Bressers, proved to be exceptionally useful 
for explaining the dynamics of social interaction processes, and he mentions that there is 
also a long tradition of thinking about each individual perspective (Bressers, 2004). Some of 
this thinking - specific theory on each of the variables motives, resources, and information 
– is discussed in appendix III because it provides a deeper understanding of how each 
characteristic individually affects actor behaviour. There we shall see also that the motives, 
resources, and information of one actor can influence each other: they cannot be regarded 
separately. 
Below we summarize our view on the actor characteristics:
Motives
Rational choice theory assumes that actors pursue goals, and that these goals reflect their 
self-interest. Self-interest is the leading motive behind the goals that actors strive to reach: 
actors try to fulfil their needs. 
Actors usually pursue several goals, related to different underlying motives and values, at 
the same time (Rhodes, 1997; O’Neill and Quinn, 1993), and they therefore take into account 
how their actions affect each individual goal. At the same time, they take into account how 
their general interests are affected, and the resulting choice and behaviour will represent a 
certain balance, and optimum, between all goals. 
Goals are not static but change during the course of interaction with other actors. Goals in 
arenas are, therefore, both process inputs, and process outputs. Initial goals and preferences 
are modified, and new goals and preferences are constructed based on the decision context 
(Tversky et al., 1988; Slovic, 1995; Latham and Pinder, 2005; Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007).
Resources  
Resources can have a variety of meanings such as capital, labour, facilities, equipment, land, 
time, and materials, but also include less tangible aspects such as skills, access to distribution 
channels, legitimacy, power / influence, and (even) entrepreneurial energy (Crozier, 1964; 
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1988; Oliver, 1990; Rumelt et al., 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Browning et 
al., 1995; Kaiser et al., 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Bressers, 2009). Resources are something that 
actors possess, such as money and human capacity: there must be at least some resources 
“[…] that an actor brings to a situation […]” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p.33, emphasis added). 
Actors use those resources for reaching their goals. They invest time and money in a process, 
and they use their skills in the action arena. Resources provide a capacity to act, and they 
are a source of power in the interaction process in the arena (Bressers, 2009). Actors can 
consciously choose which part of their resources they want to allocate to an action situation 
at a specific time, and they can choose also how they want to apply them. 
Information
Actors decide to enter an action arena (or refrain from doing so), and they act within the 
arena, based on the information they have, and the cognitions of that information. Actors 
collect, and use, data. Data are transformed into information when they are given a meaning. 
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specific ways, which to some extent excludes the development of other settings. 
There has, in particular, been an increasing interest in how different forms of path dependency 
can help understanding the decline of industrial areas, and according to Hassink many studies 
even point to the presence of lock-in as the main internal barrier to industrial restructuring 
(Hassink, 2005; Needham & Louw 2006). For example, political lock-in, aimed at preserving 
existing industrial structures, can negatively affect industrial restructuring, and indirectly also 
prevent creative opportunities. Political lock-in refers not only to institutional thickness (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994) regarding political administrations on different levels, but it can also include 
the influence of larger firms, business support agencies and underlying norms, rules and laws 
(Edquist, 1997). In such situations, actor interdependency can affect both performance and 
outcomes of action arenas negatively. Only if ‘new’ actors possess the influence and will to 
challenge such institutions, may a lock-in be deliberately broken. 
Actor interdependency in specific action situations
Because we use a perspective that focuses on actors and their interactions, we also 
acknowledge the importance of how actors can, and choose to, interact in specific action 
arenas, and accordingly related to specific action situations. The actors know that their ability 
to reach their goals depends on the actions that others take (Lake and Powell, 1999). They 
know also that they are dependent on each other for reaching their goals in specific action 
situations, and accordingly both the process and its outcomes are influenced by this actor 
interdependency: by both its nature and strength. We therefore argue that complementary 
theory on actor interdependency is necessary for understanding specific action situations. 
This actor interdependency is a ‘tricky’ variable. Actors can feel more or less dependent on 
other actors for reaching specific goals. Interdependency is then something that exists as a 
perception of individual actors, and is characteristic of the relationship between actors. It is 
both a dependency and a bond. The fact that one actor is dependent on another can influence 
the motives, resources, and information of that first actor. Theories of actor interdependency 
provide complementary perspectives on the reasons why actors choose particular actions 
and mechanisms of interaction. This is worked out further in appendix III.
Endogenous rules
Some rules are endogenous, and some are exogenous, to the process: the latter are discussed 
in a separate paragraph. Endogenous rules are those which apply within an action arena, but 
not necessarily outside it. 
Rules can be embedded in informal arrangements, collective understandings, norms of 
behaviour, conventions, codes of conduct, procedures, and contracts, but also in formal laws 
(Giddens, 1984; North, 1990; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Manzavinos et al., 2005). Rules 
are related to institutions and norms, but the extensive literature on (especially) institutions 
does not present any agreement on what these relationships are (e.g. Hollingsworth, 2000; 
Ostrom, 2005). The position taken here is that both institutions and rules concern how actors 
are influenced by constructs that they can to some extent adapt, whereby rules are viewed 
as being more specific than institutions. 
According to Ostrom, rules for arenas can be developed for entry and exit, positions, scope, 
authority, aggregation, information, and pay-off, and the cumulative effects of these rules 
affect the action situation (Ostrom, 2005). Entry and exit rules determine who is allowed to 
participate and the conditions that apply for leaving the process, and position rules together 
with authority rules tell which role these participants have and what they must, may or 
may not do. Scope rules regulate actions related to outcomes, and aggregation rules the 
level of control. Information rules regulate access to information, and pay-off rules focus on 
distribution of costs and benefits. 
to stay in close contact and not to get too ‘far ahead’ of their organisations (Susskind and 
Cruikshank, 1987). In particular, they have to make the right choices about how they handle 
information. It is both infeasible and usually undesirable to give the principal all information, 
and representatives select what they tell, and how they tell it. A particular challenge is then 
what to do with ‘sensitive’ issues addressed within highly interactive processes in decision-
making arenas. This is often the case if negotiation is chosen as the interaction mechanism, 
such as when interests are incompatible and actors are interdependent (Mastenbroek and 
van der Meij, 2007). Representatives accordingly have a more complicated and important 
position in an action arena than they may think. They need to be cautious and entrepreneurial 
in what they do and say, and at the same time to be able to understand the potential strategic 
consequences of their actions. Often they even become the crucial means of producing 
action (Pierre and Guy Peters, 2005) by creating the basis for a decision (Edelenbos and 
Monnikhof, 1998). To reach their objectives they use time, personal power, and political skills 
for advocating their preferred solutions (Mintrom, 2000), and (more or less open and actively) 
for opposing alternative views. They may even be deliberately opportunistic (Christopoulus, 
2006) within a long-term participation aimed at identifying, developing, and exploiting policy 
windows. Representatives judge their own capability to reach their goals, which leads to 
a perceived level of self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001). Both commitment and performance are 
dependent on self-efficacy, and normally high self-efficacy leads to better performance in 
difficult tasks (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1998; Locke and Latham, 2002). The high process 
complexity, and its interactive nature, implies that representatives can have a significant 
impact on both performance, and outcomes. Although this suggests paying specific attention 
to their selection, in practice representatives are often selected simply because they have 
specific responsibilities related to on-going programs within the organisations they represent 
(Hjern and Porter, 1981; O’Toole et al., 1997). 
The importance of history
Agents often carry within themselves the history of previous phases and settings, for some 
interests are sometimes repeatedly represented by the same person in different phases or in 
different settings. That history affects not only the motives, resources and information of the 
agent itself, but also how other actors relate to the agent. In a situation where actors have 
a common ‘past’, patterns can have developed that structure (both enable and constrain) 
how ‘things are done’, and in particular how the actors choose to interact. This phenomenon 
has been referred to as “path dependency” (David, 1985; North, 1989; Pierson, 1993) How 
do these common past experiences influence the design, and performance of action arenas? 
Such previous experiences can be positive or negative, and in both cases they will normally 
influence the initial willingness to participate, and the expectations regarding the process 
(Wickens and Hollands, 2000). Positive past experiences create a higher initial trust and they 
stimulate actors to enter processes open-mindedly. The actors expect that a satisfactory 
outcome is feasible, or even likely, because earlier processes in comparable action arenas 
turned out the way they desired. On the other hand, negative past experiences usually lead 
to a more cautious attitude. Actors are then often willing to get involved only if there is 
good risk ‘protection’ such as formal contracts. In other words, previous common experiences 
influence not only the willingness of actors to cooperate in action arenas, but also which 
degree, and form, of interdependency they will accept. 
Actors (and, in particular, their representatives) in local settings have often known each 
other for a long time, and they have interacted, and cooperated, in several action arenas. 
This common ‘past’ can have resulted in relationships that make them (at least) feel 
interdependent. These complex patterns of relationships can also have resulted in more or 
less openly expressed, and conscious, preferences for cooperation with specific partners in 
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underlying normative framework for actions. It includes confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), and it allows actors to focus more on long 
term benefits of a relationship than on the fairness of each individual transaction (Kaufmann 
and Stern, 1988). The long term focus implies that actors expect each other to work towards 
equalizing the distribution of costs and benefits based on a sense of obligation and duty. 
Actors invest resources expecting reciprocity and a fair deal (Ring and van de Ven, 1994, 
Stoker, 1989). Trust is accordingly based on belief. It ‘compensates’ for formal rules because 
it reduces complexity and transaction costs (Chiles and McMackin, 1996), and it has been 
claimed to be a critical component of collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). 
Exogenous factors
Both Ostrom and Bressers recognise that how actors interact in specific action arenas is 
influenced by exogenous factors. What is within this present study used as the ‘border’ 
between exogenous and endogenous variables, and how are the exogenous variables viewed, 
and addressed? We take the combined effect of three aspects into account for viewing, 
identifying, and addressing, exogenous factors. 
First, they must be relevant, in the sense that they can influence, and in particular structure, 
the process in the arena and its outcomes. 
Second, they are exogenous in the sense that they are ‘far away’ and cannot (easily) be 
influenced by a planning agency or the other actors, and, on the other hand, the factors that 
are much ‘closer’ and can be influenced locally. Everything the local actors, including the 
planning agency, can do, is viewed as inside the arena. The difference can be illustrated by 
two examples. First, planning agencies can only indirectly influence laws and regulations, so 
those latter are regarded as exogenous variables. The way planning agencies choose to work 
within these laws and regulations, is then viewed as endogenous. Second, cultural norms are 
only slowly changing, and the planning agency has no direct effect on this process. However, 
the planning agency can (co)develop a set of rules that structure the interaction in arenas. 
Third, we recognise that a factor which can change in one “round” of decision making can 
be exogenous to the following round. For example, industrial site characteristics are viewed 
as exogenous variables, because we view any changes to these characteristics as outcomes 
of a decision making ‘round’. A round leads to commitment to further action, and such an 
action can have an impact on the site characteristics: the new sites characteristics are then 
exogenous to the following round. 
Ostrom (2005) specifies three (groups of) exogenous variables: biophysical and material 
conditions, attributes of community (in short: culture), and rules. The biophysical and material 
conditions include a variety of aspects such as the socio-economic and spatial characteristics 
of an area. The reason for developing an action arena is often to improve these characteristics, 
and the desired outcome of the arena is then commitment to a decision to implement 
measures that will affect one, or more, of them positively. Many such characteristics are 
quantifiable, and their initial value and subsequent effects on the arena are, compared to the 
effect of culture and rules, relatively easy to identify. 
The common values and norms that together form a culture are less ‘tangible’. On the other 
hand, actors involved in local action arenas are usually all accustomed to working inside the 
same culture. They know that problem solving is sensitive to factors such as culture and local 
politics (Hogan, 2003), and at the same time they know, mostly unconsciously, how to handle 
these aspects. 
 
Rules are prescriptive and normative, and cover a range between “what must” and “what 
must not”, with “what may” somewhere in between, and they are applied both to change 
conduct and to prevent such change (Schauer, 2002). They are used, because they increase 
predictability, reliance and certainty (Schauer, 2002). They function as regulatory structures 
that provide both opportunities and constraints (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995), and as such they 
can facilitate and even accelerate cooperation in arenas. Planning agencies can, for example, 
intentionally develop sets of such rules for arena design and interactions (Klijn, 1996; Bruijn 
de et al., 2002, Ostrom, 2005), rules that create a context for implementation and thus 
induce participants to cooperate even though there might be conflicts of interest (Cline, 
2000). Planning agencies try to develop explicit rules that satisfy the needs of the arena 
participants, for example by applying the criteria simplicity, durability and concordance. 
Simplicity refers to how understandable the rules are, durability refers to how long these 
rules have been applied (which may be viewed as reflecting legitimacy) and concordance to 
how widely used they are (Legro, 1997). 
Rules can be pre-designed by a single actor, or co-developed, or evolve in interaction with 
other actors. Whether explicit rules are actually developed depends on perceived need. 
This can explain why processes often start without any explicit rules, whereby the involved 
actors try to find out which behaviour is appropriate in a specific situation by interacting 
(March and Olsen, 1984; 1989). This implies a search process towards an inter-subjective 
common understanding. Growth models regarding rules imply that rules probably will have 
to be changed. Such changes are likely to have different consequences for the different 
participants (Knight, 1992), and the arenas will have to be adjusted to these new situations 
as well. This takes time. Still, although such changes can delay progress in the short term 
(organisations might even decide to leave the process), they may have a positive impact 
on the long term. In particular, they create clear action space for participants and enable 
learning processes. 
Nevertheless, in such a situation implicit (also called informal) rules, and possibly coincidence 
as well, determine how the interaction takes place. This means that individual actors often 
apply their own interpretations of rules (as far as this is possible: allowed interpretations of 
formal laws and regulations are limited), and these rules can sometimes be changed without 
any traceable and transparent process. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, rules are structurally 
ambiguous and there are many ways to interpret and follow a particular rule (Wittgenstein, 
1986). Furthermore there can also be conflicts between different sets of rules (Bueren van 
et al., 2003), and rules can be ‘nested’ within other (higher) rules (Ostrom, 2005). Because 
rules are often kept implicit and ambiguous, it is understandable that a process may appear 
to proceed well, but ‘below the surface’ conflicts are contained and suppressed, and emerge 
when ‘real’ decisions are to be made. 
Even if rules have been agreed upon by all actors, this does not guarantee rule-abiding 
behaviour. In practice, actors deliberately break rules, refrain from compliance, or try to 
reinterpret and design new rules (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2006). Attempts to enforce them 
easily turn into a negotiation process.   
There is also a dilemma. If contracts, varying between formal written documents and 
informal agreements based on expectations (Jones, 1995), are ambiguous regarding non-
compliance they are difficult to enforce, but on the other hand designing and implementing 
complete, explicit, and easily enforceable contracts is costly (Blumberg, 2001) and may have 
undesirable effects on the process. 
Explicit, formalised, rules are not always necessary. For example, the involved actors can 
view the rules as evident, unquestioned and even clear to all, although they may never have 
been openly discussed. There can also be something in the relationship between the actors 
that ‘compensates’ for the certainty of formal rules: here this is called trust. Trust provides an 
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4.7.  Conclusions
In this chapter, a theoretical framework has been developed which can be used to understand 
complex, multi-actor processes such as restructuring industrial sites. This framework is, in 
essence:
•  actors interact in action arenas;
•  each actor behaves rationally in trying to achieve its own ends, according to its cognition 
of the situation;
•  the behaviour of each actor is affected by factors external to the arena, such as the 
physical situation, the reigning culture, and the laws and regulation;
•  the behaviour of each actor is affected also by factors internal to the arena. These are the 
motives of, and the resources and information available to, each actor separately;
•  each actor is dependent to a greater or lesser extent on one or more of the other actors in 
the arena for achieving its own goals;
•  the recognition of this interdependency affects how an actor behaves: it can lead the actor 
to modify its motives, it can affect the way it uses its resources, it can affect the way it 
uses its information and tries to get more;
•  the process might consist of several rounds, each in a different arena, and the actors in 
one round might not be the same as in another round. The external and internal factors in 
one round will affect the external and internal factors in the subsequent round. 5.1. Introduction
One of the actors in the ‘complex, multi-actor process’ of restructuring industrial sites is the 
planning agency. This is a public body which has powers and responsibilities for ensuring that 
an industrial site is of the required quality: usually it is a municipality, or the equivalent. The 
planning agency wants to speed up the restructuring. How can it use the insights provided by 
the theoretical framework worked out in the previous chapter in order to do that?
This chapter seeks an answer to the third detailed research question formulated in chapter two: 
How	can	the	theoretical	framework	be	applied	to	restructuring	of	industrial	sites?
The planning agency must be able to predict how the other actors will react to its policy 
measures (5.2), must choose those measures (5.3), and must choose an approach to 
managing and organising the restructuring (5.4). Finally, the chosen approach provides input 
for identifying design characteristics for the decision support model, and some remarks are 
given on its added-value (5.5).
 
5.2. Influencing actors 
The contextual interaction theory was introduced in chapter 4, and we took from it the 
statement that the behaviour of actors depends on three characteristics: their motives, their 
resources, and their information. Now we can put this statement in the context for which 
it was developed by Bressers, namely to explain the course and outcomes of interaction 
processes when a public body applies policy instruments to achieve policy goals. Earlier 
versions of Bressers’ ‘instrumentation theory’ (Bressers & Klok 1987; 1988) stressed 
that public policy achieved its effects by influencing the actions of others: measures (the 
application of instruments) work only by changing how others act. The contextual interaction 
5. Applying the theoretical framework  
 to restructuring 
“Activating the right players with the right resources is 
the crucial task of governing in cities […]”
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001, p.14)
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5.3. Choosing the policy measures 
The key to successful restructuring is getting the actors to agree to commit their resources to 
physical measures (‘investments’) which will restructure the site in ways which satisfy actors’ 
goals. The commitment of actors to allocating their resources to a specific measure or action 
depends on the information they have, the resources they possess, how the specific solutions 
fit their motives, and how interdependent they feel in reaching their goals. This means 
that deliberate (planned) changes to any of these factors influence performance (including 
progress) and outcomes of an arena. First, the process towards satisfactory outcomes can 
be influenced through collection, distribution, and sharing of information about actors and 
potential solutions. This leads to changes to the quality and quantity of information available 
to a specific actor, and also to the information being jointly accessible to the whole group of 
arena participants. Second, potential solutions (options) can be developed that fit in varying 
degrees the motives of the involved actors, and, alternatively or additionally, influencing 
approaches can be used for changing how actors feel they should act (that is, using direct 
‘face-to-face’ influencing approaches to change the actors’ motivation). Third, actions can 
be taken, and potential solutions developed, that have different cost-benefits, and different 
interdependency characteristics. Each possible solution can influence the need for resources 
from specific actors, the distribution of the related costs and benefits among the actors, and 
the joint (i.e. total) investment needed. 
Since the outcomes of implementation processes depend on the behaviour of all the actors 
involved, the planning agency can try to influence their characteristics and/or manage the 
arena in which the interaction process takes place. This is called process management.
 
5.4. Applying process management 
Process management 
As De Bruijn, in’t Veld and ten Heuvelhof say: “In recent years, the management world has 
become increasingly perceptive to the process-related aspects of change” (Bruijn de, et 
al. 2010, p.1). This has led to a large number of studies into “process management”, and 
(particularly relevant for this study) management of governance networks (e.g. Bruijn de, et 
al., 2002; 2010 and references cited therein; Bueren van, 2009; Boer de and Bressers, 2011: 
in particular chapter four pp. 86-95; Klijn, 2008; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004 and references 
cited therein). Process management and network management are closely related, and 
these approaches are often used together (Bueren, van, 2009). We use the term “process 
management”, but we include also knowledge of “network management”: in particular as 
far as it concerns the role of public actors in governance (e.g. Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). 
Process management is a form of governance that focuses on how interaction and decision-
making in complex policy processes can be influenced by design and management (Bruijn de, 
et al., 2002; 2010). “Process management […] aims to structure and facilitate the exchange 
of information and knowledge, of opinions and views, of goals and interests, resulting in 
interaction, negotiation, and decision-making.” (Bueren van, 2009, p. 55). 
The process manager designs and manages a process aimed at creating conditions where 
interdependent actors are inclined to cooperate instead of getting into conflicts, and where 
specific attention is paid to contents, maintaining transparency and openness, protecting 
core values of participants, and using incentives for ensuring progress (Bruijn de, et al., 
2010). In particular, trust in such complex processes seems to matter for outcomes, and can 
theory takes that further by saying that the effects of measures on the actions of others 
depends on the three characteristics of the ‘others’ just mentioned. 
The contextual interaction theory focuses on actor characteristics, implementation, 
interaction between (in particular) responsible implementers and target groups, and the use 
of policy instruments. Policy processes are viewed as social interaction processes, where 
both the course and outcomes are influenced by the participating actors. More specifically, 
as previously mentioned (in chapter 4), the theory assumes that three characteristics of the 
actors – within this study referred to as motives, information, and resources – are the crucial 
factors for influencing their behaviour, thus influencing the course and outcomes. This also 
means that explanations using only one or two of the three core characteristics, will lead to 
much less insight. It is further assumed that the core variables do not operate in isolation 
from each other, but influence each other, and the interaction process, in a complex (i.e. not 
simple additive) way (and see appendix III). The processes can then be explained in terms of 
combinations of values of the core factors. The resulting number of determined interactive 
settings remains limited, because there are only three core variables. 
The theory focuses on the interaction between responsible government officials (in this study 
referred to as the actor “planning agency”) and target groups, aimed at implementing policy. 
Any new policy only adds a new element to an existing situation, where the actors often 
maintain contact related to several (policy) topics, and have been engaged in efforts to 
mutually influence each other for a long time. In such a situation, the “[…] implementation 
process is not only about achieving implementation, but also about attempts to prevent 
implementation or to change the character of what is implemented […]” (Bressers, 2004, p. 
290). The planning agency is not the only actor that employs strategies to influence others. 
All actors involved use a variety of strategies for interacting such as cooperation, opposition, 
and joint learning, and a variety of approaches for influencing the others and the process. 
Their choice of approach is influenced by their motives, information, and resources. 
The use of policy instruments during such a complex process is not isolated from the situation 
in which they are used. The instruments themselves are viewed as being part of the ‘external 
circumstances’, but the decision to apply them is endogenous. When applied they have 
indirect influence on the process through their influence on the set of core variables (Bressers, 
2009). There is a specific context (e.g. previous decisions), a structural context (e.g. networks 
and actors, responsibilities and resources), and a wider context (e.g. economic, technological 
and cultural). These three contexts overlap. The wider context encompasses the structural 
and the specific ones, and the structural one encompasses the specific context. 
All the external circumstances are to be taken into account when estimating the value of the 
core variables, and those core actor characteristics can again change as a result of process 
experiences and exogenous factors. This means that an understanding of the nature of the 
interactive process between planning agency and target groups, including the knowledge 
about each core characteristic of the actors, is needed. This makes it possible to identify the 
policy instruments that preferably should be used, and how they can be used appropriately. 
Chapter 4 has added the following statements about how actors react to policy measures:
• some actors are ‘agents’, that is, they represent other actors;
•  some actors know each other from before the start of the process, and this ‘history’ affects 
their reactions to policy measures;
•  many of the actors are dependent on each other to a greater or lesser extent, and this too 
affects their reactions to policy measures.
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The design is aimed at “[…] fostering organizational arrangements to facilitate and enable 
interactions between actors […]” (Klijn, 2010, p. 132). The planning agency performs activities 
such as identifying problems and possible arena participants, identifying promising specific 
‘configurations’ of actors and possible agendas (i.e. sets of participants related to specific 
challenges), identifying and addressing process and content dilemmas, defining the agenda, 
and making process rules (Bruijn de, 2010). 
The planning agency collects information about individual actors. This includes information 
on opinions, interests, core values, perceived and actual risks, conditions for participation, 
opportunities and threats, incentives and disincentives. 
The next activity is to look for configurations of actors. This means identifying relations 
between actors, how far apart their opinions are, what their resources are, and how the 
resources are distributed among the actors. It is possible that too many important actors 
(e.g. those having substantial resources) fall ‘outside’ a desirable configuration. In that case 
reframing the agenda can make participation more attractive to such influential actors.  
Still, any agenda will be less attractive to some actors than other ones. Conflicting opinions 
can best be formulated as dilemmas. That makes them visible and acknowledged, which can 
serve as a starting point for negotiations and trade-offs in search of commitment. However, 
dilemmas are not only about content issues. There can also be process dilemmas such as the 
choice between progress and taking sufficient time for all activities (in Dutch: “zorgvuldig”), 
and between the involvement of many, or few, participants. 
The planning agency needs to develop an organisation that gets accepted by the participants. 
Besides making choices about whom to involve and in which roles, this activity can also 
include the development of process rules on, for example, entry and exit of participants and 
decision-making in the arena. 
Managing the arena(s)
The process management includes making necessary changes to any (of the previously 
described) design aspects, and using specific incentives to influence progress and outcomes. 
The aim is to reach a decision that provides satisfactory benefits to each of the involved 
actors. 
Access to sufficient information is an important aspect of the search for such decisions, 
because problem solving can fail because of insufficient information about problems or 
effects of solutions (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). This information is always related to specific 
arenas involving specific sets of participants. The planning agency therefore has to take 
into account that an “[…] actor scan is a continuous activity […]” (Bruijn de, et al., 2002, 
p. 76). This means that changes to any of the above mentioned design aspects can occur, 
and that changes should be continuously monitored and appropriately addressed during a 
restructuring. In particular, the interaction in the arena can lead to new insights and new 
opinions.
The planning agency can redefine the process regarding issues at stake (i.e. the agenda), and 
it can be desirable, or even necessary, to bring in new actors to a specific arena or exclude 
existing ones (Boer de and Bressers, 2011). Changes to agenda and participants can also 
lead to the development of new arenas, and it can be desirable to ‘move’ decisions from one 
existing arena to another one. 
Actors can for example initially refuse to participate, because they feel that the cost – benefit 
ratio of participation is unsatisfactory or that there is too much uncertainty about the process. 
Changes to the agenda, or to rules, can then make some actors become more willing to 
participate, and it can influence progress. An altered agenda influences also the ‘menu’ of 
improvement options, and accordingly also total costs and benefits, and the distribution of 
both sorts of effects among the participants. Risks must be addressed too, because if the 
be managed (Klijn et al., 2010). 
Command and control incentives can also be used as part of the process management. 
They can for example function as driver of the process if they create a sense of urgency. 
However, in general they are not likely to be successful, because (as previously mentioned) 
the actors are interdependent (Bruijn de, et al., 2010) and those ‘commanded’ can withhold 
their cooperation. 
The planning agency as process manager
The planning agency, applying a process management approach to restructuring, focuses on 
actors, and how their interaction can lead to desirable outcomes. The following aspects of 
the approach are described: quality of information; commitment; design and management 
of arenas.     
Information, problems, and solutions 
In complex multi—actor interactive processes (such as restructuring) there is often a lack 
of objective information, lack of consensus about the norms that should be applied in the 
problem solving process, and both problems and solutions are dynamic (Bruijn de, et al., 
2010). Problems are “wicked” (alternatively called “unstructured”): there are different 
perceptions of problems and solutions, and there is uncertainty related to ambiguous 
information (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). This means that information and knowledge become 
partly ‘negotiable’, and actors try to convince each other about the quality of specific options. 
The information they use is to some extent ‘coloured’, and the actors use the information 
strategically based on an assessment of possible effects on their own interests. Information 
can therefore be unequally distributed among participants.  
A process management approach implies that the planning agency uses a transparent and 
open approach to collection, distribution, and exchange of information, and to its use in the 
decision-making (Bruijn de, et al., 2010). Additionally, specific rules can also be developed 
about information access (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).  
Commitment and actor satisfaction
The decision-making process is dynamic and unpredictable, and there are regularly changes 
to agendas, participants, and perceptions. The planning agency designs and uses the 
interaction for reaching agreements to a “commitment package”, which represents the 
most “authoritative” solution (Bruijn de et al., 2010). This solution must satisfy the different 
demands of the involved actors (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
Typically, effectiveness of such a process (i.e. the outcomes) is therefore measured as the 
degree to which such an agreement has been reached, rather than whether (predefined) 
goals are reached (Woltjer, 2000). The planning agency must focus on commitment and 
specific improvement measures (‘contents’) at the same time, because “[…] a process 
without contents […] is empty […]” (Bruijn de, et al., 2002, p.169, author’s translation). This 
means that the planning agency needs to ensure that both process outputs (e.g. knowledge 
‘produced’ during a restructuring) and content outputs (e.g. selected physical improvement 
measures for a site) are satisfactory enough for each individual actor to participate in a 
specific arena. A planning agency can, and will, use ‘simple’ content measures, but the 
main question it has to address is “[…] how to sustain the process of continuous package 
improvement […]” (Bruijn de, et al., 2010, p. 13).
Design of the arena
The planning agency accordingly has to design and manage a dynamic process that can 
‘bridge’ the distance between unstructured problems and satisfactory solutions. 
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2000 provides an introduction to the variety of decision support methods and tools). Support 
is needed to facilitate the analysis of specific restructuring situations and the selection of 
appropriate improvement options. The model should combine explanatory and predicting 
power for, as Friedman argues, the only way to assess the quality of a model is whether 
it delivers predictions that are good enough for the purpose and whether it is better than 
predictions coming from alternative models (Friedman, 1953). 
Focus on applicability and socially robust outcomes
The challenge of developing something that is considered to be ‘good enough’ means that 
what is developed should be applicable and should produce socially robust outcomes (Pielke, 
2003). Furthermore there are indications that the better the users understand the model and 
have confidence in its results, the higher the probability that the model will be applied in the 
processes (Hare, 2005). 
Balancing simplicity, completeness, and usefulness
Choices have to be made about factors and relationships (Luhmann, 1995), and the decision 
support model should be as complete as possible (i.e. not over-simplified) and address and 
integrate the most important characteristics (Haimes, 2004) of restructuring. 
Guidelines and support for informed choices
The use of specific rules and measures in uncertain multi-actor interactive situations has 
to be based on an assessment of possible effects, which cannot be completely known in 
advance. In such situations, rules that condition the interactions within the arenas without 
completely determining them (Pennen van der, 2005) are suitable. 
The model therefore needs to provide guidance, but also to leave room for freedom of choice. 
In practice, a whole range of options for delivering decision support for restructuring has been 
applied, and they vary in the degree to which they prescribe rules. An example of (almost) 
non-prescriptive approaches is ‘inspiration books’. These usually contain descriptions of 
projects or options for solving problems, sometimes including related success factors or pro’s 
and con’s. The user is completely free in choosing whether to apply any, or none, of the 
examples. A more prescriptive form is often used in management guides. These present 
guidelines in a descriptive form as success factors (e.g. Novem, 2001) or as questions that 
guide the planning agency through a process towards selection of measures (e.g. Brand, 
Bugge and Roelofs, 2004). 
This range of approaches reflects a need for guidelines that not only allow, but in particular 
actively stimulate, planning agencies and other involved actors to make their own informed 
choices. However, these choices are actually never completely ‘free’. Management guides, 
in particular, include ‘hidden’ normative elements in the recommendations they include, 
and in the recommendations they exclude. They usually offer one (or a limited number of) 
recommendation(s) for handling any specific situation, and all other possible recommendations 
are accordingly, for reasons not disclosed, viewed as less important or not desirable.  
In all cases, accordingly, an underlying normative framework enables the topics that are 
important, and the strategies that are appropriate for solving specific problems, to be 
selected, and possibly also the likely effects to be predicted. Such selections and predictions 
can, in their most simple form, be viewed as the result of gathering the correct information 
(Pielke, 2003). However, a decision support model for restructuring should not attempt to 
deliver ‘perfect’ information and, therefore, predictability, because that can ‘deaden’ a 
relationship (Heath and Bryant, 2000). Efforts to collect more information can also reveal 
more complexities and increase relevant uncertainties, which again can lead to increased 
political controversy (Sarewitz et al., 2000). The model should therefore acknowledge that 
risks of (for example) joint action are too high, actors may not find these risks acceptable 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). The process is aimed at reaching a final complete understanding 
of, and agreement to, the content solution and the related distribution of costs, benefits, and 
risks (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).
Process management is very much about flexibility and “emergent” developments, and the 
ability of a process manager to quickly recognise opportunities, and adapt and use appropriate 
strategies is therefore important (Boer de and Bressers, 2011). 
Summing-up
Process management can deliver the desired ‘bridge’ between the theoretical framework (in 
chapter four) and the application to restructuring. The following aspects need to be taken 
into account:
•  Information is needed about each individual actor (e.g. opinions, resources, interests), and 
in particular about how each actor is linked to specific problems or solutions;
•  Information is also needed about specific configurations of actors related to specific arenas;
•  Information and knowledge can be unequally distributed among participants, and it is 
possible to apply rules for access to information; 
•  The planning agency should focus on commitment: information is ‘negotiable’ (i.e. the 
information is ambiguous, and there is lack of objective ways to assess its quality), and 
therefore the planning agency needs to reach a level where the actors are satisfied with 
the available information 
•  Commitment of each individual actor is needed, and in particular this means that each 
actor must be satisfied with the agenda, the participants, the organisation (including 
process rules), what he can, or will, gain (i.e. costs, benefits, and risks, and the distribution 
of these same aspects among the other actors)
•  Management of any arena in particular means continuously monitoring the satisfaction 
with agendas, available information, involvement and behaviour of participants, and 
process organisation (rules, agreements, roles etc.), also the ability to flexibly adapt and 
apply strategies according to need regarding effect on progress and/or commitment.  
 
5.5. The decision support model: choices and added-value 
The final question that needs to be answered before the model can be developed is: Which kind 
of decision support model is best suited to helping planning agencies manage restructuring 
as a complex multi-actor interactive process, and which added-value will it have compared 
to other models?
Process model for decision support 
If the problems encountered in restructuring had been ‘tame’ (well-structured), and if the 
decision process could be reduced to a single decision that is represented through a limited 
number of quantifiable variables and constraints, then it would have been possible to attempt 
mathematical modelling. However, in practice the problems which planning agencies face 
are ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Churchman, 1967, Conklin, 2005). For such complex 
and dynamic situations a process model is suitable (Vrolijk, 1996). 
The process to be managed includes all the interactions between participants, and the goal is 
good decisions (Pielke, 2003). Therefore the planning agency needs to take an approach that 
can support decision-making processes under conditions of high uncertainty (Bouyssou et al., 
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successful use of predictions depends more on a good process than just good information 
(Sarewitz et al., 2000). 
Addressing specific situations
Restructuring processes possess common characteristics, but each case is different. The 
model should therefore include, and integrate, general ‘good practices’ and situation-specific 
approaches. 
This applies in particular to the three selected factors: motives, information and resources. The 
complex relationships between these imply that a decision support model needs to include 
approaches for addressing specific situations that can be viewed as specific configurations 
of the three factors. 
Question-based adaptive model 
Planning agencies need to have a thorough understanding of restructuring situations and, 
in particular, of the possibilities for influencing them. This means that the model needs to 
support both diagnostic activities and the choice of suitable follow-up actions. 
First, this means that the model needs to include the right diagnostic questions and the right 
actions. Basis for identifying both is provided by the earlier mentioned management guide, 
which was developed specifically for sustainable revitalisation of industrial sites within a 
three years research project called “MAnagement of SUstainable of Industrial Sites (acronym: 
MASURIN), co-funded by the Fifth Framework Program of the European Commission (Brand, 
Bugge and Roelofs, 2004, for more information see appendix II). The structure and contents of 
the guide, focusing on an integral process-design approach for supporting complex decision 
making, reflect an integration of the then available body of knowledge and experience from 
interactive planning processes in six countries. The management guide is question-based, 
which facilitates actors in their own search for situation specific answers. It also includes 
suggestions for suitable follow-up actions linked to all questions and specific phases of the 
process.
Second, the model needs to fulfil the needs of (at least) the planning agency regarding 
satisfactory progress and outcomes, suitability in multi-actor processes, and adaptability to 
changing needs. Here, these issues are addressed based on ‘lessons learned’ in another 
large two-years research project (co-funded by the European Commission, FP6, “Regions of 
Knowledge 2”-program) that focused on how complex decision making in interactive multi-
actor regional innovation processes could be facilitated (Bugge et al., 2007; Welter et al., 
2008; Bugge et al., 2010). In particular, this study showed that an adaptable question-based 
decision support was favoured over blue-print approaches, and that such an approach should 
be simple, compact, transparent and understandable, and it should facilitate discussion. 
Added-value 
The model, presented in the following chapter, builds on and integrates the results of 
these two projects, and the improved understanding of restructuring reported in academic 
literature and developed within this study (see previous chapters). This model improves 
the MASURIN-model in several ways. First, MASURIN presented only general guidelines 
for restructuring, whereas this new model specifically addresses how those processes 
can proceed more quickly without endangering the final quality. Second, the new model 
is different in its focus on the way planning agencies can handle specific situations and 
in particular how actors are, and should be, involved depending on the three key factors 
motives, information, resources. Third, this model is much simpler and compact: both 
regarding number of ‘phases’ (only two arenas: initiative and implementation) and number 
of questions and suggested follow-up actions.   
6.1. Introduction
All ‘building blocks’ for the decision support model are now available. The model will focus 
on how the planning agency can influence interdependent actors that interact in initiative 
and implementation arenas, and will take into account how the decision-making will depend 
on the actor characteristics information, motives, and resources. It will be a question-based 
process decision support model, which addresses, and integrates, aspects of appropriate 
process management needed to reach a satisfactory “commitment package”.  
The objective of this chapter is to give an answer to the fourth detailed research question 
formulated in chapter two:
How	can	a	model	be	developed	for	situation-specific	process	approaches	chosen	by	planning	
agencies	to	influence	progress?		
First, the main components (6.2), and the key decisions (6.3) included in the model are described. 
The concepts are then operationalized (6.4), and the detailed design is described, (6.5) before 
the model itself is presented (6.6.). The chapter is concluded by giving some strategic options 
for addressing a limited number of specific ideal-type situations that can be encountered in 
restructuring (6.7.), and some reflective remarks on use of the model in practice. 
6.2. The main components of the model
The model comprises sets of questions and selected follow-up measures that a planning 
agency can use for designing and managing restructuring with the objective of speeding up 
these processes. It focuses on specific situations, and sees the development and management 
of the ‘right’ action arena for addressing this situation as being the key process. This process is 
split into three main activities: identifying a specific challenge and its stakeholders; developing 
6.  A decision support model for 
 restructuring industrial sites
“If an improvement model shall not only be useful, but also used,
then it needs to fulfill the needs of stakeholders that want adaptive 
question–based decision-support, and no ‘blueprint’ solution,
in their complex search for the ‘right’ strategy [...]”
(Bugge et al., 2010, p 94)
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stakeholders. These initial conditions include both the endogenous factors (actors, their 
motives, information, and resources, and the nature and extent of the interdependency 
between the actors) and the exogenous factors that structure the interaction in the arena. In 
particular, identifying the initial conditions means understanding the problems with the site 
performance and how the different actors perceive these problems. However, challenges 
can go much further than perceived problems. They can also include goals related to high 
ambitions (i.e. driven by visions) for the site development. A challenge can accordingly be 
any selected mix of problems and goals related to the restructuring, and it can be specified 
according to space, or content. Any challenge will have its own specific combination of these 
factors. The planning agency develops an overview of such challenges, links each challenge 
to stakeholders, and selects one challenge. 
The second main activity is developing the action arena. This involves selecting the preferred 
participants (see above), assessing their willingness to become involved and, if necessary, 
trying to influence that willingness. The activity includes also setting up the working rules, the 
agenda, etc.
The third main activity is managing the interaction within the action arena towards outcomes 
that are acceptable to all the involved actors.
The two action arenas
In chapter 3 – current approaches to restructuring in practice – we saw that it was common 
practice to distinguish between two ‘rounds’: taking the initiative to start restructuring, and 
implementing the restructuring. The output of the first round is the input to the second. The 
decision support model follows that practice and accordingly distinguishes two action arenas:
• the initiative action arena;
• the implementation action arena.
The general activities (see above) are the same for each action arena, but the detailed 
activities vary between the arenas.
6.3.  The decisions to be taken by the planning agency and 
for which support is desirable
In the initiative action arena
1)  Does the planning agency know enough about the restructuring challenge and the relevant 
stakeholders?
  If not, how can it gather the necessary information (i.e. for identifying the initial conditions)?
2)  Does the planning agency know who the preferred participants are?
 If not, how can it gather the necessary information (i.e. for developing the action arena)?
3)  Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and resources (process costs) on 
developing a vision for the restructuring?
 If not, how can that be influenced (i.e. for developing the action arena)?
And then, when one or more possible visions have been formulated:
4)  Is there sufficient commitment from the preferred participants to work out the vision / 
visions? 
 If not, how can that be influenced (i.e. managing the action arena)?
an action arena around preferred participants; managing the resulting action arena towards 
desired outcomes. This requires first identifying the initial conditions, selecting (based on this 
understanding) follow-up measures that influence the process positively, and identifying the 
desired outcomes. The questions and follow-up address each activity separately.    
Actors, stakeholders, and participants
The model uses three different terms: actor, stakeholder and participant. Actors are those 
parties that somehow are, or can be, involved in a specific restructuring. They include the 
planning agency, firms situated on the site, and higher authorities. Depending on the challenge 
to be addressed, actors might also be stakeholders. For example, if there is unused land, this is 
a problem for the planning agency and some of the firms. A different example is site security, 
which normally will affect all firms. A stakeholder is therefore viewed as an actor that either is 
affected by, or has influence on, a specific restructuring challenge. Stakeholders are a subset 
of the group of actors. However, not all stakeholders are equally necessary, perhaps not even 
desirable, in an action arena. Preferred participants are those actors that the planning agency 
believes to be the ‘best choice’ for achieving progress and reaching a desired outcome. The 
preferred participants will normally be a subset of the complete group of stakeholders. Finally, 
not all these preferred participants will ultimately become, or stay, involved as participants. 
The action arena participants are the actors that are willing to invest in an interaction process 
for addressing a specific challenge. The arena participants can accordingly change in time. 
The development towards an ‘ideal’ arena regarding involvement of actors, viewed from the 
perspective of the planning agency, is visualised in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1  Relationship between actors, stakeholders, and arena participants 
The model focuses on how the planning agency can develop and manage action arenas 
that have the ‘right’ combination of challenge and participants. The term ‘right’ refers to 
participant(s)’ action potential: the ability to really solve the problems. The model accordingly 
assumes that knowledge about the actors is essential for a successful process, and that 
‘wrong’ actor involvement negatively affects progress. 
Main activities and challenges
The model divides the task of the planning agency into three activities.
 
First, the planning agency identifies the initial conditions regarding the challenge and its 
Actors Stakeholders
Preferred 
participants
Arena 
participants
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• motivation, being the willingness of actors to participate / invest;
•  the resources, being the things that actors possess, such as money, human capacity and 
power that an actor brings to a situation in order to reach his goals. 
•  information, being the information about the consequences for the actor of participating / 
investing (including cognitions of the information).
When the planning agency has assembled those answers for all the preferred participants, it 
makes a picture of the:
• aggregated motivation;
• aggregated resources;
• aggregated information.
This aggregated motivation, resources, and information, refer to a specific set of arena 
participants and a specific restructuring activity or “content” measure. 
Then, taking account of those aggregates, also of how the motivation and information is 
distributed between the actors (e.g. is there an actor who can block the whole process and 
whose motivation is very low?), the planning agency can come to the decision:
• aggregated motivation is satisfactory, or not
• aggregated resources is satisfactory, or not
• aggregated information is satisfactory, or not.
According to chapter 5, the planning agency can influence this situation in different ways.   
If one or more of the aggregates is unsatisfactory, then the planning agency will have either 
to abandon the restructuring, or to change the vision / action plan, or to change the design 
of the arena, or to try to influence the motivation, resources, or information of one or more 
of the actors. One, or more, of these approaches can be used at the same time. The option 
of abandoning the restructuring is not further described, because we focus on improving 
progress in existing restructuring. Nevertheless, sometimes abandoning a restructuring is the 
best option to prevent unnecessary use of resources. 
First, the planning agency can influence the situation by changing the vision / action plan. An 
altered agenda can be developed, and new options can be included in the search for feasible 
restructuring measures. Both changes can positively influence motivation, and altered or 
completely new solutions can be found for which sufficient aggregated resources are available 
(i.e. the set of actors is sufficiently satisfied with how a development affects their goals, and in 
particular about the distribution of costs, benefits, and risks). 
Second, the planning agency can redesign, or create new, arenas. It can identify specific 
configurations of actors related to specific desired developments, and design and manage 
these configurations as arenas involving these actors. The planning agency can (partly) initiate 
changes to participants, positions / roles of participants, and process rules for interaction (e.g. 
entry / exit of participants, decision-making) that create trust and offer protection of “core 
values” for the participants. Changing participants can lead to a situation where the potential 
aggregated resources of all actors increase, and where the involved actors possess new 
information for making the restructuring successful. An altered (or new) design of the arena 
can also be more satisfactory to the participants if they for example get more influence on 
decision-making, or get the opportunity to interact with alternative actors that they trust more. 
Third, the planning agency can influence individual actors. It can for example use persuasive 
and negotiating approaches to influence motivation directly, or it can collect and distribute 
information that indirectly can influence motivation. In particular, the planning agency 
can provide information on problems, improvement measures and their effects on goals, 
specific configurations of actors related to problems and improvement measures, approach 
In the implementation action arena
For each of the possible visions put forward in the previous round:
1)  Does the planning agency know enough about the vision(s)?
  If not, how can it gather the necessary information (i.e. for identifying the initial conditions)?
2)  Does the planning agency know who the preferred participants are?
  If not, how can it gather the necessary information (i.e. for identifying the initial conditions)?
3)  Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and money (process costs) on working 
out the vision into an action plan?
 If not, how can they be influenced (i.e. for identifying the initial conditions)?
And, when one or more action plans have been worked out:
4)  Is there sufficient commitment from the preferred participants to spend (capital) resources 
on implementing the action plan / one of the action plans?
 If not, how can that be influenced (i.e. managing the action arena)?
6.4. Operationalising the concepts used in the model
The planning agency can investigate the initial site conditions and possible measures to 
improve them. In that way, it can estimate, for each possible vision or action plan, the total 
resources necessary for implementing it.
The planning agency can identify the actors involved and try to determine the relationships 
between them, also the motives, resources, and information for each actor. In this way, it 
can build up a picture of interdependencies, and thus select the preferred participants: those 
without whose participation the restructuring will not take place
The willingness of an individual actor to participate in working out a vision or working a vision 
into an action plan, depends on the motives and the information available to that actor and 
the resources available to him, where all three will be influenced (see chapter 4) by the 
context and more specifically by the role of other participants (interdependency). 
In particular, the commitment by an individual actor to investing in a specific restructuring 
activity or measure depends on the resources required from that actor, the distribution of 
costs, benefits, and risks between all actors, and the motives of the actor. That commitment 
is influenced by information about all those factors.
The answers gathered by the planning agency about the separate actors in relationship to 
each other and to a particular restructuring can be ordered along the dimensions of the actor 
characteristics motivation, resources, and cognitions of information available (see: Boer de 
and Bressers, 2011, p. 69). We view, and use, the term “motivation” as the result of person 
– situation interaction (Heckhausen, 1989). The motivation is expressed as a preference for 
acting in a specific way to achieve results in a situation, and the motivation is influenced by 
an actor’s motives (being his more long lasting dispositions) (Heckhausen, 1989; Heckhausen 
and Heckhausen, 2008). We use the term “information” instead of “cognitions” in the model 
only for the purpose of making the term more recognisable to practitioners (i.e. information 
includes cognition, and therefore it is important to focus on how satisfactory the information 
is to the actors). 
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is regarded as satisfactory (enough). To make this assessment, the planning agency can involve 
other actors. In case of a positive answer, the planning agency moves to the next (main) 
activity and related question. However, because the decision-making process takes place in 
‘rounds’, later changes might necessitate returning to ‘earlier’ questions and activities. In 
case of a negative answer, signalling an unsatisfactory situation (or at least unacceptable 
uncertainty), an “if …. then” link leads either to a follow-up question or to a suggested action. 
The follow-up action is always about motivation or information: whether actors’ willingness 
to do something is satisfactory, whether what is known about something is satisfactory, and 
how willingness and knowledge can be influenced. The choice regarding how to apply any of 
the follow-up questions or actions is always up to the model users. 
The model focuses on two specific arenas: the Initiative arena and the Implementation arena. 
For each arena, four main questions are asked related to the main activities (one question for 
the first activity, two for the second activity, and one for the third activity) within the model. 
The number of sub-levels in the decision-trees is restricted to two. The suggested actions are 
described only briefly, because there is abundant information on such approaches in existing 
literature3. To make the questions as clear as possible to the user, they are accompanied by 
short introductory texts. 
Box 6.2  Model design principles: a summary
1.  Progress is achieved by actors investing resources in the process and in 
concrete measures
2.  Resource allocation is the outcome of decisions made by actors related to 
specific challenges 
3.  Actors’ decisions to invest in (i.e. allocate resources to) a specific restructuring 
challenge, characterized by high actor interdependency, depends on three 
factors: the information and resources they have, and their motivation
4.  The planning agency influences progress within action arenas by applying 
instruments (rules and measures) that couple identified challenges to actors 
(as arena participants) so that the actors together have both the willingness 
and ability to invest and solve problems
5.  A satisfactory aggregated total of the three factors motivation, information and 
resources for a specific challenge makes implementation possible (i.e. in the 
initial situation resources are always unsatisfactory, and in the final situation 
sufficient actors possess enough information, resources, and willingness to – 
together – invest those resources for implementing a selected solution) 
6.  Restructuring processes have two distinctly different action arenas: “Initiative” 
and “Implementation”. The model includes, and addresses, both. 
7.  A question based decision support to design and management is appropriate 
for a Dutch restructuring practice. It enables the planning agency to identify 
approaches that represent the ‘best’ choice regarding the balance between 
feasibility and desirability. 
8.  The set of questions serves as a coherent set of process rules for supporting 
decision making in design and management of arenas, and it also enables 
selecting more detailed measures for influencing progress
9.  These detailed measures for influencing arenas, and more specifically for 
influencing the individual factors, are already well known as part of the 
existing body of knowledge, and therefore need only to be briefly described 
within the model
to assessment / comparison of improvement options, agenda for the arena, other actors 
involved, feasibility, risks, and rules on for example decision-making. The planning agency 
can apply an open and transparent approach to collection and distribution of information, 
and at the same time it can develop rules about, for example, confidentiality of information 
that are satisfactory to the participants. The planning agency cannot influence the own 
“resources” of another specific individual actor directly. It can only, as mentioned above, 
either develop alternative solutions that are feasible to this actor (i.e. the resources asked 
from that actor do not exceed its limits), or it can develop alternative solutions that do not 
necessitate any contribution from this specific actor, or it can try to attract an alternative 
actor that can bring the necessary resources, or it can wait for a later moment where the 
financial situation of this actor has been improved.   
Box 6.1 An illustrative example of an approach to process management
Suppose that a joint initiative has already been started, and it has been decided 
to improve land use on the site. There are not enough resources and the planning 
agency is therefore dependent on firms, higher authorities (and possibly other 
investors). The objective for the planning agency is accordingly to develop 
and manage an action arena that leads to the implementation of selected 
improvements. This means identifying solutions, and ensuring that sufficient 
resources are allocated by actors, and at the same time ensuring that no actor (is 
able to) block the implementation. The planning agency therefore needs to change 
the initial situation (unsatisfactory access to resources), and it does so through 
interaction with the individual actors. Investments in land use improvements, to 
put it simply, then depend on what the actors know (information) and what they 
are willing to do (motivation). 
The planning agency accordingly needs to select the right approach for influencing 
each of these two factors individually for each actor, at the same time taking into 
account the relationships with all other factors and actors. 
6.5. Detailed design and application of the model
The model addresses complex situations. Situations where the actors have different opinions 
about what to do, where there is insufficient willingness to invest (i.e. lacking motivation of 
individual actors), and where insufficient information is available. 
The model focuses on how influencing actors and/or choosing a different solution can lead 
to satisfactory commitment. Satisfactory commitment means that sufficient actors are 
willing to allocate resources to starting a restructuring initiative, or to implementing specific 
improvement measures.
The model helps the planning agency take appropriate action by asking questions about 
motivation, information, resources, and commitment. Although the questions address these 
characteristics, they do not always use these terms explicitly. Instead, to improve recognisability, 
the questions are formulated in such a way that they are as familiar as possible to restructuring 
practitioners. 
The questions are incorporated in a decision-tree structure, where each question leads to an 
answer “yes” or “no”. The answer “yes” or “no” is based on an assessment of whether something 
3  These approaches are described in a separate par. 6.6.3 (i.e. not described in detail directly after the questions), in order to avoid repeating text, 
because	the	measures	are	applicable	both	for	initiative	and	implementation	arenas.	However,	the	specific	issues	to	be	addressed	and	the	degree	of	
detail	(need	for	in-depth	study)	vary	for	different	situations,	and	accordingly	these	differences	are	addressed	within	the	description	of	the	measures.
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6.6. The detailed ‘filled-in’ model
6.6.1. The “Initiative Action Arena”
 The planning agency needs to continuously assess how to address each activity 
and	each	question	so	as	to	affect	progress	and	process	outcomes.	 If	answering	a	
question	or	applying	a	specific	measure	has	an	expected	positive	effect	on	progress	
and	no	(foreseen)	negative	effect	on	quality	of	process	outcomes,	then	these	actions	
are performed.
Identifying the integral restructuring challenge and its stakeholders
A starting point for the planning agency is to identify the restructuring challenge. This task is 
directly related to the industrial site performance, and in particular, how different actors view, 
and assess, this performance. The first main question for the planning agency is therefore:  
Q 1  Does the planning agency know enough about the restructuring challenge and the 
relevant	stakeholders?
If the answer is positive, which means that satisfactory information about all initial conditions 
(both exogenous and endogenous factors) is available, then the planning agency can proceed 
with the next activity of developing the action arena (i.e. question 2). 
If the planning agency does not have the information to answer this question, a global 
“Feasibility Analysis” and “Process risk analysis” are performed. The feasibility analysis can 
address both internal and external (viewed from the planning agency) issues. The internal part 
focuses on the information and resources available for the restructuring, the external analysis 
covers also process feasibility. The “Process risk analysis” focuses on potential risks regarding 
reaching the desired outcome, and specifically regarding progress. The combined outcome 
is used as input for an “Organisational (re) design” that is used to guide the subsequent 
“Identification of challenge and related stakeholders”. 
If the need for information is limited to information of the site related problems, effects and 
related risks, then a global “Site Performance Analysis” suffices. If, on the other hand, the site 
performance is known, but there is a lack of information about the actors and how they are 
affected by site performance, or about how they can and will influence this performance, then 
a “Stakeholder analysis” is applied. In practice, if no negative effects on process performance 
are foreseen, then both analyses can be performed at the same time. 
Developing the action arena
The information about stakeholders and site performance serve as input for the development 
of the initiative arena. The next task for the planning agency is to identify which stakeholders 
should preferably be involved in the initiative. The question is therefore: 
Q 2	Does	the	planning	agency	know	who	the	preferred	participants	are?
If the planning agency is uncertain about this, then a combination of a “Stakeholder analysis”, 
a “Process risk analysis”, and an “Identification of challenge and related stakeholders” can 
be applied. These measures are then used to obtain the extra information about actors and 
to add information on the potential consequences of involving an actor or not. If the planning 
agency has satisfactory information about this, the main question for the action arena 
development can then be addressed, which is:  
 
Q 3  Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and resources (process costs) on 
developing	a	vision	for	the	restructuring?	
To answer this question, the planning agency uses the outcome of a “Process Risk Analysis”. 
This informs about the potential consequences of proceeding with a specific set of participants. 
If the answer is positive (i.e. satisfactory enough), then the planning agency can proceed with 
designing the arena, using the “Organisational (re) redesign” measure, and subsequently 
managing the interaction towards a satisfactory outcome. 
However, if willingness is unsatisfactory, the planning agency needs to choose a strategy 
taking into account the effects of several factors. The willingness of any individual actor is 
influenced by the choice for other potential arena participants (i.e.: how satisfied is an actor 
with having specific other actors involved), the ideas about how to structure the arena, and 
the way problems and suggested developments are framed. The willingness is, in particular, 
related to how each individual actor believes that these choices can influence his own 
interests and goals. Therefore, if the willingness is unsatisfactory, then the planning agency 
needs to seek answers to the following three follow-up (sub) questions:
 Q 3.1	Is	the	draft	set	of	preferred	participants	satisfactory	to	the	actors?    
If the answer is negative, then the planning agency can carry out (informal) interviews for 
identifying the preferred change and the underlying reasons for opposition. The preferred 
change can be to involve additional, or to remove or replace current, actors. In all cases the 
planning agency can perform a “Process risk analysis” aimed at identifying the potential 
consequences of changing the group of preferred participants. Depending on the outcome, 
the planning agency can choose to proceed without the unsatisfied actor, can change the set 
of intended participants, or can attempt to influence the motivation of the unsatisfied actor 
(e.g. through “Organisational (re) design”).
 Q 3.2	Is	the	draft	organisation	of	the	initiative	satisfactory	to	the	actors?
The organisation of the initiative structures the interaction between the actors. Satisfaction 
accordingly reflects how each actor views the informal and formal rules that either enable or 
constrain its ability to reach his goals, and the investment it expects to make. If actors are 
unsatisfied with the suggested organisation, then the planning agency can apply a combination 
of a “Process risk analysis” and an “Organisational (re) design” approach. Depending on 
the outcome, the planning agency can decide to maintain or change the organisation. This 
decision is based on expected effects related to the objective of the initiative. 
 Q 3.3	Is	the	draft	agenda	for	the	initiative	satisfactory	to	the	actors? 
The draft agenda can be more or less ‘open’, with respect to the topics that may be addressed. 
Satisfaction reflects how actors perceive that the agenda will enable them to reach their 
goals, and, in particular, whether actors’ responsibilities, ideas and previous choices will 
constrain the process. In practice, firms and the planning agency can have quite different 
initial ideas about the restructuring, even if those ideas have been formalised in visions or 
plans. These ideas can reflect different sets of priorities. If external actors (i.e. external to the 
planning agency) are unsatisfied with the draft agenda, then the planning agency can use a 
8180
“Process Risk Analysis” to identify the potential consequences for process performance and 
for the outcomes of ‘opening’ (i.e. together reformulating) the agenda. 
Managing the action arena
When sufficient preferred participants are willing to become involved, and there is satisfactory 
agreement on a draft agenda, participants, and organisation, then the planning agency can 
start managing the interactive process towards a desired outcome. This starting point will, 
in practice, often not represent an ‘ideal’ situation, but something that at least is found 
acceptable to the participants at that time. There can still be considerable uncertainty about 
how the process will proceed and what the outcomes will be, but the actors are willing (at 
least temporarily) to accept both the known risks and the uncertainty. The planning agency 
asks itself the following main question:
Q 4		Is	there	sufficient	commitment	from	the	preferred	participants	to	work	out	the	vision	/	
visions?
The answer to this question includes two main aspects: commitment and vision. Visions can 
vary considerably regarding the detail in which they are formulated, but they all provide 
some direction for future developments. The commitment is about the support of actors to 
this vision (or visions). If an actor gives enough tangible commitment for allocating its own 
resources (in a particular time) to search for feasible improvement options and/or to address 
a specific high-priority specific challenge, then the vision can be formalised in accordance 
with the needs of the participants in a “Final agreement”, and the planning agency can start 
an implementation process (see Implementation arena). 
If there is unsatisfactory commitment, then the planning agency needs to identify the 
underlying reason(s) and decide what to do. This requires seeking answers to two follow-up 
questions. The first question is:  
 Q 4.1	Is	the	quality	of	available	information	satisfactory	to	the	participants?
Both lack of information and too much information can affect commitment. Furthermore, 
participants have different needs regarding information. If the quality of available information 
is the reason for lack of commitment, then the planning agency can provide information on 
a need-to-know basis. This means clarifying, and communicating, the issues that can cause 
uncertainty (and affect commitment) regarding, in particular, choices of goals. To identify the 
specific needs for information, the planning agency can apply the following detailed follow-up 
questions:
  Q 4.1.1  Is the information about nature and structure of problems as a basis for 
selection	of	visions	appropriate?	
  Q 4.1.2  Is	the	information	about	the	expected	effects	of	goals	on	perceived	problems	
appropriate?
  Q 4.1.3  Is the information about why goals have been selected, why they are formulated 
the	way	they	are,	and	why	alternative	goals	have	not	been	included	appropriate?	
  Q 4.1.4		Is	the	information	about	expected	feasibility	and	risks	related	to	goals	appropriate? 
The answers to each of these questions should give more clarity about goals and priorities. 
However, providing more information influences the way participants perceive the process. 
Therefore the planning agency also assesses the effects of providing (more) information 
using a “Process Risk Analysis”. 
Quality of information is not the only aspect that influences commitment. It is also about 
actors’ satisfaction related to own interests and goals. The second follow-up question is 
therefore:
 Q 4.2	Is	the	chosen	set	of	goals	satisfactory	to	the	participants?
This aspect of satisfaction cannot be influenced by providing more information, as it depends 
on the chosen priorities. If the participants are unsatisfied, then the planning agency can 
apply the following sub-questions for identifying a strategic approach:
  Q 4.2.1	Is	sufficient	satisfaction	achievable	through	influencing	participants	directly?
  Q 4.2.2		Is	sufficient	satisfaction	achievable	through	changing	goals,	participants	or	both?
  Q 4.2.3  Is starting a follow-up implementation process (assuming that resources are 
available)	without	a	clear	joint	vision	the	best	option?
Again the selected approach, which can be one specific measure or any mix, is based on a 
combination of a “Process Risk Assessment”, a “Feasibility analysis”, and an “Organisational 
(re) design” approach.
The outcome of this first round is a set of long-term and short-term goals, more or less 
hard constraints, and ideas (visions) about possible solutions. These solutions have to some 
extent the consent of the involved actors, what the solutions require is roughly known, and, 
therefore, the actors seem willing to spend their resources in further explorations.
6.6.2. The Implementation action arena
Introduction
In this round, the planning agency needs to combine a long-term perspective with continuous 
attention to the development of good solutions that can be implemented. This implies 
focusing on actors and their motivation related to specific challenges, as the key to getting 
access to sufficient resources.  
Objective, scope and focus
The objective which the planning agency has for an implementation arena is to identify 
a solution that is (at least) acceptable to the involved actors, and that at the same time 
contributes satisfactorily to the long term goals. In that respect Implementation arenas are 
comparable to the Initiative arena. 
However, there are some differences as well. First, implementation means that resources 
are allocated not only to a process (i.e. the transaction costs), but also, as an outcome of 
the process, to the implementation of specific improvement measures, and these will usually 
be much higher than the process costs. The process costs (i.e. especially time) of some 
participants are often partly covered by existing organisational responsibilities (e.g. Chamber 
of Commerce, Regional Development Agencies, Employers’ Organisations). However, 
investment costs are usually not. Second, there is much more emphasis on details of the 
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Q 2	Does	the	planning	agency	know	who	the	preferred	participants	are?
Q 3  Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and money (process costs) on working 
out	the	vision	into	an	action	plan?
 
 Q 3.1	Are	the	actors	satisfied	enough	with	the	draft	set	of	preferred	participants?				
 Q 3.2 Are	the	actors	satisfied	enough	with	the	draft	organisation?
 Q 3.3 Are	the	actors	satisfied	enough	with	the	draft	agenda? 
The outcome is more or less ‘ideal’ regarding the probability of successfully addressing the 
challenge, or in other words: solving a problem.  
Managing action arena
When one or more action plans have been worked out, the main question related to the 
desired outcome is: 
Q 4.  Is	 there	 sufficient	 commitment	 from	 the	 preferred	 participants	 to	 spend	 (capital)	
resources	on	implementing	the	action	plan	/	one	of	the	action	plans? 
Again the approach to answering this question is comparable to the process during the 
initiative arena. However, there are some significant differences as well. 
First, the planning agency can address commitment in two ways. Sufficient commitment 
can be viewed as enough for reaching a predefined specified goal, or as a situation that 
constrains what can be done. The planning agency focuses on both. There are accordingly 
always two approaches available: change the participants and their involvement or change 
the challenge that is being addressed. 
Second, any search for a solution implies that several options may be, and often are, available, 
and each option will have its own set of costs, benefits and risks. Account needs to be taken 
of the fact that these are not only ‘distributed’ among the participants, but also between 
non-participants. This distribution is important for decision making in all activities, such as 
searching for options, assessing their individual feasibility, and designing and comparing 
‘packages’ of such options. This is where the planning agency has to take into account its 
specific responsibilities towards ‘society’. This means that developing commitment is not 
only about satisfaction regarding quality of information and the suggested solution, but 
there should also be a much stronger emphasis on the impact on the interests and goals of 
all stakeholders. Stakeholders are then viewed in a broad sense as including all actors that 
may be affected by, for example, changing the allocation of resources available to a local 
community. 
If there is satisfactory commitment, then all issues are included in a “Final Agreement”. 
However, if there is insufficient commitment, then the planning agency can ask the 
following questions:
 Q 4.1.	Are	the	participants	satisfied	with	the	quality	of	available	information?
Again quality of information can influence the motivation of participants. If there is insufficient 
satisfaction with available information, then the planning agency needs to identify which 
parts of the information this concerns. This requires answering the following questions: 
specific measures, and accordingly any conflicts of interests will normally become much more 
‘visible’ during the search for, and comparison of, options. Third, each implementation will 
have (partly physical) consequences for parallel and future developments that influence the 
‘freedom of choice’ for all following steps, all of which will have to be taken into account. 
There is a need to implement a ‘package’ of solutions that can be only partly identified in 
advance. 
The focus for the planning agency is therefore on discovering and creating “golden moments”, 
where the right solution is supported by the right actors who have the ability to allocate 
the right resources. It is accordingly especially about designing and managing commitment, 
which includes attention to feasibility, effects related to goals and actors, risk, trust, and 
uncertainty. 
This description of the Implementation arena focuses on the aspects that are different from 
the Initiative arena, and therefore only brief descriptions are given of the common aspects.
The planning agency needs to continuously assess how to address each activity 
and	each	question	which	can	affect	progress	and	process	outcomes.	If	answering	a	
question	or	applying	a	specific	measure	has	an	expected	positive	effect	on	progress	
and	no	(foreseen)	negative	effect	on	quality	of	process	outcomes,	then	these	actions	
are performed. 
Identifying challenge and stakeholders
The starting point for the planning agency is that the initiative arena may have provided 
one or more visions, and there will be limited information available about any vision. The 
planning agency may therefore need to select one specific vision, and for any (selected) 
vision it needs to know enough about it. The first question for the planning agency is 
therefore:  
Q 1 Does	the	planning	agency	know	enough	about	the	vision(s)?	
 
The planning agency needs to know enough to be able to identify the ‘right’ challenge. Such 
a restructuring “challenge” is a specific problem or goal (or a specific mix of problems and/
or goals) that, for good reasons, should be addressed first (i.e. at that moment in time). The 
reasons for choosing a specific challenge, such as for example a specific problem, are always 
related to its stakeholders, and in particular, to how different actors view, and assess, the 
importance and urgency of improving specific aspects of the site performance. Choosing 
requires attention for not only the problems but also for the process. If this challenge is 
unknown, then an “Organisational (re) design” is applied that again serves as a basis for 
“Identification challenge and related stakeholders”. If needed, this activity can be supported 
by any of the measures “Site performance analysis”, “Stakeholder analysis”, “Feasibility 
analysis” and “Process risk analysis”. 
Developing action arena
The outcome provides input for identifying the preferred participants, applying the same 
approach as described for the Initiative arena. Again it is necessary to influence their 
willingness to participate by fine-tuning the organisation, agenda and set of participants. The 
questions, and the related suggested measures for the more detailed “if … then” questions, 
are identical to the initiative arena (except, of course, that they address a specific selected 
challenge instead of the restructuring initiative): 
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  Q 4.2.1	Are	the	participants	satisfied	with	the	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits?
Each participant will normally know the direct implementation costs, especially related 
to ‘physical’ improvement measures, but less accurately the costs (in time) for the 
implementation. Own (potential) benefits of specific site improvements are more difficult 
to assess in advance. Especially for commercial firms, this influences their opportunities, 
and willingness, to invest. Besides assessing how attractive the balance between costs and 
benefits for itself appears to be, any participant also looks at the distribution of effects among 
participants. This means that a participant will expect any solution to reflect a ‘fair’ distribution 
of effects: any deviation from such a ‘fair’ distribution can cause dissatisfaction. However, 
expressed concerns about ‘fairness’ can also reflect negotiation tactics. If participants are 
unsatisfied with the distribution effects, then the planning agency first needs to assess the 
underlying reason(s) and then decide whether opportunities for changes to distribution or 
choice of solution should be explored. 
  Q 4.2.2	Do	the	participants	find	the	risks	acceptable?
The second issue is about acceptance of risks. If the participants are unsatisfied with the risks 
and, in particular, with the actions that are planned for preventing or mitigating the effects on 
themselves, then the planning agency can assess the desirability and feasibility of changing 
the “Final Agreement” to address these issues. 
6.6.3. Measures for influencing process performance 
Introduction
There is a vast body of knowledge on measures for influencing processes. This study 
does not attempt to give any complete overview, or to make any thorough, underpinned, 
selection of such measures (some illustrative examples: Daft et al., 2010, Shelly et al., 
2008; Bruijn de et al., 2002; 2010; Freeman, 2010; Loosemore et al., 2006, Geltner et al., 
2007). Here we only give compact descriptions of such measures, which give guidelines 
on how to handle the “if … then” situations identified using the decision-tree approach for 
each arena (see 6.5.1-2). 
All the described measures are applicable in both arenas, and the descriptions attempt to 
capture the essence of how they can be applied depending on the situation. This means 
addressing the level of detail (accuracy etc.) needed, depending on an assessment of 
desirability versus feasibility. Generally, the need for more specific information will increase 
in the course of the process. This means that information needed for the Initiative arena will 
normally be less detailed than what is needed during the Implementation arena. 
In practice, the planning agency often uses the same measures several times, depending 
on the needs of the process. The relationships between the measures and the process, 
somewhat ‘simplified’ (i.e. not taking into account decision making in rounds, nor the need to 
collect, analyse and apply additional information in continuous improvements to the process 
design), are visualised in figure 6.2.
  Q 4.1.1  Is the information about the challenge (nature and structure of problem) 
appropriate? 
Although the previous process will have led to a well-defined challenge, participants may 
have different information or perception about what the problem really is. If this is the case, 
then the planning agency can choose, depending on the outcome of a “Process risk analysis”, 
to ensure that all participants have access to the same information and, if needed, to facilitate 
a process towards developing a joint view of the challenge. 
  Q 4.1.2	Is	the	information	about	individual	improvement	options	appropriate?
The planning agency searches for feasible improvement options. If insufficient is known about 
such options, then the planning agency searches for more information about already known 
options, and/or searches for additional options that can contribute to reaching predefined 
goals. This search is focused on identifying those options that seem to be feasible. 
  Q 4.1.3 Is the information about the comparison and selection of options appropriate? 
Comparison requires applying a method that assesses each option. Any such method applies 
criteria with more or less explicit weights. The planning agency might need to decide which 
information on this assessment should be distributed (again using information on actors and 
process risks). This can even include detailed descriptions on why some criteria are chosen 
and other ones not, as well as the reasoning behind the allocated weights. 
  Q 4.1.4  Is the information about feasibility and risks of the selected solution 
appropriate? 
This is about having a clear picture of the consequences of implementing a solution, so that 
each participant can make its own choice. If there is insufficient information available, then 
the planning agency improves, and distributes, the (draft) “Final Agreement”. In general, the 
need for more detailed information increases as the participants get closer to really investing 
in a specific measure. Although there might be a large amount of trust, each participant will 
want to know what the chosen solution will mean for own goals and interests. Expressed 
satisfaction about quality of information can change drastically if the chosen solution turns 
out to be less positive than expected. This means that the planning agency has to ask the 
following question:
 Q 4.2 Are	the	participants	satisfied	with	the	chosen	solution?
Satisfaction with a solution depends to a large extent on an assessment of effects on own 
interests and goals. These effects include costs, (expected) benefits, and known risks (and 
indirectly also the remaining uncertainty), which together deliver inputs for assessing both 
feasibility and desirability of solutions. Each participant focuses (at least) on its own situation. 
The planning agency needs to focus on more: on each individual participant, on the whole 
set of participants, and even on those stakeholders of the local community not involved in 
the process. If there is insufficient satisfaction, then two detailed follow-up questions are 
addressed:
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The organisational design focuses on developing rules and continuously adapting them 
according to need, for e.g.:
• participation (e.g. roles and responsibilities)
• changes to the set of participants (e.g. for exit, entrance);
• changes to agenda (e.g. challenges, goals, solutions)
• changes to allocation of resources (e.g. costs / benefit distribution, time, know-how)
• use of information (e.g. confidentiality, exchange, distribution);
• decision making (e.g. method, transparency, accountability, involvement, influence);
• handling conflicts (e.g. mediation, specific roles and responsibilities)
• non-conformity (e.g. use of laws and regulations in case process approach fails)
• interaction itself (e.g. codes of conduct)    
The necessity of applying rules is related to trust. Often, high trust means that fewer rules 
are needed, or that rules can be applied in a less formalised form. However, trust never gives 
complete certainty, nor is it a guarantee for process success. Actors will make decisions 
depending on the situation, and that means that unexpected changes can occur. This calls for 
continuous (re)design, which includes having back-up plans and specific ‘curative’ measures 
if things go ‘wrong’. In particular, the planning agency has the possibility of (threatening 
to) use legal instruments such as expropriation. Process design in that respect supports the 
informed choice of measures over a wide range between ‘command and control’, financial, 
and interactive process tools. 
Site performance analysis
The planning agency must identify the problems and the desired, feasible, improvements 
of the decayed site, where the actors, and in particular stakeholders, are the link between 
problems and ‘best choice’ solutions. Site performance accordingly includes aspects that are 
measurable against external norms (such as traffic congestion), and also aspects that reflect 
perceptions, and opinions, of actors. This analysis focuses on the ‘content’ part, whereas the 
following “Stakeholder analysis” addresses the actor related aspects.
The (initial) process design provides the scope and focus of the site performance analysis. 
The scope can be limited to performance of the industrial site itself, but it can also include 
attention to the strategic position of the industrial site within a local community, region, 
province, or even country (i.e. the full range of the exogenous factor “biophysical and 
material conditions”). Depending on need, the analysis can address weaknesses, strengths, 
opportunities and threats, and include more or less elaborate measurements and multi-criteria 
assessments. It can deliver (quantitative) information, related to a variety of topics such as: 
•  economy (competitiveness of site, profile firm mix, ownership, brand / profile, image, 
site marketing, migration trends, employment, prices and availability of property, use of 
suppliers, maintenance level) 
•  environment (laws and regulations, energy, water, ecology, air quality, waste, noise, 
houses on site, safety, clustering)
•  land use (laws and regulations, unused areas, opportunities for expansion inside site and 
outwards, design related to site surroundings, zoning)
• mobility and infrastructure (access, parking, infrastructure on site, transport modalities)
• social issues (links to local society, site security) 
•  organisation and facilities (Park management, organisation degree, collective facilities 
and utilities, ICT, public – private cooperation / partnerships, site improvement policy and 
plans, on-going activities and continuous improvement, monitoring) 
Figure 6.2  Measures for influencing restructuring
Organisational (re) design
The starting point for any main activity (i.e. identifying challenge and stakeholders, 
developing action arena, managing action arena) in restructuring is always that a planning 
agency has some information about actors, problems, effects, possible solutions, and risks 
associated with the current situation, but there is usually a perceived need for collecting more 
information. The planning agency therefore first assesses which information is needed at that 
moment, and which approach for collecting information and/or involving actors is feasible and 
appropriate. This process design is informed by a “Process risk analysis”, because any action 
performed by the planning agency has potential consequences regarding the motivation of 
actors. The process design is also informed by a “Feasibility analysis”. The planning agency 
assesses its own situation regarding available resources and priorities, and it also takes into 
account the feasibility of involving external actors, including aspects such as the quality of 
relationships with firms on the site. 
These analyses together with the previously available information provide a set of ‘building 
blocks’ for organisational (re)design. This design determines scope and focus, and, in 
particular, it makes it possible to structure the interaction with actors. How this interaction is 
organised has an impact on progress and possibly on outcomes as well. 
Any such design implies the use of (unwritten and often unconscious) informal and (written) 
formal rules. In particular, rules can influence the agenda, the options that are included, the 
way to assess, division of costs and benefits, risks and (perceived) uncertainty. 
Organisational 
(re) design
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Final agreement
Identification 
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Identification challenge and related stakeholders
The stakeholder analysis should be made for the various specific challenges. The starting 
point is that information is available on site performance and stakeholders. However, there is 
a need to link specific challenges to specific sets of stakeholders, and there is a subsequent 
need for selecting a ‘best choice’ challenge. 
Such specific challenges can be related to content themes, to space, and to time. Theme-
related challenges can be any of the topics described in the “Site performance analysis”. In 
some cases, theme-related challenges are only weakly linked to perceived problems on the site 
(e.g. energy efficiency). However, addressing such themes can have a significant impact on 
cooperation and can initiate ‘snowball effects’. Space is the second dimension for identifying 
challenges. Importance and urgency related to specific themes can vary significantly within 
an industrial site. Therefore the planning agency can divide the area into physical segments 
having common problems. Finally, time is a dimension for specifying challenges. Time is about 
urgency, but also about making use of snowball effects regarding finances (e.g. buy land – 
improve – sell, but also about how improvements affect property value) and process (e.g. 
initial improvements can stimulate stakeholders to invest). Finally, phasing developments in 
time is a way to ensure that developments do not endanger future opportunities. 
If challenges are well defined in time and space and related to themes, then it is possible to 
link them to the stakeholders that are most affected and/or have most possibilities to improve 
the situation. Within this group, a set of preferred participants for addressing the challenge 
can be identified. 
The planning agency therefore first creates an overview of challenges and related stakeholders. 
This serves as input for selecting the ‘best choice’ challenge regarding expected impact 
on restructuring performance, which includes selecting a set of preferred participants for 
addressing the challenge. In the Initiative arena, this means identifying the stakeholders 
that are needed for developing a more or less comprehensive and coherent set of goals for 
the complete restructuring. In any subsequent Implementation arena, challenges will have a 
more narrow scope, and accordingly the list of preferred participants will be shorter.  
Process risk analysis
Management of interaction is about continuously balancing structure and flexibility. It is 
about identifying opportunities for and threats to the restructuring and its desired outcomes. 
It is accordingly about understanding and addressing risks. 
An understanding of actors is the basis for assessing risks. Risk is the probability of a certain 
event multiplied with the effect of that event. Risk is something that can be assessed, and even, 
in some situations, quantified. Knowledge of risk creates more certainty for all participants. 
Risk analysis focuses on discovering potential changes that can affect progress or outcomes. 
This enables mechanisms to be introduced that can prevent the occurrence of such 
developments, and mechanisms that can mitigate the effects if they emerge. 
Investors, in particular, are concerned not only about feasibility (see Feasibility analysis), 
but also about risks. In restructuring, these risks are linked to behaviour of actors, and to 
the effects on progress and process outcomes. Risks that can be identified, assessed, and 
addressed therefore include issues such as: 
• actors initiating proceedings in court (e.g. blocking or postponing progress);
• actors withdrawing from the process (e.g. loss of resources);
•  actors changing opinions or new actors entering process (e.g. agenda can change and 
process may even have to start all over);
•  actors getting into conflicts (e.g. process break-down or at least negative impact on 
progress)
Initially available information, such as complaints and identified safety risks, can limit the 
necessary scope and provide a clear focus. Information about actors and their opinions can 
also be helpful in choosing a method for information collection. For example, if desired, an 
initial analysis can be performed without any direct involvement of stakeholders. 
Stakeholder analysis
Information about actors is crucial at all times during the restructuring. The starting point 
for a stakeholder analysis is that there is an acknowledged problem situation related to the 
industrial site performance. The situation itself can affect actors both in positive and negative 
ways, but normally there is a perceived need for change. This change can be implemented by 
actors. The stakeholder analysis maps the individual actors that are (especially negatively) 
affected by a situation, and the actors that can influence change. 
The information is therefore collected for actors that are expected to be crucial for progress. 
Such actors are for example those that are ‘problem owners’: that is they experience negative 
effects and the problem cannot be solved without their participation. Other examples are 
those actors that can contribute significantly to a solution (e.g. through co-financing or know-
how), or that possess the power to significantly postpone (or even block) a development. 
An important part of the process is therefore to estimate probabilities of success related to 
the influence of stakeholders (see also “Process risk analysis”). This means understanding 
the motivation (and underlying specific motives) of different stakeholders for supporting or 
opposing a development. A specific form of stakeholder analyses, called “force-field” analyses, 
can be used to (quantitatively) map motivational factors for individual actors, as well as for 
groups of (preferred) participants. In restructuring, the results of the analyses can be used 
for categorizing actors. If actors are likely actively to block, or postpone, a development, 
then they can be categorised as likely opponents. If they will probably contribute to the 
development, then they are viewed as likely supporters. Finally, if no active opposition or 
support is expected, then they can be viewed as ‘neutral’. In all situations, the force-field 
analysis should preferably include attention to the underlying reasons (motives) for an 
expressed opinion. It is important to know whether these opinions can be influenced and how 
that can be done through, for example, process (re) design.  
Although comprehensive information about all stakeholders is desirable (i.e. the analysis should 
cover all actor characteristics, and, in particular for the initiative arena, the initial conditions 
regarding the exogenous factors “attributes of society” and “rules”), resource constraints 
introduce limitations. The planning agency needs to prioritize. The situation specific “need 
to know” focuses on what actors know, how they can contribute to a process, under which 
conditions they will be willing to contribute, what their preferences are, and how these factors 
are related to specific challenges (see “Identification challenge and related stakeholders”). 
Depending on need, a stakeholder analysis can include detailed attention to topics such as: 
•  Motivation for supporting or trying to prevent a development (e.g. based on experienced 
effects related to site performance, interests, responsibilities, goals, preferred actions 
linked to expected distribution of costs and benefits, previous experiences, expectance 
regarding own role in process, and influence on process and its outcomes)
• Information that actors possess (problems, effects, improvement options, feasibility, risks)
• Resources they possess (influence, financial, time, know-how)
•  How actors are dependent on other actors for achieving their goals (including access to 
resources and information, and the felt effect of the ‘local setting’ such as culture, formal 
and informal rules)
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6.6.4. An illustrative example of model application 
The application of the model is briefly illustrated using the fictive case described in the 
following box. 
Box 6.3  Industrial site “Faded Glory”
The physical, technical, quality of the site is inappropriate. This is in particular 
encountered as insufficient capacity of infrastructure and maintenance level of streets 
and buildings. Furthermore the organisational degree of enterprises on the site is low, 
and there is a lack of trust between firms and the local authorities. Environmental 
performance is unsatisfactory: there are several complaints from neighbourhoods 
about noise and odour. Some companies represent safety risks as well and should 
preferably be relocated. Well-performing firms increasingly leave the site, leaving 
(mostly) abandoned plots. These relocations are facilitated, and accelerated, by 
the parallel development of new industrial sites within the region. The reputation 
(and image) of the area is not good and the crime-rate is high compared to other 
industrial sites. Finally, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding funding, how 
to address the problems and human capacity available. 
The planning agency has acknowledged the need for a restructuring process. 
The Initiative
The description of the industrial site indicates that the planning agency has some information 
about the situation there. This information was serious enough to stimulate starting a 
restructuring initiative. However, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding what to do and 
who to involve. So, the restructuring challenge and its stakeholders (Q1) are partly unknown. 
There is lack of trust between planning agency and firms, which affects both feasibility and 
process risks. The resources of the planning agency are limited, in particular, human capacity. 
It therefore chooses to outsource a quick-scan of site performance, while itself analysing the 
stakeholders. The results are analysed. They suggest that some larger firms and the province 
are among the preferred participants (Q2). The planning agency therefore makes a design 
for the Initiative arena, but both the firms and the province are reluctant to participate (Q3). 
Informal talks with the different stakeholders show that neither the suggested participants 
(Q3.1) nor the draft organisation (Q3.2) are experienced as problematic. However, the 
province views the draft agenda as too narrow, whereas the firms have exactly the opposite 
opinion and feel that focus should be much more on urgent problems (Q3.3). The planning 
agency applies a combination of a “Process risk analysis” and a “Feasibility analysis”, and the 
outcome supports drafting a new agenda with a mix of specific short term issues, at the same 
time giving attention to long term policy goals of the province. 
Based on this agenda, the participants agree to contribute to an initiative. However, the lack 
of trust is still an issue that influences discussions. The firms are concerned whether the 
planning agency is going to invest at all, and fear that there will be attempts to make them 
pay for improvements that are the responsibilities of the local authorities. This distrust means 
that any information provided is regarded as possibly manipulative or wrong, and there are 
frequent requests for more details on all aspects in order to achieve more certainty (Q4.1.1-
4.1.4). This situation dominates, and slows down, the process, so the planning agency decides 
In all cases, such events will normally affect the process performance, and, in particular, 
progress and/or (transaction) costs for participants. The risk assessment assesses the 
probability of any such event. This assessment is used not only for creating rules, but also for 
positively influencing the process. 
The output of risk analyses is used as input for “Organisational (re) design), and, finally, 
(indirectly) serves as an important input for developing a “Final agreement”.  
Feasibility analysis
Feasibility, within this model, means that the aggregated motivation of all participants makes 
it possible to implement a specific change. Therefore this aggregated motivation is central in 
the feasibility analysis. The participants have sufficient knowledge about what they prefer to 
do, and together they are willing to invest sufficient resources. 
A feasibility analysis therefore should include different aspects. First, there is technical 
feasibility. A specific measure is needed that can solve a problem in such a way that 
stakeholders are sufficiently satisfied with the effects. Second, there is financial feasibility. 
There must be resources available for implementing the measure, which means that the 
investing actors are sufficiently satisfied with the costs and benefits as well as the division of 
both. Third, there is organisational feasibility. The project organisation must be able to handle 
the implementation. This feasibility can be influenced through “Organisational (re) design”.  
These three aspects of feasibility are all linked. 
Final Agreement
The desired outcome of a restructuring arena is a more or less specified agreement about 
what to do, and sufficient commitment for implementation. The outcome of an Initiative 
arena might be quite different from the outcome of an Implementation arena. However, in 
both cases any (formalised) agreement has at least financial consequences for the actors 
who are part of the agreement. 
The outcome of an Initiative arena can be formalised as a Vision, Letter of Intent, Covenant 
or Master Plan. This can include anything between a set of global goals and, on the other 
extreme, a specified agreement about allocation of resources to actions. These agreements 
can be more or less ‘hard’ regarding whether actors are obliged to deliver, or only express 
their intention to attempt to deliver. 
As the restructuring moves towards implementation of specific measures, such agreements 
are replaced by more formalised versions. A final agreement for a specific Implementation 
arena includes topics such as the:
• content
• distribution of costs and (if known and relevant) benefits;
• distribution of (financial) risks;
• distribution of tasks and responsibilities;
• time-frames for activities;
• rules that apply to non-conformity regarding any of the previously mentioned aspects;
The agreement can be worked out in detailed contracts related to specific issues. 
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of the initial satisfaction (in the range between satisfactory and unsatisfactory) concerning 
aggregated motivation and aggregated information. It is not possible to provide detailed 
guidelines for all possible specific restructuring situations. However, it is possible to give 
some strategic options for addressing ideal-type situations. We do this by focusing on the 
two extreme scores within each range: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. This leads to four 
situations (see figure 6.3).
 
Figure 6.3  Four specific ‘extreme’ situations 
In all situations, all factors together influence the decisions that actors take, and in all 
situations the objective of the planning agency is to reach a sufficient level for all factors 
related to a specific challenge. This means that two options are available to the planning 
agency: influence the factors or change the challenge. 
Therefore, there are two distinctly different ways of viewing, and addressing, the situations 
in figure 6.3. They can be viewed as ‘frozen’ situations, where the planning agency has to 
find an appropriate solution without having the ability to influence any of the factors. This is 
especially the case if actor motivation for some reason cannot be improved. Then the only 
possible strategy is to focus not on what is impossible, but on what is possible. 
Alternatively, the configurations can be viewed as ‘dynamic’, where the planning agency can 
influence any of the factors, and has to decide how that best can be done. This approach will 
always, ultimately, be aimed at influencing motivation, because that is the key to allocation 
of resources. However, the approach can include, or may even start, with efforts to collect, 
and distribute, more information. 
We are here focusing on ‘dynamic’ situations, and how they can be handled. Starting from 
situation A, the key decision for the planning agency is then which ‘route’ to choose: moving 
towards situation B or C, attempting an integral ‘jump’ towards situation D, or redesigning 
the arena around an altered problem definition or solution. The choice made by the planning 
agency always focuses on effects on process, outcomes, and progress. 
The following short descriptions give suggestions for how such representative specific 
situations can be handled by the planning agency. The four situations are presented in a 
to assess the desirability of providing more information. The outcome is that the planning 
agency decides to refocus the process towards a discussion about the satisfaction with goals 
(Q4.2.), and at the same time to announce a single measure (Q4.2.1 and 4.2.3) aimed at 
improving the infrastructure. This combination has a positive impact on the process, and it 
turns out that any change to goals or participants is actually unnecessary (Q4.2.2). Finally, a 
set of goals is formalised in a Letter of Intent. 
Selecting, developing and managing an Implementation arena
This Letter of Intent reflects priorities, and it includes some global commitment to investing 
time in the restructuring, but there are no ‘hard’ agreements about exactly what should be 
done first and by whom. The planning agency therefore needs to translate these goals into 
a plan. This plan needs to include attention to both short and long term actions, building on 
the existing commitment. 
The plan focuses on identifying a ‘best choice’ challenge (Q1). The planning agency decides 
to combine two aspects. It develops a long term ‘Master’ plan, which is used to get co-
funding from higher authorities and to get investment in time and know-how from firms. 
Parallel, it develops a short term plan for addressing a selected specific site-related problem, 
where financial investments from firms, planning agency and possibly other investors are 
needed. On the industrial site “Faded Glory”, site security is chosen as the ‘best choice’ 
short term challenge. It is expected to have a substantial impact on satisfaction, and it can 
contribute to the development of better cooperation, and trust, between firms and also 
between firms and the planning agency. The preferred participants are quickly identified (Q2) 
being the firms, the planning agency as initiator and facilitator, and private firms providing 
the security control itself and the possible security certification of the site. Unfortunately not 
all preferred participants are willing to invest (Q3). About half of the firms do not express 
any interest at all. The planning agency assesses the process risks of proceeding without 
these firms, and decides to continue because all other actors are satisfied with the draft 
set of preferred participants, organisation, and agenda (Q3.1-3). The involved participants 
together develop, and compare, different options for the site security, and ensure that the 
available information is disseminated to the non-involved firms also. The information and 
related discussions attract some more firms, but still a substantial number of firms remain 
passive. An option is jointly developed that is satisfactory to all involved participants (Q4). 
This option is formalised in a “Final Agreement” and subsequently implemented. The issue of 
‘free-riders’ remain a continuous point of attention for future developments, and the planning 
agency tries to identify specific options for influencing remaining firms to take part in the site 
security
6.7. Addressing specific situations
Selection of situations
Our model holds three key variables: motivation, information and resources. Restructuring 
industrial sites can require many resources, sometimes more than what is available from all 
the involved actors. Our model, however, does not address this challenge. Instead, the model 
helps to find situations which fall within the available resources. Next to financial constraints, 
we have argued that it is the organisation of restructuring itself that complicates and delays 
the process. Our model is intended to optimise the organisation of the process. Therefore, 
in addressing specific situations we focus upon two of our key variables: motivation and 
information. We have argued that the situation on an industrial site can be expressed in terms 
C
A
D
B
Aggregated 
Motivation
Aggregated
Information
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
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and then search for alternative solutions. This means redesigning the arena, focusing on 
(partly) different improvement measures, or different (financial) arrangements, or different 
participants. It means a change from situation B via situation A towards situation C, accepting 
a temporary setback, or re-opening the process, as a necessary step.  
Situation	C.	“No	idea	where	to	go	and	how	to	get	there,	but	let’s	conquer	the	world	together”	
Both planning agency and firms are willing to act. They have no overview of effects of the 
current situation, no common formulation of problems, and no clear idea about how the 
situation should be improved, but there is sufficient commitment for starting a small-scale 
joint initiative aimed at finding (more) resources and the right solutions. The planning agency 
needs to develop a process that builds on, and at the same time maintains, this commitment. 
This situation can be quite simple initially, but it does not always stay that way. If there is 
real commitment to investing resources in an initiative, then the planning agency needs 
to focus on progress within, and outcome of, this arena. Attention to progress is vital for 
ensuring that firms stay involved and motivated, whereas focus on the outcome is vital for 
achieving commitment to the follow-up implementation arena(s). If the ‘wrong’ participants 
are involved as participants in the arena, then progress can be delayed. If the planning 
agency wants to maintain commitment, then it also needs to remember that a broad initial 
commitment gives no guarantee of commitment to specific goals or solutions. If motivation 
in the Initiative arena is to be kept, or improved, during follow-up Implementation arenas, 
the planning agency needs to collect, and distribute, information that clarifies the general 
costs, benefits, and risks related to different problems and goals. The planning agency needs 
to support the group process of agreeing to priorities. This implies moving from situation C 
towards situation D. However, it is possible that conflicts emerge when specific decisions 
have to be made. This may necessitate moving ‘back’ to situation A (re-opening the process), 
and restarting the process coupled to a new arena design. 
Situation	D.	“All	ready	to	go	and	route	set:	now	we	only	need	to	find	a	vehicle” 
There is not only agreement about what should be done, but also an expressed willingness 
of all involved actors to invest. In other words, all arena participants have agreed to allocate 
resources, but these aggregated resources may still be insufficient related to the challenge 
to be addressed. 
This situation is much easier than the previous ones, and there are different strategies 
available. If there is a high perceived need to act (e.g. application for co-financing must be 
made on time, or if firms that are important for the site performance threaten to leave the 
site), then the question is whether a part of the solution can, and should, be implemented 
immediately, or whether efforts should first be made to get access to the necessary extra 
resources. If a ‘part solution’ has a positive effect on motivation and site performance, 
(possibly) generates some new funding, and does not prevent reaching the final desired 
situation, then it can be implemented immediately. If no such solution is available, the 
planning agency can either start searching for a different (better) option, or start a follow-up 
process towards involving additional participants related to new opportunities.     
6.8. Developing the model further
These suggestions on how to handle specific situations show the need for flexibility. Both 
motivation and information depend on the situation and on time. The effect of focusing a 
process (i.e. selecting) may therefore look attractive for achieving progress in the short term, 
sequence that moves from both factors being insufficient towards both being sufficient. 
Because motivation is viewed as the key to allocation of resources, situation B (unsatisfactory 
motivation, satisfactory information) is addressed before situation C (satisfactory motivation, 
unsatisfactory information). Each approach to a situation starts with a brief introductory text 
intended to make it more recognisable for restructuring practitioners.
Strategic options for addressing four selected situations
Situation A. “Alone in a hostile unknown environment”
Although the planning agency has clear ambitions for the restructuring, its starting point 
for initiating improvement is weak. Neither the firms on the site nor higher authorities are 
convinced about the necessity to act, and there is certainly no agreement about what needs 
to be done. The planning agency lacks information that can be used to influence actor 
motivation, but also lacks the necessary resources for collecting this information. There is a 
‘vicious circle’. The planning agency has to find a way out of this situation, but does not know 
where and how to start.
Such a situation, viewed from the perspective of the planning agency, possesses high 
uncertainty, and therefore usually also high risk regarding the effects of actions on actor 
motivation. The relationship between actors is then important. If there is sufficient trust, an 
option is to start a small scale open process, which, if well facilitated, at the same time can 
improve both motivation and access to information (and subsequently resources). This is an 
example of a strategy to move directly from situation A to situation D. Another option for 
the planning agency is to implement an improvement measure (such as the quality of the 
public space) as a single actor action. This action, if well chosen, can attract the attention of 
firms, higher authorities and other investors, can show the good intentions of the planning 
agency, and can initiate a snow-ball effect towards more actor motivation and involvement. 
This strategy is mainly effective for moving from situation A towards situation C. If, however, 
even the resources for any such small-scale approach are lacking, then there is a risk of 
setting back the process. This suggests starting by focusing on improving the knowledge of 
the actors (stakeholders as potential participants) related to the variety of challenges: this 
is a move from situation A towards situation B. If the views of different stakeholders on what 
should be done are known, then this can be used to develop a follow-up process design. There 
are accordingly different options for addressing situation A, which (if it is well managed) may 
lead to any of the other three situations B, C, or D. 
Situation B. “Route to destination set, but willingness to move absent”  
The planning agency is fully aware of all problems on, and available improvement options for, 
the industrial site. This has enabled clear detailed plans for necessary improvements to be 
made. There is no, at least expressed, disagreement about the content of the plans. However, 
there is a lack of motivation of firms, higher authorities and other potential investors for 
investing in the process and specific planned improvements.
If there can be no doubt about the improvements that should be implemented, and if the 
reasons for lack of motivation are unknown, then these reasons need to be identified. If they 
are linked to a disturbed relationship between the planning agency and the firms, and if it is 
highly unlikely that it can be improved, then the planning agency can either limit its activities 
to its own property, or start negotiations. The option of improving own property (as mentioned 
in option A) can have a positive influence on motivation. If the lack of motivation is restricted 
to higher authorities and possibly other investors, then it is likely that the improvement 
plans include elements that either make them unattractive to investors, or less attractive 
than alternative investments. The planning agency then needs to identify these elements, 
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but the effects in the long term may sometimes profit more from ‘opening’ the process. 
Although this may appear as one step backwards, it may facilitate the subsequent, quicker, 
two steps forwards. On the other hand, keeping a process ‘open’ too long may delay progress. 
Actors can for example continue an open solution-seeking process for a long time, without 
addressing difficult aspects such as division of costs, benefits and risks related to specific 
solutions. Postponing, or even avoiding, these difficult discussions can mean that a process 
needs to start all over again later.  
The need for flexibility is accordingly a need for an informed flexibility. The planning agency 
in particular needs to understand how actors’ motivation is influenced by the way in which 
problems and solutions are framed. If the aggregated motivation cannot be changed, then 
the challenge needs to be redesigned. 
7.1. Introduction
A model has been developed that supports decision making when restructuring industrial sites. 
The next step is to test and operationalise it. This step can be seen as building a bridge towards 
the users: an approach is needed that delivers as much valuable information as possible and 
at the same time is experienced as useful and meaningful to the practitioners involved. This 
bridge is to be built by the potential users themselves: restructuring practitioners. 
This chapter accordingly seeks an answer to the fifth detailed research question formulated 
in chapter two: 
 How can practitioners test and operationalise the model and what do the outcomes tell about 
the	model	and	restructuring?
First, a choice is made for a specific approach for collecting data, that fits the objective of 
testing and operationalizing the decision support model(7.2). Then the approach is worked out 
in detail (7.3) before it is applied. The experiences with how the design and preparation (7.4), 
and approach (7.5) worked in practice, are then presented. Second, a choice is made for how 
the data should be analysed, namely, “Thematic analysis”, (7.6). It is used for defining themes 
(7.7), and the results are presented (7.8) before some (provisional) conclusions are drawn (7.9). 
7.2. Choice of approach, and the kind of conclusions we
        can draw 
We use a qualitative approach to testing and operationalising the model, because it allows 
the significant complexity, and perceived ambiguity, of such processes to be handled, at the 
same time gaining in-depth (rich) information about, and understanding of, specific factors. In 
particular, the operationalising is aimed less at testing what is already known, than at discovering 
new insights (Flick, 2009). Or as Judith Langer says, “[…] the complexity of qualitative research 
7. Testing the model and 
 operationalising it 
“Real world” problems cannot be solved by 
individuals alone; instead, they require rich and complex 
funds of communal knowledge and practice 
(Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 903) 
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is what makes it fascinating, difficult and, ultimately, very useful […] (Langer, 2006, p. 166). 
There are several different qualitative approaches available for testing and operationalising 
the decision support model. Probably the best way would have been comprehensive case 
studies. However, for three reasons such studies were not performed. First, time constraints 
made longitudinal, or multiple, studies infeasible. Second, it was desirable to have a broad 
representation of restructuring experts involved, because rich input and experiences were 
needed for testing and operationalising the model. This would have been difficult to achieve 
through only one or a few case studies. Third, the objective was also to investigate whether 
the model could reveal extra themes that need to be addressed in restructuring, themes 
which should focus the application and further testing of the model in subsequent (future) 
case study research and restructuring practice. 
Because case studies were not feasible, we chose an indirect approach to testing and 
operationalising the model. The approach was to design a number of key questions about 
the model, and to present these to a representative group of professionals. The professionals 
were asked to help to improve the model by suggesting how restructuring can be accelerated 
without endangering the quality of the outcomes. 
They were also specifically asked to tell if the model was a good representation of the practice 
of restructuring industrial sites. In particular, we were interested in whether the key process 
issues; choice of influential actors; the choice for an appropriate approach to influencing 
motivation and information access towards a satisfactory situation; and how to recognise 
when such a situation had been reached, were all satisfactorily addressed. It is in that respect 
that the model was tested.   
Taking into account these issues, and in particular aiming to facilitate an open and meaningful 
process involving restructuring practitioners, an interactive research method for collecting 
verbal data known as “focus groups” is used (Roulston and Liljestrom, 2010; Walden and 
Morgan, 2008; Krueger and Casey, 2008; Barbour, 2007; Stewart et al., 2007). “[…] Focus 
group interviews […] is the most widely utilised data gathering technique that researchers 
adopt when deciding on qualitative group interviews […] (King and Horrocks, 2010), and they 
have been increasingly used the past decades (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2010)4. Focus 
groups are “[…] stripped down to its basics […]” focused group depth interviews (Stewart et 
al., 2007, p.8). Focus groups are characterised by being focused on a topic that all participants 
have knowledge about, interaction within the group is seen as a means for eliciting information, 
and there is a moderator present who facilitates the discussion (Denscombe, 2007). 
They have been used for a variety of purposes (Roulston and Liljestrom, 2010), and are effective 
for research that is either exploratory or phenomenological (Werner, 2004; Calder, 1977). 
In particular, they are “[…] often used to qualify or explore issues in depth that have been 
raised elsewhere in the research process […]” (Lloyd-Evans, 2006, p. 156): this is precisely 
what is needed for testing and operationalising a new model for restructuring industrial sites. 
Focus groups “[…] are ideal for exploring people’s experiences, opinions, wishes and concerns 
[…]” (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999, p.5), and are used for identifying and refining issues in a 
setting that is less structured than those to which many other methods are applied (Stewart 
et al., 2007). However, the degree of structuring can be varied according to the needs of the 
researcher (Rubin and Babbie, 2009). Focus groups enable getting access to a concentrated 
amount of data on a specific topic of interest within a short time, and the collected information 
is rich in the sense that both consensus and diversity in opinions, and underlying arguments, 
can be gathered (Morgan, 1997). The best focus groups “[…] not only provide data on what 
the participants think but also explicit insights into why they think the way they do […].” 
(Jupp, 2006, p. 121) Focus groups are indeed ‘focused’: they provide rich information on a 
specific topic within a short time through an interactive group interview and simultaneous 
group process.  
Focus groups have both strengths and limitations (Laws et al., 2003). As Morgan puts it, 
focus groups “[…] offer something of a compromise between the strengths of participant 
observation and individual interviewing […]” (Morgan, 1997, p.16). Focus groups have their 
own characteristics, and should be used only for the situations where they are suitable.  
An alternative method might be participant observation which can offer in depth information 
on how practitioners act in real life situations. On the contrary, what happens during a focus 
group session cannot uncritically be viewed as representing what would happen in real 
life (Jupp, 2006). Focus groups are perceived by participants as “safe spaces” and “social 
spaces” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), and in such situations participants tend to express more 
‘extreme’ views than they would in their ‘own’ professional surroundings. So, stronger opinions 
can be expected, as well as polarization among participants (Morgan, 1997). However, 
participant observation has its weaknesses. It is difficult to organise for long processes, such 
as a restructuring, because the ‘rich interaction’ moments to be observed are scarce and 
separated by long intermediary periods. 
Individual interviews or questionnaires are other methods. Both provide a more controlled setting 
for getting access to data, and they give more time for extracting information from each person 
than during a group interview. However, compared to focus groups they have their weaknesses. 
Focus groups can produce data and insights that may not emerge in individual interviews 
(Rubin and Babbie, 2009; Stewart et al., 2007; Morgan, 1997) or through questionnaires, and, 
in particular, they make it possible to get insight into group norms and how views are formed, 
in a way that cannot equally easy be achieved through individual interviews (Barbour and 
Schostak, 2005). Focus groups can not only elicit individual views, but also collective views 
about specific topics (Denzin and Ryan, 2007). In particular, the safe setting in focus groups 
facilitates ‘snowballing effects’, spontaneity, and group processes of mutual stimulation, which 
together can provide results better than individual interviews (Stewart et al., 2007). 
We conclude that focus groups are an appropriate approach for testing and operationalising 
the model. As Barbour and Schostak puts it, “[…] it is better to get as close as possible to the 
real-life situations where people discuss, formulate and modify their views and make sense 
of their experiences […]” (Barbour and Schostak, 2005, p.43), and that is exactly what focus 
groups can do.  
7.3. Designing the Focus group sessions
These strengths and weaknesses of focus groups have to be taken into account both in the 
design of the sessions, and in the way the sessions are performed and the results analysed. 
According to Morgan there are two guiding principles: researcher neutrality and applying 
systematic procedures (Morgan et al., 1998). This means answering a number of questions 
regarding both content and process (Rubin and Babbie, 2009: Stewart et al., 2007; Kamberelis 
and Dimitriadis, 2005; Barbour and Schostak, 2005; King, 2004; Shaw, 1999; Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999; Krueger, 1998; Morgan et al., 1998; Morgan, 1997):
• What is the role of the researcher? 
• What is the exact purpose of the sessions and which questions are to be asked?
• How ‘open’ versus pre-structured should the session be?
• Which data are collected, and how should they be documented and analysed?
•  Who should participate, how should the groups be composed, and how many group 
sessions should be organised? 
• What is the role of the moderator?
4		The	origin	of	the	term	“focus	groups”	 is	often	credited	to	Robert	K.	Merton,	who	actually	used	the	slightly	different	term	“focused	 interviews”	
(Merton	et	al.,	1956).
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Role of researcher
The researcher determines the focus group agenda (Morgan, 1997), aimed at getting the 
data needed for testing and operationalising the model. An agenda is developed as an 
interview guide, which contains the research questions that are to be addressed (Stewart 
et al., 2007). This interview guide structures the focus groups and, in particular, serves as a 
guide for moderators (included in appendix IV). The researcher ensures that moderators and 
participants have all necessary information. 
However, opinions about how researchers should be involved in selection of participants and 
during the sessions vary. This study agrees with Morgan et al. in taking researcher neutrality 
as one of the guiding principles for focus groups (Morgan et al., 1998), and therefore it 
supports the view that focus groups should “[…] decenter the role of the researcher […]” 
(Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2005, p.904). To do this, two choices have been made. First, 
the researcher can specify the profile of the desired focus group participants, but should not 
choose them. Second, the researcher should take no active part in the discussions in the 
focus groups. His role is limited to an initial introduction of the model at the beginning of each 
individual session, and subsequently collecting data.   
Purpose of session guides the design of questions
In a focus group approach, data is collected by bringing together a group of practitioners for 
a (usually) once-only session, and asking them to comment on and discuss a specific topic 
within their common experience: in this case the restructuring (model). The scope of the data 
collection is determined by the purpose of the study. It is accordingly about exploring whether 
the model is considered to be a complete and appropriate representation of restructuring 
practice and whether it is useful and applicable as decision support, and about exploring 
how the somewhat abstract model can be operationalised in such a way that it becomes 
more useful in practice. The general purpose of the sessions is to give the practitioners an 
opportunity to test and operationalise the model in order to make it more effective as a 
decision support for planning agencies in restructuring. 
However, any focus group session about the model can be expected to ‘reintroduce’ the 
full complexity of real life restructuring, and there is insufficient time for that. Therefore the 
scope of the sessions needs to be limited to a selection of topics, and related questions. In 
practice, focus group sessions often have between two and five questions (Krueger, 1998), 
although they may have up to a dozen (Stewart et al., 2007). 
The model combines three crucial issues: it focuses on (1) actors who (2) interact in processes 
aimed at (3) reaching satisfactory outcomes. Because all detailed aspects of the model could 
not be addressed (within the limited time) in the focus group sessions, we chose to explicitly 
address these three crucial issues. 
Actors
Because actors and their interactions are at the core of the model, it is important to explore 
how the selection and involvement of actors can influence progress. Hence the first question 
to be explored in the focus groups is:
1.	How	can	preferred	participants	in	restructuring	be	chosen	so	as	to	accelerate	the	process?
Some participants preferably could have important and ‘stable’ roles during the whole 
restructuring, whereas other participants could be involved only during a specific arena or 
even only during a specific activity. This requires exploring the advantages, disadvantages, 
and risks for progress related to the involvement of individual actors. 
Interaction
The second important topic to explore is how a planning agency should organise the 
interaction starting from a ‘worst case scenario’ where the two crucial factors of motivation 
and information are perceived as unsatisfactory. The model gives some suggestions for 
handling these situations, but they need to be worked out further in detail and the participants 
can suggest more options. This leads to the second question to be addressed in the focus 
group sessions:
2.  What is the best sequence for accelerating the process (without endangering quality of the 
outcomes)	when	moving	from	the	‘worst	case’	situation	towards	a	situation	where	both	the	
aggregated	motivation	and	information	are	viewed	as	satisfactory?
There are several options available in such situations and each has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The focus groups can reveal whether restructuring experts recognize the 
different situations (i.e. configurations of motivation and information, see for example figure 
6.4) from their own practice, and whether the operationalisation can reveal more options and 
relationships for handling specific situations, as well as indicating their relative importance 
and value. 
A good result
Finally, the model leaves the decision to the planning agency itself regarding how to decide 
whether motivation or information is “satisfactory” for convincing participants to invest in 
restructuring the site to the required level. A third key topic is accordingly how the planning 
agency can determine when such a moment has been reached. This means exploring what 
‘satisfactory’ can mean, and how progress can be affected by different views. The third 
question for the sessions is therefore:
3.  How can a planning agency determine when information or motivation is satisfactory 
(enough)	for	achieving	an	acceleration	of	the	process?
The questions are all open-ended, which requires a semi-structured approach to the sessions 
(Barbour and Schostak, 2005). This approach gives ample room for exploration, discussion 
and the intended operationalisation. However, there is still a need to determine the sequence 
and relative importance of the questions. Two often applied rules for focus groups are that 
questions should be addressed in the order from general to specific, and from most important 
towards least important. In practice, these rules can conflict, and therefore the researcher 
has to exercise judgement in finding a suitable ‘trade-off’ between both rules (Stewart et al., 
2007). In our case, the questions are applied in the order presented above, which reflects 
a certain ‘trade-off’. The first question is rather general. It is intended as a short and rather 
simple ‘warming up’ exercise, which leads the participants towards the second question. This 
question is the most important, because it covers not only the full complexity of the model 
but also specifically focuses on the relationship between the two key variables and progress. 
Therefore it is allocated most discussion time. Finally, the question about what ‘satisfactory’ 
means sounds very specific, but actually it builds on the results of the discussion on the 
previous questions. So, the ‘trade-off’ regarding sequence is to start ‘easy’ and move towards 
increasing complexity and difficulty. This is expected to help to make the participants gradually 
more ‘comfortable’ with the model and with the group process. The questions explore the 
model, and relationships with restructuring progress, from three different perspectives: the 
involvement of the individual actor, the specific situations defined by the two variables, and 
the assessment of what satisfactory means. 
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These perspectives, and accordingly the questions as well, partly overlap. This contradicts 
the need for applying questions that are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Rubin and 
Babbie, 2009). However, again the choice of questions is the result of a ‘trade-off’ based 
on judgement. Using questions that are exhaustive is simply not possible within the time-
frame of a focus group. And mutual exclusiveness is possible only as long as questions are 
discussed without taking the relationships on a more detailed level into consideration, while 
it is exactly these relationships that need to be explored for operationalising the model.
Approach to data collection and analysis
The overlap on ‘deeper levels’ presents a considerable challenge regarding data collection, 
documentation, and, in particular, analysis. The previous description (in 7.2) indicated 
that any session is likely to deliver a diversity of opinions, arguments, underlying reasons, 
and experiences that can be contradictory and inconsistent, but also that the session can 
sometimes produce consensus. Also, it is possible that the same issues, and even the same 
options for addressing a problem, can be mentioned repeatedly during the discussions by the 
same or different participants and related to any of the three questions. It is also possible that 
participants adapt, or even change, their opinions based on feed-back from other participants. 
As a result, it can be expected that a wide variety of data will emerge in a rather unstructured 
form. Data are collected chronologically during the session in a transcript, a conversion of 
verbal data into text (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). A specific problem during ‘lively’ interactive 
sessions is to document data in such a way that what each individual speaker says is 
identifiable and, in particular, to enable differentiating between several parallel speakers 
(Flick, 2009). It is necessary to make notes in such a way that it is possible to distinguish the 
remarks of each individual participant as well as the moderator, in order to establish a clear 
trail of evidence (Morgan et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998). The data collection, and documentation, 
includes quotes, questions, summary points and ideas.
The next question is then, what the unit of analysis should be, and how the data can be 
analysed. The unit of analysis is what the participants say (Wilkinson, 2004), and includes both 
the level of individuals and of groups (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). There is a variety 
of approaches available for addressing data analysis in qualitative research in general (e.g. 
Outhwaite and Turner, 2007), and also for analysing interviews (e.g. Roulston and Liljstrom, 
2010). However, for focus groups in particular, there is little literature on this (Wilkinson, 
2004; Morgan 1997). The literature often suggests (or implies) that analysis can be performed 
with the same techniques that are applied for one-to-one interviews, and researchers often 
fail to place their chosen method within a clear theoretical framework (Wilkinson, 2004). Most 
focus group studies apply some form of content analysis, in the sense that they more or less 
systematically report recurring instances. However, the frequent use of quotes sometimes 
makes it difficult to recognize them as content analyses (Wilkinson, 2004). 
Again the choice of method is informed by the purpose. Because the purpose is largely 
explorative and intended to provide a basis for more structured research, simply listing the 
major and significant themes emerging in the focus group discussions (Howitt and Cramer, 
2005) often suffices. 
This leads to the follow-up question, which is how such ‘major and significant themes’ can be 
identified within the transcript. A useful link between data collection and data analysis is data 
coding. Codes are labels that represent some aspect of the data that the researcher applies 
to (in this case) the focus group transcript, and they can be related to research questions, but 
also for example to topics of talk (Roulston and Liljstrom, 2010). 
In both cases they refer to some kind of ‘theme’, which in these sessions will be related 
to restructuring arenas. The approach that is applied for analysing the data is therefore 
“thematic analysis”: perhaps one of the most commonly used approaches for analysis of 
qualitative data (Roulston and Liljstrom, 2010). According to Roulston and Liljstrom (2010) 
thematic analysis includes:
• Data reduction e.g. through application of coding in order to define conceptual categories;
• Categorization through sorting and classification of data or codes into thematic groups;
•  Reorganisation of the data into thematic representations of findings through a series of 
assertions and interpretations
“[…] These themes are supported by evidence from the data set in the form of excerpts from 
interviews that link the researcher’s assertions to what was said by speakers in interview 
contexts […]” (Roulston and Liljstrom, 2010, p.151). The first step is to identify suitable codes, 
where ‘suitable’ is partly defined by the research questions and partly by the interactive 
process that occurs within the focus group session. This means identifying, and grouping, 
recurrent instances (Wilkinson, 2004; Crabtree and Miller, 1999). 
However, a pre-defined structure for collecting data can influence how the researcher 
views the data. Any structure introduces a risk of unconsciously, and unintentionally, 
misinterpreting data as irrelevant or ‘forcing’ data into available schemes. On the other 
hand, the choice to work without any pre-defined structure has important consequences, 
because the ‘burden’ of analysis after data collection will be (much) more complex. The 
approach to developing and using codes is accordingly part of the strategy for analysis, and 
it influences its outcomes. 
An approach that fits the explorative nature of testing and operationalising the model is the 
following: no coding scheme was made prior to the first focus group session. This approach 
is consistent with the research aim to interpret meanings in contexts, as a result of which 
it is not only inappropriate, but even impossible, to finalize research strategies before data 
collection has started (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002). So, for the first focus group, 
the transcript was read systematically and all observations were organised into categories (or 
codes)5. These text segments were then reread to enable further interpretation (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999). The codes were then assembled in a code scheme, which was applied for coding 
the transcripts of the following focus group sessions. However, contrary to more formal pre-
designed content analyses, the code scheme, categories, and concepts are allowed to evolve 
during the following sessions as well. This means that rereading and reanalysing the results 
of the initial sessions might be necessary after completing all sessions. Through an iterative 
process, empirical data (from later sessions) are compared with the initially developed set 
of codes, categories and concepts, and the initial set is improved and enriched (Denscombe, 
2007). This reanalysis can also influence the decision regarding whether sufficient sessions 
have been held.   
The question regarding how ‘major and significant themes’ should be identified has still not 
been completely answered. For it is also very much about understanding why an issue is 
salient and what is salient about it (Morgan, 1988). A quantitative approach to salience would 
suggest measuring how often an aspect is mentioned by the same or different participants. 
However, although this can be done to identify codes, frequency of mentioning cannot be 
assumed to signify salience (Krueger and Casey, 2000). For that, it is necessary also to take 
into account when and how something is mentioned. First, salience experienced in a focus 
group setting is not necessarily the same as in ‘real world’ situations. Another issue is that 
salience can be the result of a consensus process, and the reason for consensus is then the 
important “why” issue that Morgan (1988) points to. It can be an effect of certain individuals 
dominating a group process (Laws et al., 2003), but also the result of establishing a common 
language and discovering that different words may have the same meaning. What is seen 
to be salient can accordingly come from views which the individual participants brought to 
5  Software is available for assisting qualitative text analysis, and ATLAS.ti is a well-known example. 
  It was not used, because it was considered to be more work-intensive than the applied approach here.  
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the session, but it can also emerge during the session. Finally, it needs to be remembered 
that what emerges as ‘salient’ need not include the most important issues. Single remarks 
can remain unnoticed, or for some reason not discussed, but still be the most important 
contribution to a session. 
Therefore it is essential to collect, and analyse, data for all individual participants, for each 
group and its interactive process, and, finally, for all groups. At the level of the individual, 
the analysis can link ideas, opinions, arguments and reasons to specific participants, and 
can identify whether, and hopefully why, views are adapted during the session, and whether 
inconsistent, or even completely contradictory, views are expressed. At the level of the 
group(s), data can be analysed, and can be expected to give a diversity of answers. This 
diversity can signal different opinions and alternative options, but also uncertainty. On the 
other hand the answers may indicate consensus regarding solutions and their importance. 
The results on both collective opinions and on diversity are important, as is how the interaction 
reveals the underlying reasoning and logic used by the participants (Denscombe, 2007). 
Selecting participants and group composition 
To ensure maximum operationalisation of the model within limited time, and also to ensure 
that methodological and ethical concerns about researcher neutrality are appropriately 
addressed, the “[…] selection and recruitment of participants for a focus group is a critical 
part of the design process […]” (Stewart et al., 2007, p. 67). The term ‘selection’ may suggest 
that the population of ‘ideal’ participants is known, and subsequently a purposive or random 
sampling procedure is applied for identifying and involving participants that fulfil the profile. 
However, real life imposes constraints on the possibility for selecting in that way (Barbour 
and Schostak, 2005), and accordingly the challenge is to get as close as possible to an ‘ideal’ 
group of participants.  
Designing a focus group therefore requires determining the participant profile and the 
homogeneity of the group. The participants should have a common background related to the 
topic (Jupp, 2006), in this case an intimate knowledge of, and experience with, restructuring in 
practice. Actually, as Jupp says“[…] the most effective focus groups consist of participants who 
are just as interested in the topic as the researchers are […]” (Jupp, 2006, p.121). Therefore 
a purposive sampling approach is applied (Rubin and Babbie, 2009). The main target group 
is therefore planning agencies, because they are the intended users of the model. However, 
in Dutch restructuring practice the target group is not limited to public authorities. The 
reason is that consultants, representatives of regional development agencies, and specific 
restructuring agencies are often actively involved in the process: performing parts or even 
the complete process on behalf of the planning agency. Besides these intended users of 
the model, other actors also are actively involved in restructuring. Provinces have a role in 
industrial site planning and they often allocate resources (co-financing, but also influence 
and know-how) to specific projects. The national government too sometimes stimulates and 
facilitates pilot projects. Finally, firms, their organised representatives (Chamber of Commerce 
and Employers’ organisations), and a diversity of organisations such as real estate agents 
and property developers, are involved in restructuring. The preferred focus group participants 
are representatives of such organisations. 
How can these individuals be identified and ‘selected’ for participation in focus group 
sessions? Identifying the population to be sampled is difficult, because there is no easily 
available overview of specialists in this field. On the other hand, it is known that relatively few 
processes of restructuring have been completed (and probably even less if ‘complete’ was 
used in accordance with the definition applied in chapter two), and accordingly comprehensive 
experience and/or overview can be expected in only a few organisations. Therefore an 
approach was applied where initially seven representatives of such organisations (where an 
overview of, and a strong network in, the field of restructuring was expected to be present) 
were contacted in different parts of the Netherlands. These representatives, who were all 
active in the field of industrial site developments, were asked to suggest other specialists in 
their own network that fit the ‘profile’ developed by the researcher. This approach increases 
the probability of reaching participants who are representative of all target groups across the 
whole country. This ‘snowball’ sampling also implies that the researcher initially is unaware of 
who the participants might be (Barbour and Schostak, 2005), which reduces the probability of 
biased selection. The approach is purposive in the sense that only people fitting the profile are 
invited, but, viewed from the perspective of the researcher, it includes a certain randomness. 
How big should a group be, and how many focus group sessions should be held? There are no 
clear ‘rules’, but most authors indicate that groups usually are between 6 and 15 participants 
(Rubin and Babbie, 2009; Stewart et al., 2007; Morgan, 1997), although for practical reasons 
they may be smaller. Some say six to nine members (Denscombe, 2007), others eight to 
twelve members (Roulston and Liljstrom, 2010). For this study, the range between six and 
twelve is applied. This range reduces the effects of undesirable group processes such as 
dominance and lack of discussion richness in small groups, and uncontrollable processes 
in large groups. However, more participants were invited, because in practice a significant 
percentage may not accept. 
Regarding the appropriate number of groups, a large variety is encountered in studies. In 
practice, sometimes only one group is appointed, between four and fifteen groups is quite 
usual (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2009; Crabtree and Miller, 1999), but there are examples 
where up to 50-60 sessions have been held. One group alone could deliver atypical results as 
well as limited information richness, and therefore more are desirable. The best (theoretical) 
approach is to continue holding sessions with new groups until the point where almost no 
new information comes out of a session, and comments and patterns are beginning to be 
repeated (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2009; Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). Another criterion for 
‘saturation’ is when the researcher is able to anticipate quite well what the next group is 
going to say (Calder, 1977). However, desirability and real world constraints (mainly available 
time) have to be balanced. In practice, five groups seem to be the most favoured, with three 
being a minimum and twelve a maximum (Cragan et al., 2009). This study, also taking into 
account previous experience with the target group, initially aimed at five sessions. 
Role and choice of moderator
The interactive, mainly explorative, dynamic group process is supported by a moderator, who 
helps to extract tacit knowledge of participants in a situation characterised by a high level 
of contextual information (Hogan, 2003). There is no accepted standard for the tasks of a 
moderator, and therefore his role can vary depending on the situation (Greenbaum, 2000). 
The moderator leads the group towards appropriate and useful answers, and, in particular, 
tries to unravel the reasons behind the expressed opinions (Puchta and Potter, 2004). He is 
interested and positive, he does not participate or express personal opinions (Krueger, 1998), 
and he has good interpersonal communication skills and is able to quickly gain confidence 
of the group. The moderator takes the (possible) common history of group participants into 
account, and, in particular, watches out for effects of ‘pecking order’ and animosities (Barbour 
and Schostak, 2005). 
The role of the moderator in this study was to apply a reflective approach, which means that 
he used a variety of active interventions. If there was doubt about the interpretation of what 
a speaker said, he asked for clarification. He also used paraphrasing to restate main aspects, 
he summarised, and he asked for confirmation. Finally, he asked for reflection in order to 
identify intensity, using words like “you seem to feel that” (King and Horrocks, 2010). The 
moderating style was active in the sense that the moderator used his knowledge of the topic 
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for intervening in the discussion. He provided information (e.g. if discussion was based on 
wrong facts) and stimulated exploring new topics, but did not dominate the discussion as 
the ‘authority’ (Langer, 2006). The moderator tried to establish the right balance between 
formality and informality in the discussion, and ensured that all participants became involved, 
and that the discussion did not drift too far away from the questions to be addressed (Flick, 
2009, Puchta and Potter, 2004). How this balance is made is linked to the need for control 
and standardization in the research (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). In this study, the 
purpose of operationalisation and the use of quite complex open questions meant that an 
open form was applied regarding contents of the discussion. This enabled participants to 
develop their own concepts and ideas (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). 
It is essential that the moderator be compatible with the group (Stewart et al., 2007), and 
has the right qualifications for performing group interviews and for understanding the topic, 
and questions, being discussed. This person could be the researcher. However, because this 
study supports the view that researchers should avoid influencing the content of the data 
collection, other moderators were chosen. Five sessions were planned at different locations 
- in the cities of Amersfoort, The Hague, Zwolle, Arnhem, and Tilburg – and most of the 
moderators were chosen from these regions. It was not only the moderator that was chosen, 
but also an organisation to host the session. Usually, that was the organisation where the 
moderator worked. The moderators that were invited are well-known in, and have strong links 
to, the field of industrial site development in The Netherlands. This means that they will often 
know many of the participants personally, which can facilitate creating the desired safe and 
social space that is beneficial to an open group process. It also means that they will be more 
familiar than the researcher with specific situations in the different regions. 
The exception was the first session. The reason is that it had to function as a ‘pilot’. To 
counter the uncertainties, a highly trained interviewer (who also was well familiar with the 
field of industrial site developments) moderated this first session. Furthermore this hosting 
organisation provided a second person for recording the session and taking notes. A third 
difference is that this specific hosting organisation used its nation-wide network in industrial 
site development in recruiting for this first session, whereas participants from specific regions 
were invited for the other sessions. 
7.4.  How the design and preparatory process worked in 
       practice
This description of how the Focus group sessions were planned illustrates the complexity of 
the process. 
Initially seven professionals active in the field of industrial site development and working for 
organisations located in five different parts of the Netherlands were contacted. They were 
asked whether they would be willing to contribute to this study in four ways. 
First, they were asked to suggest participants for the five sessions. All agreed to do so. 
In some cases they chose close colleagues in identifying potential participants, and they 
may have asked contacts in the field for additional names (whether they did is unknown 
to the researcher, because of his chosen ‘decentered’ approach). A short profile of the 
desired participants for the sessions, as well as an indication of group size, served as basis 
for the invitations and selection. The applied profile indicated that participants should have 
experience in practice with industrial site development processes, either as employees of 
public organisations (e.g. local or regional authorities, restructuring agencies, and regional 
development agencies), or of consultancies, property developers, or representatives of 
industry (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, Federation of SME’s, industrial site organisations). A 
limited number of representatives of higher authorities and intermediary organisations could 
be invited as well, as long as they had own experience or could contribute through bringing 
in results from (e.g. pilot) projects within their administrative area. 
Second, these professionals were asked whether they would be willing to provide a location 
for organising the sessions. Again there was a very positive response and five locations were 
quickly found. The main data about each session are given in table 7.1, and detailed lists of 
participants, moderators and hosting organisations are included in appendix V and VI. 
Table 7.1  Location, time, and participants of all Focus group sessions
a   One participant contributed based on his experience as a former employee of local authority.
b   One participant neither belonged to the target group of organisations nor had practical experience. 
Third, moderators needed to be found, and again the same contact people were asked if they 
personally would be willing to moderate a session. All seven had been selected in advance 
based not only on their knowledge of the field of restructuring, but also on an assessment 
of their capacity as moderators and on their willingness to contribute. Again the necessary 
five moderators were quickly found. The two remaining professionals chose to contribute 
to the sessions as participants. The first session was different from the rest because it was 
unknown in advance how the interview guide (and accordingly research questions) and the 
interaction process during the sessions would function. As earlier mentioned, the profile 
for the moderator of this session was somewhat different. He was selected based on his 
comprehensive experience as an interviewer, which includes experience in group interviews 
and moderating discussion sessions.  
The fourth issue was whether the moderators were willing also to contact and invite the 
participants they had suggested. In four cases they agreed to do so, in the fifth case this was 
done by the researcher.  
The detailed procedure for organising the sessions was as follows. The focus was on 
attracting participants with experience with restructuring at a local level. They received a 
Location
and date
Local 
Authorities Consultants
Property 
developer
Repr. of 
Industry
Higher 
Authorities
Regional
Dev. 
Agency
Total
Amersfoort 
28-4-2010
3a 3 0 1 2 1
10
(11)b
The Hague
19-5-2010
1 3 0 1 1 0 6
Zwolle
8-6-2010
1 1 1 0 5 0 8
Arnhem
10-6-2010
4 1 0 0 1 1 7
Tilburg 
7-6-2010
2 1 0 1 0 3 7
Total 10 9 1 4 9 5
38
(39)b
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short introductory invitation letter (see appendix VII). Even after repeating the invitation, 
which included the specific question whether they would be able to attend (see appendix 
five), in one case 50% did not reply at all. There were also last minute cancellations and a few 
cases of no-show, where participants that were supposed to be present did not turn up. Table 
7.2 gives two examples that illustrate differences encountered between invitations sent out 
and actual participation. 
Table 7.2  Examples of difference between invited and actual participants 
a Numbers before brackets are actual participants, and between brackets are invited participants.
The interview guide developed for the moderators was sent out well in advance, and the 
moderators were invited to comment on its contents and ask questions if anything seemed 
unclear. This did not lead to any suggested changes to the interview guide. All registered 
participants received their version of the interview guide (i.e. without the specific guidelines 
for the moderator) one week ahead of each session, and again opportunity was given (but 
never used) for asking questions. 
There were some differences in preparation between the sessions. This especially concerns 
the first versus the following four sessions. One difference was the way potential participants 
were contacted. For the first session, people were invited from all across the country. Besides 
attracting participants to the first session, this approach had two additional effects. It served 
as a ‘marketing tool’ through snowball effects (i.e. people suggesting other people if they were 
unable to attend themselves), and it made it possible to suggest attending alternative sessions. 
Although the profile of desired participants had been determined, a few people were invited, 
especially for the first session, who did not fit the profile. Because the names and affiliation 
of all registered participants were communicated to the researcher, some of these ‘unfit’ 
participants were discovered in time and could be contacted. Fortunately, they understood the 
reasons for limiting the composition of the target group, and voluntarily offered not to attend 
the Focus group session. The invitations to the other four sessions were more focused. They 
were based on short-lists of people that fitted the desired profile, and covered geographical 
and administrative regions, situated relatively close to the Focus group locations. 
A second difference between the group sessions concerns the way notes of the sessions 
were made. During the first session the researcher made hand-written notes of the session. 
Also the whole session was recorded, and a complete written transcript was worked out 
afterwards. This was done for two reasons. The outcome of the first session was particularly 
important for identifying possible salient themes; and comparison of a shorter hand-written 
transcript with the complete transcript could indicate whether the first option would suffice 
for the next four sessions. The results indicated that handwritten notes would suffice, and this 
approach was applied for the next four sessions. 
The planning and organisation of all sessions was completed in less than a month, and 
resulted in five sessions, each to last two and a half hours, to be held between April 28th and 
June 17th 2010. The second session was planned three weeks after the first, to have sufficient 
time for making any necessary changes to the interview guide or the approach to process 
moderation, based on the outcomes of the first session. No such alterations were suggested 
by participants or moderators. 
7.5. How the sessions worked in practice
Although utmost care had been taken in the preparation, it was still expected that in particular 
the first session would bring some surprises. The ‘selection’ of participants had for example 
been quite open, and the attempts to ensure that all participants fitted the desired profile 
proved to have been insufficient. Two participants came to the session based on interest, and 
not experience, regarding industrial site restructuring, and one participant neither fitted the 
desired profile regarding organisations nor had any practical experience. These two chose 
roles during the session that contributed to the interaction process in a positive and ‘non-
contaminating’ way regarding results. 
In all other respects, the first session proceeded in full accordance with the interview guide. 
The moderator ensured that all participants were given the opportunity to give their opinions 
and experiences regarding each question, and interaction between the participants was 
stimulated and at the same time guided towards giving answers to all questions. There were 
no observed problems related to any single participant trying to dominate the session, and 
the interaction was positive, constructive, and certainly lively the whole time. 
The other four sessions proceeded in a comparable way except that participants having 
no experience at all with restructuring were not present. In all cases the participants had 
sufficient opportunity to contribute, and no single participant dominated any session.  
In each session, differences were observed in how the discussions on the three separate 
questions developed. The restructuring professionals had no problem understanding the 
first question (on preferred participants), and the discussions always started immediately. 
However, for the two next questions (on ‘best’ sequence, and identifying what a satisfactory 
level of information or motivation is) the moderator usually had to give a few examples or an 
extra explanation to get the discussion started. 
There were also some differences between the sessions in the way moderators fulfilled their 
role. Although in general they all tried to facilitate the process, there were variations in how, 
and how actively, they tried to control the interaction, to explore topics in more depth, and to 
clarify ambiguous issues. The moderator affected the interaction process, but did not seem to 
have any major impact on its outcomes. Another difference was the nature of the interaction. 
Three of the sessions (having 11, 8 and 7 participants) were quite ‘lively’, whereas during the 
two last (having 6 and 7 participants) the interaction was much more ‘calm’. 
7.6. The thematic analysis
The data collected from each session (i.e. the results) all had the same form: verbal information 
that had been written down chronologically in transcripts (the original transcripts, in total ca. 
65 pages in Dutch, are available on request from the author). 
The transcript from the first session is based on an audio-recording and contains in exact 
words everything said. All remarks in the transcripts are linked to individuals (i.e. written as 
quotes: “Participant no. X: remark”), which makes it possible to trace all data and, if desired, 
perform detailed analyses of specified subsets of data. 
Location
and date
Local 
Authorities Consultants
Property 
developer
Repr. of 
Industry
Higher 
Authorities
Regional
Dev. 
Agency
Total
Zwolle 1 (11)a 1 (3) 1 (1) 0 (2) 5 (8) 0 (0) 8 (25)
Arnhem 4 (10) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 7 (17)
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It therefore preferably should have (Boyatzis, 1998):
• A name / label;
• A definition of what the theme concerns;
• A description of how to know when the theme occurs;
• A description of any qualifications or exclusions to the identification of the theme;
•  Examples, both positive and negative, to eliminate possible confusion when looking for 
the theme
In short, the code should make as reliable as possible the identification of text segments 
referring to specific properties that ‘belong’ to a theme. In thematic analyses this is referred 
to as consistency of coding (Boyatzis, 1998). Reliability is particularly important if more 
coders are working on the same material, or if the data are being coded to make them useful 
for statistical analysis. In this study, reliability was increased by checking the preliminary 
codes across sub-samples of the first session and later across all four subsequent sessions, 
in particular looking for whether they remained meaningful and well defined. This led to the 
discovery of (some) additional properties of the themes, and this enabled the definitions and 
descriptions of the codes to be improved. 
The codes were used for coding all remaining transcripts (step 8), and the resulting text 
segments for each theme were combined. This resulted in sets containing a variety of text 
segments related to different properties of the themes. In this way the themes were broken 
down into sub-themes that reflected specific properties. 
The question of validity (step 9) had already been addressed in the rules for the set-up and 
performance of the Focus group sessions. Validity was sought also by the structured approach 
to analysis of data, which included iterative steps such as rereading and repeated comparison 
of text segments, themes and sub-themes. This was done to give a clear traceable line from 
the questions asked towards the answers, and in particular to identify the relevance and 
importance of issues (for a brief reflection on trustworthiness and validity of this study: see 
appendix X).   
Finally (step 10), the results needed to be interpreted. As earlier mentioned it was decided 
not to make a statistical analysis of the information (text segments / quotes). The aim of the 
interpretation was to find meaningful, and good, answers to the questions. First, the results 
(i.e. structured information on each question, theme and sub-theme) were presented in such 
a way that a coherent and consistent picture was created that “[…] closely approximates 
the reality it represents […] (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 57). This provided the basis 
for (i.e. a second distinctly separated step) drawing conclusions. The information should 
preferably be presented in a way that ensures that the ‘main message’ comes across as 
clearly as possible to others, because this allows them to develop their own understanding 
and interpretation. If the other people reach the same conclusions as the researcher, this 
increases the trustworthiness of the outcomes. To help such an improved understanding, it is 
useful to “[…] provide them information in the form they usually experience it […]” (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985, p. 120). 
To do this, short ‘stories’ were constructed using the text segments (i.e. quotes put between 
brackets and as such identifiable as results) as core elements connected by short text 
‘bridges’, and accompanying these stories by tables that illustrate the full richness of remarks 
related to specific topics. These tables also visualize the support for certain ideas, although 
the importance cannot be deduced in any simple way based on frequency (a topic that will 
be discussed somewhat more in detail in appendix X).  
  
The data were analysed using thematic analysis. This approach, in particular, “allows a 
researcher using a qualitative method to more easily communicate his or her observations, 
findings, and meaning to others who are using different methods” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.6). 
The approach to the thematic analysis applied here (as earlier mentioned) did not make 
use of any pre-developed coding scheme, but inductively generated the themes from the 
raw information (Boyatzis, 1998). According to Boyatzis (1998) the inductive, data driven, 
approach can be performed as follows:
1. Decide on sampling and design issues 
2. Select sub-samples
3. Reduce raw information
4. Identify themes within sub-samples
5. Compare themes across sub-samples
6. Create a code
7. Determine reliability
8. Apply code to remaining information
9. Determine validity
10. Interpret results
The first step has been described related to the design of the focus group sessions. The 
transcripts, and the focus on content and answers to questions, were the basis for defining 
sub-samples (the second step). Three sub-sets were defined, being the complete discussion 
on each of the three research questions.   
The third step was to carefully (and repeatedly) read the sub-sets of the transcript of the 
first session, trying to identify text segments about the answer to the questions. Such text 
segments were first simply underlined. They were either single quotes or consisted of several 
quotes linked to topics that were discussed for a specific length of time (the time itself was 
not measured, but the beginning and end was identified as moments where the discussion 
changed to another topic). Each such piece of information was marked in the text as a ‘group’. 
These groups, numbered according to chronological appearance during the session, were 
copied to a separate document and, whenever needed, additional ‘bridging’ text was added 
to ensure that as far as possible the sentence and discussion context remained intact. This 
led to ‘summaries’: short pieces of information. 
The fourth step was to compare all “[…] summaries to determine similarities among the pieces of 
information within each sub-sample […]” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.46). This “[…] is also called pattern 
recognition and is defined as the ability to perceive patterns of themes in seemingly random 
or previously unorganised information […]” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.32); identifying (preliminary) 
themes by “[…] bringing together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which 
sometimes are meaningless when viewed alone […]” (Leininger, 1985, p.60). 
The next step (5) was comparing themes across sub-samples. Because a set of preliminary 
(draft) themes was developed based only on the first session, this comparison was restricted 
to a check across the two other sub-samples (i.e. parts of the first transcript addressing the 
two other questions) for possible overlap. After this check, each resulting theme was defined 
as a preliminary code, using as a guideline that “[…] a good code is one that captures the 
qualitative richness of the phenomenon [and] is usable in the analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of the research […]” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. x). 
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7.7. Defining themes 
The first step was to read the transcript of the first session, looking for text segments, to 
see if ideas or arguments ‘emerged’, and underlining these as potential themes. The term 
‘emerged’ may suggest some kind of spontaneous and unconscious process. However, this is 
not the case. The texts were read consciously searching for text segments that as specifically 
as possible said something about accelerating processes. 
Initially, such text segments often gave a fragmented impression, but then more segments 
introduced additional properties of, or perspectives on, such themes. By rereading and 
comparison, an understanding of how they were connected gradually developed. This enabled 
some text segments to be clustered into smaller groups that usually represented a topic that 
had been discussed for a certain time. The next step was to label (code) each ‘group’, which 
could be an individual quote or a longer text. These labels were repeatedly compared in order 
to identify similarities and differences, and gradually a more precise understanding of the 
relationships between properties enabled identification of themes. The result is presented in 
table 7.3, and each theme is discussed below (see also appendix VIII for an example of this 
stepwise and iterative procedure). 
Table 7.3  Key themes for each question
How can preferred participants be chosen?
The analysis of the text identified three themes. 
Actor Representation
Actor representation is defined as the preferred composition of a group of actors involved 
in the restructuring at a specific moment. It includes issues such as which actors should be 
contacted and why. It also focuses on the reasons for wanting to involve specific actors in 
specific roles, and, in particular, how the representation of firms can be addressed. Finally, it 
addresses how the right group composition can affect progress.  
Time-dependent Involvement
Time-dependent involvement is defined as ensuring that the involvement of actors is adapted 
according to the needs of the process. This includes issues such as timing, understanding 
how to intervene in ‘disturbed’ processes, and the advantages and disadvantages of applying 
specific sequences regarding actor involvement. 
Characteristics of Individuals  
Finally, a human perspective was repeatedly stressed in a variety of ways, referring 
to characteristics of individuals. This theme concerns the impact of personal skills and 
personality on performance. It includes a variety of issues such as enthusiasm, empathy, 
integrity and influence.  
What is the best sequence regarding improving motivation and
information?
A large variety of aspects were discussed, which made ‘discovering’ well-defined themes 
difficult (appendix VIII, included as an illustrative example, shows how this was done with the 
transcript of the first session). Seven themes were identified. 
Understanding the Problem
The first theme was already mentioned (from a different perspective) during the discussion 
on choosing preferred participants. It concerns the knowledge and understanding of the 
nature of problems, their effects, and how problems are related to actors and possible 
solutions. This theme includes not only facts related to understanding the problem, but also 
how understanding is linked to acknowledging the need to act. 
Joint Vision & Coordinated Actions
The next theme addresses how and why joint visions and actions can be reached. It 
includes the variety of organisational and individual issues that can prevent or slow 
down the development of a common vision, their effects on the restructuring, and how 
communication, cooperation, and visualization can influence the willingness to contribute to 
the vision development process. This theme focuses in particular on the internal processes 
of the local authorities.  
Managing Expectations, Motivation and Continuity   
Because restructuring takes several years, it is necessary to design and continuously manage 
the process towards a successful implementation of feasible improvement measures. This 
requires attention for the actors, and this theme is therefore described as the approaches for 
influencing the expectations about, and motivation of actors for, participating and investing in 
the process and its outcomes. This includes managing the level of expectations, searching for 
acceptable and feasible options, delivering what you promise, and ensuring visible progress 
and successes.  
Strategic use of Information
The strategic use of information refers to how selective access to, and use of, information can 
influence the motivation of specific actors to (re)act in a desired way. This theme includes 
aspects such as the information that should be given to any stakeholder at any moment, 
Question Theme
How can preferred participants be chosen?
Actor Representation
Time-dependent Involvement
Characteristics of Individuals
What is the best sequence moving from the ‘worst 
case’ situation towards a situation where both the 
aggregated motivation and information are viewed as 
satisfactory?
Understanding the Problem
Joint Vision & Coordinated Actions 
Managing Expectations, Motivation, 
and Continuity 
Strategic use of Information
Interaction & Mutual Influence
Fair shares & Trust
Flexibility & Adaptation
How can a planning agency determine when 
information or motivation is satisfactory (enough)?
Experience & Intuition
Indicators 
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the effect of quantification, and how suggesting possible developments and withholding or 
providing information may influence motivation and progress.  
Interaction & Mutual Influence
All interaction (or lack of it) influences both access to information and motivation, so the chosen 
interaction form and the behaviour of individuals are aspects that need to be addressed. This 
theme refers to how interaction influences the process, and how interaction can be designed 
and intentionally used to improve progress and the motivation for participating and investing 
in the restructuring. It includes aspects such as how to develop the interaction between the 
local authorities and firms, the effect of personal contact, and how to address communication. 
“Fair shares” & Trust
If stakeholders engage in a restructuring and they depend on each other for making it 
successful, there are also mutual expectancies regarding efforts and results. This theme 
refers to how actors’ opinions and perceptions about fairness and trust influence their 
actions, and how local authorities can handle, and influence, situations characterised by 
specific combinations of these aspects. Fairness is described here as “fair shares” (in Dutch 
the expression “voor wat, hoort wat’ is applied), meaning that costs and benefits, advantages 
and disadvantages, should be shared in an acceptable way between all those involved, even 
if some of the costs and benefits occur only later. Lack of trust between firms and local 
authorities, not delivering what is promised, the need for formal agreements, the effect of 
taking a first initiative, and interdependency are important aspects of this theme. 
Flexible & Adapting
Finally, the whole restructuring needs to be managed in a way that acknowledges and 
addresses change and opportunities. This theme is about how changing situations can be 
addressed, and how creative, and flexible, options can be used to influence progress. It 
includes a large variety of aspects such as the need for stepwise and iterative processes, 
discovering and having sufficient freedom for addressing opportunities, creative financial 
arrangements, and choosing the right moment. 
How can a planning agency determine when information or 
motivation is satisfactory?
Satisfactory implies enough for taking the next step in a process, that is for taking the action 
that at that moment has the best effect on progress (in both short and long term) and on 
final quality. Two themes were identified, which reflect complementary views on how ‘what is 
satisfactory’ can be assessed. 
Experience & Intuition
This theme refers to how experience and intuition influence the ability to discover what is 
satisfactory related to a specific challenge. Aspects such as empathy, common ‘language’ 
and being able to interpret expressions are included in this theme. 
Indicators
Although the above approach based on ‘tacit’ knowledge may suffice in some cases, other 
participants felt that more data were needed, and also that it is possible to acquire it. This 
theme refers to the total set of indicators addressing ‘soft’ process issues and ‘hard’ content 
issues, and how such indicators can be applied in decision-making. Aspects that belong to this 
theme include firm characteristics (such as interests, plans, investments etc), satisfaction (its 
importance, ways to monitor), and how different situations can be coupled to guidelines for 
action (such as when to stop and when to act).
This identification of themes was the starting point for the systematic detailed analysis of 
the transcripts of all five sessions. The next step was therefore to use these as codes for 
identifying all text segments (quotes / summaries) that ‘belonged’ to specific themes, and 
to place (‘move’ / reorder) these text segments within these themes (see appendix IX). This 
was also done for all text segments for each theme individually: specific properties of themes 
were identified as sub-themes, and text segments were structured within these sub-themes. 
7.8. The ‘story’ the sessions tell
The final step was to present the information in a way that ensured that the main message 
- the answers to the three questions presented in a meaningful and readable form - comes 
across to the reader.  
As Andrew Brown and William Gibson express it “[…] analysis is, in many respects, about 
storytelling and as any novelist will attest, themes are a useful device for narrative 
construction […]” (Gibson and Brown, 2009, p.129). The main message is here presented in 
accordance with this view as a ‘story’, a story which is constructed around the themes and 
sub-themes as structuring elements. 
To ensure that the ‘story’ comes as close as possible to the meaning expressed by the session 
participants, it is uses quotes (text segments) from all five sessions for transmitting the core 
ideas and opinions: additional ‘bridging’ texts are added only as far as deemed necessary for 
ensuring readability or clarifying the context for the discussion (for a short ‘story’ / paper on 
preliminary impressions of all sessions see: Bugge, 2010). The bridging texts are used, because 
quotes have the limitation that they are extracted from an ongoing interactive process, so 
the detailed context of any individual remark will be partly ‘lost’. The homogeneity of the 
groups made the use of bridging texts easier, because both the contents discussed and the 
presence of a ‘common language’ of both participants and researcher, decreased the danger 
of misinterpretations. The original quotes are all in Dutch, which means that the ‘richness’ 
of any quote could be lost in translation. This is especially important regarding Dutch words 
that have specific connotations (e.g. the term “beheer” that has a specific connotation that 
is somewhat more limited than the term management) and regarding typical expressions or 
sayings. To address this problem, the original Dutch text (whenever deemed necessary) is 
provided between brackets (although the added-value of this approach is limited to Dutch-
speaking readers). 
For each question, the themes are presented in a certain order. This order is neither intended 
to suggest any chronological sequence nor any relative importance. On the other hand, the 
order does have consequences for how the themes are described, because it affects the need 
for bridging texts. 
Finally, the choice of presenting the results as a ‘story’ has limitations. It does not lend itself 
to visualizing, or communicating, conflicting opinions and levels of agreement, so the ‘story’ 
is accompanied by illustrative tables. All quotes in the tables are linked to identifiable (coded) 
numbers of sessions and participants. This makes it possible to identify whether, for example, 
different opinions or support for certain ideas were limited to participants of one or more 
sessions. Because the questions use the term “participant” to mean a participant in ‘real 
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life’ restructuring, the focus group participants are distinguished (and consistently referred 
to) in the text as “professionals”. A final textual issue is that the focus group participants 
consistently used the Dutch term “gemeente”, which literally means municipality. This has 
been translated into “local authorities” where the reference is to local authorities as an actor 
(as distinct from a municipality as an administrative area). 
 
7.8.1. How can preferred participants be chosen (Q1)?
The involvement of preferred participants is always situation dependent, but the question was 
whether there are any good practices and guidelines that can support the decision-making.
Theme “Actor Representation”
Who do you contact?
For “restructuring or specific theme” you need a variety of actors, and “you do not need 
them all initially”, but there may still be good reasons for contacting a wide range. Regional 
development agencies are for example “working with internal guidelines on how to start such 
a process together with the local authorities, with [the departments of] spatial planning and 
economic affairs” and they especially involve local associations of firms. However, they also 
“approach inhabitants, environmental groups, province, region, and national authorities”, or 
even “actually anyone that would be interested in getting involved in the site development”. 
An interactive approach for “seeking stakeholders [is to] organise an evening for everybody 
to discuss and see where there is commitment”.    
Who do you preferably involve and why?
This does not mean that all actors actually get involved in the restructuring, and certainly not 
that their roles should be identical. A starting point for identifying preferred participants is to 
apply a stakeholder analysis. This is particularly useful “if restructuring is part of a larger area 
development. Then a stakeholder analysis leads to many more actors that want, can, or must 
do something”. It is about knowing “which actors do I need”, and, in particular, “who has the 
keys that work”. This means involving “people that can invest” as well as “actors that have 
the real power to decide”. These ‘keys’ are the different kinds of influence that individual 
actors can exert, and they are linked to motivation and interdependency because “a single 
actor achieves nothing on his own” in a restructuring. 
The specific actors you need “within the organisation of the local authorities are those that are 
involved in the problems”, which “depends on the contents”, and responsibilities. A topic to 
take into consideration is then that “if you talk about motivation, then the management level 
is not always consciously involved […] despite the fact that they have to allocate the financial 
means, and have to have a positive view on the developments”. This means acknowledging 
that “many civil servants have considerable power, such as the municipal secretary and sector 
managers, and time is needed to discover this”. The power balance between managers and 
responsible politicians can vary between different local authorities, and it was suggested to 
“always start trying to get the strongest actor involved in the process”. Finally, the municipal 
“council is very important, because it must allocate means”, which another participant 
acknowledged when remarking that the “municipal council should possibly have been better 
involved regarding extra budgets and maintenance budgets”. Choosing the internal actors 
is not just focussing on decision-makers, but on process and content related issues also. For 
all actors involved it is “important that they have a mandate, which means a situation with 
freedom to act”. This means civil servants that are involved in the problems, and, from a process 
perspective, “account managers for firms”, because they know the second influential group 
of preferred participants: the firms located at the industrial site. A slightly different situation 
applies to involving representatives of a Site Management (in Dutch: Park management) 
organisation that may have both information and positive relationships with firms, because 
they “do part of the work for firms and it pays off too”, or involving “ambassadors”, a concept 
applied in the province of Gelderland, because “entrepreneurs told them about their problems, 
and did not [want to] contact the local authorities”.
The opinions about how firms should be involved were more diverse (this topic is addressed 
more in detail later: see How to handle representation of firms?). One view was that “the 
large employers, we ensure that we at least get these involved”. There is also a need to 
focus on “property owners that should come into action in the area” including those that are 
“located somewhere else in the Netherlands”. But feasibility also is important and therefore 
one should “talk especially to entrepreneurs that really will and can” invest. Sometimes the 
choice is constrained in the sense that “to some extent there is no deliberate choice of 
actors, but it is a given fact, such as regarding property owners”. This means that some 
developments are impossible without involving these actors. 
There is a variety of other actors that can contribute to the process. For example the 
“Chamber of Commerce can help articulating [the needs of the firms], but not financing”. 
Other opinions about the Chamber of Commerce question its role and added-value. Once 
it was mentioned that the “Chamber of Commerce does not have a good reputation among 
individual firms”, and another session participant adds that this organisation is “interesting 
on site level, and not for individual firms”. Whenever relevant, it is also important to “not 
exclude influential inhabitants”. Finally, the involvement of the province is important. 
According to a representative of a local authority, the role of the province is “supporting” and 
its “participation is restricted to providing means”. Provincial civil servants had a somewhat 
different view, stating that their role is “not only money”, but that they also can “assist 
regarding whom to involve in process”, “facilitate through attention and communication”, 
and “stimulate in a dynamic process”. On the other hand, it was said that local authorities 
have to manage the process themselves, which implies “avoiding the role of the province in 
concrete projects”. “If local authorities do not know how [to design or manage the process], 
or if they, or firms, want a neutral actor” they can involve an external organisation that 
“selects participants”. 
How do you handle representation of firms?
This is a specific question that came up during several sessions. First, “individuals must 
be viewed by other firms as their representatives” (this remark refers to the situation on 
industrial sites where an individual working for a specific firm needs to be recognised and 
trusted as really representing the interests of all firms), but on the other hand it is emphasised 
that “they can represent a part of the firms, but not all”. An individual representative (of 
all firms) needs to be “able to communicate the collective feelings and problems of the 
firms” and be “influential towards the rest of the entrepreneurs”, which means selecting him 
based on an understanding of the “difference between those who love to talk, and those 
who have influence (in Dutch these influential entrepreneurs were sometimes referred to as 
“onderkoningen” or “smaakmakende ondernemers”)”. A specific point of attention is “to find 
the right representatives of an industrial site that are willing to contribute with ideas and act, 
and not only pursue own interests”. 
If there is a local association of firms on the site, does this represent the firms on the site? 
There is “often large difference between board members of associations of firms versus 
individual entrepreneurs” and the “legitimacy of associations of firms [is] sometimes 
not good: old-boys network [and] individual entrepreneurs do not see what they [i.e. the 
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associations of firms] do as relevant”. If several firms are not members, or if the association 
is not seen as a good representative, then one “must contact all [firms] individually, 
otherwise no commitment”. The essence seems to be that local “associations of firms can 
best communicate developments to individual entrepreneurs “[and here another professional 
immediately added] “if the associations function well”. A possibility for identifying the right 
representatives is to “make entrepreneurs ask other entrepreneurs”. 
What is the right mix of participants?
How should the group of preferred participants be composed? In particular, the importance 
was expressed of having a “right ratio of entrepreneurs versus rest” and the “right mix of 
property owners and tenants”. The group size was another salient issue, and the opinions 
about this issue diverged. One opinion [of a consultant] was that the “group of actors [should 
be] as compact as possible [and] too often local authorities create large groups and the 
process slows down”, and therefore a “project group that reports to a core group of around 
three important actors, can give high rate [interaction] process”. This led to a reaction [from 
a local authority civil servant] stating that it is “strange that broad representation of firms 
[…] is viewed as obstacle”.  
Theme “Time-dependent Involvement”
You need the combination of the right people, the right moment, the right place, and the right 
conditions (table 7.4 illustrates the diversity of views on this issue) in order to influence progress. 
Table 7.4  The importance of situation specific involvement of participants 
The right sequence is, for example, to “first talk to association of firms, [and ensure that] 
Chamber of Commerce also [is] involved, and not to property owners and other firms”: those 
latter are contacted later. On the other hand, others said that important property owners 
needed to be involved from the beginning. A growth-model approach had been applied in 
another case where “during process, actors [were] involved, [and that] worked very well”. 
The question is also whether actors should be required or able to leave the process, and how 
this influences the process. It was said that “if you cannot cooperate with people at crucial 
positions, you still need them, so you need to apply a specific approach regarding information 
and motivation”. However, in other cases “if it does not work, you have to intervene”, because 
“if a process cannot be accelerated with these people, e.g. [from] local authorities, [you can 
better] involve somebody else”. The essence is that “one place it works, other place it does 
not”, and you need the “right person at the right place”. Daring to change is accordingly 
important, and substitution of people is only one of the options. Another possibility is to “ask 
for [not one but] two representatives [e.g. of Board of association of firms], or if somebody is 
very dominant, split actors into steering group and project group”. 
This theme includes the movement from an Initiative-arena towards Implementation, and 
again the key role of firms was repeatedly stressed. One opinion expressed was that it is 
“best if firms take over the initiative” and therefore that the local authorities should not 
“immediately take control”. It was said that “if the Initiative leads to concrete follow-up, then 
projects are defined and you are much better searching for those we really need for getting 
project implemented” and therefore you should “only proceed with firms that are willing to 
invest, because then the process goes faster”.  
Theme “Characteristics of Individuals“
The willingness of an actor to invest is influenced not only by facts (which will be addressed 
later regarding information) but also by the interaction with other individuals. It is about 
achieving “success through the right combination of individuals from local authorities and 
firms”. To get “from [the discussed situations] A to D you need to have the right person, right 
connection with other actor”. 
Involving the right individuals is therefore important. For example, “people can very negatively 
influence the on-going process. Then very much depends on the chairman of the steering group 
or process manager, regarding if he recognizes what happens, and then takes action”. The role 
of individual entrepreneurs in the process can be important as well (as illustrated in table 7.5). 
Table 7.5  The impact of individual entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs use personal skills to influence other actors. Finally, there is the most difficult 
to define, but the most important, actor. This “man with the worn-out shoes is needed 
for transferring, and translating, information”, and such “influential individuals (in Dutch: 
“oliemannetjes”), [are] often retired entrepreneurs, that have sufficient time for the process, 
know practice very well […] and do not have too large an ego”. 
Conclusion on question 1: How can preferred participants be chosen: Interpreting the results
What the restructuring professionals tell is that choosing preferred participants is not simple. 
Although there are several success factors that can be included in guidelines and checklists, 
there is also a need for situation specific approaches. This is reflected in the large diversity of 
ideas, experiences and opinions provided during the Focus group sessions.
Is it then possible to find any single answer to the question about preferred participants, or 
is it more sensible to look for a consistent ‘package’ of several answers, or is a combination 
of both options possible? A starting point is that all the sessions indicate that restructuring is 
complex, and that the main key to influencing progress is understanding, and handling, this 
complexity. This has two aspects. 
Participant Session Quote
36 4 “choose your moment”
23 4 “timing is important [and it can therefore be] too early or too late”
38 3 “right people and moments”
20 3
“if process cannot be accelerated with these people […] involve 
somebody else: right person at the right place”
30 1 ”those we really need for getting project implemented”
38 3
“if all conditions have not been fulfilled then it does not work” and 
there will be “gaps / lacuna in the joint process”
Participant Session Quote
38 3 “told enthusiastic story and got support from other entrepreneurs”
17 1 [somebody] “who could tell a story”
26 1
“entrepreneur that is a good speaker and can tell about the 
bottlenecks he sees” [and] “is able to put the topic on the agenda 
of the municipal Council”
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First, it is possible to identify the right actors related to specific challenges, such as starting 
an Initiative or addressing a specific project (this is partly about access to information: a topic 
that will be addressed more in detail in the next question). A process manager can identify 
the stakeholders and their characteristics such as influence, personal skills, and willingness 
to participate and invest. This information can be used for developing a process design. 
Second, the sessions illustrate that handling complexity is about flexibility and time-specific 
involvement (explored in detail in the next question). This means accepting that progress 
with a specific challenge can be influenced positively if the complexity is reduced (meaning 
focussing on a limited number of factors and actors related to a specific challenge), but at the 
same time understanding and acknowledging that such an approach may have significant, 
often unpredictable and undesirable, effects on other challenges. It also means acknowledging 
that a too rigid approach to actor involvement can slow down progress. In particular, there 
may be a tendency to maintain the same ‘core’ group too long: even when it should be evident 
that processes have got stuck due to lack of ability, or courage, to change ‘the team”. 
7.8.2. What is best sequence regarding improving motivation and
information (Q2)?
This, second, question was about identifying strategies for moving to a situation where 
aggregated levels of information and motivation were both satisfactory. As the variety of 
themes illustrates, the professionals addressed this question from different perspectives. 
Theme “Understanding the Problem”
An interesting point is that it is “important that actors are aware of the problem, and for this 
certain information is needed, [and] as soon as the problem has been widely acknowledged, 
then the motivation to address it develops”. This remark introduces four aspects: awareness, 
specific information, acknowledgement of problem, and a causal link to motivation. 
Awareness of a problem can emerge or be deliberately created. In one case “firms were afraid 
of the development of another industrial site, and of threat of decay through firm migration”, 
and approached the local authorities about their concerns. The local authorities used this 
situation as an impulse for restructuring. In another case “in the Initiative there was a phase 
where the city was prepared for the term restructuring [i.e. people working for the local 
authorities were informed about the meaning and importance of restructuring, which was 
needed because] the value and necessity of industrial sites was not much recognised”, and 
this was a “quite systematic approach”. A third professional described how a study showed 
that over the past decades on a specific site there had been a gradual “loss of jobs, and at the 
same time politicians had said that 10,000 jobs would be created”, and this served as a real 
“eye-opener”. Actually in an early stage of this process, the problem situation “was a black 
box”, and, as the professional mentioned, “I have encountered that in several municipalities”. 
There are accordingly several questions related to problems and their relationships to specific 
actors (see table 7.6).
Table 7.6  Understanding the problem
There are different, partly complementary, ways to seek answers. Applying a “force-field 
analysis both internally and externally” enables identifying the stakeholders and their 
characteristics, and a “quality scan [is important for] knowing what we are talking about”. 
The way of extracting information affects the outcomes too. There “needs to be commitment 
to the scan from firms”. An option is also “not starting saying there is a problem, but 
asking firms: what is your opinion of the site”, or, if there is already an intention to start a 
restructuring, more specifically ask “what are your bottlenecks, which opportunities do you 
see for the area, and what should the result be if we start developing”. Local authorities 
should also ensure that there are “identifiable civil servants and politicians [where firms 
can] deliver complaints”. A third approach is to “perform a risk analysis in advance”, and its 
impact on the process was indirectly mentioned as “I believe it is insufficiently done”.  
The next step is to apply information about the situation in such a way that (other) actors 
acknowledge that there is a real problem and are motivated to act. First, local politicians 
are important, because “if there is no political urgency, then it [i.e. the problem] will not be 
addressed”, and accordingly the higher the urgency of the problem “the sooner it will be 
addressed”. However, again it was stressed how important it is to focus on the firms (see 
table 7.7) and their interests and opinions. 
Table 7.7  Focus on firms  
Participant Session Quote
12 1 “What is the scope of the problem?” 
5 3 “What do you include in the restructuring”
12 1
“What is the scope of the restructuring? Public space or also 
private property, users and owners.”
9 5
“What was the reason for the restructuring? Who has largest 
problem? Who is problem owner? What are actors sensitive to?”
23 4 “What urgency has problem? Who are stakeholders?”
4 1 “Is motivation not fragmented?”
Participant Session Quote
3 5 “starting from firms’ general interests”
25 2 local authorities “should not put problem on the agenda”
3 5
“who are we as local authorities [that we believe] that we can 
determine necessity”
5 3
“translating policy themes into something that affects [and is 
understandable to] firms”
18 3
“local authorities motivated and see advantages, other actors need 
to see advantages too”
3 5
“Local authority is for all inhabitants [and for them it] must be a 
joint problem. Firms have a functional problem. Completely 
different entities”
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Although a planning agency will do its best to take all these aspects into account, “each 
situation is unique” and “a number of things stay unclear”, which makes it “difficult [to 
communicate] towards external actors that ask for clarity”. This makes the step towards the 
“wide acknowledgement and motivation to address the problem” quite a challenge. 
Theme “Joint vision & Coordinated Actions”
This requires more than providing ‘cold’ (written) data. It is much more about focusing on 
how the information is provided, and this includes paying attention to questions about who, 
where, when and what. 
First, “seeing with your own eyes” is a “trigger” to success (explicitly mentioned by 8 
professionals in different sessions using almost similar words, and widely supported as well), 
and it stresses that being on location is needed. One professional even claimed that “the only 
thing that motivates an entrepreneur is seeing what really happens on a site”. This approach 
works regardless of target group: entrepreneurs, local council, responsible politicians, and 
members of steering groups and working groups. Taking different actors at the same time to 
see a site contributes to developing a joint perception of the situation. 
Although the need to focus on firms is clear, there was only one clear reference to problems 
associated with their involvement in developing joint visions: if important owners “are not 
involved in planning, then their motivation to contribute will be lower too […] and it will 
not address their wishes”. Much more attention was paid to discussing the difficult internal 
processes within the organisation of the local authorities, somewhat radically expressed as 
not feeling that “we all work for the same boss”. Still, it is clear that “ambitions must be 
linked”, and “real internal cooperation is crux”. It was even stated that “first everything 
[should be] internally discussed, then external action” can be taken (although, as will be 
discussed later more in detail, opinions about this issue varied). Anyway, there is a need to 
address the variety of internal problems (see table 7.8) regarding coordination and priorities. 
Table 7.8  Development of vision and cooperation within the local authority
There are many ways to achieve this internal coordination, and they all can be combined. To 
“make drawings, create picture of future” can support an interactive participatory process 
towards a joint vision. Another option is to trigger curiosity, such as asking the “local Council 
if they e.g. know how many firms there are or how large sites are, [which] worked positively 
regarding motivation”. Building commitment also means to “inform everybody to avoid 
accusations” such as “if I had known that” and “I have not been asked”. The information 
should also preferably address the core policy themes (i.e. interests) of internal actors, and 
ensure that it is understood that they are affected by the restructuring. As an example it 
was mentioned that if you “tell the department of Social affairs that on industrial sites many 
vulnerable employees are working”, it will influence their willingness to become involved. 
Finally, external stimuli can affect the development of a vision. For example, “the opportunity 
for getting provincial co-funding serves to get people moving in the same direction” (in Dutch 
the expression used was: “neuzen dezelfde kant op”). 
 
Theme “Managing Expectations, Motivation, and Continuity”
Having a vision is only a starting point, and a main challenge is to manage the process in 
such a way that the ‘right’ package of improvements is actually implemented. Motivation is 
then crucial, because “if there is a will, then there are [financial] means […] based on a good 
plan for site development” and therefore “motivation is an aspect that needs continuous 
attention”. One professional had experienced that “implementation failed because finally the 
firms did not have the drive to act”. 
To prevent actors from becoming disappointed, it is important to “perform management of 
expectations”. An often mentioned point is that the joint expectations should be realistic, 
which means taking into account feasibility and not being too optimistic (see table 7.9). 
Table 7.9  The impact of creating realistic expectations
Expectations also need to stay realistic and shared. This applies, in particular, to the 
relationship between local authorities and firms, and it is important to communicate when 
actions will be taken, and to show, achieve, and mark progress and results (see table 7.10).  
Participant Session Quote
24 4 “Convincing internal organisation is difficult”
33 2
“Different parts of the organisation were active, but had their own 
priorities”
3 5
“Internal departments are not working coordinated [which 
leads to undesired effects later in the process such as that] this 
development is impossible”
21 5
“Fragmentation at different levels. Agreements are made at 
operational level, and management level above has other interests”
Participant Session Quote
1 4 “realistic implementation program: [it] must be feasible”
9 5
“Searching for what may be possible, and what cannot be achieved. 
Searching for what is acceptable”
26 1
“sometimes it can be in interest of local authorities not to make 
a problem out of a situation, because [then] you also have to do 
something about it”
27 1 “Moderate expectations, create sober expectations”
19 5 “Creating expectations can have negative effects” 
27 1
“if you quantify too much you create expectations and the 
motivation can completely disappear”
19 5
“Are you able to fulfil expectations? Good [for local authorities] to 
take this into consideration”
34 2
“are financial means available or not” “Prevent disillusion among 
entrepreneurs”
39 4
“Completely infeasible recommendations [affects process and 
therefore remember that] a bit lower ambition level is also possible”
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Table 7.10  How progress influences expectations and motivation
Furthermore, both expectations and the willingness to participate in a process can be severely 
damaged if the local authorities do not deliver what they promise. One professional referred 
to an example when “during a visit to a site […] a lot of bad situations were identified, but 
the local authorities could not deliver what they had promised”. More in general, another 
professional (in another session) claimed that local authorities “perform much half-completed 
work [and they] are [accordingly] not completing the work on several industrial sites”. 
This means that management of expectations needs to be included in the initial design of a 
restructuring. It is not only about having realistic expectations and ensuring that progress is 
shown and promises kept, but also about whom to involve, how and when. Firms and local 
authorities have different responsibilities and often different expectations regarding how fast 
decisions can be made, and the opinions regarding how (and when) the local authorities 
should involve firms in the process were quite diverse (as briefly illustrated in table 7.11).  
Table 7.11  Expectations, actor involvement and impact on process
How can the local authorities actively influence the expectations and motivation of other 
actors during such a long process? The importance of choosing the right initial approach 
was often mentioned, which includes “enticing” and being selective about the right actions 
and actors.
   
One option is to start by “introducing something that attracts the interest of the firms”, and 
local authorities can for example implement “measures close to own ‘world’ [of responsibility 
/ tasks] to get process of enticement moving”. The use of quick-wins (see table 7.12) is one 
option, and it also needs to be recognised that “enticing is selectivity [so] you have to develop 
[a few] feasible business cases”. Selectivity also means that the process can be accelerated 
if you “start with street where there is commitment”, and maybe at the same time “put 
entrepreneurs that are unwilling at the end of the row”. One professional even expressed 
that “if you are able to activate a couple of entrepreneurs, you have reached your objective”. 
Selectivity, finally, also affects decisions regarding what you need to know, because “if you 
have part of the information, you have to [start] work on motivation”.  
Table 7.12  Effective use of quick-wins
Influencing expectations and motivation is not restricted to influencing firms, and should 
include influencing actors within the local authorities. It was stressed that although external 
actors can support the restructuring, the internal “project leader must drive the process 
himself”. Again, showing results has a clear impact, and in one case it was mentioned 
that “there is [internal] commitment [from management], because it [i.e. the restructuring] 
goes well”. Specifically, it was claimed that the motivation of the municipal council can be 
influenced if it “knows that firms support a development, then it almost becomes something 
that is accepted without discussion” (in Dutch the term used is “hamerstuk”). Local 
elections might pose a threat to progress and continuity. It was stated that “if an alderman 
[in Dutch: “wethouder”] enters or leaves the process, it is important for motivation”, and 
two professionals (in different sessions) referred to the need for getting new aldermen 
involved as soon as possible.  
Continuity requires understanding that it is “important that there are enough people in 
the organisation […] that can maintain the collective memory”, and ensuring that this is 
taken care of. It is also about accepting that “you are in a process of learning and you learn 
from your mistakes”, and “expectations can therefore be adjusted”. Adjusting, in particular, 
means that “continuously switching between two levels is important: Local authorities 
regarding policy and long term developments, and firms regarding when things are going 
to happen”.     
Theme “Strategic use of Information”
An important part of effective management is the use of information, and “providing information 
is often where it starts, and then confronting the right, depending on their influence, players 
[i.e. decision makers] with this information”. The idea is that “first information for motivating 
is necessary” (i.e. it is important to give sufficient information initially: this can positively 
Participant Session Quote
17 1
“you must not make all kinds of plans for other actors internally, 
because those plans were not used and there was no money [for 
implementing them]”
34 2
“not immediately involving all actors: first a vision that can be used 
to seduce other actors”, the “plan is used to entice and get process 
moving”
Participant Session Quote
3 5
“use quick-wins [and] start with small things, which are important 
for motivation”
12 1
“Quick-wins […] is a way for making people interested, [and] it is a 
method for reaching involvement” 
7 4 “define some quick-wins in the master plan”
17 1
“through quick-wins show a number of results on short term […] 
then it is our experience that it leads to a follow-up”
Participant Session Quote
8 3 “show results to firms”
24 4 “show progress”
23 4 “something must happen”  
39 4 “Most deadly [for the process] is if it looks like nothing is happening”
38 3
“Initiative has been started and local authorities focus on 
identifying actors and means. If this lasts too long the motivation of 
firms decreases”
23 4
“important that project does not last too long, because then the 
interest of firms decreases”
7 4 “now and then celebrating successes”
25 5
“Communicate when you really are going to act [as local 
authorities]”
12 1
“need to allow people to gain successes […] and show concrete 
results […] otherwise [you are] increasingly losing credibility”
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influence motivation), and one professional even stated that “acceleration is never through B 
[i.e. improving motivation without using new information]: regardless of how necessary it is, 
motivation decreases” (in Dutch the expression used is “zakt weg”). 
What is needed is “enough information, but especially good information”, and that means 
taking into account that “what is relevant information for you, is not necessarily so for me”. It 
is therefore about collecting, and effectively using, information according to the needs of the 
target group. Information for local inhabitants can for example initially be limited to “explain 
the problem and approach [to the restructuring] in general terms, whereas local authorities 
and firms need to understand and acknowledge importance, urgency, and feasibility of plans 
much more in detail because “everything has a price”. It is about simultaneously “calculating 
and drawing […] in order to involve actors in process […] towards increasing accuracy” (this 
refers to the need to effectively combine calculations of feasibility of specific measures with 
attempts to visualise how these measures will look in practice). Table 7.13 illustrates the 
variety of ideas and opinions addressing these issues.   
 
Table 7.13  Importance of having the ‘right’ information
The way information is presented is important, because “effectively presenting the problem 
creates motivation and leads to allocation of means”. It is necessary to move “from information 
towards motivation”, and therefore local authorities can “use information for enticing firms”. 
It was suggested to “not actively contact stakeholders [but] start working [as local authorities 
and then] stakeholders hear that”. This approach had a positive effect in one case, because 
it made the stakeholders “come to you”.   
However, more ‘strategic’ uses of information were also mentioned. Local authorities can 
“initially keep information within the organisation” regarding for example “whether they have 
sufficient financial means” (a topic that was previously discussed related to its effect on 
expectations). When there is insufficient progress, firms can be influenced in different ways. 
One option is to “trigger firms through other games: not only restructuring” (“other games” 
referred to influencing options such as enforcing laws and regulations), and presenting plans 
for NIMBY-functions can also have a strong effect on motivation (see table 7.14). 
 
Table 7.14  Strategic use of threats 
The commitment of the local authorities also is important for progress. A survey addressing 
how firms perceive the quality of their site leads to a “kind of ranking-list [and] no local 
authorities want their industrial site to score the lowest”. Using this information to influence 
the motivation to address the problem “is a clear strategy”. Commitment and involvement 
can be influenced also by telling internal actors of the local authorities that “if you do not 
join, we will continue” anyway, and in order to ensure that nobody can complain about too 
limited information, one professional stated that it is “better overloading with information”. 
In particular, higher authorities can influence progress by “coupling significant co-funding 
opportunities to conditions”, and based on such clear constraints “if nothing happens, [the 
authorities can] say that co-funding will stop”. 
Theme “Interaction & Mutual Influence”
The effects of providing information depend on how other actors react: not only to the 
information content, but also to each other: “how you communicate is important”.
Restructuring is, as one professional expressed it, “the work of human beings and about 
cooperation”, and in such a process “you just have to hope that information is interpreted in 
the same way” by different actors. In particular the question was asked “how do you reach 
the entrepreneur?”. Important for local authorities is then “not so much telling [things], but 
especially listening to what they [i.e. firms] want and what their interests are, and together 
explore what do you want, what do I want, and where can we find common grounds”. An 
issue is then that “communication with firms is [perceived as] difficult [because they] do 
not read Newsletters [and] are not coming to gatherings”. Therefore “you need to visit 
them personally”. Or, even better, “local authorities should visit firms, and not the other 
way round” (a view supported by two other professional in a different session). However, 
it is a problem that local authorities and firms are “not speaking each other’s language”, 
and therefore a ‘bridging’ role can be fulfilled by ‘ambassadors’ (people from external 
organisations facilitating the process). 
Participant Session Quote
23 4 “clarify importance, then you have commitment”
10 2
“underpin urgency of need to accelerate: what can be won 
regarding property value and employment”
1 4 “when firms see advantages, they will join the Initiative”
14 2 “must be an advantage for firm, otherwise process will not work”
7 4 “Firms need to see feasibility. This must be underpinned”
18 3 “calculating [costs and benefits] in advance [is] smart”
1 4 “Real estate agents invited for calculating increased property value”
25 5 “real estate agents invited to tell about industrial site”
23 4
“know the reasons for financial shortages in projects: [for example] 
calculating costs for buying land [were] based on expropriation” 
36 4
“make a good integral analysis including all costs and benefits for 
society as an eye-opener”
14 2 “first calculate, using [as starting point] where the power is situated” 
39 4
Regarding possibilities within an existing industrial site: “first check 
what can be done on own area and are there opportunities for 
transfer of land”
Participant Session Quote
33 2
“creating a common enemy e.g. through sending bad plan to firms: 
motivates participation in process”
36 4
Rumour of plan that “brothel is to be situated at site […] 
immediately led to creating association of firms”
27 1
“politicians suggested to allow NIMBY-function on site, and then 
firms were motivated […] and was the move from C to D”
17 1
A similar approach “turned out to be a very good means” that 
resulted in increase of firms joining local association of firms
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Nevertheless, “meet each other and get to know each other is very important” both for 
firms and local authorities. It can even be “deliberately facilitated that the most important 
entrepreneurs [are] brought into contact with the responsible politicians”. There is a 
need for “much information [because] commitment is important”, and, in particular there 
should be “regular meetings […] to inform each other about progress” and “open and clear 
communication on objectives” as well as “open discussion about all options”. The local 
authorities should also specifically be “formally informing about: this is what we have done, 
or are going to do, with the money”. The need for continuous interaction was summarised as 
“keeping on talking is important for motivation”, and as part of this interactive process “the 
informal is an important additional perspective” and therefore it can work well “to organise a 
session [specifically on the restructuring] coupled to informal gatherings of entrepreneurs”. 
This also makes it easier, because there can be a “certain fear of the unknown [and such 
settings make entrepreneurs] feel safe among fellow entrepreneurs”. 
Informal interaction between firms on the site is important. They can “appeal to each other” 
and “mutually influencing each other” regarding addressing the problems of the site. This 
may not be as easy as it appears, because “entrepreneurs on the site believe they know 
each other, but that is [often] not so”, which again stresses how important it is to really get 
to know each other.
There are also more direct (planned / intentional) ways of applying influence. As one 
professional working for a local authority expressed it, “we are doing it with respect, but we 
are using influence”. However, it was cautioned not to “use threatening as an instrument”, 
because “entrepreneurs do not forget that, and at a later stage you face the consequences”. 
Finally, if restructuring gets stuck, it can be helpful to have “talks with officials with managerial 
responsibilities to get process moving” (this remark refers to the importance of getting the 
internal managers involved, because they often can decide about allocating resources). That 
is, involving decision makers at the right moment can be crucial for progress.  
Theme “Fair shares & Trust” 
If an industrial site is to be restructured, both firms and local authorities have to act. However, 
initially it is unknown exactly what each ‘side’ can, should, and will do. Nevertheless, there 
are some underlying notions that influence expectations, and serve as a mainly implicit and 
non-quantified framework for actions. The process should be ‘fair’ and if one side invests then 
it is expected that the other side should, and will, do so. These expectations are influenced by 
trust, and the level of trust is linked to the need for formalizing agreements.
To a large extent it all revolves around trust, because “if there is no trust between the actors 
then there will be no solution” and “the process will stop”. Actually, “the essence is whether 
people trust each other”. A problem is then that sometimes at the beginning of a process 
“authorities are not exactly trusted”, and in one case the firms even “thought it was a fake 
process and that plan [of local authorities] was already made”. There is often “so much 
distrust that first must be addressed”. 
“Why is there so much distrust from firms?”. “Trust is linked to satisfaction”, and “investing 
in trust [means] doing what you have promised and showing progress”. If the previous 
experiences (related to effects on expectations) are that “the local authorities could not 
deliver what they had promised” or do not “do the tasks they are responsible for” such as 
maintenance of the site infrastructure, then it is understandable that trust is low. Continuity 
is important, because “trust is [often] damaged through local elections” and change of 
responsible politicians. On the other hand “entrepreneurs are sometimes exaggerating in 
telling that it is all the fault of the local authorities”.   
One option for the local authorities, and provinces, for getting the process moving is then to 
take the first step, and show that they are serious about addressing the restructuring (see 
table 7.15). 
Table 7.15  Influencing progress, motivation and trust through taking the first step 
Nevertheless, this is no guarantee for success, and it can have undesired effects. “You are 
hoping for firms to act, but that does have to happen”. “If firms believe [results] will be 
achieved anyway, then they will not come” to join the process. They may “just wait and see 
what the local authorities do”. Because they know that investments in site improvements 
affect property value and can lead to higher local taxes, they may even think that “local 
authorities, you pay, because you profit”. This applies not only to the local authorities, 
because “in other case there was no trust, because some players [i.e. individual firms] had 
large own interests and pursued those”. 
The question is accordingly who pays, who profits, and are these costs and benefits matched 
and distributed in a fair way. If a development is perceived as unfair, it is difficult to get 
firms involved. In such a situation “you can present a lot of information, but that does not 
necessarily mean that motivation increases. Knowing more does not mean that they [i.e. the 
firms] will join in something that is in only your [i.e. local authority’s] interest.” 
Two issues were discussed regarding how a joint process can be developed, and in both 
cases trust is important. The first is that both local authorities and firms trust that both 
sides really will (be able to) invest. This means applying “the fair shares (in Dutch: “voor 
wat hoort wat”) principle for accelerating [the process e.g. through] enticing firms to invest 
in private areas,  [by public authorities promising to invest] in public areas” (see table 7.16). 
Applying this principle is important for the relationships between all the interdependent 
actors. 
Participant Session Quote
23 4
“when firms notice that local authorities are taking initiative and 
understand that something really is going to happen, then they want 
to talk”
3 5
“if firms see that something is happening then this leads to 
motivation”
1 4
“local authorities are now acting: when entrepreneurs saw this they 
were joining, turned out to work”
7 4
When local “association of firms acknowledges that local authorities 
mean what they say, then they are taken seriously”
29 3 “province and local authorities must be viewed by firms as serious”
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Table 7.16  The impact of applying the “Fair shares” principle
The second issue is to develop a joint process, and “create joint objectives”. In one case, for 
example, “entrepreneurs were involved in the steering group to study [site problems and 
possible solutions] and there trust was built”. “When there is trust [one can move] towards 
Letter of Intent […] that signals trust and satisfaction”, “substantiates motivation”, and shows 
that the actors “believe in this development”. “This is formally sufficient for a next step, but it 
is not ideal”. In particular, to “make site management (in Dutch: “beheer”), co-responsibility 
for firms is an important condition for [being able to] accelerate the process”. 
Theme “Flexibility & Adaptation”
Although some general guidelines may work in all situations, it remains highly important to 
be flexible and adapt the process to changing needs. This applies to all actors involved in 
restructuring. 
The diversity of expressed ideas and opinions for addressing flexibility in processes was 
considerable. First of all “it is a puzzle”, and “there is not always a recognizable clear line (in 
Dutch: “rode draad”) in restructuring”. Local authorities therefore have to “think strategically 
about what they can achieve”, and because “different challenges need different approaches” 
there is a need for “adapting strategies according to what is considered important at that 
moment in time”, “use opportunities”, and “think about temporary solutions”. A process 
design should “include the not-expected”, and in particular the “crux is to think about 
alternatives if something does not go through” and “even better is to have an alternative 
second best option ready if e.g. the best option turns out to be financially infeasible”. 
The need for adaptation means that it can be useful to work “stepwise and iterative” and 
“split challenge into small parts, instead of [applying a] comprehensive approach”. This is 
necessary also, because “you cannot do everything at the same time”. Furthermore, to be 
able to seize opportunities, “timing is important” and it is “important to have a mandate” and 
“agreements on sufficiently high level of abstraction” to have room for manoeuvring. In some 
cases, even this is insufficient for finding the right solutions, and then actors must “dare to 
make political changes based on [an analysis of] effects on the society”. This can even imply 
that it is accepted that “maybe everything cannot be done, and maybe you have to be less 
ambitious”.
On the other hand, change and flexibility should not lead to ‘ad hoc’ decisions and low quality 
solutions. It is therefore important to “facilitate the choice process for site developments”, 
and “take time for sparring”. This means searching for specific solutions on a site level, but 
also to “know how to place the topic of restructuring within a broader context and involving 
other actors”. As one professional expressed it, they had “stayed too long on a detailed level 
[when they] should have been thinking on a structural level”. 
Specific ideas mentioned often referred to financing. In particular, there are various ways of 
financing site management (see table 7.17). 
Table 7.17  Creative ideas for financing site management
More flexibility was also propagated in linking the development of new and of existing 
industrial sites, transformation to other functions, and the use of compensation. In particular 
it was said that “much can be reached through mixing functions”. 
Although there were more than enough ideas and recommendations about how flexibility can 
be addressed in restructuring, the discussions also showed that real life does not always work 
in accordance with these ideas. In practice “everybody is to some extent re-inventing the 
wheel” and, in particular, there are (at least some) “consultancy firms using same approach 
everywhere”. It is said that local authorities are “too rigid sticking to maintaining the function 
as industrial site”, and if a relocation of a firm is needed there can be a “lack of ability of 
local authorities to indicate where a firm can migrate to”. Also, the flexibility of the province 
is an issue. In one case there was “agreement on the project in the past, and it has to 
proceed against all current rules”, (this remark referred to a situation where the province, 
Participant Session Quote
3 5
“Which part of maintenance budget for e.g. ‘green’ or sewage can 
be allocated to industrial site”
37 5 “Maintenance budgets can also be allocated to streets”
10 2
“”Reversing: management phase [should be] more focused on 
what is needed, and not on budget”
26 1 “Can maintenance budgets be moved forward in time”
25 5
“There are budgets for [both] investments and maintenance. 
Budgets for investments can also be applied for firms. Integrate 
systems for quality control and investments [and use] labelling of 
budgets”
14 2
“Investments of local authorities in ‘green’ and park management 
etc. can be coupled to value in m2 and local taxes (in Dutch: OZB). 
Suggested to plough back possible future [effects of] higher local 
taxes to current situation” (i.e. future increased income through 
taxes, could be invested today)
Participant Session Quote
17 1
“if there is no realistic chance that local authorities will invest in 
the future, then I believe that firms in general will quit the process”
9 5
Applied the approach that “only if firms do so and so, then local 
authorities invest” 
34 2
“Ask firms to take their own responsibilities. Local authorities and 
firms moving together”
31 1
“telling representatives of firms that “if you improve this, then the 
local authorities are willing to implement certain actions too” 
18 3 “authorities’ too high ambitions is OK, but firms have to act too”
29 3
“you want this, but we also want something: firms want something, 
then own wishes [of local authorities] (this remark refers to the 
need to take fair shares into account by knowing and addressing 
needs of both local authorities and firms)
29 3
Fair shares? (voor wat, hoort wat): “Yes, firms are also afraid that 
rest of firms [on site] will not co-invest” 
20 3 “to get co-funding for public areas, quality scan must be performed”
9 5
“if local authorities are unwilling to invest, then the regional 
development agency will not invest either. This creates clarity.”
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according to the professional, was unwilling to make any changes to previous plans although 
implementation would not be in accordance with current policy) and “sometimes conditions 
linked to provincial co-funding present bottlenecks”. 
The last, but certainly not least, main issue regarding flexibility is to know when to wait, 
proceed or stop. Here the opinions were quite diverse (see table 7.18).
Table 7.18  Restructuring: Wait, proceed or stop? 
Conclusion on question 2: What is the best sequence for improving motivation and 
information: Interpreting the results
First, it is quite clear that each situation has its own characteristics, which should be 
continuously known and taken into account. The sessions have produced a coherent picture 
of the information which is needed, the variety of options for strategic use of information, and 
they have linked these to flexibility in process approaches. 
However, the issues mentioned related to the themes “Joint vision & coordinated actions”, 
“Managing expectations, motivation, and continuity”, “Interaction & Mutual influence” and 
“Fair shares & Trust” show that the motivation of actors to participate and invest in the 
process and outcomes of a restructuring is influenced by much more than having access to 
data. In addition there is a need to manage expectations, and individuals act (and interact) 
according to a complex mix of stimuli and incentives, and related to multiple goals. Motivation 
is influenced by perceptions, previous experiences, the need to prioritize among multiple 
goals, and simple, but very important issues such as whether the actors know, and trust, 
each other. Although information can influence these aspects, especially important is how 
information is transferred and whether it is accepted as trustworthy. 
The sessions show that both ‘routes’ (A via B to D, and A via C to D) can be followed. 
Information is needed, but so is specific attention to motivation. Information can be used to 
influence motivation, and motivation influences the need for, and perception of the value 
of, information. This means also that the combined (direct) route addressing motivation 
and information at the same time seems to be the best option. The results indicate that 
a temporary emphasis on one of the two issues (i.e. information or motivation) can be 
appropriate, but that a successful approach to accelerating processes should address them 
both at the same time and continuously.  
The results also indicate that this full complexity seems to be recognised by most of the 
participants of the sessions. Only a few professionals had very pronounced preferences for 
specific sequences (see table 7.19 that includes all remarks made explicitly expressing an 
opinion about, or experiences with, alternative sequences). 
 
Table 7.19  Preferred sequence for addressing motivation and/or information 
Interestingly, even the most ‘extreme’ conflicting opinions (of participants 3 and 28) link 
the preference for focusing on either information or motivation quite explicitly to both 
factors. Participant 28 expresses that information is used for influencing motivation, whereas 
participant 3 says that information, regardless of how necessary it is, negatively affects 
motivation. Both professionals acknowledge that these factors influence each other, but they 
have different views on the best sequence, emphasis, and the effects of these on progress.  
Interdependency remains an important, almost completely implicit, factor. The emphasis on 
‘fair shares’, joint visions, expectations, interaction, and mutual influence are all examples of 
how important it is to integrate actor interdependency into process design and management. 
This needs to be addressed from a clear perspective on feasibility. If investments are 
perceived as feasible and fair, actors can accept that they have a shared responsibility for site 
restructuring, and they will take action. However, the combination of feasibility and fairness 
is important. An improvement measure may be feasible, but still be blocked because actors 
Participant Session Quote
11 3 “Be patient and wait for the right opportunity”
1 4
“Let problem get worse, when it is big enough you will immediately 
have political support”
9 5 “If there is no commitment: stop and let it slowly simmer”
26 1
If something does not work “then it may not yet be the time to act. 
Maybe you can just wait ten years and then the [right] moment 
may be there”
19 5 “Sometimes decision to really stop”
3 5 “Better to continue talking, and temporize”
3 5 “Process must not stop: change phases and priorities”
Participant Session Quote
7 4 “All strategies applied: A via B, C or directly to D”
35 5
“From A to D [directly] you need to have the right person, right 
connection with other actor”
3 5
“New alderman, dramatic for process, back from C to A, had to talk 
a lot to get him involved” 
19 5
“Back from C to A happens in practice, everybody is often happy 
during the planning phase being free of obligations, but when it 
gets concrete they leave the process”
34 2 “Believe A to B and then D”
28 2
“”Not work via C: work via B formulating challenge well towards 
motivation [and] finding solution to financial problems”
3 5
“Acceleration is never through B, regardless of how necessary it is, 
motivation decreases”
30 1
“I am sure you can influence the amount of information in such a 
way that it influences motivation and leads to stage D”
22 2 “A to C without [extra] information is about exchange of knowledge”
14 2
“A to C to D is good approach. Too much information decreases 
attention. Motivation why to act not found” (refers to the negative 
impact on motivation that can be caused by providing too much 
information) 
35 5
“How you get from A to C without going through B is something 
you learn from experience”
23 4
“So much distrust that first must be addressed […] A to D then 
very difficult […] first to C then to B and then D”
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perceive the division of costs and benefits as unfair, or they are afraid that only one ‘side’ 
will deliver what is promised. This can be interpreted as a need for clear formal agreements, 
especially where there is a lack of trust and where investments are related to long term 
ambitions that go further than what belongs to each actors’ ‘normal’ responsibility (e.g. for 
regular maintenance).  
7.8.3. How to determine when information and/or 
          motivation are satisfactory (Q3)?
When has the right ‘mix’ of motivation and information been reached, so that it can be 
translated into a next step or a formal agreement? This question was somewhat indirectly 
addressed regarding the need to know when a process can better be postponed or even 
stopped (see table 7.18). However, the question is important enough to be asked explicitly. 
Two different, and complementary, views on this question were expressed: experience and 
intuition versus ‘hard’ indicators. 
Theme “Experience & Intuition”
This refers to what may be called tacit knowledge. Although only few remarks explicitly 
addressed this issue (see also the previously described theme “Characteristics of Individuals”), 
it is particularly important. A problem is that local authorities and firms are “not speaking 
each other’s language”, and more in particular, local authorities do “not understand what 
entrepreneurs want”. This is not simply about the quality of communication skills. It is 
about “feeling what goes on in the room”. As one professional said “you will know if there is 
insufficient motivation if you have to make a lot of effort (in Dutch: “sleuren en trekken”)”, 
and knowing whether something is unsatisfactory “is feeling, experience, it is seeing people 
looking with expressions telling you that regardless [of what happens] they will not cooperate 
with you”. Or, in short, “ultimately it’s about intuition”.   
Theme “Indicators” 
This ability to recognize the ‘right’ moments intuitively is the key characteristic of the gifted 
process manager. However, even the most gifted will usually not rely on intuition only. How 
can indicators assist the decision-making? 
The discussion during the sessions showed that the professionals had difficulty defining 
exactly when something is satisfactory enough, and they actually seemed to (although this 
question was not explicitly asked) experience this way of looking at information levels as quite 
unfamiliar. On the other hand, they had clear ideas about what should be measured, how, 
and when. Their ideas about indicators are divided into two groups: indicators for general 
informational needs, and specific indicators for measuring satisfaction. 
The first category requires “knowing the local dynamics”. A risk is then, as one professional 
expressed it, that “we sometimes believe we know [what can and needs to be done] as 
local authorities, but we do miss things”. In restructuring, this risk of missing essential 
things is understandable. The problem is that “these investments and area developments 
are so complex that you can actually not express anything in terms of satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory”. 
Still, this complexity actually is an extra argument for having access to the right information. 
First, there is a need to know what should be done and who to involve, because “if the best 
choice challenge is not known, then it goes wrong there, and for example the solution 
does not fit”. The basis for identifying a best challenge is provided through “continuously 
communicating with firms about dynamics” and monitoring developments, and for local 
authorities this in particular means to “know your entrepreneurs” and “what they are doing”. 
There were clear ideas about the information that is needed related to a restructuring. The 
local authorities should know “the financial-economic importance of a site, who are the 
large employers, and who works there”, and property value. They also need to know the 
“plans for expansions, stopping, and investments” of all firms. Although one might expect 
such information to be available, one professional claimed that “9 out of 10 local authorities 
do not know which plans firms have”. More in detail related to specific challenges, it is 
“important to know all interests”; “what can be won in economy and employment”; 
“where money can be found”; whether specific “actors are necessary for success”; “which 
developments they desire”; “which entrepreneurs are willing to invest” and able to do so 
and “the conditions linked to their willingness to invest”, but also why specific actors are 
unwilling to invest because this “can have a very good reason”. 
What are the indicators for how actors value (potential) outcomes, and for their willingness 
to invest? Or, in other words, what are the specific indicators for what is satisfactory? One 
person said: “look at functionality, and measure satisfaction”. The importance of measuring, 
and managing, processes focusing on satisfaction was widely recognised, and there are 
several ways to do this (see table 7.20). 
Table 7.20  Satisfaction as indicator in restructuring 
Satisfaction can also be measured ‘indirectly’ (i.e. without asking the firms). One indicator is 
that “if firms invest, then it [i.e. the restructuring] is successful”, because “a firm that invests in 
its buildings, surroundings or employees, probably has confidence in it”. Other useful indicators 
are “the number of requests for building permits compared with streets where no revitalisation 
has been done”, “decrease in unused buildings”, and “development in property value 
[although it was mentioned that it] is difficult to calculate”. Satisfaction can also be measured 
as willingness to sign a Letter of Intent, and during a process “an indicator is how many people 
attend events”. Each of these measurements can be performed during a restructuring, and 
Participant Session Quote
3 5
“Actually you should be assessed based on satisfaction: firms and 
local authorities”
21 5
“Do you ask actors enough whether they are satisfied [and] include 
[questions about this] in surveys on satisfaction”
35 5 “Do we ask everybody if they are satisfied”
19 5
“If you conclude that stakeholders are satisfied […] then you have 
had a good process” 
23 4
“Local authorities can be very satisfied with process, but firms very 
unsatisfied with results”
32 1
“Maybe you could get to know what satisfactory is, if you 
monitored and compared several projects on information and 
degree of satisfaction”
12 1
“When do we have to address something and when not: in advance 
we are insufficiently defining what is satisfactory, and if we can 
achieve it”
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each intermediary outcome can then serve as valuable input for a next step in the process. 
It was said that, during restructuring, local authorities need to be “continuously checking 
feasibility”, “monitoring constraints”, and “anticipating problems”. This information makes it 
possible to identify when and how to act. In particular, the professionals suggested a variety 
of more or less explicitly expressed “if … then” guidelines that can help identifying when, and 
how, to act related to progress on specific indicators such as investments by firms and access 
to information (see table 7.21).    
Table 7.21  Suggested “if … then” decision guidelines 
Finally, how should this information be gathered? “Somebody is needed that oversees the 
whole site and addresses smaller parts within this whole”. This “somebody” needs to know 
the firms and be able to anticipate problems, and needs to use both ‘hard’ indicators and 
personal experience and intuition in this process. 
Conclusion to question 3: How to determine when information and/or motivation 
are satisfactory: Interpreting the results
The professionals mention a rich variety of possibilities for monitoring progress, which, if well 
applied, can be used for identifying the ‘right’ decision moments when the involved actors 
are satisfied enough to take a next step. 
Then it is important to ask why in some cases information is unavailable, and why, if it is 
available, it is not used or used inappropriately. Unfortunately, the sessions do not give any 
clear answers to these questions. 
However, the remarks on satisfaction (see table 7.20) suggest that in practice too little 
emphasis is given to defining what is needed in advance, and that during the process too 
little attention is given to actively monitoring satisfaction. Many remarks actually refer both 
to how the professionals feel that things should be done and to how they are done, which 
suggests that they have a clear idea, or at least opinions, about how improved monitoring 
can influence progress; but reality is quite far from such an ideal situation. 
7.9. Conclusions   
The combination of open questions to guide the sessions and a group of passionate and 
outspoken restructuring professionals delivered valuable, very detailed and diverse, insights 
into ideas, opinions, and experiences about current restructuring practice (a brief reflection 
on the trustworthiness of the results is included in appendix X). This is exactly the “[…] rich 
and complex funds of communal knowledge and practice […]” Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 
claim to be necessary for solving real world problems (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 
903), and the interpretation can accordingly deliver the useful new insights that are needed 
(Langer, 2006; Flick, 2009). 
What do the results of the Focus group sessions tell about the model? Do the 
practitioners recognise the model as a good representation of processes of 
restructuring, and how complete and appropriate is it? 
A part of the answer is that the participants could have said that they did not recognize the 
model and its components as representing restructuring practice, or that they were unable 
to work with the model. But: they did not say this! They suggested neither removing or 
adding any specific part of the model. Although the structure of the sessions did not explicitly 
invite such comments, it can be expected that such comments would have been given, 
taking into account the outspoken nature of most of the participants. The completeness and 
appropriateness of the model can also be tested in another ‘indirect’ way, namely whether 
the discussions during the sessions revealed any additional issues or suggested modifying 
existing ones. The answer is no. 
The model seems to be complete. But is it? Do the results of the sessions indicate that 
particular questions or measures should have been formulated differently? At a first glance 
there do not seem to be any reasons for changing the model. Nevertheless, there were signals 
that some issues deserve more attention. One such is the impact of individuals. The results 
indicate that the choice of representatives is important, in particular whether the individual 
has experience, influence, charisma, intuition, and whether somebody is respected, trusted 
and liked. This issue needs to be addressed in organisational design and as a potential process 
risk. A second issue is what can be referred to as “strategic behaviour”. Actors involved 
in restructuring do not always tell all they know, and they can choose to use information 
to their own benefit. The results indicate that if such “strategic behaviour” is perceived as 
manipulative, it can damage trust and future opportunities for cooperation. The same applies 
to “fair shares”. Actors expect that the principle of “fair shares” should apply, and not fulfilling 
expectations can influence the willingness of actors to invest. The results can be interpreted 
as a clear signal to not underestimate the importance of a long term perspective on process 
risks.
There was much discussion of “importance” and of paying “specific attention” to a topic. The 
decision support model, however, says nothing about this, leaving to the users the decision 
about the relative importance of the topics in the model. Is it possible to improve the model 
in this respect, based on the outcomes of the focus group sessions? One option would be 
to make all the questions in the model more detailed: by including more sub-questions and 
more detailed measures. However, this would make the model much larger, and our previous 
model development experience show that users prefer compact ‘user friendly’ models (Bugge 
et al., 2010). Another option is to look for clear indications from the focus group sessions of 
how relative importance is viewed and should be addressed in practice. However, there were 
only a few comments about relative importance (see also the discussion in section 7.8). Such 
remarks were limited to matters such as giving emphasis to information or to motivation 
(especially table 7.19), whom to involve in the initial stages of a process (table 7.11) and 
Participant Session Quote
29 3
“invest [in implementation of specific measures] if firms take the 
initiative ” 
8 3
“you can calculate everything, but if I [“I” being a firm on the 
site] will not sell [e.g. I will not sell my land, needed for e.g. an 
improvement measure, regardless of what you offer]: [then a 
planning agency can better] stop [its efforts]” 
36 4
“some firms really do not want to move, in that case recommended 
to do nothing”
31 1
“if something does not work then [tell that] we are temporarily 
stopping”
8 3
“local authorities develop site design [and then] firms [are] 
satisfied because they know what is allowed and not allowed”
14 2
“always behind reality […] relocation of firms can [take place not 
earlier than] when new sites are available”
14 2 “industrial site interesting for restructuring when value low enough”
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whether it would be wise for the planning agency to take a first initiative (e.g. table 7.7). 
However, all these remarks are about relative importance in general. They are not linked to 
known sets of process characteristics. So they cannot be used to improve the model in this 
respect. 
The sessions indicated no important new (i.e. not included) main issues, nor were there any 
main issues included in the model that were not discussed. In that respect it seems to be 
complete, and it integrates and addresses the most important characteristics (Haimes, 2004). 
Another test of the model is whether the professionals were able to work with it. The highly 
interactive and lively discussion during the sessions showed that the participants recognised 
and understood the key issues addressed in the model and were able to work with the 
questions addressed (this topic is addressed more in detail below).  
Will the model help speeding up restructuring?
The next question is whether this model can help to reduce the total duration of restructuring 
of industrial sites without negatively affecting final quality? The professionals were (as 
described in 7.2) explicitly instructed to direct their answers to how this can be achieved. 
We have asked the participants three key questions derived from the model about how the 
process could be accelerated. The participants had abundant suggestions for how to do so, 
but none of these challenge the core of the model nor its claim for accelerating the process. 
We can conclude from this that the model should help accelerating the process.  
The suggestions for improving the process and accelerating it are as follows.
The professionals suggested a large number of ways for identifying preferred participants, 
situation-specific approaches, and identifying when satisfactory aggregated levels of 
information and motivation have been reached, all of which should accelerate the process. 
Taking account of these facts (mentioned above) about model completeness, appropriateness, 
and usefulness, the provisional conclusion can be drawn that the model developed within this 
study will help speeding up restructuring without endangering the final quality. 
Operationalising the model
What do the results say about applicability of the model? Is it easy and unambiguous to use 
in practice, and how should it be improved? 
As mentioned above, the starting point for drawing conclusions about applicability is that the 
restructuring professionals were able to work with the model in all five sessions. However, 
the results also show that not all parts of the model were experienced as equally easy and 
unambiguous in use. 
In particular, the way the discussions on each of the three questions developed during the 
sessions illustrates this. The first question was about identifying preferred participants. 
There was no confusion about the meaning of this question, and all professionals recognised 
the relevance and importance from their own practice. This familiarity with the topic, and 
question, meant that nobody asked for any extra explanation, and the professionals had no 
problems giving useful, well-focused, answers. The second and third questions (on the ‘best’ 
sequence and identifying satisfactory level of information and motivation) were experienced 
as a bit more difficult: both to understand and to answer. The moderators often had to help 
getting the discussion started and focused by, for example, providing a couple of examples. 
However, only a very short time was needed for this, and afterwards both questions worked 
well for stimulating the discussions and finding answers. 
Does this mean that the model should be enriched by adding more explanatory text or 
examples for (especially) these two questions? Would that make it easier for professionals to 
use the model?  
The provisional conclusion drawn here is that the degree of familiarity (based on previous 
experience) with the different aspects of the model and its way of addressing decision support 
for restructuring, is the reason why professionals experienced different degrees of difficulty 
in applying it during the focus group sessions. The model introduced some (to most of them) 
new ways of looking at the restructuring challenge. However, in all cases it took a very short 
time to make the professionals familiar with the model and the underlying way of thinking. 
As soon as they understood why the model focused on achieving satisfactory levels of the 
two factors motivation and information, and why the relationship between the factors are so 
important, they had no problems working with it. 
Adapting the questions, or adding more examples or explanations, therefore, does not seem 
to be necessary for improving the applicability of the model. This would (as mentioned 
above) make the model larger, which can be expected to damage its ‘popularity’ among 
practitioners. A better, much simpler, solution is to give to restructuring professionals brief 
trainings on how to apply the model, preferably linked to testing in real life cases.      
141140
8.1. Introduction
Restructuring of industrial sites is complex and not well understood. This observation served 
as a starting point for an explorative journey towards an improved understanding of how 
a planning agency can influence progress, and in particular reduce total duration of such 
processes without negatively affecting the quality of the final outcomes. The journey was 
explorative in the sense that it started with an open question regarding how restructuring 
performance can be influenced, and it was initially focused only by its emphasis on process 
duration and target group. However, the choice for a specific human perspective on actors 
and their interactions, offered a clear direction. This choice informed the way restructuring 
practice was described, and the development of the theoretical perspective and decision 
support model.  
This final chapter seeks an answer to the sixth detailed research question formulated in 
chapter two: 
 What do the outcomes contribute to knowledge and practice as well as tell about the need 
for	further	research?
This question is split into two parts. First, the contributions to knowledge and restructuring 
practice (8.2) are discussed. Second, some recommendations for future research and policy 
development are given (8.3).
8.2. A brief reflection 
What has this study contributed to our understanding of complex interactive processes, and, 
in particular, of restructuring? During the study, a large number of choices, and assumptions, 
have been made. Each choice has influenced the scope, focus, and final outcomes of the study. 
Here we present a brief reflection on four topics: restructuring in practice and the decision 
support model, the opportunities for applying the decision support model in other specific 
8. Contributions to knowledge 
    and practice 
“The experiences gained in the course of the journey(s) are the prize, 
not some final Shangri-La of knowledge at the end of the road.” 
(Alvesson and Skjöldberg, 2009, p.122)
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situations (i.e. other than restructuring of industrial sites), the theoretical framework, and 
the methods applied. These reflections are intended as contributions to on-going discussions 
by both academics and practitioners about how complex processes can be understood, and 
improved.
 
8.2.1. Restructuring practice, and the decision support model
What has this study contributed to the understanding of complex multi-actor processes, and 
in particular restructuring? 
In our opinion it indicates how important it is to appropriately address the relationships 
between actors, and their motivation for investing in specific measures. 
Much attention in the past has been given to resources as the key factor. Lack of financial 
resources has repeatedly been mentioned as a main obstacle in complex processes, and in 
particular in restructuring. We acknowledge that resources themselves are important, but 
this study has indicated that focusing on the decision-making process that leads to allocation 
of resources is important too.   
Because these decision-making processes are complex, they are difficult to manage by, for 
example, a planning agency. This study suggests that a decision support model can have a 
significant impact by making the complexity more manageable, and it can specifically do 
so by identifying appropriate ways for influencing stakeholder satisfaction, progress, and 
duration of processes. The development of the decision support model within this study 
has indicated that some issues of complex multi-actor processes deserve more attention: 
aggregated characteristics (motivation, information, and resources); distribution of (the 
same) characteristics among involved actors; how acceptable solutions can be developed. 
We now describe the specific contribution to knowledge about these issues. 
Sufficient aggregated motivation, information, and resources
One aspect of the complexity of working with many actors with partly conflicting goals is 
that any specific measure can only be implemented if the actors are sufficiently satisfied. 
It is therefore important for a planning agency to focus on the aggregated characteristics. 
Enough actors must be willing to invest (and no actor must use ‘blocking power’ to prevent 
implementation), they must together be able to allocate sufficient resources, and they must 
have sufficient information about the chosen measure and alternative options. 
Individual motives, distribution and ‘fair shares’
Each actor focuses on the (potential) impact of a specific measure on its own situation. The 
decision about allocation of resources to a specific measure is based on an assessment of own 
costs, benefits, and risks. On the other hand, each actor also takes account of the distribution 
of the total costs, benefits, and risks. If this distribution is perceived as unfair, then the actor 
may not be willing to invest. 
Developing acceptable solutions
A planning agency accordingly needs to focus on the motivation, information, and resources 
of each individual actor, the distribution of costs, benefits, and risks among (at least) the 
involved actors, and the aggregated motivation, information, and resources related to 
investments in specific measures: all at the same time. During a process these characteristics 
can all change, and the planning agency needs to manage this process towards a satisfactory 
solution. 
The processes included in this study, and the decision support model developed, are 
those where actors are interdependent for reaching solutions, where ‘simple’ use of legal 
instruments will not suffice, where one single actor cannot ‘enforce’ an integral solution for a 
complete area, and where insufficient resources are available initially. 
The planning agency can influence, and improve, this situation in different ways. It can focus 
on collecting, and distributing, information that can serve as input for assessing the value of 
specific measures: on the level of individual actors and on the level of the group of involved 
actors. It can additionally, or alternatively, influence motivation, for example, by developing 
solutions that are more satisfactory to the actors (i.e. regarding effect on own interests and 
goals, and a fair distribution of costs, benefits, and risks among actors). 
This study suggests that three relationships between motivation and information are 
important. First, giving more information can influence motivation both positively and 
negatively: the ‘right’ quantity and quality is always needed. Second, motivation can 
influence the willingness to provide more information. Third, attention to both information 
and motivation at the same time is needed in any successful ‘route’ towards sufficient 
commitment to a solution. However, the relative emphasis on efforts to influence information 
versus motivation can vary. 
It is possible that none of the influencing approaches leads to sufficient commitment to a 
specific solution and/or to sufficient resources. The study suggests that in such situations a 
planning agency can start a new ‘round’ searching for an alternative (‘second-best’) solution 
that can be supported by all actors. Alternatively, or additionally, it can redesign the decision 
making arena, including (partly) new preferred participants that – together – can allocate 
sufficient resources. 
This study suggests that a decision support model can be a valuable tool for planning 
agencies, and in particular a question-based approach that can serve as a ‘check-list’ for 
monitoring progress and at the same time can be used for selecting influencing approaches, 
thus overcoming some of the difficulties that planning agencies run into. 
This study has, in particular, resulted in a decision support model, that can help planning 
agencies identify situation-specific approaches that reduce the total duration of restructuring 
without endangering the quality of the final outcomes. By focusing on the characteristics, 
and relationships between, the actors involved, a planning agency will be able to address 
appropriately the issues to be tackled. We recommend the use of the model to planning 
professionals involved in restructuring.  
8.2.2. Use of the model in other situations
Can the decision support model be applied in other complex (policy) processes? Two of 
the most important building blocks of the model, the IAD framework and the Contextual 
Interaction Theory, have already been used for understanding other processes (see e.g. 
Bressers, 2009; Ostrom, 2005; 2007 and references cited therein). Furthermore, the three key 
variables of the model can be applied to any process involving two or more actors who, more 
or less, depend upon each other, and the same applies to (almost all) questions included in 
the “if … then” structure and the related instruments. Although we can draw from this study 
conclusions only about the use of the model in restructuring, we believe that, after rather 
moderate adjustments, it has potential for use in a wide range of other complex interactive 
policy processes
8.2.3. Theoretical framework
How useful was the theoretical framework, and its ‘building blocks’, for understanding 
restructuring, and, in particular, for developing the decision support model? 
First, we experienced the combination of simplicity and clear structures in both the IAD-
framework and the Contextual Interaction Theory as a specific strength. They both 
acknowledge the full complexity of the interactive processes in the arenas, but at the same 
time they use only a few variables, and that makes handling this complexity possible. Another 
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strength is that they both recognize explicitly the importance of specific situations. They do 
so by stressing that any action arena will possess its own characteristics, and that design 
and management of such arenas should continuously take account of how the characteristics 
change, and how they can be actively influenced. Both strengths provided a good basis for 
the development of the decision support model.    
Second, for this study we experienced the Contextual Interaction Theory as being compatible 
with the IAD-framework. Its core variables fit the key actor characteristics of the IAD-
framework, and the theory gives a useful explanation of how these variables affect actor 
behaviour in action arenas.
On the other hand, we also experienced challenges (more or less reflecting the ‘shadow-side’ of 
the strengths mentioned above) in applying the theoretical framework. Motives, information, 
and resources are all complex conceptual variables, and the theoretical framework could 
have given more attention to how actors ‘combine’ and ‘prioritise’ such variables in specific 
situations. In particular, this suggests focusing on how an appropriate balance between 
‘simplicity’ and completeness can be found. Or in other words: how the splitting of a problem 
into its components (the key variables) and explaining these separately, can be appropriately 
combined with a subsequent step of integrating the understanding of each component into a 
complete understanding of the situation. 
8.2.4. Methods
Focus groups and thematic analysis were experienced as appropriate methods for this study. 
The experiences confirm that the Focus group method is indeed useful for explorative studies 
and, in particular, for getting access to rich information from interactive settings in a relatively 
short time. The experiences also confirmed that thematic analysis of the data (the transcripts 
from focus groups) is an effective approach for discovering main themes, and ordering data 
into these themes. The use of both methods did not lead to any new insights, but supports 
(and accordingly reinforces) the applied theory.   
8.3. How to proceed?
First, because we have concluded that the model provides a useful approach for influencing 
restructuring, applying it in real life cases is the most logical follow-up. This would enable it 
to be improved, in particular by getting a better understanding of how the decision making 
works in specific situations, and by identifying the relative importance of topics, questions and 
measures in the model. The model should be applied both to analysing completed processes 
and to supporting the management of new, and on-going, processes. 
Second, more research is needed on how expectations, trust, informal rules, “fair shares”, and 
risks influence process, progress, and outcomes of restructuring. This should include research 
on the effects of making informal rules explicit in open discourse, and on the long-term 
effects of applying approaches such as ‘enticing’ and threatening with NIMBY developments. 
The results suggest that these aspects (i.e. expectations, trust, informal rules, ‘fair shares’, 
use of enticing and threats) are closely related, and that addressing them explicitly in process 
design and management will improve the understanding and management of complex 
interactive processes. 
Third, the results of this study indicate that individuals, acting as representatives (agents) of 
actors, can have a significant impact on process performance and outcomes. More research is 
needed on how their role in interactive settings can be understood and optimised. This should 
include how the individuals should be chosen according to the specific needs of a situation.  
Fourth, restructuring is so complex that it is very difficult for policy makers to predict the 
effects of applying particular methods. For that reason, policy makers should shift the 
emphasis from what can be done (the specific e.g. financial and organisational measures) 
to how measures can be selected and implemented in specific situations. This is where the 
decision support model developed in this study comes in. Its starting point is that decisions 
are made by human beings, and the model has been developed with the purpose of making 
this decision making in local settings more manageable. Both decision support and good 
specific measures are necessary, and they complement each other.  
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Afterthoughts
 
I believe any study deserves a real ending: Something that ‘closes the cycle’, maybe shows 
how initial intentions and ambitions worked out, and at least includes a few personal reflective 
remarks.
Any conclusion is always the beginning of something new 
As a starting point I would like to borrow the words of Mark Twain. He once said that “[…] 
the time to begin writing an article is when you have finished it to your satisfaction.  By that 
time you begin to clearly and logically perceive what it is you really want to say […]” (Twain, 
1903). My interpretation, and personal experience, is that writing indeed always represents 
only a step in a process towards improved understanding, and this process never ends, and 
can never be repeated. 
Journey towards understanding
Inside his words is in my opinion also the idea that writing as a “[…] journey may not only 
lead to new knowledge; the traveller might change as well. The journey might instigate a 
process of reflection that leads […] to new ways of self-understanding […]” (Kvale, 1996, p. 
4). Such a process is never simple, because “[…] good qualitative research includes critical 
moments, struggles, resistances, pleasure and a personal journey […]” (Horsfall et al., 2001, 
p.12). My own journey was certainly no exception, and I hope, and believe, the ‘hard seas’ 
and sometimes painful self-reflection I had to face, have not only enriched the outcomes but 
also made them more robust. 
The writing experience
It is difficult to find words for summarizing the complete journey, and therefore I take the 
opportunity to let the rich metaphors of Winston Churchill express my own experience: “[…] 
Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement; then it becomes 
a mistress, and then it becomes a master, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as 
you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to 
the public […]” (Churchill, 1949). 
Finally, I would like to express my hope that this book may serve its intended purpose. It 
is now indeed “flung out to the public”, and it is my hope that in particular its ‘whispered 
message’ is understood and appreciated. 
“What I like in a good author is not what he says, 
but what he whispers.“
(Pearsall Smith, “Afterthoughts”, 1933)
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Summary
Restructuring Industrial Sites more Quickly
A Decision Support Model
Chapter 1: Rise and fall of industrial sites
Challenge and general aim
Decay of industrial sites is a major challenge in the Netherlands, and it is current national 
policy to tackle this by restructuring such sites in such a way as to improve their quality 
and durability. The challenge is perceived as being both important and urgent, and this has 
resulted in a national programme to accelerate the restructuring in the whole country by a 
one-off ‘catching-up’ operation. 
The practical problem is: the restructuring of industrial sites is taking too long. How can 
that be speeded up without loss of quality? Local authorities usually play key roles in these 
processes. However, they often have an incomplete understanding of the situation, with 
the result that it cannot be predicted whether the approach they choose will offer a real 
solution to the problems. This incomplete understanding of the relationships between the 
approaches to restructuring and the effects provides the reason for this study. In particular, 
there is insufficient knowledge about how an approach can be chosen which will speed up the 
restructuring, without sacrifice of final quality and taking account of the local situation. The 
academic problem is: how can the practice of restructuring be understood in a way which 
gives policy makers the knowledge that they need in order to develop an approach which 
could be effective? The aim of this study is to improve this understanding and to incorporate 
that into an approach that would do just that. The policy problem is: how can, using that 
knowledge, an effective approach be developed? 
Context of restructuring 
This study positions restructuring within the lifecycle of industrial sites. New sites are 
developed to accommodate new firms, or existing firms looking for a new location, and the 
initial quality is usually as far as possible in accordance with the requirements and expectations 
of the involved stakeholders (firms and local authorities, but also possibly higher authorities, 
investors, employers’ organisations, environmental interest groups, and representatives 
of neighbourhoods) and with state-of-the-art knowledge about design. However, as soon 
as the site has been developed, it starts to age. Regular maintenance and effective site 
management can prolong the period in which quality is acceptable, but at a certain moment 
ageing will be perceived as decay. Firms then often choose to move to other new sites, and 
that can accelerate the decay. 
Public authorities and/or firms can take the initiative to improve the situation. If the problem 
is limited to technical ageing caused mainly by lack of maintenance, a ‘face-lift’ might suffice. 
In other situations (parts of) the sites can be transformed into areas with other functions 
such as housing. Yet another approach is restructuring, which has been defined as “[…] a 
coherent package of activities, consisting of all non-recurring interventions on the site not 
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being part of regular maintenance, aimed at improving the quality of location factors on 
an existing industrial site […]”. The scope of the term restructuring is limited to activities 
which maintain the main economic function of the area as an industrial site. Two types are 
distinguished: revitalising, which keeps the existing types of firms, and reprofiling, which 
makes the site suitable for other types of firms. Both are especially difficult because they, in 
particular revitalisation, usually cost more than the value increase they produce. This study 
is of restructuring, not of face lifts or transformations. 
In the few past years, the increased attention to restructuring has resulted in a large number 
of policy recommendations, studies of problems and solutions, and new policy initiatives. 
These have focused on the need for a more restrictive policy for new industrial sites, on 
regional cooperation, on ‘professionalizing’ the restructuring processes, and on achieving 
more private involvement.
Chapter 2: Operationalising the research
That increased attention to restructuring indicates that policy makers acknowledge the 
importance of addressing the decay of industrial sites, and also – specifically – of accelerating 
the process of restructuring. This leads to the general objective of this study, which is to 
“Improve the understanding necessary for reducing the total duration of restructuring of 
industrial sites, without endangering the quality of the outcome”.
 This study is of the process of restructuring, rather than of the quality of the outcome, so 
it takes the quality as exogenous, a normative framework that is developed and used by 
actors. It is assumed that quicker processes are achievable and can be achieved without 
affecting final quality. The study requires therefore that “process duration” be measurable. It 
is assumed that, although such processes often do not have clearly identifiable beginnings 
and ends, more or less formal decisions made by local authorities for starting an initiative, 
and for viewing the restructuring as completed, can be identified.
The question is how such processes can best be studied. Restructuring processes are 
characterised by high interdependency between firms, and between firms and local 
authorities; by the absence of a well-functioning market for industrial sites; and by the fact 
that no single actor is able to implement all desired improvements on its own. This leads 
to the choice of applying an “actor and interactions” perspective, and more specifically to 
a focus on how planning agencies (public bodies with this responsibility) can influence the 
actions of and interactions between the actors. This perspective is chosen because it is actors 
who make the necessary decisions. This suggests that the planning agency would be helped 
by an appropriate decision support model.
These choices regarding how restructuring can be studied lead to the following main research 
question: “How can a decision support model be developed that enables planning agencies to 
identify	appropriate	situation-specific	approaches	that	reduce	the	total	restructuring	duration	
without	endangering	the	quality	of	the	final	outcome?”
 
Chapter 3: Current approaches to restructuring 
To answer this question, we need to understand better how restructuring is currently 
performed. This description is to a large extent built on the experience which the author 
has of industrial site development in the Netherlands. Although in practice a large variety 
of approaches is encountered, some main activities and tasks can be identified. Planning 
agencies have to plan, organise, and manage the process, and they need to build both an 
understanding of what needs to be done and commitment to doing that. 
Choosing the appropriate actions takes place within a complex decision-making process, 
which consists of several ‘rounds’, each round having partly different participants, interests, 
problems, solutions, and insights, and each round including the activities of searching for 
solutions, assessing their value, and making decisions. Such decision-making rounds will in 
practice often be experienced as linked to ‘phases’ consisting of more or less coherent sets 
of activities of a specific nature and having specific outcomes. 
There will always first be a growing awareness of the problems and their urgency and 
importance. The awareness of the planning agency is influenced by policies of higher 
authorities, external complaints, and internal processes, whereas the awareness of firms is 
mainly influenced by the effects of problems related to site performance. Usually a small 
initiative group tries to get restructuring on the (political) agenda, collecting information 
and exploring opportunities for starting a restructuring. At a certain moment comes the 
acknowledgment of the need to act, and one or more actors take a first organised step towards 
something that – in time – develops into a joint initiative for revitalisation or reprofiling. The 
scope and focus of the initiative ‘phase’ is to collect information on actors and the problem 
situation, to perform an interactive search aimed at identifying and possibly formalizing a 
vision that will mobilize and join stakeholders, and to establish more or less global goals. 
Based on those goals defined in the Initiative phase and on commitment to them, a series 
of activities are undertaken all aimed at ensuring that suitable improvement measures are 
taken. This implementation ‘phase’ accordingly (and as in the initiative phase) includes 
decision- making rounds aimed at searching for improvement options, exploring and assessing 
feasibility and commitment to these options, and, finally, making decisions. 
This means that the restructuring can be viewed as consisting of two decision-making 
‘phases’ and that the challenge facing a planning agency is to manage both. 
During such complex restructuring processes, actors face a large diversity of obstacles, which 
they refer to as “problems”, “bottlenecks”, or “failure factors”, or suchlike. In the past 15 
years, several studies have attempted to identify and categorize such obstacles and they 
arrive at more or less different results regarding the nature of the obstacles, their relative 
importance, and the relationships between them. From an analysis of reported obstacles, 
it can be concluded that the planning agency to some extent can influence restructuring 
performance through: the way the process is organised and managed; the availability of 
resources; the know-how available to actors; the use of the legal instruments available to the 
planning agency. 
The result of chapters 2 and 3.
The conclusion based on the description of ‘real life’ restructuring processes and on the 
exploratory analysis and interpretation of obstacles, is that we need to understand better how 
interdependent actors, working within complex decision-making processes, are influenced by 
the willingness of each of the actors to invest, by the available resources, and by information 
availability and the available (institutional) interaction mechanisms. All these vary according 
to the specific situation. Moreover, we need to understand better how the separate factors 
influence each other, and how this too depends on the specific situation. We look for the 
‘building blocks’ for developing such an understanding in existing frameworks and theories 
that focus on multi-actor interactions in complex processes. 
Chapter 4: A theoretical framework for understanding complex,
multi-actor processes
First, a policy framework was sought that fitted the restructuring characteristics and chosen 
perspective of this study. The “Institutional Analysis and Development” (IAD) framework of 
Elinor Ostrom was found suitable, because it focuses on how actors address complex problems 
through interactions in what Ostrom calls action arenas. The IAD framework includes both 
exogenous variables and endogenous variables linked to the specific actors and the action 
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situation. Also, it allows flexibility in choosing those variables that are the most important, 
and in selecting theories that can explain how such variables interact under specific sorts of 
circumstances (in this case, restructuring industrial sites). 
So the next step was to select a leading (baseline) theory which is compatible with this 
framework and which fits the characteristics of restructuring. Actors involved in restructuring 
pursue goals that reflect their self-interest (as they themselves see it), and they make 
conscious choices. These are characteristics that fit rational choice theory, so that was 
chosen as the leading (baseline) theory. It has been criticised for presenting the actions 
of and interactions between actors too simply. Therefore additional micro-assumptions are 
made. 
These enable ‘filling in’ the variables of the IAD framework by focusing on the specific 
characteristics of restructuring in practice, and at the same time they inform the choice of 
complementary theory that can explain how these variables influence each other as well as 
the restructuring.  
First, the “actors” can be characterised by their motives, information and resources. Motives 
influence willingness to invest in a restructuring, but such decisions are also influenced by 
the information and resources which actors possess. Second, the variety of actors that can 
become involved in restructuring is large, and at least all those actors who are stakeholders 
should be taken into consideration. Third, actors are represented by agents, and these agents 
are important for creating the basis for decisions, and producing action. Fourth, the involved 
actors (and their agents) often have a ‘common history’, which can influence how the 
interaction in an arena takes place. Fifth, when industrial sites are restructured, the various 
actors are usually dependent on each other for reaching their goals. This interdependency is 
viewed as characteristic of specific “action situations”. Sixth, some rules are endogenous to 
the arena. They can be influenced, and changed by the actors ‘inside’ the arena. 
Finally, the arenas, and their outcomes, are influenced by exogenous factors, which by 
Ostrom are called “biophysical and material conditions”, “attributes of community” (in short: 
culture), and “rules”.  Variables that stay constant during one ‘round’ in an arena, and cannot 
easily be influenced by a planning agency, are assumed to be exogenous.    
Chapter 5: Applying the theoretical framework to restructuring
The next step is to use the insights provided by the theoretical framework for developing 
the basis for the decision support model to be used for restructuring processes. In particular, 
this means focussing on how a planning agency can influence actors, and their actions and 
decisions. 
The “Contextual Interaction” theory is used. This theory acknowledges that the course and 
outcomes of a policy process depend not only on the inputs (the characteristics of the policy 
instruments applied), but also on the strategic behaviour of involved actors, which in turn 
depends on three core variables: their motives, their resources, and the information which 
they have.  
In particular, this means that commitment of individual actors to a specific restructuring 
measure will depend on the resources and information they possess, and on how the ‘solution’ 
fits their motives. The planning agency can accordingly influence commitment through 
collection and distribution of information about the effects of (potential) solutions, and/or 
developing solutions that possess a different fit to the motives and the need of resources of 
the actors involved. It needs to take account of how any measure affects the commitment 
of each individual actor to a specific solution, which means to focus on the distribution of 
costs, benefits, and risks. At the same time the planning agency needs to review whether the 
aggregated level of motivation, information and resources leads to sufficient commitment for 
implementing a specific option. 
To influence the interactive process towards commitment to specific ‘solutions’, the planning 
agency can apply “process management”, which focuses on how interaction and decision-
making can be influenced by design and management of the process. Its aim is to reach 
agreement to a “commitment package”, and it develops organisational arrangements 
that facilitate and enable interaction towards this aim. In particular, the planning agency 
uses information about the actors to develop an acceptable agenda, organisation, and set 
of participants in an arena, and it manages (and adapts) these aspects in its search for 
satisfactory solutions.     
For such processes, a process model for decision support is applicable. This model should 
facilitate participatory and exploratory processes that lead to socially robust outcomes. In 
particular, a simple, compact, transparent and understandable question-based model is 
suitable.  
Chapter 6: A decision support model for restructuring
The model focuses on specific situations. For each situation it facilitates identifying the initial 
conditions, and then selecting appropriate follow-up measures that influence the process 
positively towards desired outcomes. It gives indications to the planning agency about the 
actions it should take. 
In particular, the model helps to identify the actors that preferably should be involved in a 
specific arena, and given the characteristics of the specific restructuring situation. Also, a 
distinction is made between the two arenas - ‘Initiative action arena’ and ‘Implementation 
action arena’. The same model is applied to each, but separately. 
The model addresses key decisions to be made by the planning agency for which support is 
desirable. For the Initiative arena these decisions focus on the answers to the following four 
main questions: 1. Does the planning agency know enough about the restructuring challenge 
and the relevant stakeholders? 2. Does the planning agency know who the preferred 
participants are? 3. Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and resources (process 
costs) on developing a vision for the restructuring? 4. Is there sufficient commitment from the 
preferred participants to work out the vision / visions? 
For the implementation arena the following, slightly different, main questions are: Does the 
planning agency know enough about the vision(s)?; Does the planning agency know who the 
preferred participants are?; Are the preferred participants willing to spend time and money 
(process costs) on working out the vision into an action plan?; Is there sufficient commitment 
from the preferred participants to spend (capital) resources on implementing the action plan 
/ one of the action plans?
The model is further operationalised by focusing on the commitment of actors to invest in 
a specific restructuring. The planning agency therefore needs to focus on the motivation, 
information, and resources of each individual actor, and at the same time on the aggregates 
(the ‘sum’) of the same characteristics that tell whether an investment is feasible. 
If one or more of the aggregates is unsatisfactory, then the planning agency will have either 
to abandon the restructuring (sometimes the best choice, but outside the scope of this 
study), or to change the vision / action plan, or to change the design of the arena, or to try to 
influence the motivation, resources, or information of one or more of the actors.
The previously mentioned decisions (formulated as questions) are included in the model itself 
as main questions for the Initiative and for the Implementation arenas. There are sub-sets 
of specific questions coupled to each main question. These questions focus on the level of 
motivation, information, and resources present among the participants, in particular whether 
this is high enough for restructuring to take place satisfactorily and without too much delay. The 
model uses questions that via “if …then” links are coupled to follow-up actions. Any follow-up 
action is either a set of more detailed questions or the application of a method or instrument 
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that can help to improve the situation. There are standard techniques and methods already 
existing which can be used to answer those questions, and they can be used to change the 
organisational design; to identify the challenge and the related stakeholders; to determine 
the content of the final agreement; to analyse the stakeholders, the site performance, the 
process risks and the feasibility. With the answers to those questions, the planning agency 
can, using its existing powers, manage the arena towards the desired outcomes. 
Finally, some strategic recommendations are given for addressing a limited number of 
ideal-type situations, and that focuses on how satisfactory a situation is regarding the two 
aggregated variables “motivation” and “information”. There are four (extreme) possibilities: 
(A) information unsatisfactory, motivation unsatisfactory; (B) information satisfactory, 
motivation unsatisfactory; (C) information unsatisfactory, motivation satisfactory; and (D) 
information satisfactory, motivation satisfactory. The decision support model can be used 
to choose routes from situations A, B and C towards D. However, even in situation D the 
aggregated resources may be insufficient for addressing all goals. In that case there may be 
a need for (re)prioritizing goals, and postponing activities until sufficient additional resources 
have been found, or for choosing and implementing ‘second best’ choices.
Chapter 7: Testing the model and operationalising it
The best way of testing this model (seeking the answer to the question: does it in fact help to 
speed up restructuring without loss of quality?) is to apply it in a number of cases. However, 
for three reasons, appropriate case studies were not performed. First, time constraints made 
longitudinal, and certainly multiple, case studies infeasible. Second, input as rich as possible 
was desirable for testing and operationalising, and therefore the focus was on involving many 
experts with a rich experience of restructuring: this would have been difficult to achieve 
through one, or a few, case studies. Third, it was desirable to ‘pilot’ the model to discover 
whether the questions in the decision support model are suitable for revealing specific themes 
should the model be applied in subsequent case study research and in restructuring practice. 
These arguments led to choosing Focus group sessions as a method of testing and 
operationalising. Five Focus group sessions were held at five different locations with 39 
restructuring professionals as participants. The professionals were asked whether, in their 
opinion, the model would provide good answers to the three questions: How to choose 
preferred participants? How to choose the best sequence starting from a situation having 
unsatisfactory motivation and information towards the completely satisfactory situation? 
How can such a satisfactory situation be identified?
The answers provided an indirect test of the model itself, for the participants could say that 
from their practical experience they did not recognise the model, or that they could not work 
well with it. In addition, the answers of the professionals allowed the somewhat abstract 
model to be made operational, so that it could be better used in practice. 
This operationalisation was done by subjecting the records of the moderated sessions to a 
thematic (text) analysis. The analysis led to the identification of twelve themes (three for 
question one, seven for question two, and two for question three), after which the results 
for each theme were presented as ‘stories’ accompanied by illustrative tables. The stories 
were composed of quotes (text segments), using bridging texts only where necessary for 
communicating the context. 
It is considered that the results from the Focus group sessions are trustworthy, because 
a ‘trail of evidence’ could be established, a ‘detached’ researcher strategy was used (the 
author did not participate directly), the results from the analysis and from the interpretation 
were separated, and experienced practitioners were asked open questions at five different 
places. The final interpretation of all results then led to conclusions. 
The conclusions are of three types: 1. Do the practitioners recognise the model as a good 
representation of processes of restructuring, and how complete and appropriate is it? 2. Will 
the model help to speed up restructuring without loss of quality? 3. How can the model be 
made operational? 
Regarding the first question, all the professionals found the model useful, considered the 
core questions about the model appropriate, and mentioned no new themes that should be 
included, nor suggested omitting themes which the researcher had included.
Regarding the second question, the provisional conclusion can be drawn that the model will 
indeed help to speed up restructuring without loss of quality. This conclusion can be drawn 
from the fact that we have asked the participants three key questions derived from the model 
about how the process could be accelerated. The participants had abundant suggestions for 
how to do so, but none of these challenge the core of the model nor its claim for accelerating 
the process. Of course, the ‘real’ test will be in using the model in practice.
Regarding the operationalisation, the results for each individual question asked in the Focus 
group session showed that it is indeed possible to identify a set of preferred participants 
related to a specific challenge. It showed also that the tendency to oversimplify complexity 
must be guarded against, because it could cause unexpected negative effects in the long 
term. The ideas of the Focus group participants were more divided about how to find the 
best sequence of moves towards the situation in which both aggregated motivation and 
aggregated information were satisfactory. Information is necessary for formulating the 
challenge and finding solutions to financial problems, but on the other hand too much 
information can damage motivation. The results indicate that motivation and information 
can influence each other, so although a strategy may emphasise one of those two, it should 
nevertheless address both together. Finally, it is indeed possible to say when a situation 
(regarding motivation and information) is satisfactory, but such situations should preferably 
be defined in advance, and progress towards satisfaction should be actively monitored. 
Chapter 8: Contributions to knowledge and practice
This study has indicated that accelerating restructuring is not only about allocating more 
resources. It has indicated that appropriate use of decision support, based on process 
management principles, can accelerate restructuring without, perhaps using even fewer, 
extra resources. 
In particular, this study has indicated that a decision support model can be helpful, if it 
addresses aggregated actor characteristics (motivation, information, and resources) related 
to a ‘solution’; if it addresses distribution of actor characteristics among the involved actors; 
and if it addresses how acceptable solutions can be developed. This includes paying particular 
attention to actor satisfaction; distribution of costs, benefits, and risks, and how fair this 
distribution is perceived to be. 
The model, after relatively small adjustments, also looks promising for use in other complex 
interactive processes. 
We see four issues regarding how to proceed based on the outcomes of this study. First, 
the model should be applied for analysing real life completed processes, and for supporting 
design and management of new and on-going processes. Second, more research is needed 
on how expectations, trust, informal rules, “fair shares”, and risks influence process, progress, 
and outcomes of restructuring. Third, more research can address how the role of agents in 
interactive settings, and as a function of the specific needs of a situation, can be understood 
and optimised. Fourth, it is suggested that policy makers shift the emphasis from what can 
be done (the specific e.g. financial and organisational measures) to how measures can be 
selected and implemented in specific situations.   
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Samenvatting 
(translation of “Summary” into Dutch)
Versnellen van herstructurering van bedrijventerreinen
Een beslissingsondersteunend model
Hoofdstuk 1: Opkomst en ondergang van bedrijventerreinen
Uitdaging en algemeen doel
Het aanpakken van veroudering van bedrijventerreinen is in Nederland een belangrijke 
uitdaging. Het huidige nationale beleid is gericht op het aangaan van deze uitdaging door 
de kwaliteit van de terreinen te verbeteren en de levensduur te verlengen door middel 
van herstructurering. De uitdaging wordt zowel belangrijk als urgent ervaren en dit heeft 
geresulteerd in een nationaal programma voor het versnellen van de herstructureringsopgave 
voor Nederland in de vorm van een eenmalige inhaalslag. 
Het praktijkprobleem is: herstructurering van bedrijventerreinen duurt te lang. Hoe kan 
herstructurering versneld worden met behoud van kwaliteit? Gemeenten spelen meestal een 
sleutelrol in deze processen. Daar staat tegenover dat zij vaak onvolledig begrip hebben 
van de situatie, en daarom kan het niet voorspeld worden of de aanpak die ze kiezen tot 
een echte oplossing voor de problemen zal leiden. Het onvolledige begrip van de verbanden 
tussen de gehanteerde aanpakken voor herstructurering en de effecten geeft de aanleiding 
tot deze studie. In het bijzonder is er onvoldoende kennis over het kiezen van een aanpak 
dat de herstructurering kan versnellen en ook rekening houdt met de lokale situatie, zonder 
dat de uiteindelijke kwaliteit van de herstructurering wordt opgeofferd. Het academische 
probleem is: hoe kan de praktijk van herstructurering begrepen worden op een manier die 
beleidsmakers de kennis geven die ze nodig hebben voor het ontwikkelen van een effectieve 
aanpak? Het doel van deze studie is om deze kennis te verbeteren en te integreren in een 
aanpak dat dit doel (het versnellen met behoud van kwaliteit) realiseert. Het beleidsprobleem 
is: hoe kan, gebruikmakend van dit inzicht, een effectieve aanpak ontwikkeld worden?  
Context van herstructurering 
Deze studie positioneert herstructurering binnen de levenscyclus van bedrijventerreinen. 
Nieuwe terreinen worden ontwikkeld voor het accommoderen van nieuwe bedrijven of 
bestaande bedrijven die op zoek zijn naar een nieuwe locatie. De initiële kwaliteit van deze 
terreinen is normaal gesproken zo goed mogelijk passend bij de eisen en verwachtingen 
van de betrokken stakeholders (bedrijven en gemeenten, maar ook mogelijk hogere 
overheden, beleggers, werkgeversorganisaties, milieuorganisaties en vertegenwoordigers 
van wijken) en state-of-the-art kennis over design. Zodra het terrein gereed is, begint het 
verouderingsproces. Regelmatig onderhoud en effectief ‘Park management’ kunnen het 
terrein langer op een acceptabel kwaliteitsniveau houden, maar op een gegeven moment zal 
het terrein als verouderd worden ervaren. Bedrijven kiezen dan vaak voor het migreren naar 
nieuwe terreinen en dat kan de veroudering versnellen. 
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Overheden en/of bedrijven kunnen initiatief nemen voor het verbeteren van de situatie. 
Als het probleem is beperkt tot technische veroudering (vooral vanwege achterstallig 
onderhoud) kan een “facelift” voldoende zijn. In andere situaties kunnen (delen van) 
terreinen getransformeerd worden tot gebieden met andere functies, zoals wonen. Nog een 
optie is herstructurering. Herstructurering wordt gedefinieerd als “[…] een samenhangend 
geheel van activiteiten, zijnde alle eenmalige ingrepen in het bedrijventerrein die niet onder 
regulier onderhoud vallen, gericht op de verbetering van het vestigingsklimaat op een 
bestaand bedrijventerrein [...]”. Herstructurering wordt gezien als beperkt tot activiteiten 
waar het terrein zijn primaire economische functie als bedrijventerrein behoudt. Twee 
soorten herstructurering worden onderscheiden: revitalisatie, waar de bestaande soorten 
bedrijven behouden blijven, en herprofilering, waar het terrein geschikt wordt gemaakt 
voor andere soorten bedrijven. Beide soorten herstructurering zijn bijzonder moeilijk 
omdat ze beide - en in het bijzonder revitalisatie – meestal meer kosten dan ze opleveren 
aan baten. Deze studie is beperkt tot herstructurering; face-lifts en transformatie worden 
niet meegenomen. 
De toegenomen aandacht voor herstructurering de afgelopen jaren heeft geresulteerd in 
een groot aantal beleidsaanbevelingen, studies naar problemen en oplossingen, en nieuwe 
beleidsinitiatieven. Deze hebben de nadruk gelegd op de behoefte aan een meer restrictief 
beleid voor nieuwe bedrijventerreinen, regionale samenwerking, professionalisering van 
herstructurering, en het bereiken van meer private betrokkenheid bij het proces. 
Hoofdstuk 2: Operationaliseren van het onderzoek
De toegenomen aandacht voor herstructurering duidt erop dat beleidsmakers het belang 
inzien van het aanpakken van veroudering van bedrijventerreinen en – in het bijzonder – 
het versnellen van herstructureringsprocessen. Dit leidt tot het algemene doel van deze 
studie, namelijk het “Verbeteren van het inzicht dat nodig is voor het verkorten van de totale 
doorlooptijd van herstructurering van bedrijventerreinen, zonder de uiteindelijk gerealiseerde 
kwaliteit in gevaar te brengen”. 
Deze studie richt zich op het proces van herstructurering en niet op de uiteindelijk gerealiseerde 
kwaliteit. Kwaliteit wordt gezien als een exogene factor: een normatief kader dat ontwikkeld 
en gebruikt wordt door actoren. Er wordt aangenomen dat snellere processen mogelijk zijn 
en bereikt kunnen worden, zonder de uiteindelijke kwaliteit (negatief) te beïnvloeden. Het is 
daarom nodig dat de doorlooptijd van het proces meetbaar is. Er wordt aangenomen dat – 
hoewel zulke processen vaak niet gemakkelijk identificeerbare start en eindpunten hebben 
– het mogelijk is om min of meer formele beslissingen van gemeenten te identificeren voor 
het starten van een initiatief, of een herstructurering als afgerond te beschouwen.
De vraag is dan hoe zulke processen het best onderzocht kunnen worden. Herstruc-
tureringsprocessen zijn gekenmerkt door hoge afhankelijkheid tussen bedrijven, en 
tussen bedrijven en gemeenten; door gebrek aan een goed functionerende markt voor 
bedrijventerreinen; en door het feit dat geen enkele partij alleen ertoe in staat is om alle 
gewenste verbeteringen te implementeren. Dit leidt tot de keuze voor het hanteren van 
een “actoren en interacties” perspectief, en specifieker focus te leggen op hoe “planning 
agencies” (overheden met verantwoordelijkheid voor het planproces: in een Nederlands 
context is dit meestal de gemeente en daarom wordt in deze samenvatting “planning 
agency” verder vertaald als gemeente) de acties van - en interacties tussen - actoren 
kunnen beïnvloeden. Dit perspectief is gekozen omdat het actoren zijn die de noodzakelijke 
beslissingen nemen. Dit suggereert dat de gemeente geholpen zou zijn door een passend 
beslissingsondersteunend model. 
Deze keuzes met betrekking tot hoe herstructurering onderzocht kan worden, leiden tot de 
volgende hoofdonderzoeksvraag: “Hoe kan een beslissingsondersteunend model worden 
ontwikkeld die het mogelijk maakt voor gemeenten, om passende situatieafhankelijke 
aanpakken	 te	 identificeren,	 die	 de	 totale	 doorlooptijd	 van	 herstructureringsprocessen	
reduceren	zonder	de	uiteindelijk	gerealiseerde	kwaliteit	in	gevaar	te	brengen?”.	
Hoofdstuk 3: Huidige aanpakken van herstructureringsprocessen. 
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te kunnen beantwoorden, moeten we beter begrijpen hoe 
herstructurering momenteel wordt gedaan. De beschrijving daarvan is voor een groot gedeelte 
gebaseerd op de ervaring van de schrijver (van deze studie) met bedrijventerreinontwikkeling 
in Nederland. Hoewel een grote diversiteit aan aanpakken bestaan in de praktijk, kunnen 
enkele hoofdactiviteiten en – taken geïdentificeerd worden. Gemeenten moeten het proces 
plannen, organiseren en managen. En ze moeten inzicht krijgen in wat er moet gebeuren, en 
commitment krijgen voor de uitvoering. 
Het kiezen van passende acties gebeurt in een complex besluitvormingsproces bestaande 
uit meerdere ‘ronden’, waarbij elke ronde gedeeltelijk verschillende deelnemers, belangen, 
problemen, oplossingen en inzichten heeft. In elke ronde wordt er gezocht naar oplossingen, 
wordt de waarde van de oplossingen beoordeeld, en worden beslissingen genomen. Zulke 
besluitvormingsronden worden in de praktijk vaak ervaren als ‘fasen’ die bestaan uit min of 
meer coherente sets van activiteiten met specifiek karakter en uitkomsten. 
Er zal altijd eerst een groeiend besef zijn van urgentie en belang van problemen. Het besef 
wordt bij de gemeente beïnvloed door beleid van hogere overheden, externe klachten 
en interne processen, terwijl het besef bij bedrijven vooral beïnvloed wordt door effecten 
van problemen met betrekking tot het bedrijventerrein. Meestal probeert een kleine 
initiatiefgroep om herstructurering op de (politieke) agenda te krijgen, en wordt informatie 
verzameld en mogelijkheden voor het starten van een herstructurering verkend. Op een 
bepaald moment wordt de noodzaak tot handelen onderkend, en neemt een of meerdere 
actoren een eerste georganiseerde stap richting “iets” dat – in de loop van de tijd – zich 
ontwikkelt tot een gezamenlijk initiatief voor een revitalisatie of herprofilering. Bereik en 
focus van deze ‘initiatieffase’ is gericht op het verzamelen van informatie over actoren en 
de probleemsituatie. Verder: het uitvoeren van een interactief zoekproces gericht op het in 
identificeren - en mogelijk formaliseren – van een visie die de stakeholders kan mobiliseren 
en verenigen, en het vaststellen van min of meer globale doelen. 
Gebaseerd op de doelen die gedefinieerd zijn in de Initiatieffase - met bijbehorend 
commitment - wordt een serie activiteiten ondernomen, die gericht zijn op het implementeren 
van passende verbeteropties. Deze “implementatiefase’ bevat daarom opnieuw (net zoals in 
de initiatieffase): besluitvormingsronden, die gericht zijn op het zoeken naar verbeteropties; 
verkennen en beoordelen van de haalbaarheid en commitment tot deze opties; en tenslotte 
het nemen van beslissingen. 
Dit betekent dat de herstructurering beschouwd kan worden, als bestaande uit twee 
besluitvormingsfasen. De uitdaging voor de gemeente is om beide fasen te managen.
Gedurende zulke complexe besluitvormingsprocessen worden de actoren geconfronteerd met 
een diversiteit aan obstakels, die ze onder andere “problemen”, “knelpunten”, “faalfactoren” 
noemen. De afgelopen 15 jaar hebben vele studies geprobeerd om zulke obstakels te 
identificeren en categoriseren. De studies komen gedeeltelijk tot verschillende resultaten 
met betrekking tot het karakter van de obstakels, relatief belang en onderlinge verbanden. 
Gebaseerd op een analyse van gerapporteerde obstakels, kan geconcludeerd worden dat 
de gemeente herstructurering in bepaalde mate kan beïnvloeden door: de manier waarop 
het proces wordt georganiseerd en gemanaged; toegang tot middelen; kennis beschikbaar 
voor de actoren; en gebruik van de instrumenten die vanuit vigerende wet – en regelgeving 
beschikbaar zijn voor de gemeente. 
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Resultaten van de hoofdstukken 2 en 3. 
De conclusie (gebaseerd op de beschrijving van ‘real life’ herstructureringsprocessen en 
van de verkennende analyse en interpretatie van obstakels) is, dat we een beter begrip 
nodig hebben van: hoe onderling afhankelijke actoren die actief zijn binnen complexe 
besluitvormingsprocessen beïnvloed worden door de bereidheid van elke actor om te 
investeren, door de beschikbare middelen, en door de beschikbare informatie en (institutionele) 
interactiemechanismen. Deze factoren variëren allemaal, afhankelijk van de situatie. Verder, 
hebben we een beter begrip nodig van hoe de verschillende factoren elkaar beïnvloeden, en 
hoe dit proces afhankelijk is van de specifieke situatie. We zoeken naar ‘bouwstenen’ voor 
het ontwikkelen van beter begrip in bestaande raamwerken (“frameworks”) en theorieën die 
gefocust zijn op de interactie tussen actoren in complexe processen. 
Hoofdstuk 4: Een theoretisch kader voor het begrijpen van complexe
multi-actor processen
Ten eerste werd een raamwerk (“framework”) gezocht, dat past bij de karakteristieken van 
herstructurering en het gekozen perspectief voor deze studie. Het “Institutionele Analyse 
en Ontwikkeling” (afkorting IAD naar de Engelse naam) raamwerk van Elinor Ostrom werd 
passend geacht, omdat het zich richt op hoe actoren omgaan met complexe problemen in 
wat Ostrom “Actiearena’s” noemt. Het IAD raamwerk bevat zowel exogene als endogene 
variabelen gekoppeld aan specifieke actoren en de actiesituatie. Het staat flexibiliteit toe 
in het kiezen van de variabelen, die als meest belangrijk beschouwd worden, en voor het 
selecteren van theorieën die kunnen verklaren hoe zulke variabelen elkaar beïnvloeden in 
specifieke situaties (in dit geval: herstructurering van bedrijventerreinen). 
De volgende stap was daarom om een leidende (basis) theorie te kiezen die compatibel 
is met dit raamwerk en past bij de kenmerken van herstructurering. Actoren betrokken bij 
herstructurering streven naar doelen vanuit eigen belang (zoals zij dat zelf beoordelen) en 
ze maken bewuste keuzes. Dit zijn kenmerken die passen bij de “Rationele keuzetheorie” 
en daarom werd deze als leidende theorie gekozen. Deze theorie is echter ook bekritiseerd 
voor het geven van een te simpele weergave van actoren en hun interacties. Daarom zijn 
aanvullende microaannames gemaakt. 
Deze aannames maken het mogelijk om de variabelen in het IAD-raamwerk ‘in te vullen’ door 
te focussen op specifieke kenmerken van herstructurering in de praktijk. Tegelijk ondersteunen 
deze aannames de keuze voor aanvullende theorie, die gebruikt kan worden voor het verklaren 
van hoe de variabelen zowel elkaar - als de herstructurering beïnvloeden.
Ten eerste kunnen de actoren gekarakteriseerd worden door hun motieven, informatie en 
middelen. De motieven beïnvloeden de bereidheid tot het investeren in een herstructurering, 
maar deze beslissingen worden ook beïnvloed door de informatie en middelen die de actoren 
hebben. Ten tweede zou een grote diversiteit aan actoren betrokken kunnen worden bij de 
herstructurering. De betrokkenheid van de actoren die stakeholders zijn, dient tenminste 
overwogen te worden. Ten derde zijn de actoren betrokken via vertegenwoordigers, en deze 
vertegenwoordigers zijn belangrijk voor het ontwikkelen van de basis voor beslissingen en voor 
het bereiken van actie. Ten vierde hebben de betrokken actoren (en hun vertegenwoordigers) 
vaak een ‘gezamenlijke geschiedenis’, die van invloed kan zijn op hoe de interactie in de arena 
verloopt. Ten vijfde zijn de actoren bij een herstructurering van een bedrijventerrein meestal 
afhankelijk van elkaar voor het bereiken van hun doelen. Deze afhankelijkheid wordt gezien 
als een kenmerk van specifieke “Actiesituaties”. Ten zesde zijn sommige regels voor de arena 
endogeen. Ze kunnen beïnvloed - en veranderd worden door de actoren ‘binnen in’ de arena. 
Tenslotte zijn de arena’s en hun resultaten beïnvloed door exogene factoren die Ostrom 
“biofysische en materiele omstandigheden”, “attributen van de samenleving” (kort gezegd: 
cultuur), en “regels” noemt. Variabelen die constant blijven gedurende een ‘ronde’ in 
een arena en niet eenvoudig beïnvloedbaar zijn door de gemeente, worden als exogeen 
beschouwd. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Toepassen van het theoretisch kader op herstructurering
De volgende stap is om de inzichten – gegeven door het theoretisch kader – te gebruiken 
voor het ontwikkelen van de basis voor het beslissingsondersteunend model voor 
herstructureringsprocessen. Dit betekent in het bijzonder: te focussen op hoe een gemeente 
actoren, interactie en beslissingen kan beïnvloeden. 
De “Contextual Interaction” theorie wordt hiervoor gebruikt. Deze theorie erkent dat het 
verloop en de resultaten van een beleidsproces niet alleen afhankelijk zijn van input (de 
karakteristieken van de toegepaste beleidsinstrumenten), maar ook van het strategische 
gedrag van de betrokken actoren. Dit gedrag is weer afhankelijk van drie kernvariabelen: 
motieven, middelen en beschikbare informatie.   
Dit betekent in het bijzonder dat commitment van individuele actoren voor een specifieke 
herstructureringsmaatregel zal afhangen van de middelen en informatie die ze hebben, en 
hoe de ‘oplossing’ past bij hun motieven. De gemeente kan dienovereenkomstig commitment 
beïnvloeden door het verzamelen en distribueren van informatie over de effecten van 
(mogelijke) oplossingen en/of oplossingen ontwikkelen die op verschillende manieren passen 
bij de motieven en waarvoor verschillende behoefte is aan middelen. De gemeente moet 
rekening houden met de invloed van een maatregel op commitment van elke individuele 
actor voor een specifieke oplossing, en daarom focussen op de distributie van kosten, 
baten en risico’s. De gemeente moet tegelijk beoordelen of het geaggregeerde niveau van 
motivatie, informatie en middelen leiden tot voldoende commitment voor het implementeren 
van een specifieke optie. 
De gemeente kan “procesmanagement” toepassen voor het beïnvloeden van het interactieve 
proces richting commitment voor specifieke ‘oplossingen’. Procesmanagement is gericht op 
hoe interactie en besluitvorming beïnvloedt kunnen worden door ontwerp en management 
van het proces. Het doel is om overeenstemming te bereiken over een ‘commitment pakket’, 
en de gemeente ontwikkelt organisatorische arrangementen die interactie richting dit doel 
faciliteert en mogelijk maakt. De gemeente gebruikt in het bijzonder de informatie over de 
actoren om een acceptabele agenda, organisatie, en set van deelnemers aan de arena te 
ontwikkelen. De gemeente gebruikt verder management (en aanpassing) van deze aspecten 
bij het zoeken naar bevredigende oplossingen. 
Voor zulke processen past een procesmodel voor beslissingsondersteuning. Dit model zou 
participatieve en verkennende processen gericht op sociaal robuuste resultaten moeten 
faciliteren. In het bijzonder is een eenvoudig, compact, transparant en begrijpelijk vragen-
gebaseerd model geschikt.  
Hoofdstuk 6: Een beslissingsondersteunend model voor herstructurering
Het model (ontwikkeld in deze studie) focust op specifieke situaties. Het faciliteert voor elke 
situatie het identificeren van de initiële kenmerken en vervolgens het selecteren van passende 
follow-up maatregelen, die het proces richting wenselijke resultaten positief beïnvloeden. Het 
geeft indicaties aan de gemeente met betrekking tot te nemen acties.  
Het model helpt in het bijzonder bij het identificeren van de actoren die bij voorkeur 
betrokken zouden moeten worden in een specifieke arena, en de kenmerken van een 
specifieke herstructureringssituatie. Verder wordt er een onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee 
verschillende arena’s: de ‘Initiatief actie arena’ en de ‘Implementatie arena’. Het model wordt 
afzonderlijk toegepast voor beide arena’s. 
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Het model richt zich op ‘sleutel’-beslissingen die de gemeente moet nemen en waarvoor steun 
wenselijk is. Voor de Initiatief-arena richten deze beslissingen zich op de antwoorden op de 
volgende vier hoofdvragen: 1. Weet de gemeente genoeg over de herstructureringsuitdaging 
en de relevante stakeholders? 2. Weet de gemeente wie de voorkeursdeelnemers zijn? 3. 
Zijn de voorkeursdeelnemers bereid om tijd en middelen (proceskosten) te investeren in de 
ontwikkeling van een visie voor de herstructurering? 4. Is er voldoende commitment van de 
voorkeursdeelnemers voor het uitwerken van de visie / visies?  
Voor de implementatiearena zijn de volgende, iets aangepaste, hoofdvragen: Weet de 
gemeente voldoende over de visie(s)? Weet de gemeente wie de voorkeursdeelnemers 
zijn? Zijn de voorkeursdeelnemers bereid om tijd en middelen (proceskosten) te investeren 
in het uitwerken van de visie naar een actieplan? Is er voldoende commitment van de 
voorkeursdeelnemers voor het investeren van (financiële) middelen in de implementatie van 
het actieplan / een van de actieplannen?
Het model is verder geoperationaliseerd door te focussen op commitment van actoren voor 
het investeren in een specifieke herstructurering. De gemeente moet daarom focussen 
op motivatie, informatie en middelen van elke individuele actor, en tegelijk: op de totalen 
(‘optelsommen’) van dezelfde kenmerken (die vertellen of een investering haalbaar is). Als 
een of meer van de totalen onbevredigend is, dan kan de gemeente: de herstructurering 
stoppen (soms de beste oplossing, maar buiten de afbakening van deze studie); de visie / 
het actieplan aanpassen; het ontwerp van de arena aanpassen; of proberen om de motivatie, 
middelen of informatie van een of meerdere actoren te beïnvloeden.    
De eerder genoemde beslissingen (geformuleerd als vragen) zijn verwerkt in het model als 
hoofdvragen voor de Initiatief en Implementatie arena’s. Er zijn sub-sets van vragen voor 
elke hoofdvraag. Deze vragen focussen op het niveau van motivatie, informatie en middelen 
beschikbaar bij de deelnemers, en in het bijzonder met betrekking tot of dit niveau voldoende 
is om de herstructurering tot tevredenheid en zonder te veel vertraging te laten verlopen. 
Het model gebruikt vragen die via “als … dan” links zijn gekoppeld aan vervolgacties. Elke 
vervolgactie is een set van meer gedetailleerde vragen of de toepassing van een methode 
of instrument dat de situatie kan verbeteren. Er zijn bestaande technieken en methoden 
die gebruikt kunnen worden voor het beantwoorden van deze vragen. Zij kunnen tevens 
gebruikt worden voor: het veranderen van het organisatieontwerp; het identificeren van 
de uitdaging en de bijbehorende stakeholders; het identificeren van de inhoud van de 
uiteindelijke afspraak; en het analyseren van stakeholders, terreinprestatie, procesrisico’s en 
haalbaarheid. De gemeente kan – gebruikmakend van de antwoorden en eigen invloed - de 
arena managen naar de gewenste uitkomsten. 
Tenslotte zijn enkele strategische aanbevelingen gedaan voor het omgaan met een beperkt 
aantal ideaaltypische situaties, waar de nadruk ligt op hoe bevredigend een situatie is met 
betrekking tot de twee geaggregeerde variabelen “motivatie” en “informatie”. Er zijn vier 
(extreme) mogelijkheden: (A) informatie onvoldoende, motivatie onvoldoende; (B) informatie 
voldoende, motivatie onvoldoende; (C) informatie onvoldoende, motivatie voldoende; (D) 
informatie voldoende, motivatie voldoende. Het beslissingsondersteunend model kan 
worden gebruikt voor het kiezen van routen tussen de situaties A,B, en C naar D. Echter, 
zelfs in situatie D kunnen de geaggregeerde middelen onvoldoende zijn voor het aanpakken 
(bereiken) van alle doelen. In dat geval kan het noodzakelijk zijn om: (nieuwe) prioriteiten 
te geven aan doelen; het uitstellen van activiteiten tot voldoende aanvullende middelen zijn 
gevonden; of het kiezen en implementeren van ‘op een na beste’ keuzes.  
Hoofdstuk 7: Testen en operationaliseren van het model
De beste manier om dit model te testen (het antwoord zoeken op de vraag: helpt het in feite 
om herstructurering te versnellen zonder verlies aan kwaliteit?) is, om het toe te passen in 
een aantal cases. Echter, vanwege drie redenen werden passende case studies niet gedaan. 
Ten eerste maakte de beschikbare tijd longitudinale – en zeker meerdere – case studies niet 
haalbaar. Ten tweede was er een zo rijk mogelijke input voor het testen en operationaliseren 
wenselijk, en daarom lag de focus op het betrekken van veel experts met een rijke ervaring met 
herstructurering Dit was moeilijk geweest om te realiseren via één – of enkele – case studies. 
Ten derde was het doel ook om te ontdekken of de vragen in het beslissingsondersteunend 
model geschikt zijn voor het vinden van specifieke thema’s als het model later toegepast zou 
worden in case studies of in de praktijk van herstructurering. 
Deze argumenten leidden tot het kiezen van Focusgroep sessies, als methode voor het testen 
en operationaliseren. Vijf Focusgroep sessies werden gehouden op vijf verschillende locaties 
met in totaal 39 herstructureringsdeskundigen als deelnemers. De deskundigen werden 
gevraagd of - naar hun mening – het model goede antwoorden zou geven op de drie vragen: 
Hoe kies je voorkeursdeelnemers? Hoe kan de beste volgorde gekozen worden – startend 
vanaf een situatie met onvoldoende motivatie en informatie – naar een volledig bevredigende 
situatie? Hoe kan deze bevredigende situatie geïdentificeerd worden?
De antwoorden gaven een indirecte test van het model zelf. Want de deelnemers hadden 
kunnen zeggen dat zij het model niet herkenden vanuit hun praktijkervaring, of dat zij niet 
goed konden werken met het model. Verder maakten de antwoorden van de deelnemers 
het mogelijk om het wat abstracte model te operationaliseren, zodat het beter gebruikt kan 
worden in de praktijk.
Deze operationalisatie werd gedaan door middel van een thematische (tekst) analyse van 
de verslagen van de begeleidde sessies. De analyse leidde tot het identificeren van twaalf 
thema’s (drie voor vraag een, zeven voor vraag twee en twee voor vraag drie) en daarna 
werden de resultaten voor elk thema gepresenteerd als ‘verhalen’ met bijbehorende tabellen 
ter illustratie. De ‘verhalen’ werden opgebouwd uit citaten (tekst segmenten) met gebruik 
van tekst-‘bruggen’ alleen waar dit noodzakelijk was voor het overbrengen (begrijpelijk 
maken) van de context. 
De resultaten van de Focus groepen sessies worden geloofwaardig (“trustworthy”) geacht 
omdat een ‘spoor van bewijs’ vastgelegd kon worden, een ‘afstandelijke’ strategie voor 
betrokkenheid van de onderzoeker werd toegepast (de schrijver participeerde niet actief 
in de sessies), de resultaten van de analyse en de interpretatie werden gescheiden, en 
ervaren praktijkdeskundigen werden open vragen gesteld op vijf verschillende plaatsen. De 
uiteindelijke interpretatie van alle resultaten leidde daarna tot de conclusies. 
Er zijn drie soorten conclusies uit voortgekomen: 1. Herkennen de herstructureringsdeskundigen 
het model als een goede weergave van herstructureringsprocessen, en hoe compleet en 
geschikt is het? 2. Zal het model herstructurering helpen versnellen zonder verlies aan 
kwaliteit? 3. Hoe kan het model geoperationaliseerd worden? 
Met betrekking tot de eerste vraag vonden alle herstructureringsdeskundigen het model 
bruikbaar, vonden de kernvragen over het model geschikt, en ze noemde geen nieuwe 
thema’s voor het model en stelde ook niet voor om bepaalde thema’s in het model weg te 
laten. 
Met betrekking tot de tweede vraag kan de voorlopige conclusie getrokken worden dat het 
model inderdaad herstructurering zal helpen versnellen, zonder verlies aan kwaliteit. Deze 
conclusie kan getrokken worden gebaseerd op het feit dat we hebben alle deelnemers drie 
vragen, afgeleid van het model, gesteld over hoe het proces versneld zou kunnen worden. 
De deelnemers hadden veel voorstellen voor hoe dit zou kunnen, maar geen van deze 
voorstellen vormt een ‘uitdaging’ (“challenge”) voor de kern van het model of de aanspraak 
die het model maakt op het kunnen versnellen van het proces. Uiteraard zal de ‘echte’ test 
de toepassing in de praktijk zijn.  
Met betrekking tot het operationaliseren gaf de interpretatie van de resultaten voor elke 
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individuele vraag voorgelegd in de Focusgroep sessies aan, dat het inderdaad mogelijk is om 
een set van voorkeursdeelnemers gerelateerd aan een specifieke uitdaging te identificeren. 
Verder liet de interpretatie zien, dat men waakzaam moet zijn ten aanzien van de tendens 
om complexiteit te veel te vereenvoudigen, omdat dit onverwachte negatieve effecten kan 
hebben op de lange termijn. De ideeën waren meer verdeeld met betrekking tot hoe de 
beste volgorde van stappen tot de situatie met zowel voldoende geaggregeerde motivatie als 
informatie gevonden kan worden. Informatie is nodig voor het formuleren van de uitdaging 
en voor het vinden van oplossingen voor financiële problemen, maar aan de andere kant 
kan te veel informatie een negatief effect hebben op motivatie. De resultaten duiden erop 
dat motivatie en informatie elkaar kunnen beïnvloeden, en daarom – hoewel de nadruk 
gelegd zou kunnen worden op één van de twee – hoort een strategie gericht te zijn op 
beide factoren tegelijk. Tenslotte is het inderdaad mogelijk om te herkennen of een situatie 
(met betrekking tot motivatie en informatie) bevredigend is, maar zulke situaties dienen bij 
voorkeur vooraf gedefinieerd te worden, en voortgang richting voldoende tevredenheid dient 
actief gemonitord te worden.
Hoofdstuk 8: Bijdrage aan kennis en praktijk
Deze studie geeft indicatief aan dat het versnellen van herstructurering om meer dan het 
toewijzen van meer middelen draait: adequaat gebruik van beslissingsondersteuning, 
gebaseerd op procesmanagement principes, kan herstructurering versnellen zonder, of 
tenminste met minder, extra middelen. 
In het bijzonder heeft deze studie indicatief aangegeven dat een beslissingsondersteunend 
model hierbij kan helpen, als het zich richt op: geaggregeerde actorkenmerken (motivatie, 
informatie en middelen) gerelateerd aan een ‘oplossing’; de distributie van (dezelfde) 
kenmerken tussen de actoren; hoe acceptabele oplossingen ontwikkeld kunnen worden. Dit 
includeert: extra rekening houden met actor-tevredenheid; distributie van kosten, baten, en 
risico’s; en hoe eerlijk (“fair”) deze distributie wordt ervaren. 
Het model lijkt, na relatief kleine aanpassingen, veelbelovend ook voor toepassing in andere 
complexe interactieve processen. 
We zien vier aspecten met betrekking tot hoe men verder kan gaan met de resultaten van 
deze studie. Ten eerste dient het model toegepast te worden voor het analyseren van real 
life afgeronde processen, en voor het ondersteunen van ontwerp en management van 
nieuwe en lopende processen. Ten tweede is meer onderzoek nodig met betrekking tot hoe 
verwachtingen, vertrouwen, informele regels, “voor wat, hoort wat” en risico’s het proces, 
voortgang en resultaten van herstructurering beïnvloeden. Ten derde kan meer onderzoek 
zich richten op hoe de rol van vertegenwoordigers in interactieve settingen – en als functie 
van de specifieke behoeftes van een situatie – begrepen en geoptimaliseerd kan worden. Ten 
vierde wordt voorgesteld dat beleidsmakers de nadruk verschuiven van wat er gedaan kan 
worden (de specifieke bv. financiële en organisatorische maatregelen) naar hoe maatregelen 
geselecteerd en geïmplementeerd kunnen worden in specifieke situaties. 
Appendix I 
An analysis of Dutch literature on 
obstacles
First, the method for selecting and analysing relevant literature is described, including some 
remarks about the quality of the available information. This is particularly important for 
understanding the limitations of the subsequent description and exploration of general and 
situation-specific obstacles. The outcome serves as a basis for exploring the evolution of views 
on, and understanding of, obstacles. This is used to develop a picture of how restructuring 
obstacles are currently perceived. 
1. Method for selecting and analysing the literature
We cannot hope to give a complete overview or comprehensive analysis of all relevant 
literature. The choice of literature has been limited to reports published in the period 1996-
2009 that address problems encountered in improving industrial sites. A number of the 
reports published during the first decade (1996-2006) will be described in detail to create a 
coherent picture of the range of obstacles encountered: other, and in particular more recent, 
reports are analysed only as far as they add new perspectives. 
The reports have been selected using the following criteria. The reports should preferably 
cover information about obstacles encountered in general in all processes, and information 
on the relative importance of obstacles in specific cases. They should preferably also explicitly 
focus on obstacles experienced by planning agencies, be as comprehensive as possible, 
identify relationships between obstacles, have an explicit methodological framework, reflect 
the evolution of views on obstacles, and be widely cited in academic publications and/or 
policy documents. 
The initial exploration of literature revealed some weaknesses, or at least uncertainties, when 
applying these criteria. A first observation is that only a few documents explicitly link obstacles 
to the planning agency. However, we can assume that when the authors of these reports, 
being mainly authorities or semi-governmental organisations (or consultancy firms working 
for such organisations), refer to problems ‘in practice’ this usually means obstacles viewed 
from the perspective of the planning agency. A second issue is that reports do not always 
make a clear distinction between obstacles in restructuring, and obstacles when developing 
new sites. Third, the reports seldom include any explicit discussion on either the nature, or the 
relative importance of obstacles. Most reports list obstacles without giving weights to each 
individual obstacle or explicitly analysing interdependencies. However, these lists usually 
are structured into something that will be referred to as “categories”. It can be assumed 
that each category contains individual obstacles having certain common characteristics. It 
can be argued that this structuring to some extent reflects the perceived importance of 
the various obstacles. Financial obstacles have for example always been mentioned as a 
separate category (more details on how the views on obstacles have changed in time are 
given in section 4 of this appendix), and much policy attention and means have indeed been 
allocated to attempts for finding appropriate solutions to these obstacles. “Knowledge”, on 
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the other hand, is an example of how perception of importance seems to have changed in 
time. In one case (EZ, 2004b) it is mentioned as a category, whereas in other cases it is 
included only as an individual obstacle within other categories (Novem and EZ, 2001) or 
related only implicitly to a variety of individual obstacles. Defining “knowledge” as a separate 
category indicates that policy makers have acknowledged its importance, and in particular 
that they have acknowledged that having, and being able to appropriately use, information 
is a key to successful restructuring. Finally, very few reports give good complete information 
on definitions and methodology. A variety of terms such as ‘problem’, ‘bottleneck’, ‘failure 
factors’, ‘constraints’, and even ‘success factors’ and ‘causes’ have been used to describe 
phenomena which accord with the definition of obstacles applied in this study. In the case 
of success factors, these may ‘mirror’ such obstacles and accordingly allow ‘translation’ into 
(i.e. redefinition as) obstacles. 
 
2. Introduction to general obstacles
To start building a picture of current views on obstacles, a chronological approach is chosen. 
New opportunities for existing sites 
Awareness about the existence and importance of problems on decayed sites in The 
Netherlands was significantly influenced in 1996 by a report called “New Opportunities 
for Existing Sites: A Study into the Problems and Solutions for Decayed Industrial Sites in 
the Netherlands” (EZ, 1996, author’s translation). This report mentions that the following 
bottlenecks (in Dutch the term “knelpunten” is used) are encountered on decayed sites:
• Access to the site, and internal infrastructure on the site
• Spatial design / structure of the site
• Environmental performance (including constraints given by laws and regulations)
• Presentation (image) of the site
• Political-administrative and policy
• Cooperation and communication with firms
• Financial 
The bottlenecks on the sites – in particular the four first bottlenecks - are the problems that 
have to be solved during a restructuring. On the other hand, lack of resources, insufficient 
political commitment, and insufficient cooperation are bottlenecks that are encountered 
during restructuring (EZ, 1996, p. vi): they make it more difficult to address the problems 
on the sites. This difference between site problems and obstacles that hinder improving the 
situation is not discussed in the report. However, the relationships between both categories 
of bottlenecks are described.   
Towards sustainability and more involvement of private actors 
The growing awareness about the importance of ensuring sufficient quality of existing 
industrial sites was reflected in the choice for sustainable industrial sites as a key policy 
theme (in Dutch: “boegbeeld”) in 1997 (VROM, 1997). This stimulated a diversity of activities 
that covered approximately the years 1998 – 2004. In particular, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs facilitated several studies, which focused on topics such as management of site 
developments and how to improve the involvement of private actors in restructuring. Some 
of these studies are analysed below.
Integral area-focused process approach is essential
Strategic management of development processes was specifically addressed in a publication 
that presented a comprehensive set of guidelines for developing sustainable industrial sites (EZ, 
1998). The steering group that supervised the report states in the foreword “[…] an important 
conclusion […] is that the involved actors view the process as the critical success factor, because 
sustainable development touches core business of both firms and authorities […]” (EZ, 1998, 
p.7). Furthermore, the report stresses that an area-focused (in Dutch: “gebiedsgericht”) and 
integral approach that includes all stakeholders on the industrial site is important. 
This emphasis on integral processes is also encountered in the list of what the authors 
refer to as “important success and failure factors” (EZ, 1998, p. 35). It is not clear whether 
success factors can be reformulated as failure factors. However, we agree with Pellenbarg 
when he states that “[….] we can safely assume that the absence of [success] factors 
[…] may be considered as failure factors […]“ (Pellenbarg, 2002, p.74). The report makes 
no explicit distinction between issues that relate to new and those that relate to existing 
sites. Nevertheless, the list does present both new and enriching perspectives on obstacles 
(compared to EZ, 1996).  
First, there is the explicit acknowledgement of process complexity as a critical factor. 
The authors view this complexity as mainly related to the large number of actors with an 
interest in the process, the efforts needed for building commitment, the variety of influential 
developments, and establishing the necessary cooperation between the involved actors. The 
authors do not relate the complexity to the size of the investments or process duration. A 
successful management approach to this complexity accordingly focuses on ideas, interests 
and objectives of stakeholders, potential win-win solutions, and their feasibility. The authors 
state that 90% of the risk of process failure is linked to these three interdependent issues. 
More specifically, the authors point to the need for a good ‘climate’ for cooperation: starting 
the process from the perspective of the firms, and trust, are factors that are important for 
commitment. It is equally important to build and maintain political commitment. The report 
emphasises the importance of getting the right issues onto the discussion agenda, and of 
ensuring that the right balance is achieved between quick implementation of initiatives, and 
getting good information about feasibility. Visualizing results is important for ensuring that 
initiatives remain on the (political) agenda, and marketing can communicate the specific 
quality of the site. Finally, the report stresses the need for appropriate use of legal instruments 
(such as contracts and Zoning Plan). They are to be integrated into the final design and not 
applied as ‘blueprint’ constraints on the process. The lack of such success factors can (as 
mentioned above) be regarded as obstacles.    
Private involvement as an opportunity
A report published a year later focused specifically on how more private involvement in 
restructuring can offer opportunities (EZ, 1999). The authors argue that “[…] restructuring 
is often a difficult process, partly because of problems regarding financing. Because of 
[financial] deficits, projects proceed slower, or they are partly or not at all implemented, [and] 
increasing the involvement [of private actors] can accelerate projects both financially and 
regarding process […]” (EZ, 1999, p. 5). In other words, the authors (indirectly) argue that 
insufficient (or inappropriate) involvement of private parties is an obstacle. More specifically, 
public-private cooperation is viewed as a means for achieving added value, and a planning 
agency needs to decide in advance whether such cooperation is a realistic option and whether 
added value can be reached. 
The report also includes an extensive list of quite detailed success and failure factors, 
divided into the categories Organisation, Financing, and Project External Factors (EZ, 1999, 
p.14). The failure factors included in the categories “Organisation” and “Project External 
factors” stress the importance of addressing the interests of the actors. Processes can fail 
if the choices made for actor involvement are not based on appropriate analyses of their 
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interests and related risks (these risks are not specified, but we assume they especially point 
to potential financial effects), in particular taking into account those actors that have long-
lasting interests in the area. Involvement can include joint development of plans that can 
lead to a commitment to particular ambition levels. Rigid use of environmental laws and 
regulations, and long and uncertain spatial regulation procedures, can weaken the willingness 
to cooperate. A disturbed relationship between local authorities and firms, or lack of political 
commitment, can have a significant impact on process performance. This can result in actors 
not respecting each other’s interests, and also not recognizing each other’s’ contributions 
to the process, or even not keeping agreements. More generally, inappropriate coordination 
and communication can lead to “frozen” processes: if neutral intermediaries are not set in 
as mediators, this is regarded a specific obstacle. Insufficient progress and inappropriate 
use of key leverage-projects can lead to a loss of investment perspective. Progress and 
commitment are also influenced if restructuring has to compete with other projects of the 
planning agency. Probably this competition refers to political commitment and the allocation 
of finances. Finally, during the process, it should be clear that the interests of political actors 
and of market actors are kept separate. 
These obstacles are closely linked to the financial ones, because the process should lead to 
financial agreements that couple profitable and non-profitable activities in an appropriate 
way. Specific financial obstacles are therefore encountered if the cost scenarios are not 
market conform, not transparent, or known too late in the process, but also if planning 
agencies are unwilling to work with the profit requirements of private investors, or if there 
are no agreements about financial losses on specific projects and how they can, or should, be 
covered by co-funding by for example higher authorities. 
Besides these organisational and financial obstacles, there is the category referred to as 
“Project external factors”. Those obstacles are related to unfavourable market developments. 
A general economic recession may have severe consequences for the possibilities that firms 
and planning agencies have for investing in industrial site restructuring. However, these 
developments are outside the influence of the planning agency and will accordingly not be 
considered as obstacles within this study, but as situational factors that constrain or enable 
process opportunities.  
Focus on sustainability 
A significant effort to address this complex relationship between perceived organisational, 
process, and financial obstacles was undertaken by Novem (currently part of “Agentschap 
NL”), an organisation that was operating as an agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Novem between 1999 and 2004 developed and managed a comprehensive program called 
“Sustainable Industrial Sites” that addressed the full variety of challenges in industrial site 
development. Besides co-funding a large number of projects (e.g. Novem and EZ, 1999; 
2000) and facilitating the development of management guides, ‘inspirational’ brochures and 
other process support documents (e.g. Novem and EZ, 2001; 2003a and b; Novem, 2001; 
Novem and Décor, 2003), this program also specifically included attention for failure factors 
(Novem and EZ, 2001).   
This program delivered probably the most comprehensive, or at least most detailed, list of 
failure factors ever made for industrial site processes in The Netherlands. The report also 
makes clear how failure factors are viewed, namely as “[…] reasons or conditions that make 
an initiative to realize a sustainable industrial site partly or wholly unsuccessful […]” (Novem 
and EZ, 2001, p. 6, author’s translation). The report defines solutions (in Dutch the term 
“oplossingsrichtingen” is used) - “[…] ways to avoid (prevent) or remedy these reasons or 
conditions […]” (Novem and EZ, 2001, p.6) – as ways of overcoming obstacles. 
The report structures the failure factors into three levels: the first level consists of four 
categories, which each again are divided into subcategories (see fig. 1), and, finally, each 
subcategory contains a large number of specific failure factors. The factors were discussed in 
in-depth interviews with stakeholders involved in two case studies as a way of validating the 
findings. The two cases were however quite different. One was a new site being developed; 
the other was an existing site being restructured. Based on the interviews, an attempt was 
made to identify the case-specific relative importance of the factors. The chosen semi-
quantitative approach was to register how (and how often) a certain obstacle was mentioned 
in the interviews. The results are quite different for the two cases. However, the authors 
conclude that, according to stakeholders interviewed in both cases, the important factors are: 
commitment to, involvement in, and influence on decision making. The stakeholders involved 
in the restructuring case most often refer to lack of commitment and clear communication, and 
to financial risks as specific failure factors. The combined results of the literature study and 
the case studies were presented to, and discussed by, representatives of industry, and local, 
regional and national authorities, during a workshop. This resulted in further specification of 
some of the factors, and to prioritizing. Figure 1 presents the failure factors of the two ‘highest’ 
levels and includes information on priority / importance (“+++” means highest priority).
Process and Organisation
• Failure factors caused by type of process: complex, innovative (+++);
• Lack of involvement, commitment, trust (++);
• Lack of clear communication / agreements (+++);
• Long duration and slow progress caused by kind of project (++)
Contents
• Lack of experience and knowledge (+);
• Lack of clarity regarding what is mean by the objectives of the project (+);
Financing
• Lack of understanding, knowledge and experience (+);
• Financial risks (++)
External factors 
• Impediments caused by laws and regulations (+);
• Insufficient adaptation to developments in the (close) surroundings (++)
Figure 1.  Failure factors in development of sustainable sites (adapted from Novem and EZ, 2001). 
Besides introducing a new category called “Contents”, this report introduces the process 
as an aspect separate from organisation. This indicates an understanding that performance 
and outcomes of restructuring are determined not only by the nature of the (project) 
organisation itself. The process is described as complex and innovative, and a large number 
of individual failure factors are described as characteristics of such processes (for more 
details: see Novem and EZ, 2001). 
According to the authors, the participants of the workshop considered all categories and 
failure factors relevant. However, the failure factors regarding process, organisation, and 
financial risk (++), and the ‘external’ factor of taking developments in the surroundings into 
consideration, were viewed as high priority issues. 
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Complementing and enriching 
Only a few additional obstacles were suggested in the next couple of years. Konz and van 
den Thillart in their study on opportunities for industrial symbiosis on existing sites use the 
list developed by Novem and EZ (2001), but introduce a few additional aspects (Konz and 
van den Thillart, 2002, p.50). Regarding the lack of clear communication and agreements, 
they add the aspect of ‘competence’. Unfortunately no definition of this term is provided, 
but they may be referring to the mandate carried by participating actors. Konz and Van den 
Thillart also stress the aspect of financial interests within the sub-category of financial risks. 
Although the importance for process and organisation of taking interests into account has 
been repeatedly stressed, the explicit link with finances is new.   
Pellenbarg mentions a few other aspects (Pellenbarg, 2002). Reformulated as obstacles, they 
point to the importance of the lack of success in the short run, insufficient “financial means 
for the plan” (i.e. a specification of the more general lack of financing for processes), and 
insufficient use of existing management capacity of firms. He includes factors taken from 
earlier studies (van der Veeken, 1998; Kolpron Consultants 1998). He is the first to mention 
the importance that all cooperation is voluntary, and that projects need to be integral 
regarding attention to environment, ecology and spatial quality. 
Lambooy, Spit and Bugge mention the problem regarding costs and cost distribution between 
authorities and private actors (Lambooy et al., 2002), which is considered to be especially 
problematic if private contributions are expected for integral (collective) site improvements 
(Decisio, 2003). Not being willing to acknowledge and address dilemmas can also be an 
obstacle, because “[…] an open discussion about the relative importance of interests, 
norms and values […] is needed in the search for good solutions (Bugge, 2003, p. 48). The 
assumption is that lack of clarity can damage process performance and discussions about a fair 
distribution of costs. An open dialogue can also be helpful in bridging the culture differences 
between firms and authorities (SenterNovem, 2004). An obstacle is also encountered if firms 
are not appropriately involved in managing existing sites, and this can hinder the efficient 
use of space (BCI, 2002). 
Policy for restructuring: a step towards quantifying and understanding  
This study of attention to obstacles in restructuring in “the early years” has delivered extensive 
lists, but not much about the relationships between individual obstacles and progress. This 
latter was addressed in the “Actionplan Industrial Sites 2004-2008”: a national policy document 
with the goal of reducing the total duration of restructuring in the Netherlands (EZ, 2004b). 
The action plan also states that the Dutch industrial site development “[…] still experiences 
bottlenecks regarding organisation, financing, laws and regulations, and knowledge […]” (EZ, 
2004b, p.16), and that these bottlenecks (in Dutch the word “knelpunten” is used) prevent 
quicker processes (EZ, 2004b). 
 
Organisational
A bottleneck is poor (in Dutch: “gebrekkig”) organisation and process approach. This is often 
manifested as: 
• Absence of an area-oriented strategic vision;
• Insufficient regional fine-tuning of (activities and) cooperation;
• Low level of organisation of firms on industrial site;
• ‘Free-riders’ on sites where there is Site Management (in Dutch: “Park Management”) ;
• Poor communication (in Dutch: “overleg”) between local authorities and industry;
• Highly fragmented management of site
Financing
In particular, the financing of restructuring is a major problem. Bottlenecks are for example:
• High costs of soil remediation, improvement of site [road] access, and relocation of firms;
•  Sub-optimal use of alternative income-generating uses (in Dutch the term “alternatieve 
kostendragers” is used);
•  No use of the possibility to transfer financial surplus generated through development of 
new sites to the restructuring of existing sites [in Dutch: applying “verevening”];
•  Local politicians giving higher priority to the development of new sites than to structural 
maintenance and management of existing sites;
• [lack of] Co-financing by private actors;
• [lack of] Structural financing of ‘Park Management’
Laws and regulations
The accumulation of, sometimes incompatible / contradictory, rules and (quality) 
specifications, which leads to long procedures, increasing costs, and uncertainty for local 
authorities and private investors. Issues that can occur are:
•  Accumulation of thematic [in Dutch the term “sectoraal” is applied] assessments such as 
concerning water, mobility, habitat, and architectural aspects;
•  Lack of integral assessment and appropriate coordination;
•  Insufficient use of flexibility within legal constraints in order to achieve tailor-made 
solutions
Knowledge
•  Not only lack of knowledge, but in particular poor access [in Dutch the term ‘ontsluiting’ is 
used] to knowledge;
• Lack of appropriate instrument for dissemination of knowledge
Figure 2.  Bottlenecks in restructuring (translated and slightly adapted: EZ, 2004b, pp.16-17)
At a first glance, the bottlenecks (see figure 2) seem to be clearly structured into four 
categories. However, the short explanatory text below the heading “Organisation” in the 
figure states that “a bottleneck is poor organisation and process approach” (emphasis added 
by author). How these two aspects are defined is unclear, but the text indicates that they are 
viewed as closely linked but still distinguishable.  
Although most of the individual obstacles have been described earlier, the emphasis on laws 
and regulations, and especially on knowledge, is new. The way the obstacles are described 
suggests that substantial knowledge is available, but insufficiently accessible (regarding 
Knowledge) or at least not used (regarding Laws and regulations).  
Finally, this policy paper stresses that “[…] the long duration […] is caused not only by 
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these bottlenecks. Decisive are often the conflicts of interests that are part of industrial 
site developments [because], in the Dutch culture, which is aimed at reaching consensus, 
overcoming these conflicts costs significant time and energy […]” (EZ, 2004b, p.16). Conflicts 
of interests are accordingly not defined as a bottleneck, but viewed as something that 
deserves special attention. The wording suggests that these conflicts of interest are one of 
the main reasons why industrial site (re) development processes last (too) long. 
Furthermore these conflicts of interest are described as being part of industrial site 
developments. This suggests that they will be encountered in all site development 
processes. It is therefore not surprising that several of the bottlenecks mentioned are 
closely linked to this key issue. Insufficient (which probably may also be interpreted as 
“inappropriate”) regional fine-tuning of cooperation, and local politicians giving higher 
priority to the development of new sites, indicate underlying conflicts of interest. Both 
examples accordingly implicitly stress the importance of decision making and management 
of interactions between actors. 
Also Louw, Needham, Olden and Pen stress the importance of conflicts of interests in 
their comprehensive book on planning of industrial sites in The Netherlands (Louw & al., 
2004). The authors argue that “[…] two important bottlenecks that local authorities face in 
restructuring are: the extensive costs [… and] the fragmented ownership [situation on the 
site]”. The link between the fragmented ownership and conflicts of interests is given in the 
fact that “[…] to be able to implement their plans, the local authorities need to cooperate 
with the entrepreneurs on the site […and] entrepreneurs have different interests than the 
local authorities […]” (Louw & al., 2004, p.147). In the Netherlands it is normal that the local 
authorities own the infrastructure on the site, whereas the rest of the area will be owned by 
a (large) number of individual firms. Any integral improvement will therefore involve several 
stakeholders, which implies difficult discussions on the measures that should be implemented 
and on how these should be financed. Especially financing is a recurring obstacle. Although 
a planning agency can choose to transfer a financial surplus from one activity to another (in 
Dutch: “verevening”), this is rarely done. 
A risk perspective on restructuring and obstacles
Another obstacle is the uncertainty about risks, and about who should be responsible for 
them. This has been stressed in a ‘knowledge compendium’ (in Dutch: “kennisbundel”) 
stating that “[…] in restructuring projects we […] seldom encounter a thorough risk analysis. 
Unfortunately this is often the cause of uncontrolled (in Dutch: “uit de klauwen lopen”) costs 
in a project […]” (BOM, 2006, p.35). A list of risks inherent to restructuring, and of the relevant 
issues that should be addressed in project and process management, is also given. The risks 
regarding cooperation and process are viewed as linked to trust and mutual respect. If these 
disappear, cooperation stops or slows down. The same can be expected if the organisation 
of the restructuring is inappropriate regarding roles, tasks, responsibilities and mandates, 
if political changes or preferences change, or if the planning agencies make inappropriate 
(e.g. too late) use of specific	legal	instruments. There is also a considerable risk that actors 
in the society might try to block or postpone developments, and of unexpected technical 
complications. Finally, there is a whole range of risks related to finances,	such as higher costs 
for the planning process, less profitable development of the land, problems with selling (re) 
developed land, higher costs for site management, and higher interest rates.    
Recent developments
In 2007 the national authorities again stressed the need for accelerating restructuring, and 
they appointed a special taskforce to address this (VROM and EZ, 2007). This taskforce 
concluded (in an intermediary progress report) that the restructuring challenge is still large, 
complex, and poorly defined and analysed, and that obstacles are encountered because “[…] 
the goals of the many involved actors, public and private, are very different. Responsibilities 
are unclear. Legal instruments are fragmented and insufficient. There is only limited money 
available for covering the non-profitable part of the restructuring challenge […]” (THB, 
2008b, p.1). Furthermore the “imperfect market” for industrial sites (van der Krabben and 
van Dinteren, 2010) needs to be improved through a professional business-approach to site 
development and management (in Dutch: “verzakelijking”), and site developments need to 
be an integral part of urban renewal and regional coordination (THB, 2008a). The urgency 
and importance were acknowledged by the national authorities, and led to agreements 
between all levels of authorities (EZ and VROM, 2008; VROM et al., 2009), to more concrete 
recommendations on how these challenges should be addressed (BWU, 2009), and to a 
number of pilot projects (VROM et al., 2010a).
A number of other studies have contributed to understanding the obstacles that planning 
agencies face. Lack of knowledge and experience, and complicated laws and regulations 
lead to extremely slow and difficult processes (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008), and also 
unnecessary bureaucracy, low political priority, and complexity (Nicis, 2009). Planning 
agencies are still rarely analysing problems and solutions systematically, and progress still to 
a large extent depends on the availability of co-funding by provinces and national authorities 
(PBL, 2009). 
Project leaders involved in actual restructuring claim that what is needed is more attention 
to the local practice and, in particular, more in-depth understanding of the obstacles that 
are encountered in these projects (Nicis, 2009). There is accordingly a need for case-specific 
understanding of obstacles in order to improve policy intervention instruments and to support 
processes locally.  
3. Situation-specific obstacles
Are all reported obstacles encountered in all processes? And what are the relationships 
between, and the relative importance of, obstacles, and how does this differ according to 
the situation? 
The literature that explicitly addresses this topic is quite limited. It is ‘limited’ also in the 
sense that it is mainly based on one-to-one interviews or on various kinds of group sessions, 
and the reports usually lack any traceable line of evidence. Nevertheless, it is possible, with 
caution, to use the available information. Two selected studies are analysed here. 
Process and organisation
The first study describes a number of restructuring projects briefly and discusses the 
importance of process and organisational factors (EZ, 1998). The way different failure and 
success factors are described is quite diverse and sometimes difficult to interpret. First, it 
is not clear whether the reported perception of importance is related to a certain period (or 
phase) in the restructuring, or whether it refers to the complete process. Actors may have 
chosen to stress factors that have been particularly important in reaching a current situation, 
factors that are crucial at the moment or factors that are thought to be important for achieving 
final objectives. Second, the separation of process and organisational factors is unclear. 
Taking these uncertainties into account, the following table presents a range of topics that are 
experienced as most important in these projects analysed. 
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Table 1.  Process and organisational success factors (based on: EZ, 1998) 
Commitment, communication and financial risks
The second study, of the “Moleneind / Landweer” industrial site, focused on ten failure factors 
related to process and organisation, contents, financing, and external factors (Novem and EZ, 
2001). The study was performed by in-depth interviews with four key actors reported to have 
thorough knowledge of the local situation. The results point to three important failure factors: 
Lack of commitment, unclear communication, and financial risks. All are put into the category 
“process and organisation”. The factors “long total duration and slow progress” and “inherent 
to this sort of process” (the Dutch expression used is ”voorkomend uit type proces”) were 
considered by the interviewed actors to be less important, and using the opportunities within 
existing laws and regulations, and know-how, were not mentioned at all. The frequency of 
mentioning a certain issue was applied as indicating importance. The authors state that the 
relationships between different failure factors, between failure factors and solutions, and the 
relevance of the role (position) of the interviewed persons, have not been addressed within 
the study.
 
4. How the views on obstacles have evolved
The above shows that there is still much uncertainty about the relationships between obstacles 
and about their relative importance, and about how this varies with the situation. On the 
other hand, one report says that the general picture of problems currently encountered in 
restructuring is quite clear and unanimous (THB, 2008a). 
What is this picture? It is not explicitly described in the report mentioned above, so we try to 
‘construct’ it. The first step (taken in this section) is to explore how the views on obstacles 
have changed over time. This exploration, in particular, looks also at whether obstacles can 
be directly influenced by a planning agency, and whether the obstacles really ‘belong’ to the 
restructuring. 
We use four selected reports for examining how the views have changed over time (EZ, 1996; 
1999; 2004; Novem and EZ, 2001). These reports have been selected because they all apply 
complete and explicit typologies. The following table presents the categories of obstacles 
used in each report.  
Table 2.  Categories of obstacles (based on EZ, 1996; 1999; 2004; Novem and EZ, 2001)
Organisation & Process
All four reports include organisational and process obstacles: there is considerable agreement 
about the relevance of these issues for successful restructuring. However, the way the terms 
have been interpreted varies and changes.  
For example, the category “Cooperation & Communication with firms” (EZ, 1996) was later in 
the Actionplan Industrial Sites (EZ, 2004b) put as an obstacle in the category “Organisational”. 
The situation regarding the category “Policy & Political-administrative” (EZ, 1996) is more 
complex. The category contains three obstacles (not shown here): “Organisation”, “Lack of 
Know-how”, and “Low priority of existing sites compared to new sites”. This early report 
considered organisation not as a separate category of obstacles, but (only) as an individual 
obstacle. In the following decade, the importance of organisational aspects was recognised, 
which resulted in the use of “Organisation” (or process and organisation) as a separate 
category. The second individual obstacle, lack of know-how, is later (EZ, 2004b) included as 
a separate category. The third obstacle - low priority of existing sites compared to new sites 
– was later considered to be financial (EZ, 2004b). 
Finally, there is the question how the two aspects of organisation and process interact. The 
large diversity of individual obstacles, and the way they are categorised, indicates limited 
agreement about where they belong, and indicate a big ‘overlap’ between them. Nevertheless, 
they are seen as separate issues. This is understandable, because for planning agencies 
there is a significant difference between organisation and process. Planning agencies attempt 
to develop and maintain well-functioning organisational structures, and they apply process 
management within these structures in order to influence actors and their interactions. Also, 
they use processes for changing the organisation. Organisation and process are different and 
complementary perspectives, and should be viewed as separate categories. 
Financing
The situation regarding financial obstacles is much clearer. All reports view financing as a 
separate category and there is no doubt about its high importance in restructuring. Generally, 
the net costs of restructuring (costs minus any income from sales) substantially exceed the 
“New opportunities 
for existing sites”
EZ,	1996
“More private 
involvement” 
EZ,	1999
“Learning	from	failure:
 achieving success”
Novem	and	EZ,	2001
“Action plan 
Industrial Sites”
EZ,	2004
•  Policy and political 
administrative
•  Cooperation and 
communication with 
firms
• Financing
•  Access to site and 
infrastructure
• Spatial design
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performance
•  Image / site 
presentation 
•  Organisational
• Financing
•  Project external  
factors
•  Process and 
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• Financial
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(organisation and 
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• Financing
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process
Participation 
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process
Joint 
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AICD + + + +
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financial means of the planning agencies, and all the local actors together. Although the 
financial obstacles listed vary considerably, the content of this category is clear. The obstacles 
mentioned focus on two interdependent financial aspects: the high costs, and the distribution 
of costs and benefits among actors (i.e. financial agreements). There is nevertheless some 
overlap with other categories. In particular, the obstacles that refer to know-how and to 
the process for developing suitable financial agreements, such as “Lack of understanding, 
knowledge and experience concerning issues such as liability risks, cooperation-contracts 
and win-win situations” (Novem and EZ, 2001) and “Difficult to achieve overview of subsidies 
because of complex terms and fragmentation” (EZ, 1999), have effects on financing. Here, 
however, we place them in the category knowledge.   
Laws and regulations
Sometimes laws and regulations are viewed as an external obstacle (e.g. Novem and EZ, 
2001). For example, the Action Plan Industrial Sites (EZ, 2004b) mentions procedural delay 
caused by the cumulative effects of, sometimes, incompatible and/or contradictory rules. 
Laws and regulations are then experienced as an ‘external’ factor that is a constraint and has 
to be handled as such, and not as an obstacle that can be actively influenced by planning 
agencies in a restructuring.
However, planning agencies do not always fully take advantage of the opportunities that can be 
found within the frameworks provided by current laws and regulations. Then, obstacles arise, 
such as inappropriate use of legal instruments and, in particular, the insufficient use of flexibility 
within legal constraints in order to achieve tailor-made solutions (EZ, 2004b; BOM, 2006).
 
Knowledge
The views on obstacles related to process, organisation, financing, and laws and regulations 
reveal three different perspectives on knowledge. First, knowledge can be considered a 
separate category of obstacles (EZ, 2004b). Second, it can be explicitly mentioned as an 
individual obstacle within other categories (Novem and EZ, 2001). Third, it can be viewed 
as an implicit part of all other obstacles. In all cases, the importance of knowledge in such 
processes is clearly acknowledged. 
The formulations show that knowledge is experienced as a complex issue. The individual 
obstacle “Lack of understanding, knowledge and experience regarding issues such as liability 
risks, cooperation-contracts and win-win situations” (Novem and EZ, 2001) illustrates this. 
Knowledge is mentioned separately from understanding and experience. This suggests that 
knowledge means having access to information. The added value of understanding and 
experience is then that the potential user will know how to act. Together these are referred 
to as know-how. It is therefore argued that the term “know-how” better fits how planning 
agencies experience the category of obstacles related to getting access to, and subsequently 
appropriately using, knowledge.  
However, even if this know-how is available (Novem and EZ, 2001; 2004), it does not give 
any guarantee of success. As stated in the Action Plan for Industrial Sites: “Often the wheel is 
re-invented” (EZ, 2004b, p.17). It is accordingly necessary to take into consideration whether 
planning agencies actively search for, and apply, innovative solutions in a restructuring. Even 
if sufficient know-how is available, a lack of human resources and/or willingness can prevent 
effective use of it. 
Site characteristics and (perceived) quality 
The aim of restructuring is to solve the problems on decayed industrial sites. Although these 
problems were included as bottlenecks in an early report (EZ, 1996, p. iv), more recent 
views on obstacles focus on the financing and high costs of issues such as soil remediation, 
relocation of firms, and improvements of access to sites (EZ, 2004b). The ‘physical’ problems 
are in that sense viewed as situation characteristics that need to be improved and not as 
obstacles to this process of solving these problems more quickly. 
Contents
This category was introduced in the report on failure factors in the development of 
sustainable sites (Novem and EZ, 2001). It included two subcategories. The subcategory 
“lack of experience and knowledge”, has already been discussed and put into the category 
“know-how”. The second subcategory, “the substantive objectives are unclear” (in Dutch: 
“onduidelijkheid over inhoud doelen van project”), might seem to take a completely new 
angle. However, the separate obstacles mentioned under this (Novem and EZ, 2001, p.24) 
address issues related to actor interdependency and cooperation, monitoring and adjustment 
of visions, and active external communication. All these obstacles have, in different forms, 
been viewed as belonging to the categories “organisation” and “process”. A separate category 
“contents” is neither necessary nor does it reflect a current view on obstacles. 
External factors
How are “external factors” to be viewed? The reference to something as being “external” 
suggests a systems approach for identifying obstacles. Certain factors are viewed as not 
belonging to a system called restructuring. It is accordingly necessary to explore how the 
term external has been applied, and whether any such system borders are recognizable in 
the two reports that make explicit use of a category “external factors”. 
The first report refers to “project external factors” (EZ, 1999). The restructuring is viewed as 
a project, and some failure factors are ‘external’ to the project. Four obstacles (including one 
success factor, in this study reformulated as an obstacle) are placed in this category. The first 
concerns the inflexible use of environmental laws and regulations, especially regarding how 
to address soil pollution. As mentioned above, more recent reports (e.g. EZ, 2004b; BOM, 
2006) view the inflexible way that planning agencies work within the frameworks of existing 
laws and regulations as “internal” to the restructuring. The same applies to the failure factor: 
long and uncertain spatial planning procedures (in Dutch: “lange en onzekere RO-trajecten”). 
In both cases, part of this obstacle is related to the way planning agencies operate, and there 
is also an ‘external’ part that is linked to the quality of the laws and regulations themselves. 
Viewed from the perspective of a planning agency and its possibilities for influencing progress, 
this second part is not an obstacle within the restructuring itself, but a more or less constant 
factor that has to be handled. The third obstacle included under “external factors” concerns 
the competition with other internal or external projects. Again, the same argument applies: if 
the outcome of this competition can be influenced through process design and management 
applied by the planning agency, then this obstacle is not external but internal. The fourth 
failure factor concerns the effect of general macro-economic development, which clearly is 
an external factor that cannot be influenced by the planning agency. 
The second report (Novem and EZ, 2001) contains two subcategories of ‘external’ obstacles. 
The first, laws and regulations, has already been explored. The second is called “Insufficiently 
taking developments in the (close) surroundings into consideration” (in Dutch: “onvoldoende 
afstemming”). Again, the key question here is, whether the planning agencies can influence this. 
The formulation used can be interpreted as referring to the specific perspective of the planning 
agencies. This is, therefore, internal and belongs to either organisational or process obstacles. 
Summing up, there are indeed factors that are ‘external’ to the possibilities that planning 
agencies have for directly influencing the performance and progress of a specific restructuring. 
These factors (e.g. laws and regulations, macro-economic developments) function mainly as 
frameworks that direct and limit action, or as uncontrollable inputs for local opportunities, 
and have to be handled as such. 
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5. (Re) ordering obstacles to reflect current views and understanding
The planning agencies have a complex task in addressing obstacles that they can actively 
influence, while taking account of ‘external’ factors that during a long-lasting restructuring 
can change. This complexity is clearly reflected in the way obstacles have been reported.   
Although most reports do not give explicit information on definitions, nor on relative 
importance of obstacles, some ‘building blocks’ for ordering individual obstacles emerge: 
•  Categories, as reported, reflect attempts to group obstacles having certain characteristics 
in common;
•  In the literature, obstacles have been interpreted and ordered in different ways, 
depending on the perspective used and assumptions made. Making these perspectives 
and assumptions explicit makes it possible to construct categories in a way that can be 
justified; 
•  This study focuses on identifying and influencing obstacles that can be actively influenced 
by the planning agency as a part of the restructuring. However, this does not exclude the 
necessity to identify and handle the ‘external factors’ also that are ‘outside’ the direct 
influence of planning agencies.
The evolution of the views about obstacles reflects a growing understanding of their meaning, 
and changing perceptions about how they best can be addressed;
This evolution shows a slowly emerging agreement about the categories of obstacles (see 
figure 3). This especially concerns financing, organisation, and process. Other categories 
are less frequently reported and there is less agreement about their contents. However, 
there seems to be a growing acknowledgement of the importance of know-how: an issue 
that is widely encountered, either implicitly or explicitly, in almost all reports (e.g. EZ, 
2004b, Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; THB, 2008a; BWU, 2009). Finally, failure to exploit the 
possibilities offered by laws and regulations is an issue that has received increasing attention 
(EZ, 2004b; BOM, 2006; VROM and EZ, 2007; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008; THB, 2008a). 
This results in the following five categories of obstacles: 
• Organisation
• Process
• Financing
• Laws and regulations
• Know-how
Figure 3.  Five categories of obstacles 
The next step is to define each category in accordance with the current view on obstacles. 
Organisation 
This category is defined as “the structure of the planning agency, region, firms on the site, 
and coordination mechanisms in place as far as relevant to the restructuring”. This refers to 
the quality of the organisational structures and mechanisms in place, not to the way actors 
act and interact within these frameworks (which is viewed as process). Neither would the 
absence of specific documents be regarded as organisational obstacles, but as an outcome 
of a process, or in other words as an effect. 
Many reported individual organisational obstacles can alternatively be viewed from a process 
perspective. For the presence of organisational obstacles can be seen as the result of the 
willingness (and therefore motives) of actors to act in a certain way. Know-how also plays a 
role. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish a separate category of organisational obstacles. 
There is overlap between other categories of obstacles also, as we shall see. 
Process
This is defined as “how actors involved in, or affected by, the restructuring act, and, in 
particular, interact”. The ‘organisation’ (as defined above) enables and constrains the 
process, and the process influences the organisation. 
Financing
This has been defined as “availability of feasible cost-benefit arrangements”. Financing is 
accordingly about the financial resources of the various actors and about how willing those 
actors are to spend them on specific challenges (problems and possible solutions). Process, 
organisational and know-how aspects (obstacles) will therefore influence whether financing 
is successful.
Laws and regulations
This is defined as “the existing legal framework that applies to problems and solutions related 
to the restructuring”. This category of obstacles refers to how the planning agency is able to 
use the range of opportunities provided by the existing framework of laws and regulations.  
Know-how
This is defined as “access to, as well as the ability to appropriately use, relevant information”. 
Any planning agency will act based on available information, but at the same time its ability 
to collect and use information appropriately will influence process, progress, and outcomes 
of a restructuring. The planning agencies need to know how to use information for reaching 
goals. This is part of the capacity of an actor, and it affects how the actor uses information 
for developing interaction mechanisms (see organisational obstacles), for influencing the 
process (see process obstacles), for developing feasible financial arrangements (see financial 
obstacles), and for working within existing laws and regulations (see laws and regulations 
obstacles).  
6. Reflecting on the current importance of obstacles    
One important question remains. The obstacles reported above have been taken from reports 
written over many years. What is the current situation? How important are obstacles now? 
A complication is that obstacles are related to the initial situations, the objectives, and the 
chosen approaches for restructuring, all of which have changed in that period. 
Nevertheless, obstacles to progress are still highly relevant, because the need to accelerate 
revitalisation and reprofiling processes has received growing attention the past years (EZ, 
2004b; VROM and EZ, 2007; THB, 2008a; EZ and VROM, 2008; VROM et al., 2009). This 
has been translated into quantitative objectives for restructuring (THB, 2008a), and has 
been presented as a non-structural ‘catching-up’ (in Dutch: “inhaalslag”) operation (EZ and 
VROM, 2008; VROM et al., 2009). The motivation given for the recent additional political 
emphasis is that “[…] the overdue [need for] restructuring cannot await the structural 
effects of ‘professionalizing’ (in Dutch: “verzakelijking”) [through more, or different, private 
involvement in the restructuring], because this can lead to an undesired process of social, 
spatial and economic neglect (in Dutch: “verwaarlozing”) [and decay]” (VROM, 2008, p.6, 
author’s translation). This has served as the basis for agreements about extra efforts to be 
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made by national, provincial and local authorities (VROM et al., 2009). 
Another question is whether any new - categories of - obstacles have recently been introduced. 
Our literature study has not found any. This is no guarantee for completeness, but it suggests 
that the presented categories cover the relevant issues. 
Another possibility is that the relative importance of obstacles has changed radically. If so, 
some (categories of) obstacles may even have been completely removed. Starting with 
obstacles related to financing, there is no disagreement about the conclusion that restructuring 
is very expensive, and that the total costs usually significantly exceed the benefits (THB, 
2008a; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008). In particular, this is the case if remediation of soil 
pollution, buying (unused) private property, demolition of buildings, or improvement of 
access (infrastructure) is needed (Louw et al., 2004). The importance of financing as an 
obstacle is also underpinned by the recent policy and related allocation of (co-) funding for 
restructuring (EZ and VROM, 2008), by the reported impact of funding on progress (PBL, 
2009, p. 98), and by the policy recommendations regarding financial instruments (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2008; THB, 2008a). 
However, still “[…] the question is whether authorities always have to apply only financial 
interventions […]” (PBL, 2009, p. 111, author’s translation, emphasis added by author). 
The main reason for arguing that finance is not the only, or the main, obstacle is that the 
opportunities to counteract ageing processes are “[…] also determined by the money that 
we collectively are willing to invest in restructuring […]” (THB, 2008a, p. 26). The finance 
available reflects the aggregated willingness of individual actors, public as well as private, 
to participate, interact, and invest, in restructuring. The extreme solution of having ‘one side 
paying for all’ is neither acceptable nor feasible. “[…] Restructuring without any public money 
presently is not considered to be an option […]” (THB, 2008a, p. 26), but on the other hand 
authorities expect that “[…] firms [on the site] and other private actors should contribute 
significantly to make restructuring successful […]” (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008, p. 48, see 
also PBL, 2009). 
This complex situation regarding financing means that interaction is important. In The 
Netherlands, industrial site development is a decentralised responsibility: the local authorities 
are responsible for “[…] a successful restructuring” (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008, p. 10), and 
it is therefore also “[…] the task of the local authorities [serving as planning agency] to ensure 
that sufficient capital is secured […]” (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2008, p. 14; in Dutch the term 
“bijeen krijgen” is used, which emphasizes the process leading to a co-financing agreement). 
The (local) planning agency accordingly is responsible not only for ‘finding’ sufficient own 
means (which is often a considerable challenge regarding internal prioritizing processes), but 
also for getting support from provincial and national authorities and preferably from private 
parties also. 
This latter refers to a process perspective. The national government acknowledges the 
importance of process obstacles by stimulating the development of non-financial instruments 
for accelerating restructuring (VROM and EZ, 2007). This is in accordance with recent reports 
that state that, in restructuring projects, bottlenecks still exist in the areas of coordination, 
cooperation, capacity / knowledge, organisation, and laws and regulations (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2008; PBL, 2009; Nicis, 2009). In particular, people responsible for leading 
restructuring projects still mention laws and regulations, bureaucracy, low political priority, 
and the complexity of the problems as obstacles that slow down progress (Nicis, 2009). 
Appendix II 
The MASURIN-project
Note:	The	following	text	is	mainly	based	on	the	project	document	“Description	of	Work”.
The research project called Management of Sustainable Revitalisation of Urban Industrial 
Sites (MASURIN) was co-funded by the European Commission within the Fifth Framework 
Program (FP5), Key Action “City of Tomorrow”. The three-year project lasted from 2002 – 
2004, was led by the Dutch organisation TNO, and was executed by in total 15 participants 
from the Netherlands, France, Italy, Poland, Austria and Norway. 
The main objective of the project was “to provide authorities with knowledge and practical tools 
to create a new partnership with industry and the public, based on awareness, transparency 
and openness to dialogue in order to improve and maintain optimum sustainability, in both 
environmental and socio-economic terms” (DOW, p.4).
The project was performed in close cooperation between research institutes and city partners. 
In particular, the interaction and five in-depth case studies in different countries served 
as input for the main output of the project: a comprehensive Management Guide for local 
authorities (Brand, Bugge, and Roelofs, 2004). 
The Management Guide includes 8 parts: process guidance; supporting (process) tools; 
models for identifying and assessing socio-economic impacts, effects on the environment, 
best practices, and approaches for encouraging industry to adopt environmental measures; 
(improvement) measures; examples (of successful cases in different countries), (description 
of the five) cases; master plans (developed for the five cases), and references.
The Process Guidance and Supporting Tools together provide a decision support approach for 
processes: it is this that has served as the basis, and inspiration, for this study. 
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Appendix III 
Motives, resources, information, 
interdependency
1. Motives 
We focus first on the core actor characteristic “motives”. What are motives, and how do 
motives influence the decision making of actors, and the way they choose to act, and interact, 
in specific action arenas? What is the ‘thin’ explanation of how motives work, offered by 
rational choice, and which additional aspects can be included in a ‘richer’ explanation? We 
will not attempt here to give any complete overview of the extensive body-of-knowledge 
regarding motives, and how motives are translated into motivation for specific actions (for 
informative papers regarding the variety of theories that have been developed on motivation, 
see for example: Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; Steers et al., 2004; Latham and Pinder, 2005), but 
only briefly introduce the variety of motives encountered.
Using self-interest as a starting point
Rational choice theory assumes that actors pursue goals, and that these goals reflect 
their self-interest. Self-interest is the leading motive behind the goals that actors strive to 
reach. What is self-interest, and how can actors know whether, and to which extent, goals, 
measures, and actions actually contribute in a positive way to their self-interest? We start by 
observing that self-interest is no ‘simple’ motive. Rational choice theory (at least implicitly) 
acknowledges its complexity by saying that behaviour results from conscious choices. This 
implies that there must be alternatives to choose between, and actors choose the option that 
is consistent with the highest expected utility. So, there are other alternatives that contribute 
less to self-interest. Any highest expected utility will also usually be less attractive than the 
optimal utility. Furthermore, each alternative has many consequences, which mean that an 
actor has to assess how all consequences for all alternatives affect his self-interest. Rational 
choice theory assumes that such assessments are possible, because all actors possess 
the necessary information, and they have stable preferences. On the other hand, such 
assessments can be difficult to perform. What are the consequences that actors face, and 
what are the more specific motives that influence the way a ‘rational choice actor’ pursues 
self-interest? All actors focus on gain and loss. They continuously try to maximize gain and 
minimize losses at the same time, and any decision takes the expected consequences for 
both gains and losses into account. One level ‘deeper’ contains the diversity of possible gains 
and losses, and how they are related to more specific motives.   
Needs and responsibilities 
One perspective on motives is that actors try to fulfil their needs. Firms, for example, need 
to ensure their own continuity. Their actions are aimed at making profit, and possibly firm 
growth, but all their actions can be viewed as originating in their need for continuity. The 
effects of this motive are encountered in how actors try to get access to resources and 
information, and how they proactively, and reactively, choose to interact with other actors. 
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A second perspective on motives is that actors have responsibilities. The motives of planning 
agencies, for example, are linked to a general responsibility towards the local community 
(Sirgy, 1986). Their ‘self-interest’, as an actor, is to ensure that the local community prospers. 
Responsibilities are based in a structural context (Bressers, 2009). They influence the 
willingness of actors to enter an action arena, and they influence the choice of actions within 
the arena. Actors, and in particular the individuals representing them, see their actions as 
part of their responsibilities. These actions are only partly prescribed. The actors therefore 
try, more or less consciously, to assess how their specific actions can influence their situation. 
This assessment includes an interpretation of the available information about consequences, 
but also an interpretation of how far they feel their responsibilities reach, and which freedom 
of choice they feel they have. 
Motives include more than only pursuing ‘simple’ self-interest
How are such assessments made? What are the specific motives that make actors behave 
in other ways than ‘simple’ self-interest would predict? First, the actors that are involved in 
local action arenas often know each other. They have both a common history, and a common 
future. In particular, this means that they have to interact, and probably cooperate, in other 
arenas. This situation influences the way they act. They take into account how their actions 
can influence their future opportunities, and they are at the same time influenced by their 
past experiences with (representatives of) other actors. Their choices, and actions, are 
therefore ‘moderated’ by a variety of topics such as expectations about process performance 
and outcomes, trust, ideas, and even affective motives such as personal likes and dislikes. 
Second, actors in local settings try to act in such a way that they maintain, and strengthen, 
(social) relationships. In other words: actors include other normative considerations into 
their decision making. Such a normative frame, which operates together with frames of 
gain and loss, is, for example, concerned with expected effects related to ‘doing the right 
thing’ (Lindenberg, 2000). The behaviour of the actors is influenced by (especially their core) 
values, and they sometimes even choose altruistic actions that have a short-term negative 
impact on profit. On the other hand, they can consciously take into account that such actions 
can positively influence their reputation, and in that case their decisions are motivated by an 
expected positive contribution to long term gains. There may accordingly be an underlying 
general self-interest motive that drives all actions, which continuously operates on the 
background, and which has a long term orientation. On the other hand, individual actors may 
also act based on genuine altruistic motives, or, at least, motives aimed at, for example, 
creating collective benefits for a variety of local actors.  
Goals make motives ‘tangible’ 
Identifying the precise relationships between such underlying motives and specific actions is 
difficult. Actors need to know how they can translate general motives into the ‘right’ actions. 
In particular, actors therefore need something that can facilitate, and structure, their day-
to-day decision-making. This ‘something’ should make it possible to assess the effects of 
their actions in specific situations on their own general needs and responsibilities, but also 
how their chosen actions affect other actors. This is where goals are used. Goals regulate 
how specific preferences are developed, and how decisions are made in interactive settings 
(Kruglanski, 1996). What are these goals? The diversity of goals that can be encountered in 
complex interactive processes is large. There can be long-term and short-term goals, general 
aims and specific objectives, and joint goals and individual goals. Regardless of the nature 
of the goals, actors always choose actions that they believe are best suited for reaching 
them. In particular, they make decisions about whether to enter specific action arenas or 
not, their roles and actions within the arenas, and whether to leave the arenas. The first 
choice is whether to get involved in an action arena at all. There must be good reasons for 
getting involved, and these reasons must be perceived as stronger than the reasons that 
would make an actor decide to not enter the arena. Actors, in general, want to be involved in 
action arenas, if they believe they can use the participation as a way to influence a process, 
and its outcomes. They have specific objectives such as to influence the shaping of the 
discussion agenda (Friend and Hickling, 2005), and to influence other participants (Wrong, 
1979; Kirschner, 2007). Firms, for example, can view high perceived urgency and importance 
of problems as motives for taking action (Mitchell et al., 1997). Their goals are simply to 
solve these problems, and they can view interaction with other actors as the best way, or 
even necessity, for reaching their goals. Goals may also be of a completely different nature, 
because involvement is not always aimed at changing a situation. Actors can also be opposed 
to change, because they fear the negative effects. Their goal can then be to prevent, or at 
least postpone, decision making (Holmes, 1988; Bourne, 2009), and that is their motive for 
getting involved in an action arena. Citizens, for example, sometimes choose this approach, 
if they fear that quality of life or property value of their houses will be negatively affected by 
developments close to their homes. There can be a purely self-interest motive behind this 
“NIMBY”- (Not In My Back Yard) effect (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005), because these actors may 
not be against the proposed developments in general, but only opposed to them because 
they expect the developments to affect the close proximity of their homes. This NIMBY-effect, 
in particular, influences the perception of risk more than objective risk (Cutter, 1993), and 
actors will therefore often fear a ‘worst-case’ development. However, such behaviour is no 
‘simple resistance’, because the way the motives are interpreted depends on the applied 
perspective (Lidskog and Elander, 1992). A planning agency, for example, can view such 
goals and behaviour as reflecting purely self-interest driven motives, but the motives can 
alternatively be viewed as based on different opinions about which assessment criteria, 
and which weights, should be applied for making the ‘right’ decision. Actors may also want 
to participate even if they do not expect to be able to have any direct influence on the 
action arena. Their goal is then to get access to important information that otherwise would 
be more difficult, or impossible, to get. The possible benefits of participation are not the 
only aspects they take into consideration. Availability of resources can also be a motive for 
decisions about participation. A specific goal of participation, for example, can be to get 
access to (more) financial resources. On the other hand, actors also try to estimate the 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 2000; Coase, 1937), which are the costs related to 
(especially) the time they believe they will have to invest in the process preceding decisions 
on implementation of solutions. The assessment of possible benefits versus transaction 
costs, and own available resources, leads to decisions about the nature of involvement. In 
particular, citizens face resource limitations that influence their possibilities and willingness 
to participate in a process (Grant, 1994).  Actors can also assume that their goals will be 
reached without any own active contribution, and for that reason choose not to enter the 
arena. This can also lead to ‘free-riding’ opportunistic behaviour where, for example, firms try 
to maximise benefits through avoiding costs (Olson, 1965; Scott, 2000; EZ, 2004b). 
Goals influence behaviour, and behaviour influences goals
The diversity of initial motives, and of goals, that make actors decide to enter an action arena, 
keep on influencing their actions within the arena. However, the way they are perceived in 
specific situations is also influenced by actions taken by other actors. The underlying general 
motives stay the same, but the perceived importance of specific goals and actions, especially 
in interactive situations where quick decisions have to be made without having any possibility 
for checking their consequences, can vary. This means that preferences, contrary to what is 
assumed by rational choice theory, are not always stable in such situations. Goals in arenas 
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are therefore both process inputs, and process outputs. Initial goals and preferences are 
modified, and new goals and preferences are constructed based on the decision context 
(Tversky et al., 1988; Slovic, 1995; Latham and Pinder, 2005; Krantz and Kunreuther, 
2007). Actors continuously assess how the developments affect their goals, and they act in 
accordance with their perception of what they expect these effects to be. Developments that 
initially are perceived as occurring within a gain frame, for example, can abruptly transfer 
into loss frames if ‘golden opportunities’ are missed (Lindenberg, 2000). Actors perceive 
potential losses as more important than potential gains (Kahneman et al., 1991), and actions 
within a loss frame are usually taken quickly (Loewenstein, 1996). This means that actors, 
often without any prior ‘warning’, can choose to leave the arena, if they feel ‘threatened’ by 
the developments.The specific nature of goals influences also how motivated actors will be 
to strive to reach these goals (Locke, 1968; Bandura, 1986; 1991; Kanfer, 1990; Locke and 
Latham, 1990; Mitchell and Daniels, 2003), and accordingly their actions. Usually specific, 
difficult, goals lead to better “performance” than general, less difficult, goals. However, in 
situations characterised by high pressure for immediate results, and limited available skills, 
general, less difficult, goals can lead to better performance (Latham and Pinder, 2005). Both 
situations are encountered during long-term complex interactive processes, and the arena 
performance depends on how each specific situation, and goal, is perceived. This perception 
of situation, and goals, is influenced by the interaction with other arena participants, and, 
in particular, also by the feedback received. Actors apply feedback as a basis for correcting 
own performance (Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001; Locke and Latham, 2002). The feedback can 
stimulate adapting, abandoning, or changing efforts to reach, goals (Austin and Vancouver, 
1996). For example, in situations where actors view goals as (too) simple, unimportant, or not 
attainable, and where there is no appropriate feedback mechanism operating, actors often 
lack motives for accepting the goals initially, and certainly for staying committed to reaching 
them (Locke and Latham, 2002). 
Actors pursue several goals at the same time, and have to prioritise  
What happens when several goals influence performance of actors, and the arena? How do 
individual actors choose? Actors usually pursue several goals, related to different underlying 
motives and values, at the same time (Rhodes, 1997; O’Neill and Quinn, 1993), and they 
therefore take into account how their actions affect each individual goal. At the same time, 
they take into account how their general interests are affected, and the resulting choice and 
behaviour will represent a certain balance, and optimum, between all goals. This means 
that in any specific situation, actors prioritise among multiple goals (Krantz and Kunreuther, 
2007). For example, although a stakeholder perspective emphasizes that firms should take 
the legitimate interests of all relevant stakeholders into consideration (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995), firms will need to determine which stakeholders, and accordingly goals, 
matter most (Harrison and St. John, 1996). In practice, such a prioritising process often leads 
to the selection of one most important goal that dominates over other goals (Lindenberg 
and Frey, 1993; Lindenberg, 2000). The choice of one dominant goal affects the way all 
other goals are viewed, and pursued (Chaserant, 2003). The prioritising process leads to a 
distribution of resources, which implies a quantitative and possibly also qualitative (referring 
to cognitive efforts) trade-off between the goals (Erez, 2005). Less effort is taken to reach 
the goals that are perceived as less important, and these goals are also pursued with less 
persistence (Mitchell and Daniels, 2003). Actors face a particularly difficult situation if specific 
goals are perceived as incongruent (Thomsen et al., 2004), competing (Rhodes, 1997), 
vague, or conflicting (Seijts and Latham, 2000; Bozeman, 1984; Nutt, 2000). In particular, 
“performance” is undermined if goal conflicts motivate incompatible actions (Locke et al. 
1994; Seijts and Latham, 2000). The chosen dominant goal can in such situations receive 
disproportionately much attention, and the time needed to reach other ‘difficult’ goals, and 
the quality of the outcome, can both be negatively affected. Finally, the situation within an 
action arena will change during a long-lasting process, which means that relative attention 
to specific goals can change too. In particular, perceived urgency of goals influences short-
term attention to goals. Actors, at any moment in time, try to make a profit, avoid losses, and 
behave in a socially acceptable manner. They try to make sense of their complex environment 
(Weick, 1990), and at the same time they work towards some kind of general quality that is 
linked to many different goals (Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007). Although actors may attempt 
to use multi-criteria models and presume that all alternatives can be ordered with respect 
to utility functions in such a way that better alternatives receive higher values (Tanguiane, 
1990), the trade-off between multiple goals includes more than only a revealed, calculated, 
utility maximization result (Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007). Goals, choices, and behaviour are 
also influenced by the specific situation, and, in particular, the interaction with other arena 
participants.  
2. Resources  
What are the resources that actors use, and how are they applied in interaction between actors 
for reaching goals? Defining the term “resources” is a not simple (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). 
Resources can have a variety of meanings such as capital, labour, facilities, equipment, land, 
time, and materials, but also include less tangible aspects such as skills, access to distribution 
channels, legitimacy, power / influence, and (even) entrepreneurial energy (Crozier, 1964; 
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1988; Oliver, 1990; Rumelt et al., 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Browning et 
al., 1995; Kaiser et al., 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Bressers, 2009). Resources are something that 
actors possess, such as money and human capacity: there must be at least some resources 
“[…] that an actor brings to a situation […]” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p.33, emphasis added). 
Actors use those resources for reaching their goals. They invest time and money in a process, 
and they use their skills in the action arena. Resources provide a capacity to act, and they 
are a source of power in the interaction process in the arena (Bressers, 2009). Actors can 
consciously choose which part of their resources they want to allocate to an action situation 
at a specific time, and they can choose also how they want to apply them. The importance 
of the resources money (or financial capacity, or command over material goods such as 
land) is clear, especially in relation to restructuring industrial sites. The following discussion 
will, therefore, concentrate on those (often non-material) resources possessed by actors and 
which are relevant to, and used for,	influencing	process (including progress) and outcomes of 
restructuring. This means that we can focus on exploring how resources are used for affecting 
restructuring. 
The relationship between information and resources
The broad definition of resources just introduced does not exclude the possibility of viewing 
information as a resource. However, following the Contextual Interaction Theory, information 
and resources are viewed as different variables, while at the same time recognising that they 
influence each other (Bressers, 2004). Motives form the link between both parts, because 
motives affect how resources and information are used.
Influencing developments
Actors try to improve their situation and reach their goals by influencing the approaches 
taken. They do this by using their resources. There is a wide range of views on power and 
influence (e.g. Willer et al., 1997; Turner, 2005; Zimmerling, 2005; Clegg et al., 2006; 
Haugaard and Clegg, 2009). The multitude of perspectives is partly contradictory and partly 
overlapping. “[…] Power and influence are not properly distinguished in the standard theory 
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[…]” (Turner, 2005, p.8), and there is no consensus regarding the exact meaning of the terms 
(e.g. Hillier, 2002, pp.47-48; Turner, 2005; Zimmerling, 2005), nor, in particular, regarding 
how they are related to each other and to other terms such as authority and control .The 
term influence is usually preferred to power. Power is often associated with a coercive way 
of influencing a development, which is inappropriate within a democracy, unless used as the 
very last option in an otherwise unsolvable conflict. Still, although “[…] power has had a bad 
press […]” (Turner, 2005, p. 29), power is, as a wide range of scholars have pointed out, more 
complex and not a priori ‘wrong’. Power has even been called “[…] the most important single 
idea in political theory, comparable perhaps to utility in economics […]” (Elster 1976, p.249). 
However, literature on influence and power seems to revolve around the same key questions 
and issues. Therefore the term “influence” is used here as the ‘leading term’, but at the same 
time information is drawn from the rich literature on “power”. 
Influence as something actors possess and bring to arenas
To which degree should influence be regarded as a possession of an individual actor? An actor 
can assess its power as the probability of reaching his, goal taking into account any resistance 
(Weber, 1922), that is, to get activities or objectives accomplished (Lovell, 1993; Magenau 
and Pinto, 2007) by using its resources (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The relationships between actors can then be explained as exchanges, where resources are 
used to exert influence (Ulrich and Barney, 1984), and power dependencies are measured as 
asymmetries (Skvoretz and Willer, 1993). This ‘standard’ theory on power as the capacity for 
influence through resource dependency (Turner, 2005 and references cited therein provides 
a base-line explanation of why, actors, for example those involved in restructuring, focus on 
the need for financial resources and know-how. Such power bases are then ‘simple’ attributes 
or possessions (Kotter, 1977; Barnes, 1988) present in fixed relations (Clegg, 1989) and can 
be viewed as some kind of commodity that actors can acquire, exchange, share or even 
delegate. However, this ‘classical’ view on resources as the base of power has been criticised 
as being incomplete. It largely neglects the effect of a variety of underlying and much more 
complex additional power bases. The work of French and Raven (French and Raven, 1959) 
and Wrong (1979) introduces us to this complexity. French and Raven mention five different 
power bases. First, there is the positional (or legitimate power: see Wrong, 1979) which refers 
to a formal authority (Barnes, 1988; Turner, 2005). Second, there is coercive power, which 
refers to the threat or actual use of ‘punishments’ to ensure compliance. This is mirrored 
in the reward power, which includes the possibilities of offering something needed by 
another actor. Wrong applies the term ‘induced authority’, which refers to the possibilities of 
influencing developments through for example financial measures. The expert power base is 
quite different: it refers to the skills (know-how) that an actor possesses. Finally, French and 
Raven include a power base called “referent power”. This is based on personal charisma and 
interpersonal skills. All these five power bases can be distinguished in complex interactive 
processes such as restructuring. For example, the role of formal (legitimate) authority during 
restructuring of industrial sites reserved for the planning agency and higher authorities: 
government is a very powerful actor (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). However, the legitimate 
formal authority-based influence of planning agencies on processes and outcomes of 
restructuring is limited. Planning agencies can apply coercion related to their responsibilities 
and opportunities given by laws and regulations, and they can also offer ‘rewards’ such as 
co-funding to induce change (Wrong, 1979). These two power bases function as the ‘stick and 
carrot’. However, understanding influence must also take account of skills, and in particular, 
interpersonal skills and charisma. There is much more to the use of influence than simple 
hierarchical approaches or (economic) exchange relationships. 
This is where Wrong’s work adds some new perspectives. He introduces manipulation and 
persuasion as intentional ways of influencing. This means that “architectures of capabilities” 
(Grant, 1996) can affect the probability of reaching goals, including the process and the 
outcomes of an action arena. The sum of capabilities can be viewed as aggregated possessed 
influence. An actor possesses capital and information, but also bargaining power, legitimacy, 
and claims that have a certain perceived level of urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997; Friedman 
and Miles, 2006). If all these characteristics score high related to an action situation, then 
this stakeholder has a potentially high impact on the process and outcomes of an arena. 
The different power bases can also be positioned on a range between a “power over” and a 
“power to” (Elliott, 1980; Clegg et al., 2006). The “power to” adds a particularly interesting 
perspective, because it links the use of influence to a desired outcome. In most situations, 
a “power to” (see also “power through” e.g. in Turner, 2005 and “indirect power” in Stone, 
1980) is more important than a “power over”. The “power to” refers to an “action potential” 
(Kooiman, 1993), “capacity to act” (Stone, 1989), “ability to bring about the outcome you 
desire” (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1988), or “implementation capacity” (Sørensen and Torfing, 
2007). It focuses on both the distribution of influence and the aggregated influence, and as 
such it acknowledges and links influence as a possession of individual actors to a somewhat 
intangible capability that evolves and flows within an arena. This view on a “power to” means 
that if a certain group uses a mix of persuasion, authority, and coercion, it can exert its will 
to gain control over resources (Turner, 2005). 
This is an example of shared power, viewed as “[…] shared capabilities exercised in 
interaction between or among actors to further achievement of their separate and joint 
aims […]” (Bryson and Crosby, 1992, p. 13). Although “shared” suggests the presence of 
a common utility that is distributed among the actors that have power over a situation and 
in relationships (Dyrberg, 1997), shared power does not mean that all actors have equal 
power or that power is shared equally (Crosby and Bryson, 2005). This concept of shared 
capabilities is particularly interesting if some actors have reached a joint vision on the desired 
developments, but they still need to involve, and convince, other actors. This situation is 
common in the initial phase of a process. The purpose is always to seek feasible solutions. 
This requires focusing the influence of the involved actors. Accordingly, the way influence is 
distributed, shared and ‘added’ up within the arena can be more important than what actors 
individually bring. Furthermore, what actors bring to an arena can depend on processes 
that take place before the arena is ‘designed’, so influence is something that is applied 
continuously in a variety of more or less interconnected arenas, and at certain moments 
is coupled to specific developments. Influence is accordingly not something that remains 
constant within any action arena. It is affected by the interaction processes, agenda, and 
exogenous factors. The position taken here is in agreement with Giddens (1979; 1984) and his 
theory of structuration. Giddens sees power as something that is both exercised, and created, 
by agents, but also influences and limits their actions. Power relations are always two-way, 
and actors are dependent and possess autonomy. It is therefore necessary to understand how 
influence is actually used within the arena.
Intentional use of influence 
The use of influence can be divided into intended and unintended (Wrong, 1979; Turner, 
2005). The unintended part is not unimportant, because, for example, a ‘bad first impression’ 
in interaction between actors has consequences not only for that moment, but also for future 
opportunities for cooperation. The ‘unconsciously unskilled’ actor can cause much harm both 
to himself and the process. However, here the discussion is limited to how actors intentionally 
use their influence for reaching their goals. It should be added that the intention can be not 
to use one’s influence, if this would help actors reaching their goals. There are several ways 
to influence strategic decision-making (Friend and Hickling, 2005) intentionally. We view the 
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restructuring as an overt arena having an open agenda and open access. This means that 
those actors that participate have all decided to do so, and the reasons for non-participation 
are sought in passiveness or indifference and not in the influence these actors possess. 
In an ideal case, all stakeholders would then be represented in an open and democratic 
decision-making process. However, this one-dimensional model, as Lukes calls it, (Lukes, 
1974) does not explain why in practice some actors are invited to participate and others are 
not, nor why the processes within an arena are not always completely open and transparent. 
This deviation from an open negotiation model has been viewed as the impact of a second 
‘covert’ dimension of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). It is encountered as a form of 
resistance when actors for their own advantage try to prevent decision-making, seriously 
postpone processes (Bourne, 2009), or exclude topics from the discussion (Holmes, 1988). To 
reach these goals they can make use of biases that maintain or create situations that favour 
certain interests, and they try to influence perceptions of what is regarded as important 
and unimportant. Firms can for example try to move attention towards the quality of the 
infrastructure or security, whereas an environmental interest group can try to shift the 
focus towards intensive land use. A variety of outflanking techniques is also applied (Mann, 
1986). Actors can intentionally be kept in ignorance, and powerful actors can be divided and 
kept unaware of other actors in the same situation. This can prevent effective organised 
resistance, and ensure that only non-effective episodic resistance occurs (Clegg, 1989). For 
example, both planning agencies and firms have some freedom in choosing how and when 
they will communicate with other actors regarding developments that interest these other 
actors. Besides influencing what actors know and what may be discussed, these influencing 
approaches are also aimed at preventing actors from participating in the decision-making 
arena, and at obtaining compliance of these actors to the developments (Gaventa, 1980). Any 
influencing approach may lead to an outcome somewhere between commitment, compliance 
and resistance (Barnes, 2007). Outflanking approaches are, for example, encountered 
in restructuring regarding the involvement of project developers, local inhabitants and 
environmental interest groups. Project developers can be perceived by a planning agency 
as a threat, because they can use acquired knowledge for speculating in property, whereas 
environmental groups and inhabitants are ‘feared’ because they can use participation as 
a way to collect information intended for future resistance and opposing developments in 
court. Because these approaches are covert, they are what Wrong refers to as manipulation 
(Wrong, 1979). Firms involved in a restructuring can for example suggest that they lack the 
financial means for investing in certain options. They can do this by not saying anything at all, 
or by saying that they cannot contribute to a complete restructuring challenge, thereby not 
mentioning that a smaller contribution might be possible. It can be true that firms really lack 
resources, but it can also be a matter of prioritizing or even be used as a stalling strategy, 
hoping that the planning agency will find the necessary resources elsewhere. Also planning 
agencies can use such approaches. They can present plans that suggest developments that 
are perceived as threats to firms on the site, solely for the purpose of stimulating (re) action 
and active participation in a restructuring. Finally, interest groups can say that they will not 
prevent the development of a new site if sufficient attention is given to restructuring. There 
is no guarantee (unless an agreement in the form of a contract has been made) that this 
informal ‘trade-off’ between goals will work. 
All these approaches may be called negotiation strategies, but an outside spectator may well 
find such approaches manipulative. How such approaches are viewed accordingly depends 
on the normative framework applied. Besides the overt and covert dimensions Lukes found 
that the role of interpersonal interaction was insufficiently taken into account (Lukes, 1974). 
He saw how one actor can influence, and determine and shape the will of another actor to 
the extent that this second actor even does something that is harmful to himself. This way 
of influencing is particularly interesting in that it refers to how communication occurs and 
who is involved in the interaction. It is about how actors involved in an interactive process 
can influence each other’s’ behaviour through persuasion (Wrong, 1979), but also about 
how actors experience a situation and each other. Especially trust matters (, because “[…] 
when people trust you, they are [more] open to being persuaded by you […]” (Kirschner, 
2007, p.3). An actor’s reputation for achievements also matters, and how actors show self-
confidence and commitment to ideas (Barnes, 2007), just as enthusiasm, ability to relate 
well to others and to communicate powerful and attractive ideas in compelling ways. These 
factors are important both for interaction and the quality of outcomes of a process such as 
restructuring. There are many examples of ‘unexplainable’ sudden positive breakthroughs in 
real life projects that are linked to a charismatic politician, an influential entrepreneur, or a 
process manager that ‘speaks the language of both authorities and firms’. Influence is not 
only about formal decision-making and negotiations, but also about having the right person 
at the right place at the right moment: somebody who listens to feed-back, understands the 
different perceptions of importance, and builds bridges between actors linked to feasible 
proposals. 
3. Information  
The above shows the importance of the use, and understanding of, information. What is 
information, and how does it influence decision making, and behaviour? The interest in the 
field of information collection, processing, and distribution has resulted in a vast body of 
literature. It includes a wide range of topics such as management of information, and more 
specific perspectives on group interaction and communication, learning and knowledge, and 
cognition and relationships with attitudes and behaviour (see e.g. Burnstein and Holsapple, 
2008; Clegg et al., 2006; Albarracin et al., 2005; Holsapple, 2003; Frey, 1999; Daft and Lengel, 
1986; Pimmler and Eppinger, 1994; Flynn and Flynn, 1999; Thomsen et al., 2004; Premkumar 
et al., 2005). We will here (as we did regarding motives and resources) not attempt to give 
any comprehensive overview of the body-of-knowledge, but focus on the information which 
actors can ‘bring’ to action arenas, and on how information is used, and developed, within 
the arenas. 
The relationships between data, information, and knowledge
Actors collect, and use, data. Data are transformed into information when they are given 
a meaning. An important link between data and information is therefore the information 
richness, which is the capacity of data for transferring information. We view information here 
as something that changes, or reinforces, the understanding of a situation. Information, again, 
serves as input for building knowledge. More information can give a better understanding of a 
specific topic, but also of the relationships between different topics. Although we only use the 
term information here, we acknowledge at the same time that the term information includes 
the (preceding and underlying) steps of data collection, analysis, and interpretation, and that 
all information is used within, and linked to, the complete knowledge that actors possess (see 
e.g. Holsapple, 2003 regarding views on knowledge versus information).
Sources, quantity, and quality of information
Actors decide to enter an action arena (or refrain from doing so), and they act within the 
arena, based on the information they have. How do they get access to information, and what 
kind of information do they have? 
Actors use a variety of sources of information such as documents, and other actors. Each 
source has its own specific characteristics, which affect the perceived quality, credibility, and 
the range of possible interpretations. For example, information from other actors includes 
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both written and oral communication. Oral, face-to-face, communication has specific 
advantages, because it is possible to use direct feedback for controlling and correcting 
one’s own interpretations. However, it also introduces additional challenges, caused by the 
interactive process itself, which will be discussed below. Actors can have information about a 
large variety of topics. This includes information about a specific action situation, and about 
other actors. Actors face uncertainty related to lack of information: there is a difference 
between the available information and the required information. The involved actors face 
such uncertainty, for example, regarding searches for information on improvement options 
(Nutt, 2000).  
An incomplete understanding can be caused by ‘simple’ (quantitative) lack of information, 
but also by ambiguity (March and Simon, 1958). Ambiguous information means that it is 
impossible to perform an ‘objective’ analysis, and collecting more of such information will not 
help improving this situation.  
Distribution of information among actors, and the effect of interaction
Any actor enters an arena ‘bringing’ its own information. This means that different actors will, 
at least initially, normally have access to different information: the information is unequally 
distributed among the actors. The initial difference in ‘possessed’ information can be large, 
and it affects how actors behave, and also what they expect from their involvement. During 
the interaction in the arena, information will to some extent be exchanged, and shared. 
However, actors usually choose to share only part of their information, and they also choose 
the specific moments when they believe using, or sharing, information will be beneficial to 
themselves. They use information strategically for reaching their goals. There is accordingly a 
continuously changing situation about access to information for individual actors, and about 
the shared information. The interaction within the arena produces new information too, and 
the involved actors have to decide how this new information affects their situation, and how 
it is to be distributed.  
Sufficient information versus the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ 
Each actor continuously assesses whether the available information is sufficient, meaning 
complete and accurate enough, for making a decision about what to do. All actors, together, also 
regularly ask themselves whether they have sufficient shared information for decisions about 
joint actions. Sufficient information is accordingly always related to a specific combination of 
one or more actors, and a decision. Furthermore, the term “sufficient”, implicitly, indicates 
that the available information at any moment can be less than all information that can be 
collected about a specific topic. It also indicates that sufficient may also be less than what is 
desirable. Ostrom (2007) links the problems associated with access to, and use of, information 
to the concept of “bounded rationality” introduced by Herbert Simon. According to Simon, 
every attempt to comprehensive decision making will fail, because it is impossible to take 
all choices and solutions into consideration. He further states that if this should be possible, 
there will in practice always be lack of problem solving ability or resources (Simon, 1957; 
North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005). In other words: actors make decisions based on an incomplete 
understanding of a specific situation. 
Available information needs to be satisfactory, and actors are ‘satisficing’ 
How do they make these decisions? How do they view, and assess, information completeness? 
Actors collect information on a variety of decision related aspects such as uncertainty, risks, 
investments, and effects of possible solutions, and each actor has its own specific information 
needs. For example, politicians are particularly interested in information about how collective 
interests are affected (Massam, 1993), and interest groups seek information about effects on 
their specific objectives (Klaassen, 1995). 
The total assessment of possible decisions includes aspects such as possible effects on 
relationships with other actors. This means that, although information will be used as input 
for ‘hard’ calculations, ‘soft’ aspects are also taken into consideration. Each actor collects 
information until a satisfactory level has been reached. This satisfactory level reflects a 
complex aggregated total of information on all specific aspects such as investments and 
effects.
New information affects what initially is perceived as satisfactory information related to a 
specific decision. Or, in other words, new information can change both information needs, 
and the decision itself, considerably. Firms will, for example, continuously assess effects 
of different developments on profitability, which implies that they often prioritise internal 
investments (Rhodes, 1997) above investments in, for example, restructuring (EZ, 2001). An 
urgent internal investment, such as a necessary replacement of crucial production equipment, 
is an example of how priorities can influence a decision. The same applies to planning 
agencies that have to prioritise among multiple goals in a local community. Restructuring of 
industrial sites, for example, is only one of a multitude of issues that ‘fight’ for a position on 
the agenda of a planning agency. Information that indicates a higher urgency, or importance, 
of another existing problem, can change the view on a (preliminary) decision about such a 
restructuring, and lead to an altered distribution of financial means. 
Both new information, and lack of information, can lead to increased uncertainty about what 
to do, and any increase in uncertainty has consequences for an organisation (Kukalis, 1991; 
Clark et al., 1994). Uncertainty can influence the willingness to take decisions. For example, 
“[…] in an environment of increased uncertainty due to lack of adequate information, 
program managers [of public organisations] will rationally avoid decision making due to an 
unacceptable level of risk they perceive to be associated with the probability of making an 
incorrect decision […] (Fuller and Roffey, 1993, p.154).      
Cognition, affect, and interaction all matter 
Actors interpret information, and their decisions are based on these interpretations. Their 
decisions do not fulfil the assumptions of rational choice theory, because they rarely (or 
maybe never) possess all necessary information, and their preferences are influenced, and 
changed, by the information they receive. How do actors interpret? What kind of ‘truths’ are 
the outcomes of these interpretations? Stein (as earlier mentioned) says that calculations, and 
behaviour, of actors are based on perceived interests and the alternatives which they think 
are important (Stein, 2006). Actors interpret reality, and their interpretations are mediated 
by frames of reference (Bressers, 2009). Their cognitions (interpretations of reality held to be 
true) are not only based on ‘facts’ (see e.g. Corr, 2010 for an introduction to the complexity of 
the term “cognition” and its relationships to behaviour). They take into account the credibility 
of the actor that provides the information, and also the (personal) relationship with this actor, 
into their assessment of the value of information. We therefore agree with Lupia when he 
says that “[…] our treatment of how people reason should be informed by modern scholarship 
about how cognition	and	affect affect information processing […]” (Lupia et al., 2000, p.12, 
emphasis added by author).This shows that the interaction between actors in a specific 
action arena influences how information is used, and given meaning. Actors use information 
within the arena for a variety of purposes such as influencing roles, decision-making and 
participation (Arnstein, 1969; Friedmann, 1973; Pröpper and Steenbeek, 1998), negotiation 
and bargaining for resources (Bekkers, 1996; Salet and Faludi, 2000), and attempts to reach 
consensus (Driessen and Vermeulen, 1995; Innes, 1998; 2004; Woltjer, 2000). These, and 
more, processes often occur at the same time, and they can often not be distinguished as 
separate activities. To some extent the change is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 
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1973; Guba and Lincoln, 1990), and the outcome is not only uncertain, but the ‘truth’ is also 
locally and politically situated (Popkewitz, 1984). It is therefore not surprising that getting 
results other than expected seems intrinsic to such complex interactive (consensus) processes 
(Woltjer, 2000). Information and meaning are both ‘created’ in the discourse process, and the 
actors involved “[…] fall short of the ideal model of rational choice […]” (Lake and Powell, 
1999, p. 216), which also means acknowledging that actors to a certain extent are fallible 
(Ostrom, 2005).
4. Action situations and interdependency 
“Interdependence is the reason why nothing comes out 
quite the way one wants it” 
(Pfeffer	and	Salancik,	2003,	p.40).
Actors participate in specific action arenas because they want to protect their own interests. 
In addition, they know that their efforts to maximize benefits and minimize losses are to some 
extent dependent on others (Scott, 2000; Immergut, 1998, Lupia et al., 2000; Woltjer, 2000), 
and that they might need to cooperate to reach their goals (Bruijn de and ten Heuvelhof, 
2000). 
The degree of interdependency is a characteristic of specific action situations and it influences 
the way actors choose to act. An action arena can be quite complex, because there can be 
several actors involved, and the interdependency between (pairs of) actors varies. The actors 
often experience this ‘tangle’ of interdependency relationships as a situation where “[…] no 
single actor, public or private has all knowledge and information required to solve complex, 
dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application 
of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate 
unilaterally [...]” (Kooiman, 1993, p.4). It is also experienced as a situation where “[…] a 
variety of actors [are] making decisions in a web of relationships [… and] there is neither 
a purely private nor a purely public realm” (Freeman, 2000, p. 673). The actors involved 
are at the same time interdependent and operationally autonomous (Sundström, 2010), and 
they are regularly confronted with dilemmatic decisions (Sorge, 2005) in their goal-seeking 
process towards largely unknown “zones of agreement” (Raiffa, 1982; Raiffa et al., 2002). 
What is this complex phenomenon called interdependency, and how does it affect arena 
performance and outcomes?    
What is interdependency and how can it be characterised?
Interdependency (alternatively referred to as mutual dependency) is something that 
characterizes a relationship between two or more aspects. There are two distinct perspectives 
available on what these ‘aspects’ can be. 
One possibility is to focus on activities or tasks. In restructuring, for example, all activities are 
related to overall progress and outcomes. In that sense interdependency means a contingent 
relationship between (tasks or) activities (Thompson, 1967). 
The other perspective, and the one taken in this study, focuses on the actors involved and 
their interdependency. Interdependency influences how actors behave, and make decisions: 
there is a felt need for joint decision-making (March and Simon, 1958). Interdependency 
stimulates interaction in search of commitment to solutions. As Woltjer expresses it: “[…] In 
answering the question ‘why to engage in a consensus process’, the mutual dependence or 
interdependency of actors turns out to be essential [and such] mutual dependence usually 
materialises because of a joint problem or because lower government levels are responsible 
for the operationalisation of a plan […]” (Woltjer, 2000, p. 149). 
Such joint problems can be either actual or perceived, in the sense that actors are unable to 
solve the problems without cooperation, or they can feel a certain obligation to involve other 
actors in order to, for example, give solutions legitimacy and to create broad commitment. In 
practice, a mix of actual and perceived interdependencies is usually encountered, and actors 
more or less consciously, and continuously, take them all into account. Actors do so, because 
they know they have influence through relationships and mutual obligations (Barnes, 2007). 
Firms, for example, in general try to minimise their dependency on others, while maximising 
the dependency of others on themselves (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1988, Scott, 2003; Straub 
et al., 2008). On the other hand they (and other actors as well) deliberately develop and 
maintain trust-based interdependency relationships as a strategy for reaching their goals. 
Sometimes an individual actor can implement change, such as improvements that are limited 
to its own property and are not restricted by laws and regulations. On the other hand, an 
actor’s willingness to make this investment is often influenced by other perceived or actual 
interdependencies. 
The cognition of interdependency, and the actual interdependencies, can both be actively 
influenced, because “[…] the way individuals interact depends on how interdependence is 
structured in the situation […]” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, p. 319). Interdependency is 
accordingly more than a constant, or a ‘simple’ constraint that limits freedom of choice. It is 
at the same time a variable that can be integrated in arena design and management, and it 
can be used for influencing arena performance. 
What are the characteristics of interdependency relationships? Actors can take a variety of 
dependency characteristics into consideration in their decision-making, such as importance 
(criticality and magnitude) and legal necessity (Oliver, 1990); tightness, or strength, of 
couplings (Granovetter, 1973; Weick, 1976, Orton and Weick, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 
1996); symmetry and power (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003); reciprocity (Thompson, 
1967; O’Toole, 1988; Oliver, 1990); vertical (hierarchical) versus horizontal in networks (e.g. 
Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997; Klijn, 1997; Sørensen and Torfing, 
2007); exchangeability of alternatives (Scharpf, 1978). Finally, there are also “contingent 
interdependencies”, which refer to situations where timing is a major uncertainty (March and 
Simon, 1958). 
Given this diversity, some interdependency-relationships may even be too complex, or 
subtle, to be identified (Siggelkow, 2002), and completely understood through rational 
analysis (Weick, 1990). To counter this, it is sometimes possible to simplify by viewing 
interdependencies as existing only in cases where such a relationship has been “consensually 
validated” (Gresov and Stephens, 1993). 
Actor interdependency regarding motives, resources, and information 
In spite of this complexity, it is possible to explore actor interdependencies. We do this from 
the three perspectives established earlier: the motives, resources, and information that 
characterise the actors in the process. Each of these perspectives sheds different light on 
dependency relationships between actors. The different perspectives do not lead to the same 
single ‘solution’ for understanding interdependency, but can be used in a complementary 
manner to provide an expanded view on performance, and outcomes, of action arenas. 
Motives: goal interdependency
Interdependency influences which goals actors choose, and how they are pursued, and 
the actors take interdependency into account when assessing the potential effects of their 
behaviour both on current and future opportunities. For example, firms and planning agencies 
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in restructuring know that they will need each other for a variety of issues at different 
moments in time (Bueren van and ten Heuvelhof, 2005, p. 63), and this influences their 
willingness to cooperate (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2000). Actors take into consideration 
a wide range of additional strategic goals linked to establishing, and maintaining, inter-
organisational relationships (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Firms, for 
example, accept the interdependency of cooperative agreements in order to reach goals such 
as better access to know-how, sharing of risks, and influencing governing bodies ((Powell, 
1990; Barringer and Harrison, 2000).   
This complex interdependency makes actors experience the interaction in the arenas as 
strategic interactive choice processes: the ability of actors to reach their goals depends on 
the actions that others take (Lake and Powell, 1999). These interaction processes accordingly 
include a diversity of ‘strategic choices’ (Friend and Jessop, 1969) where the interdependent 
actors pursue goals by shaping the decision making context, and by influencing choices 
of other actors (Collier and Norden, 1992). The way actors choose, and pursue, such goals 
is addressed within the social interdependence theory, which posits that the outcomes for 
actors are affected by each other’s actions (Deutsch, 1949; 1973; for a comprehensive 
overview see: Johnson and Johnson, 2005). If goals can be achieved solely through one’s 
own actions, the actor in a relationship is independent. If, in order to achieve one’s goals, 
one’s own actions have no effect but the other’s actions do, then an actor is dependent. 
There is interdependency when the actions of both sides are necessary to achieve goals. 
The theory further posits that actors therefore view goals as cooperatively, competitively or 
independently related. When actors cannot benefit without reaching some kind of agreement, 
their interests, and goals, are complementary: they cooperate. The interests are opposed if 
benefits (e.g. resources) have to be divided between actors, and the more one gets, the less 
the others get (Willer et al., 1997). In such a case the actors compete. 
Although the social interdependency theory was first developed based on the assumption of 
a single goal, “[…] in the real world, each person always has multiple goals and, therefore, 
situations are always mixed motive, with individuals often having cooperative, competitive, 
and individualistic goals in the same situation […]” (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, p. 295). 
Actors therefore choose their strategy for pursuing each goal based on an assessment of its 
nature, and at the same time they focus on the total effect on all their goals. 
Ideally there is a situation of reciprocity in the arena, when actors are cooperating to reach 
mutually beneficial goals (Oliver, 1990). However, in particular, some of the more traditional 
public goals may be incompatible with traditional private goals. In such situations “[…] a 
complicated exchange (the original Dutch text applies the terms “uitruil en uitwisseling”) of 
goals is necessary […]” (Teisman et al., 2001, p.51).
The actors accept the interdependency (and hence the necessity to cooperate) in a specific 
action arena only as long as they believe it is beneficial to reaching their various goals. 
The key question they ask themselves regarding the interdependency relationships “[…] is 
the simple notion of whether [they] make sense and whether the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages […]” (Barringer and Harrison, 2000, p. 368). Actors take both long-term and 
short-term effects into account. They can participate because they expect future benefits to 
(more than) compensate for current (transaction) costs (Blau, 1964). On the other hand, if a 
short term perspective dominates, they cooperate only as long as both parties are making a 
profit (Homans, 1961). Planning agencies, for example, often have a long-term perspective 
on restructuring whereas firms tend to be more focused on short-term improvements, which 
suggests that an appropriate combination of ‘quick-win’ goals and long-term ambitions is 
needed. 
Finally, goal interdependency is not limited to one specific action arena. Actors usually 
participate in more arenas (more or less) at the same time, and they need to take into 
consideration how the performance of the different arenas affect each other. The effectiveness, 
for example, can depend on policy-making in one specific arena, but the results have to be 
approved in another arena (Benz, 2007). This interdependency can affect both outcomes, 
and, in particular, progress.  
Resource interdependency
Resource dependency is one of the main reasons why actors participate in specific action 
arenas. They need each other’s’ resources for reaching their goals. 
The extensive literature addressing resource dependency has focused both on inter- and 
intra-organisational relationships (e.g. Ulrich and Barney, 1984, Ancona and Caldwell, 1990; 
Malone and Crowston, 1994; Roth, 1995; Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Casciaro and Piskorski; 
2005). In particular, inter-organisational studies are increasingly addressing resource 
dependency in complex situations, such as encountered in internal ‘networks’ of subsidiaries 
of multinational corporations (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Birkinshaw 
et al., 2001, Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), and in networks involving firms (Scharpf, 1978, 
Thorelli, 1986; Johanson and Mattson, 1987; Medcof, 2001), and in networks involving other 
actors also (Teisman, 1992; Rhodes, 1997; Klijn, 2008). 
Resource dependency theory tries to explain the success of organisations in maximizing their 
‘power’ in an uncertain environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Emerson, 
1962; for an attempt to summarize the basic tenets of research dependency theory, see 
Brandsen, 2004, p.31). The term power in this case refers to the control that an entity has, or 
tries to get, over scarce and essential resources in order to ensure a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Mintzberg, 1983; Barney, 1991; 1995), and dependency is accordingly related to 
asymmetries in exchange relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Mintzberg, 1983; Ulrich 
and Barney, 1984; Barney, 1991; 1995). The more important a certain resource is, the more 
control is desired (Pugh and Hickson, 1996). 
Finance, for example, is generally viewed as the most important example of such scarce and 
essential resources in restructuring industrial sites (e.g. EZ, 2004b; THB, 2008a). Separately, 
the planning agency and firms on the site have insufficient control over, or access to, the 
necessary finance for integral site improvements, and accordingly there is high resource 
interdependency. So resources need to be shared, or used in a complementary way, in 
different forms of cooperative partnerships (Mitchell and Singh, 1996). This can be a way 
of reaching sufficient capacity for addressing the major challenges encountered (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998). 
Information interdependency 
Developing such cooperative partnerships means building commitment and trust, and a key 
factor in this process is the exchange, and sharing of, information. 
The specific problems regarding dependency on information are central to the organisational 
information processing theory (Galbraith, 1973; 1977). The basic assumption of this theory 
is that organisations need information for performing activities, but always have limited 
capacity to access and subsequently process it. Action arenas present opportunities for 
getting access to the needed information. However, although arenas may be effective, or 
even the only option for reaching goals, they are not necessarily efficient. This depends on 
the willingness of actors to share information.  
Actors can face two different kinds of information interdependency. First, they can be 
dependent on each other for access to facts about, for example, the existing situation 
in a specific area (e.g. an industrial site). These facts can be more or less ‘confidential’, 
and the willingness to share the information is influenced by the value it can have both 
inside, and outside, the arena. For example, information on production processes of firms 
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can have strategic value for competitors, and information about plans of planning agencies 
(e.g. for development of land) can be valuable to property developers. Second, actors are 
interdependent regarding information about the commitment to specific potential outcomes 
of the arena. This interdependency is even more complicated, because actors have certain 
preferences and they use their information to bargain for solutions that fit these preferences 
as well as possible. There are usually also several options available, and the gradual, 
cautious, exchange of information can change the total pattern of interdependency between 
the actors. This means that the interdependency remains an important factor during each 
‘round’ in the action arena. 
Understanding interdependency as aggregated one-way dependencies
The interdependency relationships between actors such as planning agencies, firms and 
other actors are complex. There is an underlying notion of perceived reciprocity (Thompson, 
1967; O’Toole, 1988), because many involved actors are aware of their mutual long term 
dependencies. Although each of the individual dependencies has different strengths 
(Granovetter, 1973; Weick, 1976, Orton and Weick, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) and 
power distribution (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), they all have in common that 
one of the actors to a large extent is dependent on the other one. There are aggregated 
‘intangible’ interdependency relationships between the actors, which consist of several 
different one-way dependencies. 
For example, firms have a legal dependency (Oliver, 1990) on planning agencies for permits, 
and at the same time planning agencies have a dependency on firms for their contribution to 
the local community. These relationships are often characterised by a lack of exchangeability 
of alternatives (Scharpf, 1978), which means that one actor cannot simply be exchanged for 
another one. The actors involved are ‘bound’ to each other. For example, no other actor can 
replace the planning agency in its legally defined role regarding permits. Furthermore, it is 
not always possible to ‘trade’ such individual dependencies. For example, a planning agency 
cannot use its power ‘resource’ regarding permits legitimately in any explicit bargaining 
game (Axelrod, 1984; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). 
Accordingly, actors, such as firms and planning agencies, can find it difficult to know how to 
address these interdependencies related to specific problems. They need to share resources 
for reaching joint goals, and also to translate interdependency into clear agreements on 
division of costs and benefits. They need to interact not only in general, but more specifically 
they need to find the right way of cooperating related to the complete process and to individual 
situations. If they perceive their interdependency as strongly asymmetric, then these 
(resource) imbalances may result in power struggles in (otherwise) cooperative situations 
(Powell and Exwonhy, 2002), which again can affect process performance. This combination 
of a perception of an ‘intangible’ complex interdependency and pursuit of multiple goals can 
explain why actors are willing to participate in action arenas, but there is no guarantee that 
actors will be willing to make any substantial investment in specific solutions. The effects 
of interdependency are different for process participation than for investment in solutions. 
Planning agencies therefore have to address both issues at the same time. 
Appendix IV 
Interview guide for moderators
Notes:	
•	 	This	appendix	contains	a	translation	of	the	original	version	written,	and	applied,	in	Dutch.	
The original Dutch version is available from the author on request.
•	 	All	Focus	group	participants	received	the	same	interview	guide:	only	the	specific	remarks	
for the moderators were not included 
Interview-guide for moderators of Focus group sessions 
“Accelerating restructuring without negatively affecting quality 
of the final outcomes”
Kjell-Erik Bugge
Centre for Urban and Environmental Development 
Saxion
Introduction 
This is the version for moderators! A separate version (without the specific parts for the 
moderator) will be made available to participants prior to each session. 
It is, of course, quite important that the research is not ‘polluted’. In other words: the sessions 
must be performed in a scientifically correct way. In this respect you – as moderators – are 
crucial. Your role in approaching and selecting participants, applying the participant profile 
described below, is a first important element. Second, it is, of course, important that 
information about, and in particular results of, sessions are not communicated to anybody 
before all sessions have been completed! 
The objective of the sessions
A model for accelerating restructuring without negatively affecting the quality of the final 
outcomes is presented. The objective of the sessions is that the participants enrich (test and 
operationalise) the model based on their experience in practice.
The ideal participant
The ideal participant has extensive experience in practice with restructuring (or at least 
extensive experience with industrial site development). He / she works for authorities, 
Chamber of Commerce / industry, consultancies or a regional development agency. 
This group does accordingly not include people with interest in the topic, but without 
experience. And also not people having significant theoretical knowledge, but no experience. 
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Procedure (structure of the session)
The model is first briefly introduced (by me). Then the moderator takes over responsibility for 
the session. The applied approach is a group interview (Focus group session) based on three 
questions regarding the use of the model.  
What is a group interview (Focus group)?
The most important difference between individual and group interviews is that group processes 
will occur. These are accordingly acknowledged as an explicit part of the interviews. The 
composition of the group will therefore affect both the (interaction) process and the outcomes. 
The more homogenous the group, the more ‘controllable’ (in theory) the process will be.
The groups being brought together are selected by you based on two criteria: involvement 
in, and know-how about, industrial site development. In that respect these groups are quite 
homogenous, but there are also differences between the participants such as regarding role 
in the process, interests regarding outcomes and influence. There are also differences on a 
personal level (is somebody dominant or not, level of experience, educational level, ability 
for abstract thinking etc.). 
In practice (according to literature) especially two mechanisms occur during sessions. An 
argument (opinion) often leads to a reaction such as a counter argument, given by somebody 
else in the group having a (partly) different opinion. On the other hand, discussions usually 
tend to lead to some kind of consensus result. 
 
What is the role of the researcher?
The role of the researcher is limited to the initial presentation providing basic information. 
During the rest of the session he is only taking notes and observing. 
What is the role of the moderator?
In short he is the leader of the discussion, but also the one who facilitates that people (are 
able to) give their opinions. The moderator determines – in essence – the difference between 
success and failure of the sessions.
The main tasks of the moderator are to:
1. Facilitate that individual participants express clear quotes (opinions, arguments) 
and (as far as relevant) facilitate that widely supported opinions (i.e. consensus 
opinions) per question are discovered. 
(I will not know all participants personally and also have limited time for taking notes. It 
is therefore important that the moderator always uses the name of the participant when 
addressing him or her. That makes it easier for me to link name to quote. 
If there is doubt about the exact meaning of something said: ask for clarification and write 
down high-lights on a flip-over, repeat and ask for confirmation whether this is what the 
person meant etc.) 
2. Ensure that all questions are addressed within the available time. 
(all sessions must have identical structure and content. This also means that time spent on 
each question as far as possible should be identical for each session.)
3. Ensure that everybody is heard and at the same time try to avoid that (a couple 
of) people dominate the session.
(this is an often encountered ‘problem’. Group processes are allowed, but at the same time 
the researcher needs to hear the full range of opinions)
5. Follow up interesting topics of discussion 
(this is again an important activity for the moderator: understanding the importance of a 
remark and addressing it.)
Structure
Each session has an identical structure. 
1. Short introduction (10 – 15 min.) about research results and (especially) the model. 
2. Group interview (ca. 2,5 h) led by moderator
3. Summary (5 - 10 min.) where the moderator tries to sum up the most important issues and 
asks for ‘confirmation’ from the group. 
Ad 1. Short introduction (K-E Bugge)
(Besides providing the texts for moderator and participants, a Power-Point presentation is used)
The challenge and the obstacles 
The role of the local authorities is to design and manage a restructuring, first towards a 
vision and subsequently towards the necessary measures. The actors involved in the process 
usually have different opinions about priorities regarding problems and possible solutions. The 
local authorities therefore have to deal with complex decision making: in ‘rounds’ including 
partly new participants, improvement options are sought, options are compared and, finally, 
decision are taken. During this process the local authorities encounter many ‘obstacles’. 
Summarised (based on an analysis of reports) five main groups of obstacles are recognizable: 
process, organisation, financing, laws and regulations, and know-how.  
The model
Decision making in ‘arenas’
The model is intended to support decision making for the restructuring of industrial sites, 
having as objective to accelerate the processes without compromising the quality of the final 
outcomes. The model is based on theory about actors and their interactions. 
The restructuring is viewed as an ‘arena’ where participants are the stakeholders that a) have 
an interest in addressing the ‘challenge’ (a problem and/or an objective that goes beyond 
problems: i.e. for instance linked to a long term vision) and b) have influence on (enabling) 
the implementation.  
The model assumes that there are only two kinds of arenas: linked to a restructuring initiative 
and linked to an implementation of specific improvements. The Initiative-arena focuses on 
getting the process started and formulating goals, whereas the Implementation-arena always 
aims at choosing and implementing specific improvement measures. The following issues 
apply to both arenas. 
Important activities and factors during a restructuring 
The model splits restructuring (regardless of kind of arena) into three main activities. First 
the local authority (or other ‘planning agency’: see below for an explanation) identifies a 
specific ‘challenge’ and its stakeholders. A ‘challenge’ can e.g. be to reduce the extent of 
plots not being used.  Then the stakeholders that have the highest interest in, and influence 
on, a development are identified, and the local authority tries to involve these stakeholders 
as participants in the arena. The final activity is to manage the arena towards commitment 
to implementation of results. 
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During this process four factors are addressed: motivation, information, resources and 
interdependency. Motivation is the willingness of an actor to invest in a process and/or 
measures. Information is the knowledge about problems, effects and improvement options, 
and, in particular, the related costs, benefits and risks. Resources are not only financial, but 
also include influence, know-how and time. Interdependency means that an actor needs a 
contribution from one (or more) actor(s) for reaching his own goals.  
It is furthermore assumed that initially there will always be insufficient resources available 
AND (partly caused by this) there is always a high degree of interdependency between actors. 
These two variables are accordingly viewed as constant in an initial phase and accordingly 
only the factors “information” and “motivation” are addressed as variables. 
Furthermore the following issues are included in the model:
1.  Resources are never available unless actors are willing to give them (e.g. resources 
are allocated from budgets of the local authorities OR a province is willing to co-fund a 
development). In other words the factor ‘resources’ is always dependent on (i.e. ‘follows’) 
the factor motivation.
2.  Information can influence actor motivation, but sufficient information as such is never 
sufficient (an actor can e.g. know everything there is to know about a measure, but still 
have good reasons for not wanting to invest in it).  
The model accordingly focuses on motivation, and views information as an important factor 
for influencing motivation. 
Role of the local authorities and supporting the choice of process measures 
The model is primarily intended for supporting how the “planning agency” (= the actor that 
normally initiates and manages the process: usually a local authority) can accelerate the 
process through ‘smart’ use of process measures. These individual measures are all well-
known by practitioners: problem analyses regarding performance of the sites, analyses of 
risks and feasibility, selection of a ‘best choice’ challenge (e.g. applying a multi-criteria 
analysis), stakeholder analyses, measures for (re) design of a process, and how agreements 
can be formalised. 
‘Smart’ use of measures means making choices depending on the specific characteristics of 
the situation. The model supports decision making through simplifying and structuring the 
complexity of restructuring.  
To achieve this goal, the planning agency uses decision supporting questions that enable 
identifying the situation regarding both of the factors motivation and information, and 
subsequently (depending on the answers) that enable planning and implementing actions. 
The planning agency accordingly chooses an approach depending on whether the available 
motivation and information is considered to be satisfactory.  
The decision support questions are all “yes / no” questions that always lead to a follow-up 
through a “if … then” link. If the answer is positive, then it is possible to move on to a next 
question. If the planning agency is uncertain of the answer (or the answer is negative), then 
EITHER follow-up questions are asked (i.e. more in detail regarding aspects) to gain more 
clarity OR measures are applied for improving the situation. 
 
Specific situations
Although the model enables managing all possible situations, a planning agency will prefer 
to know how to act in specific situations. Even having only two variables (motivation and 
information) there are still an infinite number of such situations. The model therefore, to 
make this challenge manageable, restricts itself to suggestions for handling four ‘extreme’ 
situations. The planning agency considers the aggregated motivation either satisfactory OR 
unsatisfactory, and the same for information. In both cases an assessment of satisfaction is 
linked to a specific challenge. The aggregated motivation is what all participants together are 
willing to allocate c.q. invest. This leads to four possible situations:
 
Figure 1.  Four specific ‘extreme’ situations  
Ad 2. Group interview led by moderator
The objective of the session is ENRICHMENT OF THE PRESENTED MODEL. This implies 
e.g. to add issues or make issues more clear, and accordingly the moderator is to prevent 
discussions about alternative models (i.e. comparisons).
A first starting point for the discussion is that (it is assumed that) the local authorities have 
already decided to initiate, design and manage a restructuring, but they are dependent on 
other actors for a successful process and, in particular, they have insufficient resources. 
The second starting point is that all questions are about HOW THE PROCESS CAN BE 
ACCELERATED WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE QUALITY OF THE FINAL OUTCOMES.
The questions focus on some main issues of the model (i.e. not all parts of the model are 
addressed explicitly in detail).
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Question 1 (duration: short exploration of ca. 20 min.)
Introduction
The model views restructuring as complex decision making (‘rounds’ of searching, 
assessing, deciding who the participants should be, problems and solutions) in arenas. 
The model aims specifically to help the planning agency to accelerate the process by 
influencing actors and their interactions. 
Specifically, the challenge for the planning agency is to couple the right actors to a well-
defined (qua scope) challenge / problem. 
A ‘best choice’ challenge is selected by the planning agency (usually based on the outcome of 
interaction with other actors) through an estimate of impact on progress of the restructuring. 
This may imply that a ‘small’ problem be handled first OR alternatively a larger, more 
complex, problem is addressed. 
The ‘right actors’ are those that have an interest in, and/or influence on, improving the 
situation. These actors can accordingly be ‘problem owners’ as well as actors that possess 
the necessary resources. The model refers to these crucial actors as “preferred participants”. 
Question for discussion: 
How can preferred participants in restructuring be chosen 
so as to accelerate the process?
Explore e.g. through: 
Dependency	on	kind	of	arena	and	time.	In	other	words:	who	are	particularly	important	in	an	
Initiative	arena,	who	in	an	Implementation	arena,	and	who	during	the	whole	process?	
How	do	the	choices	regarding	participants	affect	progress	on	a	short	respectively	long	term	
(i.e.:	advantages	and	disadvantages	and	risks)?	
(Main) Question 2. (duration: until ca. 30 min. before end of session)
Four extreme (initial) situations A-D are possible:
Situation A.
Example: Firms on the site, the Provincial authorities and other potential investors (contrary 
to the planning agency / local authority) are not convinced about the necessity of any 
restructuring. There is no overview of problems and effects and certainly no agreement about 
what needs to (should) be done. 
Situation B
Example: The planning agency has developed a plan based on satisfactory insight into 
problems, effects and improvement options. There is unsatisfactory (broad) commitment 
to the plan. 
Situation C
Example: Firms and local and provincial authorities all have satisfactory motivation for 
starting a restructuring initiative, but it is unknown what problems and effects exactly are 
and, especially how they can, and should, be addressed. 
Situation D.
Example: There is satisfactory motivation (i.e. resources allocated) for implementing a chosen 
solution / approach. (NB. The situation can in practice also be different: namely that the 
aggregated resources are insufficient for implementing the first choice solution. The question 
then arises whether a ‘second choice’ option should be chosen OR e.g. try to involve (partly) 
other actors and work towards making the first choice option feasible).
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What is the best sequence for accelerating the process (without endangering 
quality of the outcomes) when moving from the ‘worst case’ situation (A) 
towards a situation (D) where both the aggregated motivation and information 
are viewed as satisfactory?
(Note for moderator: ensure that all ‘routes’ are discussed)
Are you moving directly from A to D, and in case you do: how?
(e.g. careful start, joint initiative, small scale improvement options having positive effect on 
futuire process aimed at stimulating a ‘snowball’ effect)
Are you moving from A to B and then towards D?
(e.g. First gaining insight into problems, effects and solutions, then a process towards building 
commitment OR is it better to acknowledge that the different actors will never support the 
plan which, therefore, needs to be discarded: i.e. moving back to A and then on to C?)
Are you moving from A to C and then towards D?
(e.g. First building motivation, then together searching for solution. But: Conflicts can emerge 
during the second step when more specific solutions have to be sought and compared, so 
how can that be prevented?)
Question 3 (duration: short exploration of ca. 20 min.)
Introduction
For the implementation arena the model applies decision support through questions about the 
variables motivation and information. Below some examples are given of applied questions:
Is the ‘best choice’ challenge known? 
(i.e.: has the planning agency been able to select the problem / challenge that is expected to 
have the most positive effect on progress of the process)
Are participants satisfied enough with the draft organisation of the initiative?
(i.e.: regarding how different actors are involved in the arena)
Are the participants satisfied with the chosen solution?
(i.e.: how does the planning agency know when the process is ‘completed’)
An essential issue regarding these questions is that the planning agency has to assess 
whether the available information is satisfactory and/or whether actors are satisfied enough. 
This assessment can have significant consequences for both progress and process outcomes. 
Basis for discussion:
“Satisfactory” is always linked to a specific situation. The local authorities, as process 
manager, can e.g. strive to reach satisfactory motivation for implementing a pre-selected 
measure. Then the desired end determines what satisfactory means: namely the aggregated 
resources allocated are sufficient for implementing the specific measure, and there is nobody 
that wants to (or can) block this development. 
“Satisfactory” often also means something else: sufficient for continuing the process and 
at that specific moment in time the ‘best choice’ regarding progress. This ‘best choice’ is 
accordingly no ‘ideal’ situation, but it is one often encountered in practice. Some actors are 
less (or not at all) satisfied, and the planning agency takes that into account when choosing 
a follow-up approach (such as adjusting organisation or arena participants OR adjusting the 
arena itself towards a solution where satisfactory commitment may be achievable).
The essential issue is that the planning agency (jointly with other actors or not) continuously 
has to choose what to do in a situation possessing some degree of uncertainty. This choice is 
always based on the aggregated available motivation and/or information (which includes the 
distribution of both factors among actors) and is always based on an assessment of what at 
that moment the best choice is for process performance, and, in particular, progress.  
The question:
How can a planning agency determine when information or motivation
is satisfactory (enough) for achieving an acceleration of the process (without 
endangering quality of the final outcomes)?
Summary of most important issues (maximum 5 -10 min)
This can be limited to main issues and conclusions that e.g. have been written down on a 
flip-over during the session. 
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Appendix V 
Focus group participants
Name  Organisation
Van den Andel, Arie  Gemeente Ede
Bevers, Ryan  Gemeente Tiel
Boerman, Willem  Provincie Overijssel
Bronsema, Annemiek  Provincie Overijssel
Coenen, Chrit  Gemeente Echt-Susteren
Doorakkers, Jan  Doorakkers Advies
Geerlings, Frank  Oost nv
Gehrels, Annemarie  IPO
Gordon, Rob  Brabantse Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij (BOM)
Hartsuiker, Jeroen  Provincie Drenthe
van der Heijde, Pieter  Bureau Stedelijke Planning 
Huntink, Willem  Provincie Gelderland
de Jager, Frans  Gemeente Rotterdam   
Janssen, Jeroen  Gemeente Nijmegen
Juurlink , Esther  De Wijde Blik     
Kamphuis, August  Gemeente Rijssen-Holten 
Keuker, Onno  MKB Nederland    
Kierkels, Dennis  LIOF
Krijgsman, Jeroen  BOM
Kruisselbrink, Maarten  Bureau Buiten
Lotgerink, Wilfried  Lotas
Mossel, Piet  Provincie Overijssel
Olden, Han  Stogo advies    
Op de Haar, Frits  Frits op de Haar Economie en Ruimte   
Pen, Cees-Jan  Nicis      
Pigge, Daan  Meedenken en doen    
Roeterdink, Joost  Provincie Gelderland    
de Roo, Bastiaan  Kamer van Koophandel Den Haag    
Rook, Arjan  Gemeente Breda
de Roos, Irma  Gemeente Den Haag  
Rotink, André  Gemeente Culemborg
Schaefer, Wim  Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
Sjerps, Rob  Arcadis
Smid, Wouter  Gemeente Emmen   
Snippe, Maxim  VROM
Tibben, Alfred  Explorius Vastgoedontwikkeling B.V.
Verhoeven, Irma  Kamer van Koophandel Brabant
Wagemakers, Gé  BOM
Walman, Jolanda  Provincie Overijssel
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Appendix VI 
Moderators and hosting organisations 
Moderators
Amersfoort: Jan-Willem Wesselink Elba Media
The Hague: Cees-Jan Pen Nicis
Zwolle: Han Wiendels HMO
Arnhem: Joost Roeterdink Province of Gelderland 
Tilburg: Jeroen Krijgsman BOM
Hosting organisations
Amersfoort: Elba Media
The Hague: Nicis
Zwolle: Province of Overijssel
Arnhem: Province of Gelderland
Tilburg: BOM
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Appendix VII 
Invitation letter 
Note:	Translated	version	of	the	original	invitation	letter	in	Dutch.
Dear Sir/ Madam,
We are pleased to invite you, as an expert, to participate in the Focus group session “Accele-
rating restructuring of industrial sites: How can it be done without loss of quality?”
The session is organised at  from  at  
First, the session is interesting! You are making acquaintance with a brand new decision 
support model for accelerating restructuring. This model has been developed by researcher 
Kjell-Erik Bugge of Saxion as part of his PhD-study, and he wants to assess the model toge-
ther with practitioners.  
Second, the session is challenging! Because we expect you to deliver an active contribution 
to the enrichment of the model. You will take part in a discussion including a select small 
group of fellow experts coming from local authorities, provinces, regional development agen-
cies, consultancy firms, and representatives of industry, led by an experienced moderator. 
Finally, the session is important! Your knowledge, experience and active participation are 
important as input to the final phase of a several years lasting PhD-study AND the best con-
tributions to the sessions will be used as quotes and short highlight texts in an article for the 
magazine “Bedrijventerrein”. 
One week before the session you will receive information by mail, which includes a short in-
troduction to the model, the design of the session, and the questions that will be addressed. 
Could you please let us know if you are able to attend the session? 
Yours Sincerely, (also on behalf of the researcher Kjell-Erik Bugge),
Name and organisation of moderator / host
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Appendix VIII 
Procedure for identifying themes 
This is an example of how themes were identified. It shows the procedure applied to the results 
of the first session in Amersfoort, namely the results about the (second) research question 
on how to identify ‘best’ sequences for addressing motivation and information. The starting 
point was 18 pages of text transcript. The text (originally available in Dutch and accordingly 
translated into English) was carefully read, looking for ‘emerging’ text segments. Such segments 
often were part of smaller groups: i.e. core aspects of discussion topics for a limited time. The 
segments were therefore first combined in such small groups (numbered G1-n, and not yet 
given any code), and subsequently preliminary labels were given to each segment. Second, 
labels (and text segments) were repeatedly compared, themes identified, and segments 
combined for each theme. Words between brackets […] in some text segments were added for 
clarification by the researcher whenever the text segments themselves provided insufficient 
information.   
1. Reading, making notes, underlining, looking for emerging (groups
of) text segments, and adding preliminary labels.  
G1:   “is motivation not fragmented”, “what can you do if somebody is too motivated or 
has too much information… too much quantified and too much studies … creates 
expectations … motivation can disappear” (possible labels: expectations, motivation)
G2:   “situation A: research  ... industrial site develops … loss of jobs … new responsible 
politicians said 10000 new jobs will be created … eye-opener … actually nothing known 
at all  … black box ”, “economic analysis” (possible labels: problem, effects)
G3:   “identifiable responsible civil servant and politician … for complaints” (possible labels: 
problem, communication)
G4:   “management of expectations”, “moderate motivation”, “creating sober expectations” 
(possible labels: expectations, motivation, long term / continuity)
G5:   “in own context (i.e. organisation) everything organised, establish understanding of initial 
situation”, “all important departments (in Dutch: diensten)”, “share … expectations”, 
“first information … leads to motivation, if information is made available in the right 
way”, “information is first kept inside the organisation”, “via B to C” (possible labels: 
understanding problem, expectations, motivation, right information)
G6:   in another case “the opposite happened … firm bankrupt … many entrepreneurs 
motivated …via C to D”, “was quite a lot of information available”, “disaster … 
stupid political decision … firms motivated … strategy… allowing NIMBY-function”, 
“[this approach was] not planned… ad hoc”, “does work” (possible labels: strategic 
information)
G7:   “survey … firms …bottlenecks … opportunities… desired results”, “new information 
acquired”, “almost-accidents”, “local authorities sometimes think they (already) know 
what needs to be done” (possible labels: problems, understanding)
G8:   “interest … local authorities … not defining situation as a problem”, “problem defined… 
must do something about it” (possible labels: expectations)
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G9:   “how does an industrial site score…ranking list … no local authorities wants its industrial 
site having lowest score”, [Moderator asks: “specific part of information to improve 
motivation?”, answer] ”exactly… clear strategy”, “stakeholders … awareness of problem 
… specific amount of information … problem wider acknowledged … motivation to do 
something is created” (possible labels: motivation, problem)
G10:   “always commitment from Council necessary”, “problem … well communicated … leads 
to motivation” (possible labels: motivation)
G11: ”iterative, stepwise” (possible labels: flexibility, change)
G12:   “important [property] owners … should be involved”, “not involved … motivation 
… smaller”, “local authorities making plans without …[other] stakeholders ... no 
commitment … not addressing needs” (possible labels: trust, joint action)
G13:   “what is the scope of the restructuring”, “what is the scope of the problems” (possible 
labels: understanding problem)
G15:   ”visualize problems [to different target groups]”, “politicians and civil servants 
… insufficient attention and knowledge [about industrial sites]” (possible labels: 
understanding problem, acknowledgement)
G16:   “provide information … confront right players, depending on influence, with information”, 
“decision makers”, “process stuck … people from management … for getting process 
moving again”  (possible labels: specific information, influence)
G17:   “only thing that motivates entrepreneur is seeing what goes on” (possible labels: 
understanding problem)
G18:   “first research”, “information … kept within small group”, “first … sufficient financial 
means” (possible labels: strategic use information, time-dependency)
G19;   “Letter of Intent”, “substantiates motivation”, “”plan including simple measures ... 
implementing covenant within specified time” (possible labels: joint vision, keeping 
promises)
G20:   “mutual trust”, “no trust … then no success”, “[trust] not present because …players 
had large own interests”, “motivation: focused by own interests” (possible labels: trust, 
fair)
G21:   “people knowing more … does not imply that they join you if [an action] only serves 
your own interest” (possible labels: fair shares)
G22:   “listen to what they want and what their interests are”, “together exploring what do 
you want, and I, and where do we find common grounds” (possible labels: fair shares, 
interaction)
G23:   ”trigger”, “opportunity for getting provincial co-funding focuses and merges actor 
ideas” (possible labels: join vision, influence, information)
G24:  “seeing with their own eyes” (possible labels: understanding problem)
G25:   “allow people successes … show concrete results … otherwise increasingly losing 
credibility” (possible labels: expectations, trust)
G26:  “dare to take own responsibility” (possible labels: dare to change)
G27:   “local authorities could not deliver what they had promised”, “if not likely that local 
authorities can invest then firms will not be motivated either” (possible labels: trust, fair 
shares)
G28:   “investing is not only money, but doing your tasks”, “[regular] management [in Dutch: 
beheer] of site” (possible labels: fair, trust, expectations)
G29:   “different images …different departments [of local authorities] … same expectations” 
(possible labels: joint vision)
G30:   “regular meetings … inform each other about progress”, “local authorities … tell what 
they have invested in”, “meeting each other and getting to know each other very 
important”, “informal [contact] … phone … show your face”, “leave your desk [and visit 
the entrepreneurs on location] (possible labels: interaction)
G31:   “trust is damaged through elections [and change to politicians]”, “keep on informing”, 
“involve as soon as possible”, “show [possible] successes”, “accident or crisis … can 
also give large change”, “predictable and unpredictable changes”, “firm bankrupt … 
leading partner leaving” (possible labels: trust, expectations, change)
G32:  “the trusted person” (possible labels: trust)
G33:  “motivation needs continuous maintenance” (possible labels: continuity, motivation)
G34:   “sufficient people in organisation … maintain collective memory” (possible labels: 
continuity)
G35:   “anticipated … what if those jobs disappear”, “dependency on firm”, “professional 
approach …risk analysis… anticipate”, “is insufficiently done” (possible labels: 
understanding problems)
G36:   “things that per definition not succeed”, “firms that conform to all legal requirements … 
not easy to move”, “if not possible, stop”, “may be not yet right time to act… wait ten 
years until moment is there” (possible labels: adapting, flexibility)
G37:   “not inability to get firm to migrate, but inability of planning agency to indicate where 
firm can migrate to” (possible labels: flexibility)
G38:   “dare to make political change based on … effect on society” (possible labels: flexibility)
G39:  “implementation failed … firms no drive to act” (possible labels: motivation)
2. Identifying themes and combining text segments into themes
Theme 1: Understanding the problem
The groups 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 14, 17 and 35 all focus in different ways focus on problems. There 
is a need to define what the exact problems are, which includes current and possible future 
effects. Acknowledging the problem is the outcome of a process that includes presenting 
information that can serve as eye-openers and linking problems to responsible actors. 
Theme 2: Joint vision & Coordinated actions
The groups 5, 12, 15, 23 and 29 refer to a shared understanding of an initial situation, 
objectives and the process. 
Theme 3: Managing expectations, motivation and continuity
Expectations were discussed in several ways (groups 1,4, 8, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33 and 34) such 
as how they are created, influence motivation, can be formalised, can be influenced, are 
related to trust, and can be managed continuously. 
Theme 4: Strategic use of information
The groups 5, 6, 9, 10, 16, and 18 include different perspectives on the effects of using 
information selectively in “the right way”: i.e. the right moment and the right information for 
the right actor in the right form. 
Theme 5: Interaction & Mutual influence
Interaction between actors was an implicit aspect addressed during more or less the whole 
discussion. However, it was also explicitly stressed (group 5) as the impact of regular personal 
contact.
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Appendix IX 
Quotes per theme  
The definitions of the 12 identified themes were used as codes. Then the text segments / 
quotes that ‘belonged’ to each theme were identified in all transcripts and combined per 
theme. This appendix contains the outcome of these two steps. 
The subsequent steps of defining sub-themes, second round of coding and rearranging / 
combining text segments / quotes was performed in the same way. 
Question 1: How can preferred participants be chosen?
Actor representation
P21:  “Who has the keys that work? People that can invest.”
P9:  “a single actor achieves nothing on his own [in a restructuring]”
P39:  “which actors do I need”, “focus on who’s responsibility: those you need”
P3:  “you do not need them all initially”
P39:   “Municipal Council should possibly have been better involved regarding extra budgets 
and maintenance budgets”
P36:   A-team “selects participants: local authorities and property owners that should come 
into action in the area”
P11:  “avoiding role province in concrete projects” 
P18:  “not exclude [forget] influential local inhabitants”
P8:  “you are not talking to all firms”
P39:  “understanding that not the whole industrial site is being represented” in the process
P8:  “restructuring or specific theme: different actors”
P6:  “account manager firms” (in Dutch: “bedrijfscontactfunctionaris”)
P29:  Chamber of Commerce not good reputation among individual firms”
P11:   “Chamber of Commerce interesting on the level of the whole site, and not for individual 
firms”
P29:   site management / interest organization “does part of the work for firms and it pays off 
too”  
P8:   local “associations of firms can best communicate developments towards individual 
entrepreneurs” ….
P29:  “if they are well-functioning”
P7:   “approaches inhabitants, environmental interest groups, province, region, national 
authorities, internal organization local authorities [i.e. diff. departments]
P1:   “association of firms in working group and two ‘ambassadors’”, ambassadors very 
useful: entrepreneurs told them about their problems, and did not contact the local 
authorities”
P36:   regional development agency asked if local authorities do not know how [to design and 
manage the process] or if they, or firms, want a neutral actor” involved
P36:   internal actors “project leader from economic affairs, spatial planning, environment, 
management of neighbourhoods (in Dutch: “wijkbeheer”)”, “actually anyone that 
would be interested in getting involved in the site development”
P1:  “having people within own organization having sufficient freedom / mandate” 
Theme 6: Fair shares & Trust 
Groups 19-21, 27, 31, 32 and 39 all address relationships and interdependencies between 
actors, and in particular between industry and planning agency. Trust, and credibility, 
influences the need to formalize agreements and actors’ perceived need to be involved in all 
activities, and interests and an idea of fairness regarding ‘balanced’ contributions of ‘both 
sides’ influence motivation. 
Theme 7: Flexibility & Adaptation
Groups 11, 26, and 36-38 address issues related to how the total process can be managed: 
stepwise and iterative, where flexibility is needed regarding finding, and daring to implement, 
change. 
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P34:  “important to have mandate: means situation with freedom to act”
P23:  “right mix of property owners and users / tenants [and] not only members of association 
of firms”, “reaching property owners located somewhere else in the Netherlands”
P23:   “who are the influential entrepreneurs (in Dutch: referred to as “smaakmakende 
ondernemers” of “onderkoningen”): difference between those who love to talk, and 
those who have influence.” 
P22:  “contact with entrepreneurs that are influential towards rest of entrepreneurs” 
P23:   “More difficult to find the right representatives of an industrial site that are willing to 
contribute with ideas and act, and not only pursue own interests”
P39:   “often large difference between board members of associations of firms versus 
individual entrepreneurs. Often better to talk to individual entrepreneurs”
P21:   “legitimacy of association of firms sometimes not good: old-boys network, individual 
entrepreneurs do not see what association does as relevant”    
P7:  “right ratio of entrepreneurs versus rest”
P14:  “Chamber of Commerce van help articulating, but not financing”
P14:   “group of actors [involved] as compact as possible”, “too often local authorities create 
large group, and process slows down”, “project-team that reports to core-group of ca. 3 
important actors, can give high rate process”
P22:  “small core team recognizable in well-working processes”
P33:  “involve bottom-up individual entrepreneurs”
P33:  “strange that broad representation of firms not are involved: is viewed as obstacle”
P25:  “Council is very important, because it must allocate means”. 
P37:   “seeking stakeholders we organised an evening for everybody to discuss and see where 
it was commitment”
P37:   “firms not member of association of firms: must contact all individually, otherwise no 
commitment”
P21:   focuses on “users, because that is broader than only members of any local association 
of firms”
P19:   “many civil servants have considerable power: e.g. municipal secretary and sector 
managers, time is needed to discover this”
P15:   “Often the chairman or member of the Board of the local association of firms who is 
able to communicate the collective feelings and problems of the firms, and not only 
viewed from the perspective of his own firm”
P15:   the actors you need “within the organization of the local authorities are those that are 
involved in the problems”, “depends on the contents”
P17:   regarding selection of representatives of firms “we made entrepreneurs ask other 
entrepreneurs”, but we started using an existing group involved in an on-going project.
P26:  what you need are “actors that have the real power to decide”
P12:   “if you talk about motivation, then the management level [of the local authorities] is 
not always consciously involved […] despite the fact that they have to allocate the 
financial means, and have to have a positive view on the developments”
P12:   regarding where to start, managers or responsible politicians, “always start trying to 
get the strongest actor involved in the process”
P30:   “if restructuring is part of a larger area development, then a stakeholder analysis leads 
to much more actors that want, can, or must do something”
P30:   “working with internal guidelines on how to start such a process, Initiative together 
with local authorities, with spatial planning and economic affairs, and involve especially 
local associations of firms”
P30:  “there is always the level steering group, project group of civil servants etc.”
P27:  “who are the large employers, those we at least get involved”
P26:   “there are important owners in an area, and you need to get those involved in the 
development”
P17:  “individuals must be viewed by other firms as their representatives”
P17:   “they can represent a part of the firms, but not all”, so it can be useful to e.g. have 
different representatives for SME’s and larger firms.  
P8:   “partially there is no deliberate choice of actors, but a given fact, such as regarding 
property owners”
P29:  “talk especially to entrepreneurs that really will and can” invest
P5:  “[province] assists regarding whom to involve in process”, 
P5:  province “stimulating in a dynamic process”
P20:  “not only money”, “facilitate through attention and communication”
P8:   province is “supporting” local authorities: “participation [of province] restricted to 
providing means” according to municipality
Time-dependent involvement
P14:   “only proceed with firms that are willing to invest, because then the process goes 
faster”
P32:   “if you cannot cooperate with people at crucial positions, you still need them, so you 
need to apply a specific approach regarding information and motivation”
P18:  “best is if firms take over initiative: local authorities: do not immediately take control”
P6:   “right people and moments”, “if all conditions have not been fulfilled, then it does not 
work”, “gaps / lacuna in the joint process”
P23:  “timing is important [an action can be] too early or too late”
P36:  “choose your moment”
P29:  regarding key persons, process managers, “one place it works, other place it does not”
P20:   “if process cannot be accelerated with these people, e.g. local authorities, involve 
somebody else: Right person at the right place”
P24:   “Chamber of Commerce facilitating in initiative arena, past years [not involved] any 
more
P24:   “in initiative arena mainly contact with board of association of firms, later with individual 
firms”
P1:  “during process actors involved, worked quite well”
P3:   “first talk to the association of firms, Chamber of Commerce also involved and not 
to property owners and other firms, then inform and contact personally these actors 
individually” 
P30:   regarding personal characteristics and ability to cooperate “if it does not work, you 
have to intervene”, “e.g. ask for two representatives, or, if somebody is very dominant 
split actors into steering group and project group”
P30:   “if Initiative leads to concrete follow-up, then projects are defined and you are much 
better searching for those we really need for getting project implemented, e.g. involving 
key players regarding property ownership”
Characteristics of individuals 
P15:   “quite important are the influential individuals (in Ditch: “oliemannetjes”), often retired 
entrepreneurs, that have sufficient time for the process, know practice very well […] 
and not having a too large ego” 
P6:  entrepreneur “told enthusiastic story and got support of other entrepreneurs”
P17:  somebody “who could tell a story”  
P18:  “man with the worn-out shoes is needed for transferring, and translating, information”
P20:  “entrepreneurs like you” 
223222
P23: “success through right combination of individuals from local authorities and firms”
P35:  “from A to D you need to have the right person, right connection with other actor”
P26:   “entrepreneur that is a good speaker and can tell about the bottlenecks he sees”, “who 
is able to put the topic on the agenda of the Council”
P13:   “people can very negatively influence the on-going process. Then very much depends 
on the chairman of the steering group or process manager, regarding if he recognizes 
what happens and takes action” 
Question 2: What is the best sequence towards satisfactory 
motivation and information?
  
Understanding the problem
P30:   “important that actors are aware of the problem, and for this certain information is 
needed, […] as soon as the problem has been widely acknowledged, then the motivation 
to address it develops” 
P12:   “what is the scope of the restructuring. Public space or also private property, users and 
owners. What is the scope of the problem”
P5:  “what do you include in the restructuring”
P27:  “It was a black box”, situation A, “I have encountered that in several municipalities” 
P4:  “is motivation not fragmented” and coupled to different interests and objectives
P9:   “What was the reason for [starting] the restructuring? Who has largest problem? Who 
is problem owner? What are actors sensitive to.”
P27:   research in one case showed for the past decades “loss of jobs, and at the same time 
politicians had told that 10.000 jobs would be created: eye-opener”
P3:  “starting from firms general interests”
P25:  as local authorities “do not put problem on the agenda”
P3:  “who are we as local authorities [that we believe] that we can determine necessity”
P25:  “if there is no political urgency, then [problem] will not be addressed”
P35:  “which urgency has problem: the [higher the] sooner it will be addressed”
P1:   “a number of things stay unclear”, “difficult towards external actors that ask for clarity”
P18:   “local authorities motivated and see advantages, other actors need to see advantages 
too”
P5:   “translating policy themes into something that affects [and is understandable for] 
firms”
P8:  “needs to be commitment to scan from firms”
P6:  “quality scan, knowing what we are talking about”
P2:  “know what you are talking about makes discussion concrete”
P8:  “each situation is unique”
P35:  “who are stakeholders? [look as] broad as possible”
P7:  “Applied very professional Force field analysis”
P21:  “Force-field analysis at the same time internally and externally” 
P1:   “firms were afraid of development other industrial site and threat of decay through firm 
migration”, “study into bottlenecks and solutions”
P39:  “migration of firms would lead to decay, so be on time with restructuring”
P9:   “not starting saying there is a problem, but asking firms “what is your opinion of the 
site”
P3:   “Local authorities are for all inhabitants. It must be a joint problem. Firms have a 
functional problem. Completely different entities” 
P15:   “in the Initiative there was a phase where the city was prepared for the term 
restructuring: what the importance is of industrial sites”, “the value and necessity of 
industrial sites was not much recognised”, “quite systematic approach”
P27:   to get access to information on the problems there needs to be “identifiable civil 
servants and politicians for delivering complaints”
P17:   “asked firms what are your bottlenecks, which opportunities do you see for the area, 
and what should the result be if we start developing”, “firms presented new information 
about what they found important”, such as about almost-accidents
P29:  “Use interests of firm as starting point for moving towards restructuring”
P12:   “you cane perform a risk analysis in advance”, “but I believe it is insufficiently done” 
Joint vision & Coordinated actions
P39:   “how do you reach a joint vision internally”, not at all any feeling of that “we all work 
for the same boss” 
P5:  “ambitions must be linked”
P7:   “internal organization local authorities important: many not knowing situation on site, 
make drawings, create picture of future”
P23:  “excursion for members of Council to site”
P26:   members of municipal Council taken to the industrial site “to just see how the situation 
is” 
P10:  to convince municipal Council ”seeing the site is important”
P21:   “ask Council if they know e.g. how many firms there are or how large sites are: did they 
not know, worked positive regarding motivation”
P36:  “steering group, working group and members of Council on excursion”
P17:   “showed the rear side of the firms, and that made quite an impression both on 
entrepreneurs and responsible politicians of the local authorities” 
P12:  “let the people see the full range of the problems”
P31:   “the only thing that motivates an entrepreneur is seeing what really happens on a site”
P24:  “convincing internal organization difficult”
P36:   “actually anyone that would be interested in getting involved in the site development 
[…] otherwise [the reaction is that] I have not been asked”. They often say “include me 
on the [distribution list for the] agenda, then I can see if attending” is useful
P3:  “inform everybody to avoid accusation: “if I had known that””
P14:  ”regional and local visions differ”, “if so, process lasts long”
P33:   “different parts of the local authorities were active, but had their own [different] 
priorities”, “coordinated control of non-conformity to laws and regulations, then 
problems disappeared quickly”, “combining application of private and public law: large 
acceleration”
P3:   “internal departments are not working coordinated”, which leads to undesired effects 
later in the process such as “this development is impossible” 
P25:  “real internal coordination is crux”
P21:   “fragmentation at different levels. Agreements made at operational level, and 
management level above has other interests”
P35:  “first everything internally discussed, then external action”
P15:   “vision on the sites that are most important, which decayed, and which that needed to 
be improved”
P27:   if you “tell the department of Social affairs that on industrial sites many vulnerable 
employees are working”, it will influence their willingness to become involved in the 
process
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P27:   “in own context having everything organised”, “all important departments […] share 
expectations [including] that expectations must be moderated […] is a success factor”
P26:   if important owners “are not involved in planning then their motivation to contribute 
will be lower too […] and it will not address their wishes”
P15:  “the opportunity for getting provincial co-funding serves to get people moving in the 
same, direction”
P15:  “seeing with your own eyes […] was the trigger in our case too”
Managing expectations, motivation and continuity
P17:  “implementation failed because finally the firms did not have the drive to act
P30:  “motivation is an aspect that needs continuous maintenance”
P27:  “perform management of expectations”
P27:  “moderate expectations, create sober expectations”
P23:  “something must happen”
P39:  “most deadly [for the process] is if it looks like nothing is happening”
P7:   “if there is a will, then there are [financial] means” “based on a good plan / vision on 
site development”
P6:   “initiative has been started and local authorities focus on identifying actors and means. 
If this lasts too long the motivation of firms decrease”
P19:  “creating expectations can have negative effects”
P39:   “important that project does not last too long, because then the interest of firms 
decrease”
P18:   “local authorities implementing measures close to own ‘world’ [of responsibility / tasks] 
to get process of ‘seduction’ moving”
P34:   local authorities: “not immediately involving all actors: first a vision that can be used to 
seduce other actors”, “plan is used to seduce and get process moving” 
P17:   “you must not make all kinds of plans for other actors internally, because they were not 
used and there was no money [for implementing them]” 
P22:  “seduction and vision important”
P28:   “Seduction is selectivity: you have to develop feasible business cases”, “a few feasible 
processes”
P9:   “searching for what may be possible, and what cannot be achieved. “Searching for 
what is acceptable”
P29:  “local authorities introducing something that attracts the interest of firms”
P29:   “if you are able to activate a couple of entrepreneurs, you have reached your objective”
P20:  “wanting to do something for other people”
P29:  “needs to be able to show future opportunities”
P20:  “if you have part of the information, you have to [start] work on motivation”
P8:  “show results to firms” and P24: “show progress”
P24:   “initially “vision developed by consultancy firm and association of firms, Chamber 
of Commerce, local authorities involved, everybody quickly supported vision”, 
“consultancy firm quite ambitious, some proposals not feasible because of costs, other 
proposals not because of lack of political support”
P1:  “realistic implementation program: [as constraint] must be feasible”
P39:  “completely infeasible recommendations”, “a bit lower ambition level is also possible” 
P36:  “visit to site and then feed-back towards local authorities: is this image correct?”
P36:   internal “project leader must drive the process himself”. Address e.g. as “spatial 
planning expected, but not present”
P1:   “if municipal Council knows that firms support development, then it almost becomes 
something that is accepted without discussion (in Dutch the term used is “hamerstuk”)
P1:   “commitment is not only about number of firms represented, but also about number of 
employees each firm represent”
P7:  “now and then celebrating successes” 
P28:   local authorities “perform much half-completed work: are not completing the work on 
several industrial sites”
P34:  “are financial means available or not? Prevent disillusions entrepreneurs”
P25:  “really communicate when you really are going to act” as local authority
P25:   “continuously switching between two levels is important. Local authorities regarding 
policy and the long term developments, and firms regarding when things are going to 
happen” 
P19:   “are you able to fulfil expectations? Good to take into consideration as local authorities”
P3:   “if alderman enters or leaves process it is important for motivation”, “new alderman, 
dramatic for process, back from C to A, had to talk a lot to get him involved”  
P25:  “there is commitment, because it [i.e. the restructuring] goes well”
P3:   “use quick-wins”, “start with small things, which are important for motivation”, 
“sometimes sub-optimal solutions the right choice”
P9:  “if there is no commitment: stop and let it slowly ‘boil‘ (in Dutch: sudderen)
P3:  “start with street where there is commitment”
P9:   “put entrepreneurs that are unwilling at the end of the row (in Dutch: “zet ze achteraan 
in de rij”)
P35:   “you are in a process of learning and you learn from your mistakes, [and] expectations 
can therefore be adjusted”
P31:  “we work bottom-up”
P27:   “what to do if somebody is too motivated or has too much information. If somebody 
is too far ahead of the rest, he may have to return to the start. And if you quantify too 
much you create expectations and the motivation can completely disappear.” 
P26:   “sometimes it can be in interest of local authorities to not define it as a problem, 
because […] then you also have to do something about it”
P12:   “need to allow people successes […] and show concrete results […] otherwise 
increasingly losing credibility”
P27:   “during visit to site […] a lot of bad situations were identified, but the local authorities 
could not deliver what they had promised”
P27:   “you have to keep on informing”
P30:   involve new elected politicians “as soon as possible after elections […] and inform 
about [potential] achievable successes” 
P15:   “important that there are enough people in the organization […] that can maintain the 
collective memory”
P12:   “quick-wins […] is a way for making people interested […], it is a method for reaching 
involvement”
P17:   “through quick-wins show a number of results on a short term […] then it is our 
experience that it leads to a follow-up”
P7:  “define some quick-wins in the master plan”
Strategic use of information 
P12:   “providing information is often where it starts and then confronting the right, depending 
on their influence, players (decision makers) with this information”
P34:  “believe A to B and then D”
P28:   “not work via C: via B formulating challenge well towards motivation” and “finding 
solution to financial problems”
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P3:   “acceleration in never through B, regardless of how necessary it is, motivation 
decreases”
P19:  “first information for motivating is necessary”
P30:   “I am am sure” you can influence the amount of information in such a way that it 
influences motivation and leads to stage D“
P30:   “acknowledging and effectively presenting the problem creates motivation and lead to 
allocation of means”
P9:  “basic information is necessary”
P38:  “outcome of quality scans are used to “create time-pressure and maintain motivation” 
P29:  “large firms do not want bad publicity: use this for motivating e.g. sustainability”
P7:   “from information towards motivation”, “what is relevant information for you, is not 
necessarily so for me”
P1:   “enough information, but especially good information”, “consider which information for 
firms”
P3:   regarding information for local inhabitants “explain problems and approach in general 
terms”
P23:  “clarify importance then you have commitment”
P10:   “underpin urgency of need to accelerate, what can be won regarding property value 
and employment”
P14:  “first calculate, using where power is situated as starting point”
P1:  “when firms see advantages, they will join” the initiative
P7:  “firms need to see feasibility. This must be underpinned”
P17:   “as local authorities we acknowledged that we needed to start [from the perspective of] 
the firms”
P14:  “must be an advantage for firm, otherwise process will not work”
P18:  “calculating [costs and benefits] in advance smart
P33:   “make a good integral analysis including all costs and benefits for society as an eye-
opener” 
P1:  “real estate agents invited for calculating increased property value”
P25:  “real estate agents invited to tell about industrial site”
P29:  “everything has a price”
P23:   “calculating and drawing”, “parallel to involve actors in process”, “towards increasing 
accuracy”
P23:   “know the reasons for financial short-comings in projects” such as “calculating costs for 
buying land based on expropriation”
P20:  “if nothing happens, say that co-funding will stop” 
P20:  “trigger firms through other games: not only restructuring” 
P18:  “marketing increasingly important: promote site, image (brand) often not well used”
P1:  on internal actors: “if you do not join, we will continue” anyway
P7:   regarding involvement of internal actors local authorities “better overloading with 
information” 
P39:   “first, check what can be done on own area and are there opportunities for transfer of 
land”
P36:   sometimes rumours of plans can have effect such as story that “brothel is to be situated 
at site”, “immediately led to creating association of firms”  
P33:   creating a common enemy e.g. through sending bad plan to firms: motivates 
participation in process”
P22:  “happening from the outside, e.g. getting a joint enemy”
P34:  “coupling significant co-funding opportunities to conditions”
P19:  “start working, stakeholders hear that, do not actively contact them”
P3: “ opposite happened, they come to you”, “also inhabitants of neighbourhoods”  
P9:  “use information for seducing firms”
P27:  “initially keep information within the organization of the local authorities”
P31:   “local authorities are first studying whether they are going to restructure site, and 
whether they have sufficient financial means etc. This information is first kept within a 
limited group”
P27:   in other case “politicians suggested to allow NIMBY-function on site, and then firms 
were motivated […] and was the move from C to D”
P17:   a similar approach “turned out to be a very good means” that resulted in an increase of 
firms that joined the local association of firms
P26:   survey among firms about bottlenecks leading to “kind of ranking-list and no local 
authorities want their industrial site to score the lowest”, this approach to using specific 
part of information for influencing motivation “is a clear strategy”
Interaction & Mutual influence
P14:   “A to C to D is a good approach. Too much information decreases attention. Motivation 
why to act not found.” 
P19:   “back from C to A happens in practice, everybody is often happy during the planning 
phase being free of obligations, but when it gets concrete they leave the process”
P22:  “A to C without (extra) information is about exchange of knowledge”
P35:   “how you get from A to C without going through B is something you learn from 
experience”
P33:  we are doing it with respect, but we are using influence”
P19:  “how you communicate is important”
P1:  “how do you reach the entrepreneur?”
P23:  “organizing session coupled to informal gathering of entrepreneurs”
P39:  telling entrepreneurs “do not forget to use informal communication”
P7:  “certain fear for the unknown, feeling safe among fellow entrepreneurs” 
P29:  “important to really know” the entrepreneurs 
P39:  “not speaking each others’ language [PA and firms]
P24:  “responsible politicians close to entrepreneurs: much contact”
P29:  “entrepreneurs on site believe they know each, but that is not so” 
P20:  “keep on talking is important for motivation”
P2:  “entrepreneurs mutually influencing each other” regarding performance
P7:   “much interaction, commitment is important”, “open and clear communication on 
objectives”
P1:   about the use of ‘ambassadors’: “entrepreneurs do not want to write letters, they prefer 
to approach people directly”, therefore ambassadors “important for success”
P1:  “tell them: write a letter” 
P1:   “communication with firms is difficult, do not read Newsletters, are not coming to 
gatherings”, “you need to visit them personally”
P39:  “local authorities should visit firms, and not other way round”
P7:   “you just have to hope that information is interpreted in the same way” by different 
actors
P3:  “continuously communicating with firms about dynamics”
P19:   “open discussion about all options. In practice only plan A and B are communicated. 
Then comes plan C, which make other actors feel cheated”
P7: “do not use threatening (e.g. conformity to laws and regulations) as an instrument”
P39:  “entrepreneurs do not forget that, and a later stage you face the consequences”
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P15:   “much about listening to the users of the site: what are your problems and do you have 
ideas about how they can be addressed”
P17:   “deliberately facilitated that the most important of the entrepreneurs were brought into 
contact with the responsible politicians” 
P4:  “it is the work of human beings and about cooperation”
P26:   if a process gets stuck “talks with managers of local authorities to get process moving”
P32:   it is important to “not so much telling [things], but especially listen to what they want 
and what their interests are, and together explore what you want, what I want and 
where can we find common grounds”
P27:   “entrepreneurs can also appeal to each other’s regarding addressing problems on the 
site
P32:  “regular meetings […] to inform each other about progress”
P15:   “as local authorities formally informing about this is what we have done, or are going to 
do, with the money”
P12:  regarding trust “meet each other and get to know each other is very important”
P4:  “the informal is an important additional perspective”
P12:  “do not stay behind your office desk, but visit other actors”
P13:  “makes completely different impression if a civil servant visits something organised by 
firms in the evening”
Fair shares & Trust 
P32:   “You can present a lot of information, but that does not necessarily mean that motivation 
increases. Knowing more does not mean that they will join you in something that only is 
in your interest”
P31:  “If there is no trust between the actors, then there will be no solution”
P34:   “apply fair shares (in Dutch: “voor wat hoort wat”) principle for accelerating” process, 
“seducing firms to invest in private area, and comparable in public area”  
P18:  “authorities too high ambitions is OK, but firms have to act too” 
P29:   “you want this, but we also want something: first firms want something, then own 
wishes [of local authorities]”
P29:   “Fair shares? (in Dutch: “voor wat hoort wat”) “yes, firms are also afraid that rest of 
firms [on site] not will co-invest”
P20:   “to get co-funding [from province] for public areas, quality scan must be performed” 
first
P39:  “why is there so much distrust from firms?”
P20:  “trust from both sides, I believe in this development”
P15:   “entrepreneurs involved in steering group of study [into site problems and solutions] 
and there trust was built”
P15:   “in other case no trust, because some players had large own interests and pursued 
those”
P1:   “when there is trust towards letter of intent”, “signals trust and satisfaction”
P31:  “Letter of Intent substantiates motivation”
P21:   “e.g. use Letter of Intent. This is formally sufficient for a next step, but it is not ideal” 
[in all situations]. 
P29:  “province and local authorities must be viewed by firms as serious”
P7:   when “association of firms acknowledges that local authorities mean what they say 
then they are taken seriously”
P1:   “local authorities are now acting, when entrepreneurs saw this then they were joining, 
turned out to work” 
P23:   “when firms notice that local authorities are taking initiative and understand that 
something really is going to happen then they want to talk”
P3:   “if firms see that something is happening [at the local authorities] then this leads to 
motivation” 
P36:   on the other hand “if firms believe [results] will be achieved anyway, then they will not 
come” to join the process
P23:   “firms did not believe that it was the start of a process”, “thought it was a fake-process 
and that plan [of local authorities] was already made”, “so much distrust that first must 
be addressed”, “A-D then very difficult”, “first to C, then to B and then D” 
P36:  support later for exactly same route 
P39:   firms “just wait and see what the local authorities do”, investments in site improvement 
affect value of land and leads to higher local taxes, so firms say “local authorities, you 
pay, because you profit”
P39:  at the beginning of the process “authorities are not exactly trusted”
P33:   “seduction yes, but local authorities also have to do the tasks they are responsible for”
P34:   “ask firms to take their own responsibilities. Local authorities and firms moving 
together”
P33:   “you are hoping for firms to act, but that does not have to happen. Create joint 
objectives: agreements” 
P14:   “making site management (in Dutch: “beheer”) a co-responsibility of firms is an 
important condition for [being able to] accelerate process” 
P9:  applied the approach that “only if firms do so and so, then local authorities invest”
P35:  as local authorities “show that you are doing something” 
P9:   “if local authorities are not willing to invest, then the regional development agency will 
not invest either. This creates clarity”
P19:   “trust is linked to satisfaction. Entrepreneurs [in specific case] have insufficient trust 
despite agreement with local authorities. Process manager builds trust”
P35:  “only agreements on paper is insufficient”
P19:  “let [actors] sign, that shows [whether there is trust] 
P23: 2: “if there is insufficient trust, then the process stops”
P27:   “entrepreneurs are sometimes exaggerating in telling that it all is the fault of the local 
authorities”
P17:   “if there is no realistic chance that local authorities will invest in the future, then I 
believe that firms in general will quit the process”
P31:   telling representatives of firms that “if you improve this [i.e. problems on site] then the 
local authorities are willing to implement certain actions too”
P15:  “investing in trust: doing what you have promised and show progress”
P13:  “the essence is whether people trust each other”
P27:  “trust is damaged through local elections [and change to politicians]” 
Flexibility & Adaptation
P30:  work a bit “iterative and stepwise”
P9:   “There is not always a recognizable clear line (in Dutch: “rode draad”) in restructuring”
P7:  “all strategies applied: A via B, C or directly to D”
P14:  “facilitate the choice process for site developments”
P39:  “think strategically” about what you can achieve”
P23:  “timing is important”
P5:  “may be everything cannot be done, and may be you have to be less ambitious”
P29:  “it is a puzzle”
P18:  “different challenges need different approaches”
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P18:  “split challenge into small parts, instead of comprehensive approach” 
P8:  same remark later
P18:  “ agreements on sufficiently high level of abstraction… room for manoeuvring and 
choices” 
P18:  “link to e.g. restructuring of neighbourhoods” 
P22:   “know how to place the topic of restructuring within a broader context and involving 
other (internal) actors”
P1:  available “co-funding linked to specific year: not very realistic”
P33:   “sometimes conditions linked to provincial co-funding present bottlenecks: local 
authorities will e.g. improve street, but has to apply for funding for project”
P1:  stayed too long on a detailed level, should have being thinking on a structural level” 
P39:  “consultancy firms using same approach everywhere”
P7:   “try to score wherever possible, not forgetting the main objective of a well restructured 
site”, “adapting strategies according to what is considered important at that moment 
in time: change according to phase” 
P24:  “if this is not possible, then we change the direction”
P23:  “dare to change strategy, also regarding phases”, “use opportunities”
P33:   regarding willingness of Council to invest: “you can keep on informing, but if they are 
unwilling”
P11:  “be patient and wait” for the right opportunity
P39:  “take time for sparring”
P7:  covenants implies “room for adaptation, and that is necessary”
P34:  “important to have mandate: it provides room for manoeuvring”
P10:   “during Initiative too much focus on sequence of activities”, “are responsible politicians 
willing to move process steps forward in time”
P33:  “cannot do everything at the same time, sequence determined”
P28:  “start bottom-up, and not based on availability provincial funding”
P14:  “facilitate entrepreneur” in addressing “bottlenecks regarding Zoning plan or permits” 
P34:   “too rigid sticking to maintaining function as industrial site”, transition “no problem 
if new sites are developed”, “this linking should be made stronger, especially now”, 
“compensation policy”, “much can be reached through mixing functions”
P22:   ”take into account regional differences, in Randstad this [i.e. transition] is financially 
feasible, not in Limburg”
P14:   “investments of local authorities in green and park management etc. can be coupled 
to value in m2 and local taxes (OZB), suggested to translate future [effects of] higher 
local taxes (in Dutch: OZB) to current situation”
P10:   “reversing: management phase (in Dutch: “beheer”) more focused on what is needed, 
and not on budget”
P22:  be flexible: include the not-expected” 
P28:   regarding the role of the province: “agreement on project in the past and it has to 
proceed against all current rules”  
P10:   “avoid restructuring because it is necessary, and do it because it can lead to good 
things: brings more energy / impulse for accelerating”  
P25:  “seize the moments: build opportunity on opportunity” 
P3:   “property developers see opportunities, but it is now difficult for owners to invest. This 
leads to delays. Process must not stop: change phases and priorities”
P19:  “sometimes decision to really stop”
P3:  “better to continue talking, and temporize”
P3:   “which part of maintenance budgets for e.g. green or sewage can be allocated to 
industrial site”
P26:  “can maintenance budgets be moved forward in time”
P25:   “there are both budgets for investments and maintenance. Budgets for investments 
can also be applied for firms. Integrate systems for quality control and investments 
[and] label budgets”
P37:  “maintenance budgets can also be allocated to streets” 
P3:  “think about temporary solutions”
P35:  “crux is to find alternatives, if something fails to happen”
P25:   “even better is to have an alternative second best option ready if e.g. the best option 
turns out to be financially infeasible” 
P12:  “everybody is to some extent re-inventing the wheel”
P4:   “It is important to know what you according to theory should need, but you should not 
be afraid deviating from theory” regarding choice for actors to involve
P27:   “it is always said that the local authorities have insufficient money. No, it is just a 
question of priorities” 
P26:   if something does not work “then it is may be not yet time to act. May be you can just 
wait ten years and then the [right] moment may be there”
P13:   “it does not have to be the ability to get a firm relocated, but lack of ability of local 
authorities to indicate where a firm can migrate to”
P12:  “dare to make political changes based on [an analysis of] effects on the society”
P1:   “let problem get worse, when it is big enough you will immediately have political 
support”
Question 3: What is satisfactory?
Experience and intuition
P29:  Local authorities “do not understand what entrepreneur wants”
P20:   “ultimately it’s about intuition” regarding how far you should go in influencing non-
cooperative firms
P23:  “feeling what goes on in the room” regarding meetings with firms 
P39:   “you will know if there is insufficient motivation, if you have to make a lot of effort (in 
Dutch the expression used was: “sleuren en trekken”)
P31:   when do you know whether something is unsatisfactory “is feeling, experience, it is 
seeing people looking with facial expressions telling you that regardless [what happens] 
they will not cooperate with you”
Indicators 
P32:   “may be you could get to know what satisfactory is, if you monitored, and compared, 
several projects on information and degree of satisfaction”
P12:   “when do we have to address something, and when not: in advance we are insufficiently 
defining what is satisfactory, and if we can achieve it”
P27:   “these are so complex investments and area developments that you can actually not 
express anything in satisfactory or unsatisfactory”
P30:  not seeing what really goes on (in Dutch: “wat er leeft”) on the site”
P17:   “we sometimes believe we know [what can and needs to be done] as local authorities, 
but we do miss things”
P3:  “actually you should be assessed based on satisfaction: firms and local authorities”
P21:  “do you ask actors enough whether they are satisfied?”
P35:  ”do we ask everybody if they are satisfied”
P21:  “include in surveys on satisfaction”
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P19:   “if you conclude that stakeholders are satisfied …P30: ”then you have had a good 
process” 
P25:  “important to know all interests”
P3:  “restructuring is never completed”
P21:  “as Park management it is a process”
P9:  “9 out of 10 local authorities do not know which plans firms have”
P27:  “what their investment decisions, and their plans”
(P3:  “continuously communicating with firms about dynamics”) 
P7:  “are actors necessary for success”
P39:  “if firms invest, then successful”, “multiplier effect”
P23:   “local authorities can be very satisfied with process, but firms very unsatisfied with 
results”
P10:  “know your entrepreneurs”
P29:  Firms: “plans for expansions, stopping, investments etc”
P28:  “know what they [firms] are doing”
P14:   the Dutch “Cadastre, Land Registry and Mapping Agency can provide insight into firm 
profiles and property transactions”
P10:   “often witnessed that what can be won in economy and employment is insufficiently 
visualised”
P34:  “Employment is important for convincing Council”
P14:   “where are they to invest”, “keeping an eye on everything such as firms that suddenly 
change strategy”
P22:  “knowing which development entrepreneurs desire”
P29:  “do only invest if feasible”
P28:   “know which entrepreneurs who are willing to invest: not being willing to do so can 
have a very good reason”, “select based on willingness to invest”
P36:  “usually firms have conditions linked to their willingness to invest” 
P29:  “invest [in implementation of specific measures] if firms take the initiative”
P8:  “let firms choose what to do”
P8:  “you can calculate everything, but if I will not sell: then stop”
P36:  “some firms really do not want [to move], in that case recommended to do nothing”
P31:  “if something does not work then [tell that] we are temporarily stopping”
P22:   “let’s face it, you are not motivated, may be you join in two years” regarding local 
authorities in regional approaches
P29:   Some firms really have no possibilities for paying more, but are willing” to participate 
in process 
P20:  “local authorities present results of scan to firms”
P8:   “local authorities develop site design. Firms satisfied, because they know what is 
allowed and not allowed”
P18:  firms need to “wake up and see the real value” of their property
P8:  “letter of intent, each time an agreement, not keeping it completely open”
P18:  “how to know who ‘Mr. right’ is? Only results count”
P7:  “development in property value (in Dutch: OZB) is difficult to calculate”
P7:   “number of request for building permit compared with streets where no has been done”
P1:  “continuously checking feasibility”
P14:  “local authorities do not know where money can be found”
P33:   “restructuring performed as project. A year after completion decay starts again. Site 
management (in Dutch: “beheer”) and account-management are important. When are 
you formulating a new project. Monitor the development” 
P14:   “always behind reality”, “relocation of firms can [not earlier than] when new sites are 
available”
P34:   “clear constraints and civil servants and politicians accountable”, “monitoring 
constraints”
P33:   “somebody is needed that oversees whole site and addresses smaller parts within this 
whole”
P33:   “cyclic: site management (in Dutch: “beheer”) not well taken care of, and problems 
recurring”
P33:   “does not like being accountable for restructuring in ha. (i.e.: based on quantitative 
basis). Indicators / estimates for costs restructuring per ha. do not work”
P28:   “if the best choice challenge is not known, then it goes wrong there and e.g. solution 
does not fit”
P14:  “industrial site interesting [for redevelopment] when value low enough”
P22:  “Look at functionality, and measure satisfaction”
P19:   “role of account manager of local authorities is to anticipate problems” regarding firms 
that may have plans for relocating
P35:  “knowing the local dynamics”
P27:   “what is the financial-economic importance of a site, who are the large employers, and 
who works there”
P27:   “you can do something with investments in buildings, local taxes (in Dutch: OZB) 
increases, what firms are investing, […] and decrease in non-used buildings”, “ a firm 
that invests in its building, surroundings or employees, has probably confidence in 
them”
P15:  “an indicator is how many people attend events”
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Appendix X 
A brief reflection on trustworthiness 
and validity  
An important question regarding the use of focus groups and the thematic analysis within this 
study is how the chosen approach has affected the quality of the outcomes. How trustworthy 
are the outcomes, where the essence of trustworthiness is that the “[…] research findings 
of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of […]” (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985, p. 290). This is about whether the outcomes are correct and found credible (Maxwell, 
2005). However, “[…] there is no specific litmus test we can administer that will apply a 
stamp of approval on any given qualitative research project […]” (Nagy Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2010, p. 48). 
Scholars have quite different, and partly conflicting, ideas about how trustworthiness can 
be reached and judged. There is agreement about the need to get to findings that come as 
close as possible to reality (although the ideas about what such a ‘reality’ actually is, differ). 
It is equally clear that there should be a traceable trail of evidence that makes it possible for 
other researchers to make their own analyses and interpretations of raw data, and to draw 
their own conclusions. 
There are different ways of improving the probability that the results are valid (= correct / 
accurate). One way, applied here, is to focus on the threats to validity (Maxwell, 2005). Then 
“[…] validity is ascertained by examining the sources of invalidity […]” (Kvale, 2007, p.123). 
What are these threats to validity? Here we look at researcher ‘bias’; completeness, relative 
importance and the use of triangulation; researcher reactivity; trail of evidence. 
Researcher bias
Researcher bias is in particular a tendency to select data that fit the researcher’s theory and 
that “stand out” to the researcher (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108, referring to Miles and Huberman, 
1994 and Schweder, 1980). Within this study it could have influenced how the themes, and 
sub-themes, were identified, and how the ‘stories’ and accompanying tables were composed. 
Selecting the text segments is open to researcher bias. So is identifying the themes. The 
themes were not determined in advance, but identified by reading the transcript of the first 
session and looking for patterns. This was an attempt to prevent researcher bias. However, 
although the transcript was read ‘open-minded’, the results are undoubtedly influenced by 
the researcher’s experience with research and practice in restructuring. Still, this influence 
seems to have been quite small, because several themes were new to the researcher. They 
did indeed ‘emerge’ as recognizable patterns based on recurrent topics. Two examples are 
“fair shares” and “expectations”. 
Having selected the themes, all transcripts were analysed to identify the text segments 
(summaries) that belonged to specific themes, and this again is open to researcher bias. 
The next step was to present the results in such a way that the meaning comes across to the 
reader. The purpose was to find answers to open questions, and it was necessary to make the 
complexity manageable. The choice for a ‘story’ accompanied by small tables necessitated a 
second ‘round’ of analysis for each theme, which again is open to researcher bias. 
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Completeness, ‘salience’, and data triangulation 
Two different approaches to data triangulation were used: participants within one session 
can verify or falsify each other’s ideas, and data can be compared from the different physical 
locations (involving different participants). 
Were five sessions sufficient for achieving information saturation? Did the fifth session offer 
new information, and was information increasingly being repeated? The answer is that the 
amount of new information from each additional session did in fact decline, and information 
was indeed increasingly repeated. Already after the first session, information saturation 
regarding main themes was reached, and the last sessions served primarily to underpin and 
enrich earlier observations. 
The frequency of arguments could have been analysed statistically to measure support for 
an idea. This was not done here. For it became clear that the repeated statements provide 
different insights into the meaning and salience of themes. Individual participants can for 
example repeat something as a way to stress or defend their own arguments or ideas related 
to a specific topic, or they can use the same argument at different times related to different 
topics. It was not possible to distinguish between the importance of single remarks (i.e. 
mentioned only once) and repeated remarks.   
Researcher reactivity
Another threat to validity is researcher reactivity, which refers to the effects of the setting or 
the individuals on those interviewed (Maxwell, 2005; Patton, 2002). Interviewees may react 
to the interviewer, for example by acting in ways that make them seem more important. 
They may even stage events for the benefit of the researcher. In this case, the researcher’s 
previous knowledge of, and interest in, the topic studied, was a real threat to validity. If the 
researcher was to function at the same time as a moderator and researcher, he could very 
well influence the discussion. It is for this reason that the researcher chose a ‘detached’ 
role, which was limited to a short presentation of the model, making notes and observing 
during each session. An indication that the effect of reactivity was probably small is that the 
participants after a (very) short period at the beginning of a session seemed to completely 
‘forget’ the presence of the researcher, being focused solely on the interaction with the 
moderator and the other session participants. 
Reliability and the trail of evidence
The final aspect of trustworthiness is reliability. Babbie defines reliability as “[…] that quality of 
measurement method that suggests that the same data would have been collected each time 
in repeated observations of the same phenomenon […]” (Babbie, 2010, p.150). Reliability is 
accordingly both about the quality of the measurement method and about the data obtained. 
The first issue is then the quality of the method. To ensure that other researchers should 
be able to repeat the Focus group sessions, the method as well as all steps in the research 
process have been described in detail: a trail of evidence has been established. 
Would the same data have been collected by others when using this method? There are two 
indications that they would. First, the total group of participants represents a wide range 
of organizations, perspectives and expertise on restructuring practice, which suggests 
that repeating the sessions with the same participants, or even different sets of equally 
experienced practitioners, would provide the same information richness. Second, five 
sessions was sufficient for achieving information saturation, and the range of main topics 
discussed within all five sessions did not change. 
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